













This thesis has been submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for a postgraduate degree 
(e.g. PhD, MPhil, DClinPsychol) at the University of Edinburgh. Please note the following 
terms and conditions of use: 
 
This work is protected by copyright and other intellectual property rights, which are 
retained by the thesis author, unless otherwise stated. 
A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without 
prior permission or charge. 
This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining 
permission in writing from the author. 
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or 
medium without the formal permission of the author. 
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, 









The International Law of Climate 
Change and Accountability 
 









Doctor of Philosophy 
 
The University of Edinburgh 
























“[A] time may come (…) when the need for an effective  
international law is more obvious to more politicians in more  
nations than it is now. Climate change, for example,  
may provoke that shift in opinion. It would be a shame 
 if lawyers and philosophers had not improved 
 the jurisprudential discussion of international law  
before that day arrived.”1 
                                                 
1 Dworkin, 2013, 15. 
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In the past few decades, accountability has become a key concept to assess the 
role and place of a wide range of trasnational institutions. Such trend can be partially 
explained by the widespread sense of unaccountability that permeates the legal realm 
beyond the state. 
The aim of this thesis is to investigate three particular institutional actors of 
the Climate Change Regime: the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 
the Compliance Committee of the Kyoto Protocol (CCKP), and the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM). This investigation is carried out through the 
descriptive and critical lenses of accountability. It resorts to the Global Administrative 
Law (GAL) project in order to pursue that task. 
Along the way, the thesis asks four interrelated research questions. The first is 
conceptual: what is accountability? The second is an abstract normative question: 
what is regarded as a desirable accountability relationship at the national and the 
global level? The third is purely descriptive: how accountable are the three 
institutions? The fourth, finally, is a contextualised normative question: how 
appropriate are their three accountability arrangements? The two former questions are 
instrumental and ancillary to the two latter. That is to say, they respectively provide 
the analytical and evaluative frameworks on the basis of which a concrete description 
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“Lawyers should not cede the pursuit of  
good governance, enhanced accountability, 
 or improved transparency to the politicians.”2 
 
The new journey of an old concept 
 
Accountability-talk is omnipresent in contemporary law and politics.3 In spite 
of its rather high currency, though, accountability does not partake in the select group 
of first-order political ideals: democracy, human rights, constitutionalism and rule of 
law have all been historically uttered in much more vocal tones and still remain at the 
forefront of public demands for legitimate authority.4 Accountability, in turn, has 
stayed at the backdoor of our legal or political vocabulary and operates at a lower 
waveband. It has not exactly been an incendiary enough flag to lead people to the 
streets, but it still incites reformist initiatives. It somewhat assists and qualifies each 
of those stand-alone ideals to pursue their respective ends.5 Rather than radiating a 
comprehensive legal or political vision, accountability supplies a power-constraining 
toolbox that allows for a variety of permutations. Each permutation will hinge on the 
role, place and weight of the entity or actor to be held accountable. 
This ability to serve various masters makes accountability all the more 
intriguing and chameleonic. To hold a powerful individual, a collectivity or an 
institution accountable is generally presumed to be a good thing. Accountability is 
announced, in other words, as a praiseworthy goal to be pursued by law and politics 
no matter where it takes place, be it locally or regionally, nationally or internationally. 
It would protect the account-holder and, in several ways, perhaps counter-intuitively, 
                                                 
2 Alvarez, 2006, 34. 
3 The literature on accountability is manifold. It ranges from political science to public administration, 
from administrative law to international law and international relations. A comprehensive sample of 
this extensive literature will come up along the dissertation. For an overview, see Mulgan (2003). As 
Mulgan himself has put it: “‘Accountability’ and ‘accountable’ are buzzwords of our era.” (2003, 1) Or 
Rubenstein: “accountability is often treated as a buzzword that is good in and of itself”. (2007, 620) 
4 Chapters 1 and 2 will address the ideological and institutional environments in which accountability 
discourses emerge. 
5 This “assistance” to more salient political ideals is already implied, for example, by the “French 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen” (1789), article 15: “Society has the right to require of 
every public agent an account of his administration.” (“La société a le droit de demander compte à tout 
agent public de son administration.”) 
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it may benefit the accountee as well. It may even rise above (or sit below) the public 
domain and permeate other sorts of power relation that cut across many spheres of 
social life, as we shall see. 
This rather commonplace story, though, tells very little about the concrete 
configurations of accountability, the specific values and ends, if any, it is supposed to 
attain, let alone the exact settings in which it should apply or the functions it should 
fulfil. That resounding catchword, as it turns out, offers neither a straightforward 
definition nor a clear portrait of its own potential institutional translations. Therefore, 
it would be methodologically doubtful, if not futile, to start off any investigation 
about the accountability of specific international institutions of the Climate Change 
Regime without, first, cleaning up the haphazard rhetoric and, then, openly 
constructing a firmer conceptual foundation.6 
The term is pregnant with conceptual meanings, rhetorical usages and 
ambivalent connotations, and has occasionally been uttered in a sloppy way as a 
“remedial slogan”.7 It turns out, quite often, to be a vacuous container that carries 
whatever desirable institutional, procedural or personal qualities a powerful agent 
should possess. The reliability of the concept, in short, is “threatened by its 
popularity”.8 All one can long for, thus, is to avoid the “free ride on the evocative 
powers”9 of such a cunning word. 
In the last few decades, we have witnessed a remarkable increase of calls for 
more accountability in the global arena. These calls were triggered by the perceived 
“challenge of unaccountability” that pervades the legal environment beyond the 
state.10 Amid widespread institutional transformation and accretion, international law 
is being called upon to rethink its justificatory foundation. In such reflective exercise, 
accountability comes about as a chief category. The shift of the concept to the 
                                                 
6 See Stewart (2008), Kingsbury and Stewart (2008) and Mashaw (2006). The concern with clarity of 
this “appealing but elusive concept” (Bovens, 2007, 467) is overwhelmingly spread over the literature 
on accountability. Schedler echoes it: “accountability represents an underexplored concept whose 
meaning remains evasive, whose boundaries are fuzzy, and whose internal structure is confusing.” 
(1999, 13) That elusiveness, for example, is what made Dubnick (2002) draw the distinction between 
“accountability-the-word”, with all its rhetorical overtones, and “accountability-the-concept”. 
7 Stewart, 2008, 3 
8 Dubnick, 2002, 1. 
9 Bovens, 2010, 949 
10 Najam and Halle remark that “the challenge of unaccountability – and selective or partial 
accountability – is widespread in the international system”. They seek to devise the “few immediate 
steps that can begin recalibrating the Global Environmental Governance system towards a culture of 
accountability” (2010, 2) 
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transnational sphere, transcending the traditional domicile of domestic democratic 
politics, has materialised in a series of episodes of pressure to improve the 
accountability of most institutions of global governance.  
Let me give two revealing examples of this current trend: one involves the 
core set of international institutions related to economic and financial policies; the 
other indicates how some non-governmental international organisations have been 
advocating the remodelling of the institutional status quo by way of accountability-
enhancing measures. 
The alleged accountability deficit of international financial institutions, such 
as the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), has been added 
to the global agenda for more than 30 years. There are two main reasons for the 
widespread concern it has generated. First, member states are unevenly represented in 
the decision-making bodies of these institutions – the Boards of Directors. Only eight 
member-states are able to indicate their own Executive Director to the Board.11 The 
remaining 181 states, organised in groups, can elect only a limited set of posts and 
hence complain against the different level of influence they can exercise on the 
decision-making.12  
The second reason is that the scope of the activities of international financial 
institutions has expanded over the years. These institutions lend money for 
developmental purposes to lower and middle-income countries. The conditions for the 
approval of such loans have progressively escalated and require borrowing countries 
to adjust all sorts of internal policies (from economic regulation to judicial structures) 
in the name of good governance principles set up by the financial institutions. As a 
result, international financial institutions have a high leverage of interference with 
domestic actors without being, themselves, subject to the conventional web of 
accountability arrangements that domestic actors face.13 
                                                 
11 They are the five largest shareholders (Germany, UK, US, France, and Japan) together with Russian 
Federation, China and Saudi Arabia. See World Bank’s website (Boards of Directors) and Woods, 
2001, 85. 
12 Woods spots the problem: “This means that most national governments have only the weakest link to 
the formal deliberations and decision-making processes of the institutions.” (2001, 85) 
13 As Bradlow claimed: “The net effect was that, de facto, the IFIs became important participants in the 
policy-making process of their member states.” (2004-2005, 407) Woods goes the same way: “Both 
institutions are now engaging governments in negotiations which cover virtually all issues in economic 
policy-making – and beyond, with ‘good governance’ extending into areas such as the rule of law, 
judicial reform, corporate governance and so forth. This new, wide-ranging domain of advice and 
conditionality directly affects a broader swathe of policies, people, groups and organizations within 
countries.” (2001, 89)  
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In the face of pressure, some measures were taken to improve the 
accountability of these institutions.14 One of the most commented is the creation, in 
1993, of the independent three-member Inspection Panel to probe the compliance of 
the World Bank with its internal policies and procedures.15 Such panel is competent to 
receive requests for inspection by parties whose interests or rights have been or are 
likely to be affected by a project financed by the WB.16 It came to be praised, thus, for 
giving voice to citizens of member-states. Moreover, both organisations have focused 
on increasing its level of transparency.17 The WB, for example, has set up a “Policy 
on Access to Information”. Its rationale is entirely geared to an accountability 
discourse. Interestingly, the policy creates the right to appeal to whoever is denied 
access to information by the Bank.18 
Created in 1995 as a substitute for the General Agreement on Trade and Tariff 
(GATT), the World Trade Organisation (WTO) has been repeatedly attacked on the 
accountability front. Behind the attacks is the fact that the international regulation on 
trade has gradually been converted from an agreement about the reduction of tariffs to 
a comprehensive system of rules that govern all sort of trade-related issues, in which 
typical domestic policies, such as food safety and agricultural subsidies, are also 
included.19 Countries cannot just pick and choose to which agreement they want to 
commit themselves. It is rather on a ‘take it or leave it’ basis.20 
Apart from being regarded as the source of intrusion on domestic 
arrangements by international law, the WTO has also given rise to a different, yet 
related, accountability-concern: the unequal power that developing countries have in 
comparison to developed ones to disproportionately influence decisions. Although the 
WTO formally adopts the rule of ‘one state, one vote’, the decisions, in reality, have 
allegedly been more dictated by the interests of developed countries. As Woods and 
Narlikar submitted, developed countries are the “decision-makers”, whereas the rest 
                                                 
14 Very little has been done to tackle the inequitable voting structure and composition of the Executive 
Board. See One World Trust, 2008, 17.  
15 The World Bank Inspection Panel was created by two Resolutions: Res. 93-10, from the 
International Bank for Reconstruction, and Res. 93-6, from the International Development Association. 
16 Resolutions 93-10 and 93-6, article 12.  
17 Woods, 2001, 90.  
18 World Bank, 2010, Policy on Access to Information, paragraphs 1 and 36. 
19 Esty, 2002, 12. Woods and Narlikar, 2001, 571.  
20 Woods and Narlikar contend: “the WTO was created on an all-or-nothing basis whereby countries 
had to commit to full membership in a “single undertaking”, binding themselves to a rule-based-
system” (2001, 570) 
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of the countries are the “decision-takers”.21 The already old story of accountability 
deficit, again, comes forth. 
Similar examples abound. Let us see how three active organisations have 
approached the question. The first is the International Law Association (ILA). In 
1996, it started to “consider what measures (legal, administrative or otherwise) should 
be adopted to ensure the accountability of public international organisations”.22 The 
final report on the matter presented an extensive list of recommended rules and 
practices (RRPs), which, if adopted, should arguably render the operation of these 
international organisations more effective.23 Just as an example, the first of its RRPs 
addresses the importance of implementing the principle of good governance, which, 
among other measures, includes (i) turning the decision-making process more 
transparent, (ii) allowing for better forms of participation and access to information, 
and (iii) providing regular report and evaluation of its activities.24 Accountability, as 
conceived by the ILA, is a means towards effectiveness. 
The second example is the One World Trust, an independent think tank that 
has published several reports on the accountability of global governance. The reports 
intend to gauge the accountability of three global actors – international organisations, 
non-governmental organisations, and global corporations – so as to “to contribute to 
wider understanding and commitment to common principles of accountability”.25 As 
the report argues, accountability is an important device to control the decisions taken 
by these actors, which, as a matter of fact, impact increasingly upon peoples’ lives.26 
The reports conceptualise accountability as “the process through which an 
organisation sets a commitment to respond to and balance the needs of its diverse 
stakeholders in its decision making processes and activities, and delivers against this 
commitment.”27 Based on such concept, the accountability of global organisations is 
appraised in accordance with four dimensions: transparency, participation, 
evaluations and complaints handling. Having assessed ninety institutions over the 
years, the reports gather the findings about cross sector accountability standards. On 
                                                 
21 Woods and Narlikar, 2001, 573. Woods and Narlikar list the US, the European Union, Japan, and 
Canada as the most powerful countries within the organisation.   
22 ILA, 2004, 4. 
23 ILA, 2004, 6. 
24 ILA, 2004, 8-12. 
25 One World Trust, 2008, 20. 
26 One World Trust, 2006, 11. 
27 One World Trust, 2008, 11. 
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average, international organisations score highest in transparency and evaluation, 
whereas non-governmental organisations have higher marks in participation. Global 
corporations do not have a constant result in the assessment, but, usually, have a 
better performance when it comes to the handling of complaints.28 
Thirdly, the Transparency International, an organisation committed to the 
cause of combating corruption internationally, also echoes the same concern. It 
recently drafted, for instance, a report that diagnoses the ways in which FIFA’s 
reputation can be enhanced and its internal corruption practices avoided. The report, 
written by Schenk, couches its recommendations of institutional improvement in the 
language of accountability and transparency, translated through a series of principles 
of anti-bribery, process and structure.29 
These seem like a set of random examples. We could surely go much further 
in collecting other instances of the same accountability call, but that would be 
redundant. At any rate, these cases follow a general pattern that is increasingly present 
in international institutional-building nowadays. Accountability discourse resonates 
across the board. It seems to be, at least at the symbolic level, and however it gets 
translated into practice, the minimum common denominator that international 
institutions need to have. Apart from a resounding symbol, though, accountability is 
also a heuristic device, a lens that tells useful things about the international 
institutions I will investigate. It is not, to be sure, an unfamiliar lens. However, it has 
not yet been deployed to depict and contrast the major actors of the international 
Climate Change Regime, as I intend to do. 
Lawyers, sometimes, have an uneasy attitude towards this “vague and 
suspiciously political term”,30 as Alvarez referred to accountability. Alvarez has 
obviously not meant that lawyers are unconcerned about the improvement of 
international institutions. Rather, he suggested that they are more inclined to conceive 
of and couch such improvement in a language that resonates more closely with the 
                                                 
28 One World Trust, 2008, 6. 
29 As Schenk points out: “A new era for FIFA requires a review of its internal governance and the 
introduction of transparency and accountability into its decision-making processes and operations.” 
(2011, 3) 
30 Alvarez contends that: “(t)he notion of ‘responsibility’ has a grip on the legal imagination that the 
vague and suspiciously political term, ‘accountability,’ does not.” (2006, 3) For Alvarez, lawyers 
“surely have something useful to contribute with respect to reforming voting procedures and oversight 
mechanisms; creating effective internal audits and ombudsmen procedures; or enhancing participation 
and access.” (2006, 34) That is how he envisions the role of lawyers in enhancing accountability, a 
concern expressed in the epigraph of this introduction. 
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legal imagination, a tradition of thought that is still not at home with the potentially 
distinct roles of accountability. However, turning a blind eye to the concept, or 
seeking a functional equivalent within the legal conceptual repertoire, may 
impoverish what is lurking behind these public calls for accountability. The attempt to 
translate it into more familiar – and apparently interchangeable – terms like 
‘responsibility’, fails to grasp the multiple accountability demands.31 Squaring the 
circle, as it happens, might misguide the analyst. 
Legal scholarship, to be sure, has not been indifferent to such a discourse. 
Alan Boyle, for example, defines accountability as a set of “techniques of political 
supervision and control”.32 He had examined how states can be held accountable, by 
international organisations, for the implementation of their environmental obligations. 
His concern was not, however, directed towards the ways in which the international 
organisations themselves may be held accountable.33 
This thesis engages with the latter issue, which was embraced, more than two 
decades later, by the global administrative law project (GAL). The project has 
dedicated a central critical leverage to the language of accountability. Its institution-
building programme is mostly framed in that light. Alternative reformist approaches 
to global governance, in addition, have also taken a similar path. These strands have 
noticed that lawyers are trained and placed in a privileged position to be, among other 
things, accountability watchdogs and designers. Their responsibility, in that front, is 
to illuminate undetected accountability blind spots and indicate ways to fix and 
enhance them. In order to fill such lacunas, legal knowledge can sharpen, from its 
own partial angle, the observer’s capacity to diagnose and evaluate. Generally 
speaking, and within its delimited scope, this thesis seeks to participate in this 
collaborative intellectual enterprise. 
                                                 
31 Alvarez (2006). 
32 Boyle, 1991, 232. 
33 Boyle hints at how some procedural features of international organisations might help holding the 
states to account. As he claims: “To the extent that such bodies are public and open to other interested 
bodies or NGOs with observer status this accountability may even extend to a wider public”. (1991, 
231) Two years later, he slightly refines that idea by adding the concept of representation: “To the 
extent that the proceedings of these bodies are public and open to representations from interested 
individuals or NGOs, the accountability of states for their environmental performance is enhanced.” 
(1993, 105) It was not his purpose, for sure, to elaborate on how these same features can also be 
consequential in holding those international organisations themselves to account. Interestingly enough, 
however, the elements of “publicness” and “opennes” are key for conceptualising the accountability of 
transnational bodies as well. 
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I do not dispute the paramount importance and urgency of exploring the 
accountability of states vis-à-vis the international law of climate change. As we shall 
see, the specific bodies that will be studied here actually do have a role in that specific 
respect as well.34 That is not, nevertheless, the primary concern of the present inquiry. 
I will rather examine how and in what sense some emerging transnational institutions 
are becoming accountable. There are strong reasons for pursuing a research of this 
sort, which were shortly rehearsed through the examples listed above and will become 
more extensive in the first three chapters. This enterprise surely does not supplant, 
thus, the need for probing how states are held to account. It rather intends to provide 
additional insight as to the legal features and institutional roles of this international 
regime. 
 
Research questions and a methodological caveat 
 
The aim of this thesis is to investigate, through the lenses of accountability, 
three particular institutional actors of the Climate Change Regime: the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the Compliance Committee of 
the Kyoto Protocol (CCKP), and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). Such 
lenses, which are both descriptive and critical, display an important angle of those 
institutions.  
Along the way, the thesis asks four interrelated research questions. The first is 
conceptual: what is accountability? The second is an abstract normative question: 
what is regarded as a desirable accountability relationship at the national and the 
global level? The third is purely descriptive: how accountable are the three 
institutions? The fourth, finally, is a contextualised normative question: how 
appropriate are their three accountability arrangements? 
The two former questions are instrumental and ancillary to the two latter. That 
is to say, they respectively provide the analytical and evaluative frameworks on the 
basis of which a concrete description and a concrete normative assessment will be 
done. For sure, several subsidiary questions surround or are implicitly encompassed 
by those four research questions. To list a few: Why use the language of 
accountability to comprehend and respond to the sense of  unease with the current 
                                                 
34 Specially the Compliance Committee of the Kyoto Protocol (CCKP), to be examined in chapter 5. 
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state of international law and global governance? What is the difference between legal 
and political accountability? Is accountability an inextricably state-centred template or 
is it versatile enough to transcend it? Why not pursue this query departing from the 
heavy-loaded terms like democracy and constitutionalism? Does the nonchalant tone 
of accountability moderates the political passions associated with those other ideals? 
Is accountabiliy a value-neutral term? Is it apt enough for an enlightening description 
of current institutional arrangements? Or is it more suitable to address international 
concerns from the normative point of view?  
Those three institutions of the Climate Change Regime, as every other 
international institution that one could single out, are accountable somehow, to some 
extent, at some point in time. This is not a novel or very informative claim.35 To grasp 
exactly how accountable they are and, for the most part, whether they meet 
appropriate regimes of accountability, is a more taxing inquiry. In order to answer this 
question, one needs analytical categories to describe what the accountability regime is 
in each institution, and critical categories to judge whether it is a good accountability 
regime. 
This path, depending on how the scope of each question is calibrated, could 
indeed be over-demanding. Specially the second and fourth research questions, which 
attend to highly disputed normative concerns, could be answered at various levels of 
abstraction and depth. This is a pertinent methodological warning. Since each of the 
questions could potentially lead to an inordinately vast investigation, that warning 
puts forward the obvious challenge of establishing the exact role and scope of the four 
questions. The extent to which the thesis is successful in meeting this challenge of 
reasonable calibration  cannot be anticipated here. Rather, it is up to the reader to 
judge at the end.  
From a methodological point of view, the approach delineated above does not 
automatically fit within a single department or category of the traditional taxonomies 
of legal research. This is certainly not a thesis on the pure theory of international law, 
and on the ultimate legitimacy criteria of global governance. It does, however, discuss 
the conflicting values embedded in the designing of some international institutions (in 
particular, the values and functions that underpin accountability). Such a work cannot 
help but borrow, therefore, some key concepts from that source, without which 
                                                 
35 See Keohane and Grant (2005) 
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lawyers are unable to proficiently navigate in the waters of legal reasoning and 
interpretation. Neither is this thesis a work on strict dogmatics of international legal 
materials and norms, concerned with the interpretation of treaties and with the rational 
reconstruction of that corpus of rules in the light of the formal ideals of consistency, 
coherence and sistematicity. Doctrinal disputes, however, incidentally surface in the 
course of describing some general features of the institutions discussed throughout the 
thesis. 
The thesis is not, still, an ‘empirical work’ in the explanatory sense that 
empirical works are conceived and practiced in the social sciences – that is, to isolate 
the exact links between causes and consequences, or, to use their hargon, between the 
‘independent’ and ‘dependent’ variables. It would be clearly improper, thus, to 
propose any strong empirical claim about how well accountability mechanisms are 
actually functioning, or a causal explanation for their occasional success or failure. 
The thesis actually steps backwards and touches upon the normative standards that 
this very sort of empirical investigation presupposes. And despite not being 
‘empirical’ properly so called, it does engage in a type of institutional analysis by way 
of depicting the formal structures of the respective bodies, and also, when relevant, by 
taking some of their decisions and other outputs into consideration. 
To sum up, the thesis fosters a legal inquiry that is conceptual, descriptive and 
critical: it stipulates, in view of contemporary academic literature, the features that 
make up the concept of accountability; it systematises some normative benchmarks 
that help devise a vantage point from where to evaluate concrete regimes; it depicts, 
through those categories, three real-world institutions; and, finally, it proceeds to a 
tentative assessment of those three institutions.  
The four research questions not only scrutinise what sort of accountability 
formally exists in each of the three contexts, but also probe the consistency of such 
arrangements with the self-proclaimed purpose of each institution. The answer, at the 
very least, will hinge upon what the function and how powerful the institution is, on 
who the stakeholders are, and upon what kind of outcomes it delivers. 
These are old questions worth asking over and over again, because they 
thematise momentous problems that otherwise might remain unnoticed. Answers will 
be tentative, contested and provisional for a long time to come. The answers so far 
given are embryonic, and the institutional responses even more rudimentary. The 
stakes could hardly be higher when politicians, scholars and citizens discuss the next 
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steps of global institutions, which gradually free themselves from states’ mantle and 
become thicker and more intrusive. 
When Alvarez, in the epigraph of this introduction, claims that “lawyers 
should not cede accountability to the politicians”, he is not saying that we, lawyers, 
should be focusing more on legal accountability and less on political accountability, 
however such controversial distinction is conceived.  He is telling something deeper 
and institutionally more subtle. He more plausibly echoes Rosenau’s postulation that 
“the legal profession has a huge role to play” in developing the accountability 
mechanisms that will bring “transnational decisions closer to the people and publics 
affected by them.”36 Rosenau is pointing to a particular lawyerly craft, which does not 
exactly correspond to the interpretation of rules, but actually to building and specially 




The questions raised above can be better spelled out by a concise description 
of the structure of chapters. A bird’s eye view of the argument enables us to identify 
three main movements: the thesis first frames the terms of the discussion, which help 
to understand, describe and classify some accountability modes that are in place in the 
real world (chapters 1 and 2); it then introduces and summarises the historical 
background of the emergence of the Climate Change Regime within international 
environmental law (chapter 3); and lastly, it subjects the accountability structure of 
particular institutions to a thorough description and scrutiny (chapters 4 to 6). This is 
a contested interpretive exercise that requires not only the examination of written 
norms and practices, but also the excavation of some underlying principles that make 
sense of each respective institutional enterprise. 
More precisely, chapter 1 will discipline the use of the term ‘accountability’, 
which is the chief conceptual tool for the remaining chapters. This chapter 
demonstrates why the answer to a seeminlgy obvious question – ‘what is 
                                                 
36 As Rosenau points out: “one could list a number of other mechanisms for furthering accountability 
without reliance on the domestic analogy. Most of these involve working with international 
organizations and national governments to promote further disaggregation, thus bringing transnational 
decisions closer to the people and publics affected by them. And it is with respect to these mechanisms 
that the legal profession has a huge role to play inasmuch as treaties and public policies will have to be 
rewritten to achieve desirable levels of decentralization.” (2001, 355) 
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accountability?’ – is not straightforward, and why the everyday common sense should 
not be taken for granted. The concept of accountability is more volatile than a cursory 
look at public debates might suggest. 
Chapter 2 situates the ‘concept’ of accountability within the main ‘contexts’ of 
accountability, that is, it explores the question of where and why it makes sense (or 
has historically made sense) to talk about it. The contrast between the national and the 
transnational arena orients such query. The normative standards of accountability at 
the transnational level are drawn from one key contemporary strand of thought: the 
‘global administrative law’ (GAL) project. 
Chapters 1 and 2, therefore, ground the analytical scaffolding of the thesis and 
nail down the edges of a slippery, vulgarised and over-signified concept. While the 
former stipulates a descriptive blueprint, the latter elaborates on the contextualised 
normative standards that might fill in those categories. Both chapters, in addition, 
review a substantial portion of the relevant literature and draw a picture of the state of 
the art of the discussion in international law. This preparatory work operationalises 
the concept for the descriptive and critical exercises that follow. 
Chapter 3 depicts the mosaic of the Climate Change Regime, the structuring 
concept of global common goods that lies behind it, the characterisation of climate as 
one of such public goods, and the historical political mobilisations that paved the way 
for the emergence of the current institutions. It justifies, moreover, why the 
comparative analysis of the IPCC, CDM and CCKP is apposite to the perspective of 
accountability. 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 try to “audit”37 three different accountability systems, all 
of which are integral parts of an overall system of international regulation of climate 
change. These three chapters have a common structure. First, they proceed in two 
descriptive steps: a general portrayal of the institutional configuration (which 
comprises the institutional purpose, actors and processes) and a translation of that 
configuration into the language of accountability according to the blueprint of chapter 
1. Second, they concentrate on an evaluative step, which I call ‘test of 
appropriateness’, informed by the tools provided by chapter 2 (this consists, by and 
large, in appraising whether and how those arrangements fits the demands of the GAL 
                                                 
37 To use Mashaw’s term (2006, 140). 
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project). Lastly, concluding remarks will seek to take stock of the overall analysis 
undertaken. 
Stipulating, contextualising and situating the concept of accountability in three 
specific settings is, therefore, the expository thread that runs through the thesis, from 
chapters 1 to 6. In a way, the thesis can be seen as contributing with the GAL 
umbrella project by adding one additional ‘chapter’.38 It is, in all fairness, so broad 
and versatile an umbrella, that it would be difficult to escape its purview. But the 
thesis can fairly be seen as a separate investigation of the different configurations of 
accountability. It should, at least, enable the reader to decipher what the concept of 
accountability is and which the diverse contextual instantiations and institutional 
implications are. Further, the reader should be able to visualise the institutional map 
of the international law of climate change, its nature and purposes. Finally, the reader 
will also consider how accountability is shaped in three actual contexts and what the 
alternative paths for institutional critique and potential reform are. 
 
                                                 
38 Project inaugurated by the founding paper of Kingsbury, Krisch and Stewart (2005). 
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Chapter 1 
The concept(s) of accountability 
 
“Every action we take, we take within a set of  




The concept of accountability is Janus-faced. Its duality is expressed in three 
distinct ways that are complexly intertwined with each other. The concept can: (i) 
display a descriptive or normative character, (ii) capture a political or extra-political 
relationship, and (iii) be shaped by legal or extra-legal properties. In order to get a 
satisfactory grip on that concept, one should put these three parallel dimensions into 
an adequate and coherent context. Should any of these three dimensions be left out of 
the picture, the explanatory capacity or normative appeal of the concept will 
significantly recede. 
With regards to the first dimension of its duality, accountability can be 
conceived both as a given and as a construct, both as an inevitable “social fact” and as 
a “purposeful enterprise”.40 Mostly, however, it seems to convey nothing but noble 
intentions in the ordinary political lexicon. That is to say, its normative side usually 
overshadows its purely descriptive one. Converted into a ‘feel good’ term, it often 
ends up working as a verbal weapon for political strategists and rhetoricians, not as a 
tool for legal and institutional analysis.41 
Accountability, moreover, is not a solely political concept. A political agent, 
apart from making and implementing decisions, inevitably carries some burden of 
accountability for her or his actions. To some extent, moral agents, in several extra-
political domains, also have to discharge a similar duty. The obligation to give an 
account to someone, somehow, for some particular act and at some point in time, and 
the expectation that this someone will react, positively or negatively, strongly or 
                                                 
39 Mashaw, 2006, 131. In the same vein, he also maintains: “We all feel ourselves accountable in one 
way or another to scores of other people and institutions. (…) The ubiquity of accountability regimes, 
and our entanglement in scores if not hundreds of them simultaneously, complicates the task of sorting 
regimes by family, genus and species.” (2006, 118) 
40 This dichotomy evokes the basis on which a substantial part of the famous jurisprudential debate 
between Hart (1958) and Fuller (1958) was constructed. 
41 Dubnick (2002 and 2005) 
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weakly, at some other point in time, cuts across the conventionalised borders between 
politics and other spheres of social life. 
Finally, the concept may get more or less enmeshed with law. First, that might 
happen when the concept enters the province of institutionalised politics, a province 
constituted and governed by legal rules and procedures. Second, that might also 
happen when one confronts social relations that, despite not being purely political, 
have been densely legalised. 
This chapter clarifies these manifold connections and delineates a framework 
to inform the analysis on which the thesis will embark in the following chapters. To 
be sure, there is no single way to lay down such theoretical backdrop, no self-evident 
typology or uncontroversial boundary that the concept of accountability encapsulates. 
Every attempt of conceptualisation passes over diverse aspects of the phenomenon it 
seeks to make sense of. Accountability directs itself to the phenomenon of power. It 
hinges upon the divide between power-holders and subjects to power. It establishes a 
peculiar and contingent sort of relationship between both sides (by way of converting 
the latter into an ‘account-holder’). 
The variegated literature thereon oscillates between more restricted and more 
expansive concepts of accountability, without incurring, necessarily, in analytical 
inconsistency. The conceptualisation of accountability to be proposed here, as it is the 
case with any other of its several conceptualisations, is derived from a purposeful 
stipulation. Its litmus test, thus, should be its capacity to illuminate a precise aspect of 
power relations and, certainly, its coherence to the arguments and conclusions I will 
draw in the next chapters, not its conformity with any putatively authoritative 
definition. 
This chapter elucidates accountability in a slightly abstract way, detached 
from a precise context. Such an abstract definition, admittedly, may not lead us far 
enough for a revealing study of institutions of either global or domestic governance. 
To contextualise accountability geographically and functionally across multi-level 
jurisdictions is the crucial task of the second chapter. A broader depiction of how 
accountability permeates the Climate Change Regime will be discussed from the third 
chapter onwards. For now, I concentrate on the conceptual grounding without which 
the further steps would remain too vacillating. 
Before we focus on specific contexts and sites, we need to know what 
accountable and unaccountable powers essentially are (and the gradual variations 
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between both poles), and why the latter is deemed a rather alarming entity, while the 
former is quite vehemently cherished. Defining the concept and distinguishing its 
descriptive and normative, political and extra-political, legal and extra-legal aspects 
are major analytical steps undertaken by the accountability literature.42 This chapter is 
no different to the rest of the literature on this topic, in that it aims to make sense of 
these various facets. 
The next section (section 2) characterises political accountability as opposed 
to its extra-political forms and advances the basic structure of accountability 
relationships. Section 3 develops the fundamental coordinates of political 
accountability. Section 4 sketches the key functions political accountability may and 
has been expected to play. Finally, section 5 puts forward some archetypes that can be 
carved from the the variety of configurations between coordinates and functions. 
 
2. Political and extra-political accountability: shifting and contested boundaries 
 
 Accountability is not, by definition, restricted to politics, no matter how 
politics is conceived.43 It transcends the domain of authoritative collective action and 
pervades social relations more widely and deeply.44 One should be attentive to extra-
political forms of accountability in order to understand what accountability shares 
with the political form and what is distinctive of the latter. Rather than a pedantic 
digression, this inquiry helps us both single out, at least to approximately, the 
elementary particle of the concept and discern the concept itself from its uniquely 
political manifestation.45 
                                                 
42 See, for example, Bovens (2010) and his distinction between accountability as a “mechanism” and as 
a “virtue”. Philp also claims: “we have to be clear about when an accountability relationship exists 
before we ask whether that relationship satisfies certain other principles or values.” (2009, 48) Or as 
Stewart and Kingsbury maintain: “demands are made for greater accountability without serious 
analysis of precisely what it consists in, how it can be achieved, and what its goals are.” (2008, 10) 
43 The exception, for sure, would be a dystopian totalitarian regime, where nothing is left out of the 
sphere of the political, where the “extra-political” is inconceivable because the respective political 
culture does not have any default criterion to exclude something from the realm of politics. 
44 See Mashaw, 2006, 118. 
45 Mashaw is also pointing to such structural commonality when he warns, for example, against 
“overselling” the dissimilarities between different types of accountability. (2006, 130) Philp is also 
concerned with distinguishing the core, definitional or necessary parts of the concept from its 
contingent and supplementary components. (2009, 48) 
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 There are several types of extra-political accountability.46 Cultural or social 
accountability is probably the most difficult to perceive and diagnose. When feminist 
activists, for example, complain about the “failure of the culture to hold men 
accountable”,47 they do not necessarily ask for legal punishment or for the use of 
coercion to right the wrongs allegedly committed by men. Their protest runs deeper. It 
concerns the more diffuse and subtle ways through which a reputedly gender-biased 
culture curtails the autonomy of women to lead their own lives. Pressures of 
conformity and ossified social institutions would thus prevent women from being 
fully self-governing. It is tough to run against the social tide and prejudices with 
impunity. The demand for cultural accountability, in this sense, intends to unveil and 
to challenge the sources of social normativity as well as the informal ways through 
which standards of behaviour are furtively enacted and enforced in a potentially 
oppressive fashion. Accountability mechanisms, thus, would be constitutive of a more 
horizontal social fabric.48 
 Accountability relations also emerge in a variety of other extra-political 
settings.49 Professionals, for example, may be called to account in the light of how 
they exercise their expertise vis-à-vis their peers and laypeople.50 Lawyers, engineers 
or medical doctors take technical and learned decisions the appropriateness of which 
their respective clients or patients have limited capacity to judge. Still, this would not 
necessarily prevent the latter from having a right to demand, from the former, a 
justification for the choices that were made as well as from taking a stand on such 
choices’ acceptableness and accuracy. Their reputation towards their peers, moreover, 
may be a decisive factor for their professional success and self-satisfaction. 
                                                 
46 “Extra-political” should not be equated with “non-political” or “anti-political”, as if some issues 
were always and necessarily outside any allegedly essential boundaries of politics. Because the sphere 
of politics fluctuates, some issues that today are extra-political can be politicised tomorrow, and vice-
versa. Ian Shapiro advances such insight, by claiming that politics is “both nowhere and everywhere”: 
“They are nowhere in that there is no specifiable political realm; (…) Politics are everywhere, 
however, because no realm of social life is immune from relations of conflict and power.” (2002, 206) 
47 Dines and Murphy (2011). A further example thereof is Stuart Mill’s identification of the lack of 
sufficient check on the conduct of men towards women: “There is no check but that of opinion, and 
such men are in general within the reach of no opinion but that of men like themselves.” (1869, 323) 
48 At the most general normative level, being accountable to others may even be seen as a central 
feature of a moral life. (Dubnick, 2010) 
49 Schedler also draws the distinction between private and political accountability (1999, 21). 
50 Onora O’Neill raises this question before indicating solutions that combine trust and trustworthiness: 
“In areas of concentrated specialisation and expertise, including medicine, science and biotechnology, 
how then can inexpert patients, citizens or customers judge the experts?” (118, 2004) Thompson also 
points, for example, to the role of collegiality in professional accountability (2004, 59). 
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Schools and teachers, in the same vein, are constrained by policy-makers, 
parents and pupils themselves to account for what takes place in the classroom or the 
school as a whole.51 Corporations may be called to account for how their market 
actions affect the lives of their clients, employees or society at large; for what their 
products stand for; for how these products are made and advertised; for which 
patterns of consumption are encouraged; for how their employees are treated and how 
their facilities are constructed or, more broadly, for where their money is spent and 
investments are addressed to. The answers to all these questions impact different 
social groups that may wish or reasonably deserve to have an input on decisions that, 
one way or another, also concern them.52 
Still, some other accountability relations may be dispersed across time and 
less immediately identifiable. Parents, for example, may be called to account to their 
children for the type of education they have provided or for the moral standards they 
have inculcated; spouses may be called to account for how they understand the duties 
and responsibilities of marriage; younger generations can call older generations to 
account for how the acts of the latter may have severely circumscribed the living 
conditions of the former;53 even someone’s present self can feel pressed to account to 
her hypothetical future self, in an exercise of prospective ethical imagination, for 
pursuing a consistent and justifiable ideal of good life.54  
Cultural, professional, corporate, parental, spousal, generational or ethical 
accountability share something in common. In all these cases, there is a split between 
an agent who takes decisions and another who bears the impact of or has some stake 
in these decisions. There is, thus, a division of labour between two poles. 
Accountability is a quality that may or may not permeate the relationship between 
both groups. It exists where the decision-maker has the obligation or is factually 
impelled to account, and where the subjects to the decisions are entitled or factually 
able to demand an account for the actions or inactions of the decision-maker.55 
                                                 
51 On the role of democratic education in promoting a “culture of accountability”, for example, see 
Nussbaum, 2010, 53-54. 
52 A recent example of how a company becomes accountable to investors and shareholders was the 
debut of Facebook in the financial market by opening its capital: “Whether it likes it or not, Facebook 
will now be accountable to a lot of people who do not share its values.” (Stone, 2012) 
53 The debate about inter-generational justice and environment exemplifies this. 
54 Stephen Fry’s letter to his “future self” and then his response, as an older man, to his past self, is an 
anecdotal example of such intra-personal reflection across time. (Fry, 2009) 
55 Onora O’Neill delineates the formal structure that accountability relations share: “Systems of 
accountability are highly varied, but they have a common formal structure. They are used to define, 
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Accordingly, accountability monitors, or even compensates for that division of 
labour by constraining, to varying degrees, the autonomy of the decision-maker. 
Hence, the behaviour of accountable decision-makers is far from unbound. 
Exogenous considerations will need to be factored into their decisions, which 
interfere with the decisions themselves. For sure, the force and the kinds of 
constraints will vary, and the extent to which they can credibly curb one’s actions will 
also differ across time and space. 
Accountability revolves around a power-holder and a “significant other”.56 
The “other” is only “significant” as far as she has a credible claim on the power-
holder, that is, the ability of demanding the latter to furnish an account for her 
conduct, of engendering, to use Bovens’ phrase, a “reflective discursive encounter”.57 
It is reflective since it lets the agent turn inward and find a justification for her acts; it 
is discursive because the agent also needs to turn outward and express this 
justification publicly and intelligibly in order to engage in a back-and-forth 
conversation; and, furthermore, it instantiates a non-arbitrary encounter inasmuch as 
there is some sort of link binding the two subjects. This encounter, to sum up, 
amounts to “an ongoing process of account-giving and account-taking”.58 
However large the diversity of accountability relationships can be, and despite 
their particularities, there is a core analytical structure that imbues all the examples 
above and below. Such structure can be enclosed by a set of rudimentary descriptive 
questions: Who accounts to whom? For what and on the basis of which standards? 
How and when? Under pain of what consequences?59  
The first question brings forward the subjects of an accountability relation, or 
who the accountee and the account-holder are.60 The second specifies the object and 
                                                 
assign and help enforce second-order obligations to account for the performance (or non-performance) 
of primary or first-order tasks or obligations.” (2007, 167)  
56 Bovens clarifies: “Explanations and justifications are not made in a void, but vis-à-vis a significant 
other.” (2010, 951) 
57 For Bovens, accountability is supposed to be a “reflective discursive encounter between accountor 
and accountee”. (2010, 953) 
58 As Dubnick has phrased it (2002, 5). 
59 Keohane (2003), Stewart (2008) and Mashaw (2006), among others, resort to fairly similar 
formulations of such a structural question to explain accountability. 
60 The two poles of an accountability relationship, according to a common terminology, are the “power-
holder” and the “account-holder” (see Keohane, 2003). The contrast, however, is somewhat 
misleading. It insinuates that the former holds power at the expense of the latter. Disempowered 
account-holders, nonetheless, are no account-holders at all. To be sure, both actors are empowered in 
distinct ways and to a certain degree, as the chapter will extensively demonstrate. The relationship 
may, indeed, be asymmetrical. Still, constructing an accountable relationship is to empower a 
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standards of accountability, that is, the acts of power that are exposed to such 
constraint (after all, power-holders may not be accountable for acts that are not related 
to the exercise of such power), and also the benchmark of judgment that informs such 
account. The third settles the procedure and timing of an accountability relation, or 
the way it is done and the moment it takes place. The fourth, finally, prescribes the 
consequences that will ensue.  
We can also turn this descriptive question into an explanatory one: Why does 
A account to B for the K acts, on the basis of X standards, through Y procedure and at 
time Z? The answer would have to spell out what is the causal story that binds A to B 
and its respective connection with K, X, Y and Z. Such answer would give us a 
thorough picture of how a definite accountability relationship is conformed. They still 
do not suffice, however, to grasp the normative dimension that a plea for 
accountability entails. Bringing a critical grip to the question, then, one could 
ultimately ask: who should be accountable to whom for what, on the basis of which 
standards, how and when? 
The aforementioned descriptive, explanatory and prescriptive variants of this 
structural question are the key analytical prisms to understand the disputes and 
arguments about accountability. Accordingly, any attempt to classify an 
accountability relationship into this or that category will revolve around this 
fundamental formal pattern. Whether the accountability relatioship is political or 
extra-political will depend on the contingent question of how we feed each of those 
components – the subjects, the object, the standards and so forth.61 
The uniqueness of political accountability relates to the sort of power in play, 
namely, political power, to the subjects to which the exercise of that power is directed 
– the members of a political community – and to the issue that is under consideration 
– the general interest, the common good or the like.62 Decisions taken under such 
                                                 
previously disempowered actor, however soft or arguably insufficient that empowerment might be. To 
avoid this mischaracterisation, I will henceforth use the terms “accountee” instead of “power-holder”, 
and keep “account-holder” or “accountor” for the other side of the equation. When appropriate, I will 
still use “power-holder” if the very question of whether such actor is accountable is uncertain or simply 
not at stake. But that, again, does not at all mean that the “account-holder” is not a “power-holder” as 
well. 
61 By “contingent” I mean the historical and shifting borders of the realm of politics. (Shapiro, 2002) 
62 “General interest” is admittedly a rather vague and inevitably volatile definition of the realm of 
politics, but it should suffice for the current purposes. “Common good”, “collective good” or “public 
good”, without further qualification, would do no better, because different traditions of thought and 
different moments of political history would read them in different ways. 
 31 
political authority are binding on and made in the name of the polity. Collective 
decisions based on the political pedigree may generate a duty of obedience whose 
enforceability does not depend upon the individual endorsement of the content of 
every single choice. The effectiveness of such collective decisions, as it happens with 
politics, presupposes a sense of trust and membership.63-64 However blurred the 
boundaries between political and extra-political types of accountability might be in 
the edges, the distinction between these two types is worth drawing. Yet this does not 
mean that their relational structure is substantially different.65 Quite the opposite is the 
case: political and extra-political accountability share much in common. 
In sum, a power-holder may be deemed accountable when her power is 
plausibly constrained by the expectations, instructions or stakes of one or several 
external agents.66 She is thus compelled to furnish an account for what she is doing or 
not doing. Such rudimentary definition, for sure, is still far from sufficient to fully 
equip the inquiry that this thesis intends to undertake. For instance, one could argue 
that it is too vacuous to come to terms with the contemporary debates about 
accountability deficits and gaps, overloads and excesses in either national or 
international levels.67 This sketch must not be the entire notion of accountability these 
debates have in mind. After all, there is hardly an absolutely unaccountable power, 
political or otherwise, and some forms of accountability may be spurious rather than 
admirable.68 Their protest calls for something more specific and normatively loaded, 
not for whatever sort of accountability one happens to discern.  
In fact, the sheer existence of accountability is no reason for celebration. 
Politics is often embroiled in a string of more or less onerous accountability 
                                                 
63 The idea that a polity lies in the background of political accountability gets more complicated when 
the very existence of a polity is contestable, like on the supra-national level of governance, a question 
described by the next chapter. 
64 On the “sense of trust” as a pre-condition for meaningful accountability, see Philp (2009). 
65 The borders may actually be more porous than strict classifications might suggest. Mashaw 
emphasises the permeability between different regimes of accountability, which “flow and blend into 
each other” despite the differences in kind between public governance, market and social 
accountability. (2006, 127) 
66 As Schmitter asserts, the “ordinary cycle of accountability” revolves around “exchanges of 
information, justification and judgment”. (2004, 49) Political accountability, in other words, “implies 
an exchange of responsibilities and potential sanctions between rulers and citizens”. (2004, 47)  
67 Bovens et al, 2008, 227. 
68 Schmitter mentions, for example, the accountability mechanisms that may exist in sultanistic 
autocracies, military dictatorships or even absolute monarchies (2004, 48). Mashaw also points to a 
“monarchical model of accountability”: “Officials were accountable to the monarch and the monarch to 
God. We know little about how God kept his accounts, but monarchs rapidly developed rudimentary 
systems of auditing.” (2005b, 155) 
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relationships.69 Behind the veneer of public rhetoric, the actual discussion has rarely 
been about whether a certain agent is accountable.70 The critical question has rather 
been about whether one is accountable to the right constituency, in the right way, at 
the right time, for the right reasons or standards. Thus, in order to get some traction, 
one needs to delve deeper into these thorny normative elements. One does not 
contribute to this debate without openly recognising these normative underpinnings. 
Bracketing them is not a sustainable option because a value-free standpoint is simply 
not available. 
 
3. The coordinates of political accountability 
 
The field of application of political accountability is vast. It comprises diverse 
sorts of political relationships, that are assimilated by an array of typologies.71 The 
regimes of political accountability resort to a number of devices that inform the 
interaction between accountees and account-holders. The next chapter will locate 
these devices alongside multiple levels of governance and kinds of institutions. Here I 
introduce some of the chief categories that help to particularise these several possible 
arrangements.72 
The structural question put forward in the previous section specifies a way to 
envisage the coordinates of political accountability (or, in fact, of any power 
relationship): the subjects, the object, the benchmark of judgment, the procedure, the 
timing and the consequences that bear upon such a relationship. Here, I intend to 
further spell out those coordinates that allow accountability arrangements to fulfil 
different functions and mould diverse archetypes. 
                                                 
69 As the epigraph that headlines this chapter also contends. (2006, 131) 
70 A power-holder, whoever he happens to be, is hardly exempt from any accountability relationship. 
This proposition does not, though, equate accountability with every single power relationship. It is not 
incompatible, thus, with a proposition that contends that there are unaccountable power relationships. 
The power-holder A, for example, may exercise raw and naked power against the actor B, and this 
would configure an altogether unaccountable power relationship. It would neither be reflective nor 
discursive. Still, A would almost certainly be accountable to other actors, even if those other actors 
were not the ones we wish them to be (neither the ones normative theories recommend). 
71 The typologies are multicoloured and will be further discussed later in the chapter. Some important 
ones are offered by Schedler (1999), Keohane (2003), Keohane and Grant (2005), Ferejohn (2007), 
Stewart (2008) and Morgan (2006). 
72 The idea of “coordinates” that I develop here echoes and, to some extent, replicates and expands the 
use made by Walker (2009). 
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Every accountability relationship has a distinct density. Depending on how its 
coordinates are configured, it will vary across thicker and thinner ends of a spectrum 
of possibilities. Thicker and thinner modes, as we shall see, imply not only that the 
accountees will feel more or less constrained by (or tied to) the account-holder, but 
also that it will be enmeshed in more or less complex, institutionalised and formal 
sorts of connection. 
 The following analysis will touch upon 11 prisms of accountability. The first 
prism through which that density can be observed purports to capture the level of 
formality of an accountability relationship.73 This is a leading coordinate that 
pervades and shapes all others. Any power relationship will be more or less formal 
and legalised. This means that general and previously enacted legal rules may regulate 
each of the coordinates listed above, ascribe an official status to their subjects and 
specify their respective authority and competence. Accountability relationships may 
benefit from the qualities of the rule of law in order to become more stable and 
predictable.74 
 This legal angle invites a conceptual caveat. It would be erroneous, of course, 
to equate the distinction between political and extra-political accountability with the 
presence or absence of law (or adjudication). Law is only one of the several possible 
institutional conveyors that can promote both political and various sorts of extra-
political accountability. It brings to accountability relationships a measure of rule-like 
formality and the accompanying apparatus for legal enforcement. Legal norms and 
institutions are commonly used for promoting corporate, professional or parental 
accountability, as well as for fostering political accountability. Law, however, does 
neither exhaust their potential nor capture informal or less rule-bound accountability 
tools that may also operate within each of these accountability relationships, including 
the political ones. Perceptible traces of accountability still subsist both in “law-free 
                                                 
73 Schmitter, for example, is sceptical towards a non-institutionalised form: “However complex it may 
be, political accountability must be institutionalized if it is to work effectively. This means that it has to 
be embedded in a mutually understood and pre-established set of rules.” (2004, 48) 
74 The mainstream literature on the rule of law explains what these basic qualities are. See, for 
example, Fuller (1968) and MacCormick (1989). Onora O’Neill, however, provides significant 
examples to show that setting the optimal degree of formalisation is a controversial enterprise: 
“Formalisation has advantages that are constantly mentioned by its advocates: mutual clarity of 
expectations, clear performance targets, defined benchmarks of achievement, enhanced accountability. 
But there is also the danger that more formalised procedures may deepen the distrust they seek to 
remedy.” (2004, 130) 
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zones of privacy and association”75 or in law-free zones of political relationships, 
which should not be ignored. This explains why the categorical opposition between 
political and legal accountability, proposed by some typologies sketched in a later 
section, may be misleading part of the time.76 
The second prism resorts to a traditional spatial metaphor. It regards how the 
power relationship between two agents materialises along horizontal or vertical lines. 
The vertical angle is more typical of accountability discourses. Substantially, vertical 
accountability is characterised by some asymmetry of power between accountees and 
account-holders. It can run downstream when the account-holder delegates power to 
the subject that will then be held accountable (in a “principal-agent” or “truster-
trustee” fashion) or it can run upstream when the accountee is held accountable by 
those who are bound by her decisions or somehow bear their impact. To use a 
fashionable dichotomy, a vertical accountability relationship can run either top down 
or bottom up. The same actor, moreover, may be accountable both ways – from above 
and from below.77 
Apart from this vertical axis, there can also be accountability relationships that 
take place along a horizontal (or gradually less vertical) line.78 This may occur 
between two agents that are tied neither by a clear relation of “command-and-control” 
authority nor by an unmitigated duty of obedience. The constraint, in this case, is 
more delicate and stems rather from a cooperative commitment in light of mutual 
dependence. Scrutinising it further, a horizontal accountability relationship could be 
unidirectional if, despite the horizontality, only one of the subjects is truly held 
accountable to the other, or bidirectional, if there is a reciprocal constraint to account 
for the decisions that either subject takes. “Checks and balances” and its several 
internal tools for mutual control and cooperation are classical instance of this 
                                                 
75 Mashaw, 2006, 119. 
76 See section 5 (archetypes of accountability). 
77 This lies close to the typology proposed by Keohane (2003): on the one hand, accountability would 
be internal, based on an act of superior delegation, authorisation and support; on the other, it would be 
external, based on participation of those who bear the impact of decisions. Keohane and Grant slightly 
rephrase the dichotomy into “delegation” v. “participation” (2005). The World Bank is one of their 
examples of the simultaneous downstream and upstream dimensions operating at a single institution. 
78 To be sure, a sensible perception of the “phenomenology of authority” indicates that a pure top-down 
pyramidal model usually misses part of the phenomenon. Mashaw reminds of this important feature of 
power relations when he claims that bureaucratic hierarchies, for example, rather than sheer pyramids, 
operate through “dense networks” of influence and persuasion. (2006, 123) 
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horizontal bidirectional type, where a single agent is both an accountee and an 
account-holder at one and the same time.79 
 The third prism regards the way the two subjects of an accountability 
relationship are connected to each other. When the account-holder herself is able to 
perform the tasks involved in calling the power-wielder to account (tasks like setting 
standards, assessing choices and applying sanctions), the relationship is a direct one. 
When a subject arguably deserves to act as the account-holder, in the sense that she is 
affected by the power-wielder, but is not able to do so, and some surrogate carries out 
the respective tasks, this would be an indirect accountability relationship. The indirect 
character is due to the mediation of a third subject.80 As an empirical matter, an 
effective accountability arrangement cannot be a relationship between the powerful 
and the powerless. The latter, for sure, should first be granted the power to hold the 
former accountable. A mechanism of surrogacy, thus, would bring a measure of 
second-best realism where advices of first-best idealism do not work. 
The fourth prism sheds light on the multiplicity and control of these 
connections. Borrowing from Keohane, accountability systems will be unitary and 
pluralistic.81 The former would be controlled by unified centres of command, on the 
basis of an ultimate sovereign or a clearer last word. The latter, in turn, would occur 
in contexts where authority is dispersed, and complex chains of multilateral 
connections and overlapping jurisdictions exist.82 Whereas the former is easier to 
                                                 
79 The concept of horizontal accountability was crucial for O’Donnell to single out what genuinely 
representative democracies had that “delegative democracies” lacked: “Delegative democracies rest on 
the premise that whoever wins election to the presidency is thereby entitled to govern as he or she sees 
fit, constrained only by the hard facts of existing power relations and by a constitutionally limited term 
of office.” (1994, 99) The species of “delegative democracies”, by having only the vertical type, falls 
short of consolidated democracies: “In institutionalized democracies, accountability runs not only 
vertically, making elected officials answerable to the ballot box, but also horizontally, across a network 
of relatively autonomous powers (i.e., other institutions) that can call into question, and eventually 
punish, improper ways of discharging the responsibilities of a given official.” (1994, 101) 
80 For a thorough analysis and exemplification of the difference between “standard” (direct) and 
“surrogate” (indirect and second-best) accountability, see Rubenstein (2007). She further specifies the 
first-order and second-order dimensions that this relationship can have: if a putative account-holder 
needs a surrogate in order to hold the power-holder accountable, but can hold the surrogate itself to 
account, then that first-order surrogate relationship will be complemented by a second-order standard 
accountability relationship. Nevertheless, if the account-holder cannot effectively hold even the 
surrogate to account, but a fourth agent can do that on her behalf, this will configure a second-order 
surrogate accountability. 
81 Keohane, 2002, 1128. 
82 For Keohane, the “nature of world politics means that any accountability arrangements at the 
international level will be pluralistic”. (2002, 1130) 
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visualise and to operate, the second, due to the plurality of accountees and account-
holders, hinders the assignment of responsibilities. 
The fifth prism highlights a relevant nuance of accountability relationships in 
multi-member institutions. It shows whether it is the institution, organically 
considered, or each of its members, who is called to account. The process of holding a 
power-wielder accountable can work in the wholesale and in the retail or, to use 
another common dichotomy, be centripetal and centrifugal. In the former case, the 
entire collegiate (like a court, a regulatory commission or any deliberative body), 
rather than its members, may be assessed and held responsible for its decisions. In the 
latter case, on the contrary, the institution evades a collective responsibility, but each 
member is assessed by the way she has contributed to the collective performance.83  
An elected parliament, in a constitutional system that also adopts judicial 
review of legislation, simultaneously provides an example of both: on the one hand, 
the parliament is subject to atomised accountability by the constituents, who are able 
to judge, reward and punish, by means of election or non-election, each 
representative, but not the institution itself;84 on the other hand, the parliament is 
subject to organic accountability by the court that asseses the constitutionality of 
legislation. In such a system, the parliament is held to account both as “many” and as 
“one”, both in its plurality and in its supra-individual unity. 
The sixth prism casts our attention to a formal variation that cuts across the 
two previous ones. It refers to whether an accountee and an accountor are both within 
a single institution that has a discrete personality (legal or not), or are, themselves, 
different institutions (juridically recognised or not). In the former case, accountability 
operates internally, whereas in the latter, we are presented with an instance of external 
accountability.85 This sixth prism informs us whether the relationship between the two 
subjects, no matter whether they are related to each other by means of a vertical or a 
horizontal vector and independently of whether they are considered as a 
                                                 
83 See Keohane, 2002, 1129. Keohane shares Derek Bok’s view, according to which individual 
accountability, rather than making the members of Congress collectively responsible, would expose 
them to “the centrifugal pressures of special interests and constituent groups”. 
84 This will vary, of course, according to the kind of electoral and party systems that shape the electoral 
representation.  
85 This dichotomy is here used in a sense different from that defended by Keohane (2003); see footnote 
38. According to Keohane, internal accountability refers to this closer vertical link that is typical of a 
principal-agent relationship, and can thus be contrasted with external accountability, which captures the 
relationship between power-wielder and those who are affected by the decisions. Keohane does not 
consider, for example, whether the principal or the agent have distinct legal personalities. 
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transindividual organ or as a group of individuals, takes place within one single entity 
or between separate entities. 
An accountability relationship may also be marked by demands of expertise. 
Through this seventh prism, one should realise whether the subjects possess special 
knowledge, that is, whether they are technocrats and hence decide on the basis of 
reputedly objective, impartial and universalisable premises.86 Here, four pictures may 
conceivably emerge between accountees and account-holders: (i) both are experts, 
which would lead to a strictly technocratic accountability relationship;87 (ii) both are 
lay and nontechnical agents;88 (iii) the accountee is an expert whereas the account-
holder is not;89 (iv) the accountee is lay whereas the account-holder is an expert, 
shaping a sort of guardianship regime.90 To sum up, the fifth, sixth and seventh prisms 
explicate the “who” and the “to whom” slices of the structural question earlier raised. 
Power-holders are usually expected to discharge a rather specific role. The 
performance of this task might be accompanied by substantive standards and 
expectations to appraise the output that is delivered (which might be related to 
expertise or not). The eighth prism, thus, reveals whether there are explicit criteria 
through which the performance of power-holders will be evaluated. The specificity of 
standards may vary and hence provide, to the power-holder, more or less precise 
guidelines on how her performance will be rated. The existence of public standards 
(or the lack thereof) will qualify, for example, both the exercises of voting and 
reason-giving, mentioned below. 
The stringency of standards shapes diverse kinds of accountability 
relationships. Whatever their sources are, the more standards constrict the behaviour 
of the power-holder, the lesser room for the exercise of discretion will remain. The 
openness of standards turns an accountability relationship into one between a “truster” 
                                                 
86 See Bovens et al (2008) and Shapiro (2005). 
87 This type may be practised, for example, within a technocratic body, in which there is a hierarchical 
division of labour. 
88 This can be seen in the classical accountability relationship between constituents and elected 
parliamentary representatives, which is usually called “electoral accountability”. 
89 This evokes the traditional tension between technocracy and democracy and may be seen, for 
example, in the relationship between regulatory technocrats and the people generally conceived. 
(Shapiro, 2005) 
90 Though this type might sound too stylised, it suits our ordinary understanding of the relationship 
between a legislator (prasumably “lay”) and a court in charge of judicial review of legislation (the 
“constitutional expert”). Even if one could claim that the legislator is supposed to be no less prepared 
than judges to handle legal and constitutional matters, as critical accounts on the legitimacy of judicial 
review have recalled, it is the opposite assumption that one of the mainstream arguments in favour of 
judicial review of legislation is grounded upon. 
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and a “trustee”. At the other end of a continuum of stringency, the relationship might 
be reduced to one between a “rule-setter” and a “rule-follower”, where discretion 
itself might disappear (and, with it, the very idea of accountability91). If accountability 
is not a matter of strict compliance with rules and standards, so as to render 
accountees “wholly subservient”92 to account-holders, and if it should rather 
encourage a mindful exercise of judgment, some degree of agency for the power-
holder has to be preserved. Wherever this threshold might be located, one might 
expect to see variations of degree along this continuum. As Philp suggests, at one pole 
there will be a “compliance-based system”, structured around a set of incentives for 
conformity and threats against non-compliance; at the opposite pole, there will an 
“integrity-based system”, which prioritises agency over rule-following and hinges 
upon trust.93 
The ninth prism exposes the modus operandi of an accountability relationship, 
or, in other words, how proceduralised it is. Several methods of participation, enquiry 
and contestation may sew a web of constraints on decision-making. The way in which 
the accountee is appointed, appraised or even removed from office by the account-
holder may be governed by more or less consolidated practices and conventions. 
Voting and reason-giving are two stereotypical mechanisms through which these 
procedures are designed. By voting (or simply nominating), the account-holder can 
place someone in or, without further justification, remove someone from a position of 
power. By having the occasion to reason and interrogate (through a “notice and 
comment” mechanism, for example), the account-holder can also air disagreements 
that put pressure on the accountee, triggering a sort of deliberation between them 
both.94 The power-holder, in turn, may have the obligation to articulate a public 
                                                 
91 For Keohane accountability relates to agency, that is, power-holders have significant choices to 
make, not just superior orders to follow. Therefore, genuine accountability relationships would 
presumably be closer to the “truster-trustee” rather than the strict “principal-agent” relationship. 
Keohane has clarified this as follows: “Cast in the language of power, an accountability relationship is 
a relationship in which an actor making a normative claim that it should have influence over another 
actor actually has such influence; and in which the actor subject to influence has significant discretion.” 
(2002, 1125) Philp shares this point: “Paradoxically, where the discretion or latitude of the office 
holder is eliminated in this way, he or she has nothing to explain or justify – nothing to account for!” 
(2009, 37) 
92 Philp, 2009, 43. 
93 Philp contends: “We trust people to do things under their own initiative and discretion and we use 
accountability for feedback and evaluation, but the accountability is parasitic on that trust”. (2009, 41) 
94 These two modes of control in the hands of account-holders (reasoning and voting) can be 
analogised with the distinction between “voice” and “exit” advanced by Hirschman (1980). Voice and 
exit, for Hirschman, are ways for a customer to protest against an economic organisation. Keohane also 
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justification for each decision she takes.95 The accountability-promoting quality of 
reason-giving, therefore, would be able to operate in two directions: for the account-
holder, as a right both to give and to receive reasons; for the accountee, as a pressing 
burden. To put it differently, while the former may constrain through the opportunity 
to reason, the latter is constrained by the duty to reason.  
A variety of balances between transparency and confidentiality will ultimately 
delineate how the procedures of voting, arguing and commenting by the account-
holder, or the onus of reason-giving by the accountee, set the stage for an altogether 
plausible accountability relationship.96 Rather than accountability itself, the 
transparency of the procedures and decisions taken by the accountee constitutes the 
informational pre-condition for such a relationship to be set in place. On the whole, 
transparent authority is not, in and of itself, accountable. Accountable authority, 
though, cannot but be a minimally transparent one.97 Total opacity and accountability 
do not match. 
Accountability interactions may also be put into a temporal perspective.98 This 
tenth prism illuminates the exact moment the power-holder expects a reaction from 
                                                 
resorted to this distinction in order to exemplify market accountability (2002, 1131), but the analogy 
can be further explored in the realm of politics. One should not confuse this distinction, however, with 
the one between reason-giving and voting proposed by Ferejohn (2007). Ferejohn’s account considers 
reason-giving only as a burden that some non-elected power-holders (specially judges) have to handle 
and, in that precise sense, as a pattern of reasoning that would enhance accountability. Ferejohn does 
not emphasise any special role of reason-giving as a means for account-holders themselves to challenge 
the power-holders (which Hirschman’s “voice” would entail). This emphasis, therefore, overlooks a 
dialogic role that reason-giving can play as an accountability mechanism, and focuses only on a 
monological angle. 
95 Reason-giving, for Schedler, would turn monological power into dialogic, would make “both parties 
speak”. It is therefore “opposed not only to mute power but also to unilateral speechless controls of 
power.” (Schedler, 1999, 15) There is, for him, only a partial overlap between accountability (to 
someone, with duty to account) and responsibility (for something): “while accountability forces power 
to enter into a dialogue, the notion of responsibility permits it to remain silent.” (1999, 19) 
Accountability, thus, goes beyond “attributing responsibility” and comprises the act of “giving an 
account”. 
96 Schedler underlines the importance of transparency for accountability. Transparency would tackle 
the “black-box of politics” and the “opacity of power” (Schedler, 1999, 20). He also reminds, though, 
that politics may have “legitimate realms of secrecy” (1999, 20). See also Thompson, 2004, 130. 
97 On the point of transparency, see Stewart (2011). Onora O’Neill elaborates on the insufficiency of 
sheer transparency: “Since transparency is only a matter of disclosure or dissemination, it may limit 
secrecy, yet fail to ensure successful communicative transactions with others”. (2007, 178) And later, 
she concludes: “Speech acts that need not engage with audiences – such as disclosing, distributing, 
disseminating, or even publishing – do not provide enough for those who seek to place or refuse trust.” 
(2008, 180) 
98 Schmitter considers that the temporal perspective captures the accountability relationship and the 
“rhythms” of democracy better than the spatial one (vertical and horizontal). For him, the temporal 
dimension comprises three movements: “overture” (before), “intermezzo” (during) and “finale” (after). 
(2004, 54) In another article, he emphasises the centrality of the temporal perspective: “what 
 40 
the account-holder, or the moment the latter has the opportunity to respond to the 
former. Two main temporal coordinates help discerning the possible variations. 
Firstly, the accounting may be ex post or ex ante, that is, it may take place after the 
decision by the accountee is made and implemented, consummating more or less 
concrete effects, or it may come somewhat earlier.99 Mechanisms of preventive 
control illustrate the latter whereas the posterior ascription of responsibility 
exemplifies the former. A combination between the two possibilities may jointly form 
a single accountability relationship. Occasionally, when the power-holder anticipates 
the potential reactions of the account-holder and acts accordingly, the distinction itself 
may partially lose its grip. The distinction between ex ante and ex post, thus, captures 
an ambivalence in the phenomenon of ‘being accountable’: to ‘perceive yourself 
accountable’ (and acting accordingly) and to ‘be held accountable’ (and suffering the 
consequences of your previous acts) are not the same thing. Both may indeed coalesce 
part of, or even most of the time, but it is crucial to note when they do not. 
Secondly, both ex ante and ex post reactions could also be qualified as 
immediate and prompt or as diffuse and gradual. Such temporal angle enables one to 
insert accountability relationships into a short or long-term horizon. Thirdly, these 
interactions across time can be characterised as a process and hence considered as 
following a set of phases. Roughly, this process would comprise, as Keohane and 
Grant suggest, three phases: first, the standard-setting; second, the process of 
informing, justifying and assessing; lastly, the sanction.100 This sequence of phases, as 
an “endless loop”,101 can permanently restart and configure iterative “cycles of 
accountability”.102 
Finally, the eleventh prism, finally, refers to the weight of the consequences 
that ensue from the exercise of power. The amount of power bestowed upon account-
holders to sanction accountees varies. Sanction is a wide concept and comprehends 
                                                 
determines the outcome of ‘recursive cycles of mutual accountability’ may be more a matter of when 
than where”. (2007, 14) 
99 There is some measure of disagreement in the literature with respect to this temporal dimension. For 
Keohane and Grant (2005), among others, accountability is chiefly a matter of ex post control. 
Mashaw, however, asserts that “ex post sanctioning is likely to be evidence of a poorly functioning 
accountability system, not a successful one”. For him, the “crucial purpose of accountability is really 
forward-looking or prophilatic.” (2006, 132) 
100 Keohane and Grant (2005) set out this definition, which has also been adopted by Rubenstein 
(2007). Bovens also distinguishes three stages, but in a slightly different way. They comprise 
information, interrogation and judgment. (2010, 952) 
101 Rubenstein, 2007, 618 
102 Schmitter, 2004, 49 
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mechanisms with greater or lesser teeth. Some authors have equated the power to 
sanction to the power to remove someone from office (a typical example would be the 
power of voters to periodically elect, re-elect or “diselect” their representatives). This 
automatic equation, though, neglects the more subtle ways through which power may 
effectively be constrained and held accountable. 
The power to remove the accountee is probably the most drastic but by no 
means the only instantiation of sanction there can be. Sanctions that fall short of sheer 
removal may comprise forms of public criticism and exposure, shaming and 
stigmatising, all of which can jeopardise the exercise and the very viability of 
legitimate power.103 The shrinkage of reputation, for example, might be disastrous for 
decision-making bodies that operate within a terrain of soft power.104  
Hard and soft or direct and indirect are apposite dichotomies to enclose the 
variety of sanctions there may be. It is undeniably important, for sure, to keep in mind 
that “inconsequential accountability is no accountability at all”.105 Embracing this 
forceful maxim, however, does not imply reducing “consequential” to the most severe 
kind of sanction. Whether a soft or indirect sanction creates efficient and credible 
enough constraints on the power-holder is a different, if relevant, empirical question, 
the implications of which should be addressed separately, according to each 
context.106 Some of them will do, while others will certainly not. Generalisations in 
such a domain would be prone to failure.107 At any rate, the extent to which sanction 
                                                 
103 Sanctions may also include the curtailing of budget, the curbing of jurisdiction, among others (see 
Ferejohn, 2007). Although Keohane believes that sanction must be presupposed by an accountability 
relationship, he has a flexible approach to it. His understanding of accountability of the Supreme Court 
exemplifies it: “The reputations of particular justices rise and fall depending on these evaluations. For 
justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, a devastating critique of an opinion may surely 
constitute a sanction.” (2002, 1134) Mashaw also recognises the significant range of possible 
sanctions: “sanctions range from removal to simple displeasure, or perhaps ostracism from the inner 
councils of the ruling elite”. (2006, 121) For Rubenstein, “bad publicity constitutes a sanction in its 
own right”. (2007, 626) 
104 Like the agents that are deprived of significant “potestas” and heavily depend on “auctoritas” in 
order to be followed. The IPCC, as chapter 4 will indicate, illustrates this. 
105 Schedler problematises this “tight coupling” between accountability and sanction and argues that, 
however weaker it might be, accountability can prosper without proper sanction. (1999, 16-17) 
106 Rubenstein elaborates on the adequate amount of sanction: “the sanction must be neither too mild 
nor too severe: if if is too mild it will function not as an effective deterrent, but rather as an additional 
cost that the power wielder must bear (…) If the sanction is too severe, it might dissuade power 
wielders from taking worthwhile risks.” (2007, 620) 
107 One could certainly try, as a rhetorical strategy, to retain the term “accountability” for describing 
and demanding thicker arrangements. One would evade the risk of legitimating, through using that 
term, too thin relationships. But, as far as the concept is concerned, it seems coherent to classify as 
instances of accountability those relationships in which the applicable sanction is too light. 
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is a “definitional component” of an accountability relationship will depend on how 
one defines sanction itself.108 
 These are, in sum, the minimal properties of an accountability relationship. 
With such coordinates at hand, one should be able not only to answer the set of 
descriptive questions advanced by the previous section in a more thorough and 
meaningful way, but also to join the normative debate from a more comprehensive 
starting point. Without such an analytical map, the observer may not go too far in 
portraying and criticising so complicated arrangements. The following table pinpoints 
these elementary units: 
 
Prisms Basic variations 
1. Formality 





7. Expertise  
8. Substance (output) 
9. Procedure (input) 
10. Timing 
11. Consequence 
More or less legalised 
Vertical (top down etc.) or horizontal (unidirectional etc.) 
Direct (standard) or indirect (surrogate) 
Unitary or pluralistic 
Wholesale (as “one”) or retail (as “many”) 
Internal or external 
Technocratic or lay 
Quality of standards; compliance-based or integrity-based 
Voting, reason-giving and other participatory tools 
Ex ante, ex post; immediate, gradual; multiple phases 
Hard and soft, direct and indirect sanctions 
 
 One can certainly play with these abstract ingredients and speculate about 
which recipes would engender the thickest and the thinnest relationships. Authors 
widely diverge on finding the exact thresholds, and occasionally deny the title of 
accountability to some of its thinnest instances.109 Here, I do not intend to engage in 
                                                 
108 For Philp, sanctions are not part of the core concept. This opposite view, for Philp, “muddles the 
object of description”. (2009, 35) 
109 For Stewart, accountability is either thick (with possibility of sanction) or it is something else. 
Expanding the concept to capture other sorts of relation would damage its “integrity and utility” (2008, 
3 and 9). Keohane and Grant are slightly less demanding. For them, accountability necessarily involves 
the right of account-holders to judge and punish the power-wielders. Besides, it occurs only after the 
fact, but can exert some ex ante. (2005, 29-30) Schedler is more flexible. Accountability, for him, has 
three dimensions – information, justification (answerability) and punishment (sanction) – but they do 
not have to be fully present for accountability to exist. (Schedler, 1999, 20) 
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this sort of definitional line-drawing. The coordinates offer a broad picture of how 
power relations are configured and how power-holders may be constrained and held 
accountable.110 
When pressed against complex concrete arrangements, these mostly 
dichotomic categories may fall apart somewhere at the edges. Abandoning these 
categories, however, would give away a useful source of insight, an angle without 
which, I believe, important things would otherwise remain unsaid and sound hardly 
plausible. Knowing how accountability relationships are structured along all these 
dimensions is an instructive, if not indispensable, step to understand them. Ignoring 
its “complex dimensionality”, as Schmitter contends, would restrict understanding.111 
The next section sets out the main functions one can derive from such coordinates. 
 
4. The functions (and dysfunctions) of political accountability 
 
Institutions are not built in order to be accountable in the first place.112 Some 
way or another, however, they are likely to be. If we needed a concept to help us 
minimally describe the features of this specific power-relation, the distinctions 
elaborated above would fairly do. However, in order to gain normative traction – or to 
know both who, how and why should account, and who, how and why should hold to 
account – one should further engage with the values and purposes involved. That 
would presuppose, to start with, a conception of legitimate politics.113 Accountability 
conveys no more than a special link between a power-holder and someone else. The 
mere perception of such a link, in itself, leaves us in a normative vacuum.114 One can 
presume neither a positive nor a negative quality in it. There is no such thing as a 
                                                 
110 Mashaw, for example, draws a comparison between “public governance” and “market” 
accountability in a way that, however less comprehensively, echoes the coordinates here systematised. 
In the former type, obligations would flow mostly in one direction (unidirectional). It would also be 
formalised, structured and collective. The latter, in turn, would be descentralised, informal and 
individualized, and comprise a more coordinate structure, based on mutual obligations. (2006, 128) 
111 Schmitter argues: “accountability cannot be captured by a single variable due to its ‘complex 
dimensionality’”. (2007, 19) 
112 As O’Neill implies, accountability is a second-order phenomenon. (2007, 167) 
113 In other words, a defence of accountable authority implies a notion of legitimacy, a statement of 
why it has sufficient moral standing to deserve compliance. This is a common claim of several authors. 
See, for example, Schmitter, 2004, 49. 
114 That is exactly why Philp advances a “parsimonious” or “stripped-down” concept of accountability, 
so as to distinguish its core from its occasional supplementary ingredients. Not doing that would “fail 
to distinguish between what something is (the nature of the component) and what is necessary for that 
component to produce a specific result.” (Philp, 2009, 32) 
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“pure theory” of accountability, as far as a value-laden prescription is concerned. That 
is, the appeal of the contemporary call for accountability does not stem from 
accountability tout court. Such call is not self-standing, but rather ancillary to an 
external ideal, be it explicitly articulated or not.115 Or so I shall argue. 
The most plausible way to defend and justify accountability, in this sense, is 
instrumentalist. Instead of an end in itself, it is a means to an end.116 More precisely, it 
is a means to a series of dissimilar and usually conflicting ends that those external 
ideals articulate. There is no single self-evident end to be promoted. This 
discomforting feature leads to an inevitably contested dispute.117 Which are, then, the 
expectations that are embedded in current accountability-talk? What are the 
institutional ills it is supposed to cure or the vices it is expected to prevent? When can 
accountability, to sum up, be seen as a good thing, as a positive qualifier of power 
relationships? 
This is an intricate theoretical problem, as controversial as political philosophy 
can get. To take a firm stand on such dispute is beyond the scope of the thesis. 
Nevertheless, one cannot entirely dodge the question if one wants to somehow 
participate in such debate. If anything, it is crucial to clearly identify the acceptable 
normative goals of accountability and be prepared to accept that, depending on the 
context, these goals may be mutually inconsistent or reinforcing. It is up to the 
context-oriented institutional designer to strike the suitable balances and value-
judgments. Tensions can hardly be solved, but a conscious designer has to manage 
them.118 Analytical transparency is a pre-condition for meaningful dialogue on the 
matter. 
Accountability scholarship roughly puts forward four pivotal normative 
rationales to back up its claims. Accountability devices would orient themselves (i) 
                                                 
115 Accountability, as it has been argued, has a close affinity with a multiplicity of uplifting terms. As 
Bovens maintains, it would be synonym for several “loosely defined political desiderata, such as good 
governance, transparency, equity, democracy, efficiency, responsiveness, responsibility, and integrity”. 
(2010, 946) 
116 Stewart, for example, contends that accountability is just one of the three mechanisms of 
governance, all of which aim, ultimately, to the promotion of participation and responsiveness. (2008, 
2) 
117 As Schmitter remins: “some of its positive properties may be incompatible with each other or, at the 
very least, involve complex tradeoffs.” (2007, 17) 
118 Managing rather than solving inevitable tensions is the fate of the institutional designer, as Mashaw 
has insightfully put. He shows, for example, how the tasks of managerial effectiveness and political 
responsiveness may become “strongly competitive”. (2005b, 160) And he adds: “But, this is a design 
problem that can only be managed, not solved. For, it entails maintaining an appropriate balance 
among competing forms of accountability”. (2005b, 154) 
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towards limiting power and inhibiting abuses; (ii) towards recognising, listening and 
responding to the plurality of voices of the account-holders – those who are deemed 
to have legitimate stakes on the matter; (iii) towards building institutional capacity – a 
particular craft for taking substantively good decisions; or, finally, (iv) towards 
fostering allegiance and obedience from the account-holders. Each rationale has a 
different story of legitimacy to tell, a distinct reason as to why accountability is a 
desirable attribute.119 The first rationale is defensive, the second is emancipatory, the 
third is technical and the fourth is strategic. I will call them, respectively, the 
constitutional, the democratic, the epistemic and the populist ambitions of 
accountability.120 Such polemical terms evoke concepts with complicated tensions 
and overlapping zones, not to mention their diverse yet intertwined historical 
traditions, which I will not directly address. I resort to them as terms of art.  
Let me elaborate a bit more on these four aspects of legitimacy. The 
constitutional aspect reverberates a conventional way to justify accountability. It 
basically seeks “to keep power from running wild”,121 to moderate and 
counterbalance its weight through a set of procedural techniques and substantive 
standards. Under such perspective, legitimate power cannot be raw and naked power. 
It should be restricted, so that the arguably constant danger of abuse (that is, of 
overstepping the commonly regarded limit) gets domesticated. This political maxim is 
meant to serve a clear-cut goal: the protection of individual autonomy. 
Accountability, here, enables account-holders to oversee their accountees, to ascribe 
responsibilities to them and to somehow punish or reward them, if necessary. The 
point of constraining authority, thus, is to block arbitrariness, to retain power under 
check.122 
The democratic variant of accountability is concerned with something else. 
Regardless of limits or checks, it is meant to give any member of a political 
                                                 
119 The dark side of the normative coin, or the spurious accountability relationships (anti-constitutional, 
anti-democratic and so forth), will be not elaborated here, but can be taken as the opposite of each of 
these rationales, what they try to combat. A different negative side of accountability devices, however, 
is their occasional dysfunctionality, which will be better elaborated below. 
120 Bovens et al (2008) and Bovens (2010) came up with a slightly similar approach and grasped three 
different roles that these mechanisms might have: constitutional, democratic and learning.  
121 Schedler, 1999, 19. 
122 The constitutionalist project, to be sure, is not only concerned with limits (its defensive or negative 
side), as others have forcefully shown, but also and firstly with empowerment itself (its constructive 
and positive aspect). On what can be called “positive constitutionalism”, see Sotirios Barber (2003) and 
Waldron (2010). I will focus only on the limiting and negative property of “constitutional”. 
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community who might have been affected or otherwise influenced by the exercise of 
authority, some fair leverage in collective decision-making. The usually rhetorical 
appeal of “the people” as the one and only source of legitimate power is, in practice, 
translated into more or less convoluted chains of power delegation or “transmission-
belts”.123 If authority is accountable in that way, one is supposed to trace back and 
ultimately find some incarnation of “the people” in the decisions that ask for 
collective compliance. Procedurally, this means that some channel must carry the 
plurality of voices into the final decision-making table, however distant that table 
might be. These voices, to invoke three other mainstream terms, are “included” or 
“represented”, and somehow “participate” in that table.124 The farther away this 
delegation string goes, nevertheless, the quieter the people’s voice and hence the less 
credible the democratic vestige becomes.125 How far-off that string can be stretched 
for convincingly granting the democratic pedigree is a disputed issue. 
Accountability arrangements, however, do not only interpose safeguards 
between power-holders and those subject to power in order to prevent abuses 
(constitutional rationale). Neither do they solely seek to receive the inputs of “the 
people” and somehow reflect and express their will, however loosely that will is 
conceived (democratic rationale). It is not only a transactional cost that hampers the 
efficiency of decision-making for the sake of other evenly important political goods. 
Accountability, as it has been argued, also carries a “promise of performance”126 or an 
“institutionalized capacity to learn”.127 It aspires to enable the power-holder to take 
appropriate decisions, to become an instrument for epistemically better choices. In 
that respect, accountability would improve the cognitive abilities of the institution and 
have a bearing on efficiency itself.128 
                                                 
123 A term conventionally used in US administrative law. See Stewart (1974) and Mashaw (2005a). 
124 Inclusion, representation, participation and responsiveness are, among some others, derivative 
virtues that underlie rhetorical appeals to democracy. 
125 Ferejohn (2007), for example, believes that this distance from electoral sources of authority can be 
compensated by a more stringent duty of reason-giving (like the one courts face), and this would still 
fit a democratic framework. 
126 For a sceptical view of the too quickly assumed “promise of performance” embedded in new 
reforms of public administration, see Dubnick (2005). The plausible possibility that accountability 
devices make power more competent does not necessarily lead to the empirical conclusion that power-
holders will be actually willing to be held accountable. 
127 Bovens, 2010, 954. This “learning dimension of accountability”, for Bovens, co-exists alongside the 
democratic and constitutional dimensions. 
128 Rubenstein highlights the epistemic dimension that springs from the exercise of judgment: “The 
back-and-forth instigated by the power wielder’s explanation can be a source of mutual learning and 
compromise and distinguishes accountability from mechanical enforcement of rigid rules.” (2007, 619) 
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Quite often, the concern with a putative accountability deficit is related neither 
to the risk of occasional power abuse nor to the lack of popular embedment. It is 
rather an apprehension about a possible malfunction, about the danger of power being 
used unwisely and unskilfully, even if, presumptively, with no arbitrary intentions, or 
arguably, with no elitist or exclusivist predispositions. In that case, accountability 
would not be dispensable no matter whether we could prove, hypothetically, that 
power-holders were the pure embodiment of reasonableness, self-restraint or popular 
conscience (that is, no matter how power-holders could fulfil our constitutional and 
democratic demands).129 This is a less visible aspect of an accountability relationship 
and must be elaborated with care. 
Somehow, there is a banal connection insinuated here. After all, if, through 
echoing a prevalent normative premise of western political thought, we argue that 
arbitrary and obscurantist decisions are necessarily wrong, then accountability devices 
that manage to obstruct these sorts of decisional faults should presumably enhance 
competence. Such negative sense of the epistemic promise does not exhaust the 
present claim though.130 Otherwise, the epistemic ambition would simply be 
redundant, that is, would be conflated with either the constitutional or the democratic 
ones. Nonetheless, a well-crafted accountability relationship, some will argue, has a 
competence-based virtue for reasons that do not simply replicate the constitutional or 
democratic ambitions.  
One could try to identify the singularity of the epistemic point by arguing that 
the notions of abuse and impermeability, which the constitutional and democratic 
dimensions respectively intend to rectify, are formal, whereas the epistemic point is 
substantive. The same political decision, thus, could be abusive or impermeable from 
the formal point of view, but still correct from a substantive perspective, or vice-
versa.131 But to classify the constitutional and democratic demands as merely formal, 
and to reserve the substantive pull for the epistemic facet, would neglect the intricate 
                                                 
129 Mashaw, for example, claims that there is an inherent demand of competence within democratic 
politics: “Indeed, in some significant sense, electoral politics cannot produce responsive government 
unless it is harnessed to technically competent administration. And incompetence is politically 
dangerous.” (2005b, 168) 
130 As explained earlier, the epistemic promise is here understood as the expectation that accountability 
arrangements are instrumental, among other things, for producing good decisions. 
131 That is, the procedures could be tainted by abuse and lack of transparency, but, at the same time, 
could deliver a reasonable and defensible output, or vice-versa. 
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interdependence between form and substance that both ideals entail.132 It would strain 
this formal/substantive dichotomy and yet offer an artificial answer to the question of 
which promise of accountability has a bearing upon the decisional output.133  
The epistemic promise is actually more aspiring. It affirms that the 
performance of an institution is, to some extent, contingent on the sort of 
accountability arrangement that applies to it.134 The epistemic promise is not only 
concerned with avoiding abusive and impermeable decisions, even if we envisage 
them from a substantive point of view. It also aims to highlight how accountability 
devices may develop, depending on the context and decisional issue at stake, the 
aptitude or the proficiency of an institution to reach better decisions (according to 
some criterion of correctness). It purports to call our attention to the fact that, 
oftentimes, there is an intersection between being “accountable” and being 
“competent”, a correlation between accountability devices and decisional accuracy.135 
Among other things, then, choosing the adequate accountability regime would also 
presuppose “weighing the comparative competence or incompetence of alternative 
accountability arrangements.”136 An accountability device is hardly indifferent to that. 
Lastly, accountability also has a populist aspect.137 Institutions tend to obtain 
better compliance with their decisions through mustering, with the aid of 
                                                 
132 There is no need to embark in this tricky theoretical controversy here. For a general explanation of 
the parallel formal and substantive aspects of democracy and constitutionalism, see Dworkin (1995). 
One could still claim that, whereas the constitutional and democratic ideals have a substantive ambition 
of a negative sort (that is, to avoid abuse and impermeability), the substantive aspect of the epistemic 
expectation would be positive (to find the best answer). This would come closer to what I intend to 
convey by the epistemic point. 
133 For Stewart, in a similar vein, the problem of disregard and the goal of accountability have both a 
procedural and a substantive aspect: the former is related to fairness – “to help ensure that the affected 
are fairly and appropriately treated in the decision made”; the latter is related to justice – “it may not be 
sufficient to satisfy the procedural regard (…), if the decision itself treats the affected with manifested 
injustice.” For him, this does not make procedure collapse into substance because substantive 
requirements still provide decision-makers with considerable “latitude in striking the balance”. (2008, 
5-6) 
134 Or, in Mashaw’s words, regimes are “regulators of institutional performance”. (2006, 154) 
135 The epistemic promise should not be confused with the distinction between “technocratic” (or 
“expertocratic”) and “lay” authorities, drawn in the previous section. The epistemic mission, generally 
conceived, can be pursued either through a technocratic or a lay authority, either by experts or non-
experts. Its plausibility will depend, for sure, of what is the decisional issue under consideration and the 
respective institutional arrangement designed to handle it. 
136 Mashaw, 2006, 116. 
137 The term “populist” has ambivalent meanings, some ostensibly pejorative and others more neutral 
and analytical. For an example of the former, see Couso (2010), who describes the “populist 
temptation” of current presidential regimes in Latin America as a danger of authoritarian regression 
and personalistic cult of a single leader. For an example of the latter, see Dahl, who contrasts 
“Madisonian” democracy to what he calls “populistic” democracy, a regime in which “majorities have 
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accountability mechanisms, a positive public perception. This property strengthens 
the reputation that an accountable institution conveys as well as such an institution’s 
consequent ability to encourage actual obedience. It illuminates a plain causality: if an 
institution is able to “maintain the confidence of the public”138, it has a greater 
propensity to be accepted. Accountability would help us construct, maintain and 
protect the trustworthiness and hence the social effectiveness of an institution.139-140 
These four dimensions, for sure, may crisscross each other from several angles 
when one uses them to observe concrete arrangements of accountability.141 The same 
device may be expected to play more than one function. For example, power may be 
limited by incorporating the diverse voices of the stakeholders; or an institution may 
construct its reputation and prompt collective compliance precisely because abusive 
decisions get blocked by the adoption of a veto point, and so forth.142 Arguably, a 
single device may simultaneously fulfil all the four functions and, thus, reach a 
symbiotic arrangement.  
Cases of benign convergence might, indeed, exist. But the four ambitions do 
not always join forces. When their vectors clash or compete, some accommodation 
may prove indispensable.143 Cases of divergence among the four functions tend to 
raise tricky normative dilemmas. If a point of equilibrium is not carved, the whole 
                                                 
unlimited sovereignty”. (2006, 37) The meaning stipulated here is closer to the latter, although I do not 
enter the specificities of majority rule. 
138 Keohane, 2003, 15. 
139 It would help “satisfy disappointed claimants”, to use Mashaw’s words (2006, 141). See also 
Dubnick, 2002, 5. Although trustworthiness cannot guarantee that actual trust will be earned, it gives 
good reasons for trust to be deserved by institutions. As Onora O’Neill argues: “Good reasons for 
rejecting blind trust are not good reasons for rejecting intelligent trust.” (2007, 164) She further argues: 
“Good systems of accountability […] can improve trustworthiness, and may offer helpful evidence for 
placing and refusing trust intelligently. But they do not and cannot supersede trust.” (2007, 163) In 
another book, she clarifies what that would entail: “Unless those who hold others to account are 
informed, unless they judge matters independently and unless they communicate intelligibly to 
relevant, specific audiences, accountability may do little to support trust”. (2008, 180) 
140 One should not mistake this populist aspect of accountability, however, with the pre-existing trust 
that should arguably obtain in order for accountability relationship to take hold. For Philp (2009), trust 
is an underpinning feature of accountability, not the product of it. This tension, however, should not be 
regarded as a binary “chicken-and-egg” question. Rather, both aspects (namely, trust as a pre-
condition, or trust as a product) can be seen as mutually reinforcing, as both cause and consequence. 
141 As Mashaw contends: “No institution really serves only one purpose or goal, and, therefore, no 
institution should be expected to be responsive to only one form of accountability regime.” (2006, 153) 
142 For an interesting account of the interrelationships between different conceptions of legitimacy 
(specially between moral, legal and sociological), see Fallon (2005). 
143 Mashaw, 2006, 130 and 147. 
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arrangement may become dysfunctional.144 Accountability becomes a laudable 
relational property to the extent that such balance is well struck. 
Apart from the mismatch of different purposes, a quantitative sort of 
dysfunction might also arise when the amount of the accountability burden becomes 
counter-productive.145 Different sorts of deficits or excesses will emerge from the 
miscalculation of those functions. Processes of accountability deflation or inflation, 
thus, should be assessed with care. Inflation can be a welcome evolvement if the 
status quo characterises a deficit, and vice-versa. Finding the optimal amount of 
accountability is a perpetual challenge of legal analysis and institutional design, 
which needs not to extrapolate the tipping point where accountability turns to be 
harmful rather than beneficial.146-147 
Deciding how accountable an institution should be, thus, is a not a 
straightforward and one-dimensional choice of an institutional designer. The 
appropriate accountability package is contingent on the ultimate purpose of an 
institution. The appropriate modular construct148 can be assembled only after such a 
purpose has been made sufficiently clear.149 Once fully developed, the modular 
construct has to delve into occasionally incongruous functions and to find out what 
devices better fit the particularities of this or that case. Conflicts of equally valuable 
or incommensurable functions demand the exercise of balancing or, to phrase it in 
                                                 
144 There is a significant literature on the inconsistencies, distortions or excesses of accountability 
arrangements. See Bovens (2007 and 2010) and Koppell (2005 and 2010). Dysfunctionality would 
refer to an arrangement of those expected functions that cannot be minimally met because of the wrong 
calibration of each chosen device. 
145 As Bovens claims: “more accountability does not necessarily produce better government. 
Accountability overkill discourages innovative and entrepreneurial behaviour in public managers”. 
(2010, 953) See also Koppell (2005) on “multiple accountability disorder”. 
146 Among the decisional flaws that might emerge, authors pay particular attention to “tunnel vision”, 
“ritualization”, “defensive routines”, “mutual stereotyping” and “hostile behaviour”. (Bovens et al, 
2008, 228 and Bovens, 2010, 954) 
147 A traditional pathology is the overemphasis on conformity to strict rules, which reduces 
discretionary judgment. This is a typical epistemic dysfunction: the decision-maker prioritises the 
avoidance of punishment at the expense of making creative judgments, and instead of thinking on what 
the good decision is, she gets primarily concerned with minimising the risk of being penalised. 
148 Or, alternatively, “radial concept”, as Schedler would prefer. Schedler explains: “They are 
continuous variables that show up to different degrees, with varying mixes and emphases.” (1999, 17) 
149 The institutional purpose logically precedes, of course, the question of how accountable this 
institution should be. As Mashaw remarks: “much of the dispute about accountability is a dispute about 
what particular institutions are meant to do, not how accountable they are in the doing of it.” (2006, 
117) For him, the question of how accountable an institution should be is “parasitic on beliefs about the 
true purposes of the program” (2006, 155) 
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economic jargon, imply trade-offs and cost-benefit assessments.150 In what follows, I 
expose the main archetypes that can be found in real world institutions and some 
trade-offs that have to be struck. 
 
5. The archetypes of political accountability 
 
“Archetype” sounds a bit pompous and pretentious. Indeed, the term has been 
borrowed and distinctly conceptualised by eminent traditions of thought.151 
Etymologically, however, it evokes a primary template, an elementary pattern from 
which we derive more complex objects and concepts. In this non-technical sense, 
“archetype” is an adequate term to refer to the basic modules that accountability 
arrangements put together in order to pursue the functions enumerated above. An 
archetype, in other words, is the classical instance of a proper function, the paramount 
and arguably first-best institutional translation of that general principle. Among the 
infinite fancy permutations of coordinates one could think of and experiment with, I 
will first enumerate some that are more frequently found in existing institutions and 
will then discuss their functional interrelation.  
As for the democratic function, nowadays, one can hardly acknowledge that a 
political regime is democratic if it does not, at the very least, collect and convert 
individual votes into a quota of seats within a representative body through a reliable 
procedure (usually through an arithmetic formula that materializes a plausible 
conception of equality, as e.g. “one man, one vote”). Competitive elections, the act of 
delegation through which a principal-agent relationship between constituents and 
representatives is founded, are the first-best archetype of democratic accountability. 
Voting is the basic procedural mechanism to empower or disempower, to reward or 
sanction the representatives according to their performance as appraised by the 
constituents. 
                                                 
150 As Schmitter puts it: “some of its ‘positive properties’ may be incompatible with each other, or at 
least may involve complex tradeoffs. High levels of individual participation may not be so 
benevolently linked to subsequent attention and sense of obligation.” (2004, 56) 
151 Dictionaries of philosophy map the abundant meanings and manifestations of this concept in the 
history of philosophy. In the contemporary literature on law and politics, it is also used with some 
frequency. Wind criticises the focus on federal and national models as the only “archetypes of 
international transformation” (2003, 124); Carens points to Nazi Germany and Apartheid South Africa 
as the “archetypes of moral wrong” (2000, 215); Manin examines the historical moment when the 
British House of Commons was “the archetype of parliamentarianism” (1997, 204). 
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Second-best supplements, to be sure, can also resonate the democratic idea. 
Devices of participation, responsiveness, transparency and the like, despite 
engendering spheres of engagement and influence that fall short of decision-making 
power, establish horizontal constraints that can conceivably be traced back to the 
people. All these mechanisms, admittedly, tend to be primarily but not exclusively 
associated with democratic accountability, since institutional arrangements are 
versatile to pursue a large variety of ends. Elections, for example, are first and 
foremost perceived as a tool to empower the people. However, one should not 
underestimate their ability to limit governmental power, to trigger adequate legislation 
and policies and to induce the compliance of the constituents with the decisions of 
representatives (that is, to pursue the three other functions of accountability). 
Constitutional archetypes, in turn, are of two sorts: on the defensive and 
negative side, the procedure of horizontal checks and balances and the substantive 
standards that underlie the discourse of rights put, when in good working-order, limits 
on power, that is, they demarcate what power cannot do, the realms of action it cannot 
pervade; on the constructive and discursive side, institutions in charge of deciding on 
the basis of principled and public reasons, like courts and other regulatory agencies, 
also flesh out the ambition of constitutional accountability. 
As for the epistemic function, a variety of procedural mechanisms are 
regarded as appropriate to fulfil the specific task of an institution. When this task is 
somehow related to expertise, arrangements such as panels or committees of experts, 
dense mechanisms of peer review and review bodies, among others, may fit the bill. 
When that task in not predominantly technical and does not require specialized 
knowledge, then the appropriate epistemic device would probably overlap with either 
the democratic or the constitutional archetypes. Once again, the example of elections 
is illuminating: apart from its democratic pedigree, it arguably channels multiple 
voices and hence facilitates a better-informed collective decision. Finally, the populist 
function of accountability does not exactly have an institutional archetype. Since its 
goal is to gain the allegiance and respect from the addressees of power, whatever 
arrangement can foster social legitimacy would meet its central demand. 
To summarise, elections and a set of other voice-giving channels signal a 
democratic function; mechanisms of mutual oversight, substantive standards of 
decency and burdens of public justification play a self-styled constitutional role; 
devices of information-gathering and knowledge-producing would enhance an 
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institution’s epistemic capacities and, lastly, whatever mechanisms manage to 
improve the public perception of an institution would highlight a populist function. 
There are further ways, however, to think about the archetypes of 
accountability. A supplementary point of entry to this exercise is to collect and 
organise the major typologies that the current literature on accountability puts 
forward. Ferejohn and Keohane have respectively furnished a minimalist and a 
maximalist typology. The contrast that can be drawn between the two is illuminating. 
Ferejohn offers a simple yet percipient typology, in the context of what he calls “folk 
democratic theory”. For Ferejohn, there are two basic archetypes of accountability: 
political and legal. The former is practiced through silent and arbitrary voting, a crude 
choice that does not need to be publicly justified. Election is the main example of 
such a mechanism: the accountees (elected officials) are invested, assessed and 
removed from office without having the right to ask the account-holders to explain 
why they chose to remove them. Public reasons, whatever they might be, do not 
matter, or at least are not required of any voter. Political accountability guarantees 
citizen’s right to capriciously say no, to vote in and to vote out with no concern for 
public justification. Its arbitrariness and blandness, for Ferejohn, is precisely its 
virtue. 
Legal accountability, in turn, consists in a constraint of public reason-giving 
based on general norms that judges must discharge.152 It fosters less caprice and more 
open dialogue. Under such regime, non-elected authorities, despite having tenure and 
being shielded from elections, bear a heavier burden of reason-giving instead. Folk 
democratic theory provides a proportionally inverse continuum that encloses, at each 
pole, a pure type of accountability: the closer to the electorate, the lesser the duty to 
reason; the farther away, the greater pressure to argue.153 Parliaments and courts 
would epitomise these two poles: periodical voting by the electorate and reason-
                                                 
152 The literature on the legitimacy of judicial review of legislation is an example of a blunt equation 
between accountability and election. The typical question that inspires much of that discussion is why 
“unelected and unaccountable” judges should be authorised to overrule the acts of “elected and 
accountable” legislators. Ferejohn (2007) rejects such flat contrast by distinguishing between 
accountability through “voting” and accountability through “reason-giving”.  
153 Ferejohn explains: “A well functioning political/legal system can be expected to exhibit a range of 
accountability relations that runs roughly from the political to the legal or, if you prefer, from the 
arbitrary or wilful to the reasonable or deliberative.” (2007, 10) Whereas the first pole of such 
continuum would present a “deliberative deficit”, the other would have a “democratic deficit”. 
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giving by judges are what prototipically characterises political and legal 
accountability.154 
Keohane widens the compass and offers a comprehensive picture of eight 
accountability types.155 These types, moreover, are not necessarily attached to the 
value of democracy. The first four derive from an act of delegation of powers, on the 
basis of which the delegator has the authority, through various means, to control the 
delegate. They can be hierarchical (the control, within organisations, exercised by 
superiors over subordinates); supervisory (a subtly milder form of control, usually 
inter rather than intra-institutional, by which supervisees respond to supervisors for 
their decisions); electoral (the control of elected officials by the electorate); and fiscal 
(the funding agents require certain level of information and performance from the 
funded agents).  
The remaining four types are imbued with what Keohane calls participation. 
They assign to different actors the possibility of constraining others’ decisions by 
having leverage, though sometimes short of formal entitlements, in the activities of 
others.156 They can be legal (where agents are required to abide by formal rules and 
be prepared to justify their actions before courts or quasi-judicial arenas); market 
(through a diversity of principals that constrain economic agents); peer (by which 
professionals are constrained to perform adequately in the eyes of her peers); and 
                                                 
154 Two caveats regarding the use of the words “political” and “legal” are opportune. Firstly, the 
general concept of political accountability, on the basis of which this chapter was structured, seems to 
contradict Ferejohn’s opposition between “political” and “legal”. What I call “political”, however, is 
broader than Ferejohn’s conception of the term. This apparent tension can be solved by considering the 
concept of political accountability adopted by the chapter as a genus (political with “P”), and 
Ferejohn’s concept of political as a specimen of that genus (political with “p”). To be sure, law usually 
disciplines the procedures of election as well, but not the substantive choice of voting itself. That is 
why election, in Ferejohn’s terms, is a mode of political rather than legal accountability. A second 
caveat, which will be important for understanding Keohane’s notion of “legal” accountability below, 
relates to what many authors refer to as “accountability to law”. What is actually at stake, in this case, 
is the subjection of certain agents to the review by the quintessentially legal institution, the judge or 
judicial tribunal, according to legal standards. When Ferejohn talks about “legal accountability”, he is 
concerned with how judges and courts themselves can be held accountable, not with subjecting third 
agents to the oversight of judges and courts (in other words, he is talking about accountability of 
adjudication or judges, not about accountability to adjudication and adjudicative-type procedures, by 
challenging the legality of third-party decisions in courts). 
155 See Keohane (2002) or Keohane and Grant (2005). Stewart (2011) proposes a similar typology, 
although slightly more restrictive. For him, accountability has an irreducible set of elements, which 
involves the presence of an account-holder with formal authority to call the power-holder to account 
and, ultimately, to sanction her deficient or unlawful actions. Accordingly, there would be only five 
types of accountability mechanisms available: electoral, fiscal, hierarchical, supervisory and legal. 
Stewart thus deliberately excludes market, peer and reputational types. 
156 Keohane and Grant, 2005, 36-37. 
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lastly, public reputational, a more general pressure by which any authority feels 
constrained to. 
These typologies are far from covering all the permutations that could be 
rehearsed among the accountability coordinates. They exemplify, nonetheless, the 
most ordinary, perhaps commonsensical, arrangements through which those functions 
materialise. Each overall accountability arrangement will, most of the time, pursue 
more than one function. Hybrid models emerge from a combination of archetypes. 
The extent to which this multi-functional design will be reinforcing, symbiotic and 
virtuously competitive or, on the other hand, malignly erosive and harmful points to 
the crux of the matter. 
Archetypes of accountability are mental constructs that can hardly be 
concretely implemented in their pure form. They are optimal solutions that emerge 
after one applies a simplified “test of appropriateness”: the inquiry into which 
institutional device would be adequate to perform and excel in one single function. 
Such ideal solutions, however, do not conclude the work of an institutional designer. 
Real-world institutions, after all, are charged with overlapping rather than unitary 
functions. 
The purposeful design of accountability arrrangements, therefore, consists in 
balancing the plural functions each device is supposed to undertake in an overall 
institutional operation. Because each single device might be simultaneously suitable 
for one function and unsuitable for another, the “test of appropriateness” of a real 
institutional arrangement becomes more fallible and tentative. Philp has insightfully 
captured what that test amounts to. For him, the designer faces the taxing challenge of 
“keeping accountability clean”, that is, of “ensuring that it is used for the right 
purposes and ends”, as well as that it is kept “with the spirit of the institutions to 
which it applies”.157 
 
6. Conclusion: a form in search of substance 
 
What exactly do we praise when we praise accountability? This question is not 
a rhetorical one. It should have become clear, by now, why it is worth asking. 
Accountability works, like other complex political concepts, as an umbrella-term for a 
                                                 
157 Philp, 2009, 45. 
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“nested set of inquiries”.158 This chapter sought to present the many anxieties that 
accountability spurs, and put them under an intelligible and orderly expository 
scheme. Coordinates, functions and archetypes are the analytical lenses through 
which I will discuss accountability in the next chapters. 
The concept of accountability, as I have tried to show, has been both under 
and over-signified:159 under-signified, when it gets restricted to the praiseworthy types 
of power relationships, ignoring the spurious types and practically equating 
“accountable” power with “legitimate” power; over-signified, when it ends up 
inadvertently incorporating external political ideals. 
Accountability is a formal property that might be present in some power 
relationships. Its semantic reach range from the slightest sort of constraint to muscular 
forms of power control.160 Deprived of a substantive orientation, though, it tells little 
about why we should foster it. With no good answer as to “why” some should be held 
accountable to others in a particular way, accountability remains nothing but a link 
between two subjects, without anything intrinsically or instrumentally valuable in it. It 
can equally serve emancipation and domination, self-government and oppression, 
efficiency and inefficiency, institutional integrity and venality. Sultans and dictators, 
as Schmitter has reminded, or even criminal gangs and corruption schemes, are 
accountable in their own way, however abhorrent to us their distribution of rewards 
and sanctions might be.161 
The attempt to render accountability an independent political ideal turns it into 
a rather enigmatic category, as hollow and manipulable as any buzzword that 
permeates low-quality political debates.162 If we want more than a sound-bite, we 
need to dissect and identify what values lurk behind each of the claims for 
accountability. Their appeal is not self-standing. Rather than a substitute for political 
                                                 
158 Mashaw, 2006, 116. 
159 Bovens et al: “It is an evocative concept that is all too easily used in political discourse and policy 
documents because it conveys an image of transparency and trustworthiness. Moreover, 
‘accountability’ often serves as a conceptual umbrella that covers various other, often highly contested, 
concepts.” (2008, 226) 
160 Example of policy documents like the World Bank Handbook: accountability can be a meta-
principle, a principle or a standard (see Kingsbury and Donaldson, 2011). 
161 Schmitter, 2004, 48. Similarly, for Keohane, “not all forms of accountability are intrinsically 
democratic. It is an essential aspect of democracy, but it exists, in some forms, in all political regimes.” 
(2002, 1131) Rubenstein gives a similar example: “it is perfectly comprehensible to say that Hitler held 
his underlings accountable for failing to follow Nazi protocol.” (2007, 618) 
162 That is what Mashaw means when he calls accountability a “protean concept”, a “placeholder for 
multiple contemporary anxieties”. (2006, 115) 
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ideals, accountability is a technology that helps these ideals to pursue their various 
ends.  
A purist accountability discourse would thus lack normative direction. Only a 
clearly fleshed-out political ideal can provide such a north. Accountable power, if not 
normatively qualified, does not equal legitimate power. If accountability intends to 
become a benchmark for legitimacy, its concept needs supplementary normative 
flesh. This realisation, for sure, is just the beginning, not the end of the problem. 
Trivial though as this claim might sound, it has not been openly conceded by many 
authors.163 
The following chapter will further illustrate this story. The current chapter 
sought to craft a sharp enough question that enables the observer to capture and 
understand, when examining a certain institution, the absence or presence of elements 
of accountability and what values they might serve. In other words, it uncovers an 
analytical scaffolding without which accountability-talk tends to become mystifying, 
if not unintelligible. The following chapter, in turn, presents the key instantiations of 
accountability that domestic and global politics provide, their varying degrees of 
density and their more or less explicit alliance to higher order political ideals. Of 
course, one can doubt whether the enlarged conception here adopted is adequate and 
sufficiently enlightening for our inquiry. Yet several arguments discussed in the 
following chapters purport to relieve such doubts. 
 
                                                 
163 Philp has forcefully urged on the drawing of this distinction: “whether (and in what forms) an 
accountability relationship exists is a descriptive claim; whether we want more or less of it, or different 
types or additional dimensions of it, will be driven by normative commitments, and we should not run 
the two together.” (2009, 32) 
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Chapter 2 
The context(s) of accountability 
 
“Accountability – or lack thereof – is a fundamental challenge  




Evaluative claims aired in the public sphere often struggle with the temptation 
to insert most cherished institutional qualities into a single master concept that 
entangles all others and simplifies the message. Nuances fade away in such an all-
encompassing picture. In the light of such resounding symbol, practices and 
procedures are hastily praised or criticised. Accountability discourses have probably, 
if inadvertently, suffered from this verbal mannerism. The word has earned a flashy 
rhetorical influence. The concept behind it, though, recommends circumspection.165 
Accountability is not the summa of all legal and political virtues. It may not even be 
virtuous at all.166 
Conceptual clarification, therefore, is an indispensable first step whenever one 
comes across such multiple-meaning umbrella terms. Accountability is a value-free 
phenomenon (or toolbox) that can manifest (or be used for) good and wicked 
properties (or purposes). Its neutrality partly explains its versatility and omnipresence. 
The first chapter set out a conceptual glossary to grasp the “grammar of 
accountability”167 and gave us a helpful analytical orientation. It did not intend to 
unveil the one and only frame of mind under which it makes sense to talk about 
accountability, but rather to stipulate a concept that disciplines my argument. It did 
answer, yet quite briefly, some initial questions: What is to be accountable? What is, 
in particular, to be politically and legally accountable? What are the descriptive 
                                                 
164 Najam and Halle, 2010, 1. 
165 Echoing Dubnick’s (2002) distinction between “accountability-the-word” and “accountability-the-
concept”. 
166 As Raz pointed out: “Not uncommonly when a political ideal captures the imagination of large 
numbers of people its name becomes a slogan used by supporters of ideals which bear little or no 
relation to the one it originally designated.” (1979, 210) Or as Kopell remarked: “Accountability has 
become a catchall for everything good in governance and administration.” (2010, 293) Or Bovens et al: 
“Accountability is one of those golden concepts no one can be against.” (2008, 225) To use Krygier’s 
words, accountability would be within the prime list of “unassailably Good Things” (2010, 1) or 
“hurrah words” (2007, 8) of politics. 
167 Mashaw, 2006, 117. 
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coordinates, defensible functions and discernible or historically experimented 
archetypes of accountability? In what ways does law relate with all this? 
The current chapter pursues a rather different line of inquiry. It departs from 
the premise that what complicates accountability discourses is not only the 
multiplicity of concepts they imply and their more or less pronounced normative 
undertones, but also the various contexts they address.168 Whereas chapter 1 indicates 
what accountability means in abstract, this chapter illuminates much of what it has so 
far meant in practice, along with the values that are built in accountability 
arrangements, and some of the challenges that lie ahead. In that respect, the present 
chapter is concerned with other sorts of questions, such as: What is for national and 
international institutions to be accountable? What distinguishes the international 
accountability mechanisms from the national ones? What explains the current 
anxieties with regards to the alleged accountability deficit of novel international 
institutions and practices? What normative expectations do they aspire to? Which new 
directions or reforms do they indicate? 
Zooming out, and in spite of a dense interconnectedness between them, two 
general contexts of political accountability come forth: ‘within the state’ and ‘beyond 
the state’.  If one zooms in, one would perceive that the state context comprises, due 
to the pulverisation of internal sovereignty through a broad distribution of power, an 
intricate chain of interlocking bodies that are accountable in multiple ways (certainly 
not just in the hierarchical principal-agent style). One would also realise that the 
‘beyond the state’ context – traditionally depicted as a world of sovereign and 
autarchic political communities that may contract among themselves – is under 
intense transformation. It not only accommodates and sets the terms of engagement 
between multiple sovereigns, but also includes non-state actors that did not have any 
significant political weight until recently. If one gets even closer, one would further 
notice that the very distinction between domestic and international gets blurred at the 
edges and fails to grasp an evolving institutional space in between, which is not 
precisely grasped, however much one tries, by that categorical dichotomy.169 
                                                 
168 The chapter draws some inspiration, it may fairly be said, from Keohane’s and Grant’s claim: the 
“appropriateness and efficacy of any of our mechanisms for accountability will depend on the 
particular context.” (2005, 40) This is not, to be sure, an unprecedented insight, but is definitely one 
that straightforwardly meets the conditions for a sensible discussion on accountability. 
169 What Held calls “intermestic” (2004, 371), or Kingsbury et al call “distributed administration” 
(2005, 20). 
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The next section will describe how accountability, despite obvious variations, 
is generally organized in constitutional democracies. The third section will then 
describe how accountability had been somewhat settled, and currently has been 
disrupted at the international arena. This sequence – from ‘within the state’ to 
‘beyond the state’, using the former as a departing default template for looking at the 
latter – replicates the expository strategy of the mainstream literature thereupon.170 
The dichotomy, however, is a loose one and should not obscure the presence of 
significant intermediary decision-making sites. 
The fourth and the fifth sections will outline how that sense of ‘accountability 
deficit’ or ‘legitimacy crisis’ has been approached by one of the most influential 
legitimacy discourses that have recently surfaced: “global administrative law” (GAL). 
The ‘GAL project’171 is one of the current intellectual enterprises that seek to 
understand, describe and take a critical stand on what is happening beyond the state 
from a legal and institutional point of view.  Despite usually sharing some deep values 
with other reformist discourses, the GAL project has its own distinct takes and 
proposals. Rather than a mere terminological or peripheral disagreement, though, the 
project diverges from other similar enterprises with respect to (i) the remedies for 
current pathologies of accountability arrangements, (ii) the perception of historical 
feasibility of reforms and (iii) what is, at least in the foreseeable future, the most 
desirable model of global governance through international law. 
This extensive route completes the preparatory stage of the thesis. It provides 
the necessary repertoire for examining three specific institutions of the Climate 
Change Regime. Rather than a textbook description of this large topic, or a 
fragmentary sample of the extensive contemporary discussion, this chapter orders and 
casts light on the multiple angles from which the question of accountability in 
                                                 
170 See Ferejohn (2007). Or as Keohane and Grant have asked: “How should we think about global 
accountability when there is no global democracy? How can understanding accountability at the level 
of the nation-state clarify the problem of accountability at the global level?” (2005, 30) 
171 A caveat about the meaning of ‘GAL project’ should be put forward. The expression might suggest 
a false image of a rigid and self-contained group of people working under a commonly shared 
conceptual apparatus. This first take on it, though, is inaccurate. The ‘GAL project’ is not exactly an 
organic and homogeneous school of thought in international law, but rather a collective initiative of 
scholars that are concerned with the need to conceptualise the space of administration within the 
overall structure of global governance. GAL is an umbrella-term that has convened authors to ask a set 
of crucial questions. For the sake of clarification, I will use ‘GAL project’ when I refer to this research 
enterprise, and only ‘GAL’ when I refer to the emergence of an institutional phenomenon that can be 
plausibly called “global administrative law”. This distinction will become clearer in section 5. 
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international and transnational law can be conceived.172 This broad backdrop, despite 
overlooking specificities, shows whether and how GAL project is a pertinent 
analytical template and fruitful legitimacy discourse for the particular case-studies 
that follow in later chapters. 
 
2. Power and accountability within the state 
 
Any attempt to summarise how accountability is shaped within the state, or 
how it operates within the self-styled constitutional democracies, needs to face the 
bare fact that there surely are as many variations of domestic accountability systems 
as there are states. The risks of parochialism, anachronism, ethnocentrism or 
simplistic didacticism remain behind any such effort. Yet, the opposite risk – namely, 
the risk of overlooking the existence of insightful commonalities and core features at 
a more general level – is not less disconcerting. It is true that reputedly democratic 
nation-states diverge immensely on how they instantiate some general devices of 
authority, such as electoral and participatory mechanisms. It is not less true, though, 
that oftentimes these particular devices are conceived and justified under strikingly 
similar accountability principles. 
However that may be, the goal of this section is to offer a panoramic view of 
some basic archetypes of accountability that function within constitutional 
democracies, or to pinpoint what is it that they share.173 I intend to describe those 
overall arrangements through the coordinates of accountability put forward in chapter 
1, or to read the centerpieces of such architecture through those categories. To some 
extent, the previous chapter, by way of explaining the idea of archetypes, already 
kicked off the exercise that is carried on here. 
The accountability project of national constitutional democracies is mainly 
undertaken by public law in general, constitutional and administrative laws in 
particular. As Mashaw reminds us, there is an “accountability project implicit in 
                                                 
172 For the sake of terminological clarity, it is useful to distinguish between ‘international’ and 
‘transnational’ or ‘supra-national’ law even though this distinction is one of degree rather than of kind. 
Whereas the former captures the traditional horizontal agreements – either bilateral or multilateral – 
among states, the latter illuminates some thicker modes of regulating state’s behaviour. Finally, 
‘global’ will be used here as a generic term that denotes either one or the other. These terminological 
choices do not significantly deviate from general usages of the international law literature, despite the 
linguistic variation that still remain. 
173 Kumm claims: “There is a consensus today that legitimacy of domestic law is predicated on it being 
justifiable in terms of a commitment to liberal constitutional democracy”. (2004, 910) 
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public law liberal legality.”174 It is, thus, a project that resorts to hard state law, even 
if one can also identify elements of soft law and long-established conventions 
operating in the interstices.  
The democratic state embodies a large chain of institutionalised accountability 
relationships. It comprises (i) a series of delegations and transmission-belts from the 
vertical point of view (typically hierarchical, principal-agent relationships), (ii) 
divisions of labour from the horizontal point of view (which follow some sort of 
checks and balances and coordination logic), and (iii) some additional sites of 
interaction and control from the diagonal point of view. Let me elaborate on how 
accountability is diffused along these three spatial perspectives. 
 
2.1 Spatial picture 
 
The vertical angle enables one to pick out accountability relationships in at 
least three spheres. First and foremost, the one established between political 
institutions and the people. Before anything else, the people hold authorities to 
account by means of democratic elections and their right to an equal vote. However, 
various additional participatory tools may allow individuals to intervene, directly or 
mediated by a third body, like a court, in the general decision-making of 
administrative, legislative and other judicial bodies. In these extra-electoral channels 
for holding authorities to account, it is usually the pressure of justification and reason-
giving, intensified by transparency and contestatory tools, that purportedly 
compensates for the absence of election.175 Some of the avenues through which one 
can set a vertical bottom-up relationship between the people and the officials  might 
even be of the surrogate kind (when, for example, an organisation represents the 
interests of a vulnerable group of citizens).176  
These sorts of arrangements are usually classified into the compartment of 
either constitutional, administrative or procedural law: into constitutional law due to 
its substantive standards to check the validity of collective decisions; into 
                                                 
174 Mashaw, 2006, 133 
175 As already seen in chapter 1, Ferejohn (2007) conceives the distinction between political and legal 
accountability on the basis of how close the accountee is to the people (that means, to elections). The 
farthest from election an authority is located, according to him, the greater its burden of reason-giving 
should be. 
176 Like, for example, public attorneys that, in some constitutional regimes, have the mandate to defend 
the rights of excluded or de-mobilised groups. 
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administrative law because of its formal requirements to constrain discretion; and into 
procedural law due to its formal rules that discipline the procedural steps necessary 
for an individual to hold an authority to account in a judicial or extra-judicial arena. 
Second, hierarchical dynamics within the intrabranch sphere also underscore a 
vertical accountability phenomenon. From the ultimate chief of a respective branch, 
the chain of delegation may go downwards along several levels (like, for example, 
from the president to her ministries, secretaries and so on). A typically hierarchical 
relationship will predominantly be shaped by trust, that is, by an integrity-based rather 
than compliance-based accountability mechanism. The accountee, at the inferior 
position, usually has some minimum measure of discretion to take decisions, whereas 
her superior, the account-holder, can sanction her without the need for rule-based 
public justification. 
Third, another genre of vertical relationship may be struck through devices of 
territorial decentralisation and sub-national entities, either in a hard form of a 
federation, which divides internal sovereignty into further relatively autonomous units 
of power, or in lighter forms of division of labour between the centre and the 
regionalised units. Accountability relationships, thus, are here established between a 
central authority that has jurisdiction over the whole territory, and the regional or 
local authorities with competence to act over an internally demarcated region. 
Techniques for dividing the competencies between the parts and the unifying whole, 
and further tools to adjudicate occasional conflicts that arise between these different 
vertical levels, are usually meant to oil the wheels of such accountability 
relationships. 
To sum up, the vertical perspective is able to identify not only a vast array of 
principal-agent delegation relationships (in the two first spheres), but also a federal-
like division of legislative, adjudicatory and policy-driven competencies across sub-
national levels. Such competencies will be either bottom up, tracing back the ultimate 
account-holders to the people, or top-down, whereby higher-level authorities control 
the acts and assess the performance of the lower-level officials. 
 The horizontal angle, in turn, illuminates another type of accountability 
dynamics that is also widespread in constitutional democracies. Rather than a 
command-and-control or hierarchical way of organising power, the horizontal prism 
captures an element of accountability constraint in interbranch ‘checks and balances’ 
and other bilateral coordination mechanisms that take place at the intrabranch domain.  
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Horizontal accountability, in such context, may be uni-directional (when, for 
example, a court controls administrative acts, but the executive branch lacks any 
formal tool to control courts back) or bi-directional (when, for example, a court 
controls legislative acts, but the parliament has competence to respond and challenge 
judicial decisions). As for the temporal coordinate, horizontal accountability 
relationships may operate ex ante, when horizontal constraints have a bearing on the 
very decision the power-holder takes, may occur ex post, when the act of judging and 
sanctioning by the account-holder succeeds the decision of the power-holder, or both 
symultaneously in continuous circular movements. 
Horizontal mechanisms solve a classic dilemma of public law that vertical 
mechanisms spark: how to control the ultimate guardian? By letting “overseers”177 
check one another, the trap of infinite regress, or of sheer absence of oversight, is 
circumvented. Vertical mechanisms, on the other hand, are supposed to solve the 
dilemma that horizontal mechanisms elicit: who settles the issue at last? By defining 
an ultimate, however provisional, decision-maker, the trap of infinite circularity and 
lack of settlement is partially relieved. It is the balance between these two spatial 
coordinates of accountability that help constitutional democracies to eschew, 
accommodate or alleviate both predicaments. 
The spatial metaphor also allows us to identify diagonal accountability 
relationships.178 The diagonal angle might approximate the working logic of either the 
vertical or the horizontal perspectives. A typical example of the former case is the 
interaction between two different federal entities in a command-and-control style (like 
the federal legislature defining a mandatory policy that needs to be obeyed by the 
executive branch of sub-national units). The latter case, in turn, is exemplified by any 
comprehensive public policy that needs to be pursued by the cooperative involvement 
of a series of agencies that cut across the federal levels. 
The constitutional document, if there is one, the infra-constitutional legislation 
and the lower normative directives laid down by the administrative bodies themselves 
legally structure these accountability relationships. 
 
                                                 
177 As Thompson contends: “A completely hierarchical system of accountability is subject to a regress 
of authority; overseers overseeing overseers all the way up. But in the absence of a single trustworthy 
guardian (…) the answer must be to multiply the overseers at various levels, and allow them to check 
one another.” (2004, 261) 
178 Slightly similar to the “oblique” perspective, for Schmitter (2004, 53). 
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2.2 Legitimising the interlocking axes 
 
This is certainly not all that accountability at the domestic level means. 
Though relatively cursory, the description above should suffice for singling out the 
backdrop rationale of accountability within the state. Mashaw contends that 
“accountability regimes directed toward public governance are meant to reinforce the 
normative commitments of the political system.”179 In order to grasp the character of 
a given accountability arrangement, thus, he rightly stresses the importance of 
unveiling the principles that undergird its overall structure, its general telos. 
That chain of accountability relationships calls for a justificatory discourse in 
its background. How are, then, these accountability relationships justified? Actual 
constitutional democracies promote a normative fusion between the ideals of 
democracy, constitutionalism, and the rule of law. Such regimes somehow managed 
to interweave such diverse ideals into one institutional tissue. They strive, at one and 
the same time, to render political power accountable to the people, to fundamental 
rights, and to previously enacted and predictably enforced general rules and 
principles. Such entangled demands forge a legitimacy story that, however contested, 
has become a fairly consolidated mainstream public philosophy that underlies the 
current power arrangements within the state. That story cannot unfold without 
invoking each of those general ideals. 
This is a kind of disseminated common sense, the “folk theory” in which 
constitutional democracies are embedded.180 Regardless of the complexity to which 
vertical, horizontal and diagonal axes might get, they have a vital common 
denominator. Power has a final cornerstone, a common root that grounds it. There is a 
magnetic needle that pulls the claims of legitimacy towards an all-encompassing 
polity. 
The pyramidal metaphor has been a stereotypical image to grasp how political 
power is understood, and its respective legitimacy basis conceived, within the state. A 
pyramid, for sure, misses the horizontal accountability phenomena described above. 
Nonetheless, it depicts the prevailing working logic. Even if there are cooperative and 
horizontal mechanisms along the way of intermediate decisions, the state provides for 
                                                 
179 Mashaw, 2006, 153. 
180 Ferejohn called it “folk democratic theory”. (2007, 7) 
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a procedural circuit that reaches a final decision (however ‘provisional’ its 
characterisation as ‘final’ might be). This decision, at least in a short-term 
perspective, settles the legal matter and is ultimately enforceable by recourse to 
physical coercion. And that coercion is believed to be legitimate, again, because of a 
justificatory logic that can be traced back to the people, rights and law within a self-
constituted polity. Within the state, therefore, the cartography of political power and 
legal authority, no matter how complex its internal structure might be, is defined by 
an elemental anchor, by a single point of reference. The political and legal 
environment beyond the state, as so many have argued, lacks that organising 
centripetal feature.181 
 
3. Accountability beyond the state: the mosaic of international law 
 
Accountability arrangements within the state lean towards an ultimate arbiter 
or source of legitimate power, an ultimate account-holder and accountee. That is the 
case not only in the complex internal design of constitutional democracies, which 
were exemplified above, but also in non-democratic state systems. In both cases, 
irrespective of whether state sovereignty is more or less internally divided, it presents 
itself in a compact form from the transnational point of view. 
Unlike the domestic, the global context is considered “highly imperfect”, 
“defective” and “nonideal” for political action.182 Hierarchical metaphors, like the 
irresistible pyramidal image, do not work. The global context, so to say, lacks the 
“burden of the whole”,183 a transnational sovereign that carries, like the state, the 
ultimate general responsibility for actions, one that takes binding collective decisions 
and that has the power to coercively enforce them. Without a centralised government, 
there are a variety of power-holders who relate to each other in non-hierarchical ways. 
For this very reason, in such domain, “there is no single ‘problem of global 
accountability’; there are many.”184 
I shall now proceed to explain how global accountability is structured and 
justified. This explanation will be made in two steps, reflecting upon two stylised 
                                                 
181 Walker (2008a and 2008b), Krisch (2006 and 2009), MacDonald (2008) 
182 Ferejohn, 2007, 1-2 
183 Palombella, 2012, 17 
184 Keohane and Grant, 2005, 41-42 
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models of international law. For lack of a better typology, let us call the first 
“Westphalian” and the second “post-Westphalian”.185 This division presupposes 
neither a hard and fast point in time when there was a movement from one model to 
the other, nor the emergence of an entirely new system that supplants the old one. 
Nonetheless, it usefully sheds light on patterns that stray from the path of classical 
international law and build something distinct. It assumes that the current institutional 
outlook beyond the state has significantly shaken the old conceptual resources 
through which that landscape has been depicted, understood and warranted until 
recently. 
 
3.1 Old picture 
 
One of the customary criticisms directed against international law laments its 
lack of any resembling mechanism to constrain power and enforce decisions that is 
reputedly present in domestic systems.186 International law would be essentially weak 
and primitive: it is followed insofar as it is convenient to, and ignored insofar as it is 
against state’s self-interest. 
Sovereignty, in the Westphalian world, means freedom of the states to act 
according to their will.187 A Westphalian sovereign is traditionally based on the dual 
concept of territoriality and autonomy.188 Whenever one refers to this model of 
international law, one silently makes some assumptions about the international 
community. To begin with, the Westphalian model is state-centric: states prescribe the 
rules and are, at the same time, the main addressees of these rules. Each state, at least 
from the legal point of view, is as sovereign and independent as any other state. Every 
state has the ultimate right to be left alone regarding its own domestic matters, and the 
                                                 
185 Walker, 2010b, 18. 
186 Keohane and Grant explain: “The problem of abuse of power is particularly serious in world 
politics, because even the minimal types of constraints found in domestic governments are absent on 
the global level. Not only is there no global democracy, but there is not even an effective constitutional 
system that constrains power in an institutionalized way, through mechanisms such as checks and 
balances. Lacking institutionalized checks and balances, the principal constraints in world politics are 
potential coercion (as is the balance of power) and the need for states and other actors to reach 
mutually beneficial agreements. But these constraints are quite weak in restraining powerful actors, and 
they are not institutionalized in generally applicable rules.” (2005, 30) 
187 As Chayes points out, such concept of sovereignty, based on a complete autonomy of the states to 
act as they choose, only existed in the legal literature, never in real world. (1995, 27) 
188 The issue of the emergence, rise and crisis of the Westphalian model of international law is 
discused by a vast literature. See Koh, 1997, 2607-2608. 
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power to refuse to comply with any international agreement.189 Like private citizens, 
states contract with each other and, once they do so, they find themselves surrounded 
by intricate horizontal enforcement mechanisms that can be activated in case of non-
compliance.190 A “thin and derivative”191 spontaneous order would surface from the 
interaction between agents that celebrate agreements according to their mutual 
interests.  
From the horizontal perspective, therefore, there exists a system of states 
among themselves. Through treaty-making (either bilateral or multilateral), states 
make mutual promises and acquiesce to certain rules of behaviour. Treaties, indeed, 
may also create discrete international organisations. From the vertical perspective, 
however, such organisations are strictly bound by those same treaties and 
hierarchically accountable to the states through a principal-agent relationship. 
Procedures of domestic implementation, moreover, give states the chance to retain 
their autonomy with regards to international law.192 A state’s consent to these 
international or thin transnational arrangements is perceived to be enough for 
legitimising such legal state-of-affairs. 
In a Westphalian world, international law and institutions are subordinate and 
hence accountable to states. They are a product of states’ autonomous will. As a 
measure of last resort, as this story goes, sovereign states have the power to withdraw 
themselves from international law altogether. There is no legal impediment for them 
to do so. That is the doctrinal formulation put forward by international law to 
operationalise itself. Whether this has been and still remains a plausible and realistic 
account on international relations, and whether powerful and weak states have had 
even-handed means to exercise such autonomy, are other types of problems, as we 
shall see.193 
 
                                                 
189 Article 2 (7) of the UN Charter contains this idea of a state being inviolable with regards to its 
domestic matters: “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to 
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require 
the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not 
prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter Vll.” See Slaughter, 2004, 283.  
190 For Koskenniemi, it is a “system of contractual obligations between independent states declared at 
Westphalia”. (1991, 397) 
191 Walker (2009). 
192 Krisch, 2010, 246-249. Kingsbury et al. argue: “In classical theory the domestic regulatory 
measures are the implementation by states of their international obligations. Private actors are formally 
addressed only in the implementation stage, and that is solely a domestic matter.” (2005, 23) 
193 Ferejohn, 2007, 2.  
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3.2 New picture 
 
The development of international law and institutions during the second half 
of the 20th century has reshaped this forthright picture. There has been a perceptible 
transition, analysts claim, from a classic model of international cooperation (by means 
of conventional bilateralism or multilateralism) towards more intrusive modes of 
supra-national decision-making.194 The world is in the process of becoming, to an 
already observable extent, post-Westphalian, and states, rather than sovereign agents 
(whatever that has genuinely meant), gradually turn into what one could label as, in 
the absence of a more precise name, “post-sovereign”.195 
This diagnosis points to a different global scenario of power and institutions, 
which comprises relevant non-state actors alongside states. It apprehends a shift from 
a state system to a multi-actor system of international relations. Cohen and Sabel have 
already discerned such recent phenomenon: “something new is happening politically 
beyond the borders of individual states and irreducible to their voluntary 
interactions”.196 
To say that the state is just one actor among others, rather than the actor of 
international law is certainly, as yet, an overstatement. Although the state is not 
withering away, its political and legal centrality slowly gets attenuated.197 That sounds 
frightening because of what it practically means and normatively implies: power may 
have gradually slipped from the terrain which tends to be most public, visible, 
accessible and controllable, and has shifted, or has been gradually moving, towards an 
area that seems to be more technocratic, paternalistic and distant, definitely less 
familiar to us. 
                                                 
194 Zürn (2004). 
195 Several authors have been using the prefix “post” to refer to the current international state of 
affairs: “post-sovereign” and “post-Westphalian” are usual ones. For the former, see MacCormick, 
2001, 123; for the latter, see Fraser, 2005, 73, and Walker, 2008a, 373. There are also alternative 
labels. Abram and Antonia Chayes, for example, refer to a “new sovereignty” in order to explain that 
sovereignty, instead of granting states the freedom to act as they wish, requires that they make 
compromises in order to honour their role as members of the international community. According to 
them, “the only way most states can realize and express their sovereignty is through participation in the 
various regimes that regulate and order the international system”. (Chayes and Chayes, 1995, 27) 
196 Cohen and Sabel, 2006, 763. 
197 Cassese goes in that direction: “The centrality of the state to the notion of public powers has become 
an optical illusion. This does not mean, however, that the global legal order has supplanted the state, 
nor that it has become dominant, inasmuch as it is also through global regulatory systems that domestic 
public powers are able to make their voices heard.” (2006a, 673) 
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Although one can rightly claim that the backbones of the Westphalian 
rationale are slightly breaking down, two important caveats deserve our attention. The 
first concerns the nature of this shift. The emergence of the post-sovereign model of 
international law does not imply the disappearance or entire overhaul of the 
Westphalian model.198 The former model refers to a conceptually loose way to 
capture more complex institutional arrangements that place themselves over and 
above the conventional horizontal agreements that remain valid anyway. Such 
arrangements, though, fall below the radar screen and are inaccurately detectable 
through Westphalian categories. 
The second caveat, which springs from the first, is that the binary and stylised 
distinction between the sovereign and the post-sovereign models lacks refinements 
that other classifications attempt to rectify. Koh, for example, gives a more detailed 
account of the changes of international law and furnishes a more intricate 
periodisation.199 Walker, in turn, draws a larger picture of the “global legal 
configuration”.200 Weiler, finally, looks at three specific periods (1900-10, 1950-60, 
1990-2000), and respectively recognises three command modes in international law: 
transactionalism, community and regulation.201 For him, one cannot talk about 
revolutionary transformations, “but of layering, of change which is part of continuity, 
of new strata which do not replace the earlier ones, but simply layer themselves 
alongside.”202 This geological metaphor symbolises the superposition of different 
kinds of institutional structures, each of which with a distinct capacity of autonomous 
                                                 
198 As Jose Alvarez has claimed in a public lecture: “We are still living in Westphalia. States are still 
very much alive and the trickle-up effects show this.” (Edinburgh Lecture, May 2011) Koskenniemi 
also asserts the “continuing vitality of statehood”. (1991, 397) 
199 Koh, 1997, 2604-2634. 
200 Walker, 2008a, 373. 
201 In Weiler’s words: “The ways and means of international norm setting and law making, the ‘modes’ 
in which international law commands, are so varied, sometimes even radically so, that any attempt to 
bring them into the laboratory of democracy as if belonging to a monolithic species called 
‘international law’ will result in a reductionist and impoverished understanding of international law, of 
democracy and of the actual and potential relationship between the two”. And Weiler continues: 
“Much can be gained, in this context, by conceptually unpacking international law or the international 
legal system into different co-existing ‘command’ modes: International law as Transaction, 
international law as Community, and international law as Regulation. Each of these modes presents 
different normative challenges, entails a different discourse of democracy and legitimacy, and, 
eventually, will require a different set of remedies. What is critical is that I will refract each of these 
command modes as an instance of Governance which, thus, requires some form of legitimation.” 
(2004, 552) 
202 Weiler, 2004, 551. 
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decision-making and a specific legitimatory burden, and thus helps us better grasp the 
plurality of existing arrangements in international law. 
To sum up, we have witnessed a multiplication of atypical sites of global 
decision-making. The alleged novelty of these sites is a product not only of a 
horizontal expansion of new domains but also of the vertical incisiveness of 
transnational norms. As the explanatory narrative advances, in order to overcome 
international coordination hurdles that come up when state interests do not converge, 
international law was asked to stretch its authority along the horizontal and vertical 
coordinates: it has gained width as it pervades new subjects (previously treated by 
domestic jurisdictions alone) and depth by stronger modes of subordination and 
enforcement. The natural effect of these movements was the mitigation of sovereignty 
and of its legal corollary – the principle of consent.203 More than a monolithic system 
of autonomous states entering into horizontal agreements with one another, these new 
sites compose a more heterogeneous environment. A “mosaic”204 or a ‘patchwork’ are 
images that better express the phenomenon and allow this theoretical effort to better 
apprehend the components of that landscape. 
Although one can claim that the national sphere is still the overriding domicile 
of political power, the scale of new functional demands has largely surpassed the 
walls of that domicile. A suitable example comes from the area of human rights. 
There is a fair consensus among scholars that we are now experiencing a post-
Westphalian era in international law of human rights.205 Since the end of the Second 
World War, states cannot embrace a theory of sovereignty understood as the freedom 
to eliminate dissidents, or to allow the massacre of its own people according to faith 
or political convictions.206 The UN Security Council has repeatedly declared that 
                                                 
203 Kumm describes the transformations suffered by international law with respect to its scope, to its 
enforcement measures and to state consent (2004, 913-916). In the same sense, Weiler also talks about 
“the widening and deepening in the scope of the international legal order”. (2004, 561) 
204 The point of the mosaic metaphor has been well characterised by Walker, Tierney and Shaw (2011). 
205 See Henkin (1999), Slaughter (2004), Kahn (2000). 
206 Henkin holds: “The international human rights movement, born during the Second World War, has 
represented a significant erosion of state sovereignty. And it took Hitler and the Holocaust to achieve 
that. Since 1945, how a state treats its own citizens, how it behaves even in its own territory, has no 
longer been its own business; it has become a matter of international concern, of international politics, 
and of international law.” (1999, 4) 
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violations against humanitarian law constitute “threats to international peace and 
security”.207 
International law of human rights is built upon the idea that individuals, not 
states, are at the centre of its normative claims.208 It represents a extension from a 
“doctrine of state relations to a regime of individual rights”.209 This feature of 
international law of human rights, at least theoretically, has a clear impact on 
traditional sovereignty. Rather than a “dark picture of the condition of state 
sovereignty”,210 one perceives a mode of authority that cannot claim to enjoy total 
independence from the international community, a mode of authority that is sensitive 
to rights and interests other than the states’ own interests. This phenomenon is 
definitely not restricted to the field of human rights, and it calls into question some 
premises on the basis of which traditional international law, rightly or wrongly, was 
accepted as legitimate. 
 
3.3 Legitimising the mosaic and the sense of crisis 
 
The Westphalian era stabilised a legitimacy theory attached to states and 
subordinated the authority of international law to states’ consent. Traditional 
international law, therefore, had a shorthand answer to the question of whether and 
how international institutions of that kind are accountable: through state’s consent, a 
principal-agent transmission belt is set up, that is, the state delegates to international 
organisations non-discretionary power and would keep intact its sovereign power 
while subjecting itself to international rules. 
This rationale became outdated. New configurations of authority, as it 
happens, do not fit well into the traditional legitimising discourse anymore. They 
have, thus, been challenged by new demands of accountability. These two “moving 
                                                 
207 This statement has triggered Security Council’s power to intervene, under article 44, Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter. See also Security Council’s Resolutions, especially Resolution 836, adopted by the 
Security Council at its 3228th meeting, on June 4th 1993 (Bosnia and Herzegovina). In a similar tone, 
paragraph 139 of a Resolution adopted by the General Assembly in a World Summit in 2005 affirms 
that: “The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use 
appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, (…), to help to protect populations 
from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.” A/RES/60/1 (24 October 
2005). 
208 See Kahn, 2000, 11. 
209 Kahn, 2000, 5. 
210 Henkin, 1999, 5. 
 73 
targets”,211 namely, the new institutional forms and the new accountability demands, 
are still in search of accommodation. In the light of more complex and autonomous 
transnational institutions that originated in the last decades, accountability through 
state consent became fake and unwarranted. To the extent that these new kinds of 
transnational institutions distance themselves from that original act of state consent, 
the respective legitimising discourse calls for re-elaboration.212 
This is not to deny that state consent remains a pivotal component of a 
substantial part of international law’s legitimacy. Consent, however, can hardly be 
seen as the sole one anymore. Insofar as new regimes start to have the ability to bind 
states even against their will, one cannot be entirely satisfied with consent doing the 
whole legitimising work that in the past was done by thicker sorts of authority.213 
Each layer of international law, as Weiler contends, has a different “charge of 
legitimation”. When a disquieting portion of international law escapes state’s 
oversight or control and thus deviates from the conventional frame of legitimation, 
when some slices of state autonomy erode by virtue of an international regime that is 
too costly to opt out, the appeal to sovereignty becomes too theoretical, overly 
impractical and unrealistic. Or worse: it is utterly unable to justify what is happening, 
does not accord to basic standards of legitimacy and ends up leading to an 
accountability deficit. 
                                                 
211 Weiler refers to international law and legitimacy as “two moving targets”. (2004, 548) 
212 Addressing international environmental law, Bodansky affirms: “Apart from a few regimes (…), 
state consent and legality have provided until now a relatively firm foundation for international 
environmental law. But two developments are likely to undermine their ability to do so in the future. 
First, the coming generations of environmental problems will probably require more expeditious and 
flexible lawmaking approaches, which do not depend on consensus among states. Second, to the extent 
that international environmental law is beginning to have significant implications for non-or substate 
actors (which have not consented to it directly), rather than just for the relations among states, state 
consent may for them have little legitimating effect.” (1999, 606) See also Weiler, 2004, 548; Henkin, 
1999, 5. 
213 Chayes and Chayes, among others, have asserted that the legitimacy of governance regimes lies 
predominantly on the open process of norm elaboration and application and not only on state consent: 
“even if the state may be said to have consented to the text of the treaty, that doesn’t carry very far if 
the meaning of the text depends significantly on the relatively open process of norm elaboration and 
application (…). It may be argued that these processes of interpretation and supplementary norm 
creation are legitimated by the consent of the state in adhering to the treaty in the first place. But (…) 
such imputed consent is less persuasive as a legitimator of outcomes if the procedures turn out to be 
unfair in operation.” (1995, 128-129) It is also the point of the “paradigm of human rights”, on the 
basis of which Kahn argues that international law can be legitimate even in the absence of consent: 
“The international law of human rights rests on more than the positivist conception of the origins of 
law. We are, after all, most concerned with applying human rights law against non-consenting regimes. 
We do not think a state has the option of withdrawing its consent from such norms.” (2000, 5) 
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Transmission-belt concepts, therefore, have lost their grip to ground 
international organisations that can hardly be seen as mere agents with a clearly 
defined mandate. Rather than agents of states, these organisations can be considered 
as trustees. Rather than principals, states become actual trustors. And these trustors, in 
some situations, cannot even sanction the trustee when they do not agree with the 
latter’s decisions.  
For the ‘post-sovereign layers’ of international law, legitimate accountability 
is still an open and deeply disputed question. It has been a widespread belief that 
several existing organisations are being accountable to the wrong constituencies, by 
the wrong reasons and procedures.214 Their legitimacy, thus, remains in doubt. 
Devising pathways for accountability improvement and legitimacy promotion 
is the ultimate aspiration of a series of academic and practical endeavours. These 
projects purport first to theorize about and then to implement what is deemed to be a 
rectification of current institutional flaws. In the following section, I will approach 
one of these available pathways and briefly contrast it with some alternatives. 
 
4. Between adaptation and invention: the quest for accountable global 
governance 
 
One hardly denies that public power, wherever it comes from, should be duly 
accountable – or, according to the aforementioned normative ambitions, to face limits, 
to be inclusive, to display proficiency and, eventually, to enjoy the respect of its 
subjects.215 Nowadays, it is rather uncontroversial that a power arrangement should 
fulfil the constitutional, democratic, epistemic and populist demands for legitimate 
accountability, however combined and in whatever specific form and depth those 
charges are deemed appropriate in each site of public power.  
This claim, though, needs to be voiced with care. After all, accountability 
might do harm as much as it might do good. If accountability, in line with the broad 
                                                 
214 Krisch argues that: “the problem is that these institutions are often accountable in the wrong way: in 
part, they are accountable to the wrong constituencies”. (2006, 250) Keohane and Grant go in the same 
way: “The problem is not a lack of accountability as much as the fact that the principal lines of 
accountability run to powerful states, whose policies are at odds with those of their critics, and which 
may or may not themselves be fully democratic. Public within countries are not heavily involved in 
these processes.” (2005, 37) 
215 Held and Koenig-Archibugi, for example, claim: “the conception of political legitimacy prevalent in 
most countries today is hostile to the idea of any form of power that is unaccountable to those over 
whom it is exercised and especially to those who are most affected by it”. (2005, 1) 
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definition here adopted, turns out to be almost everywhere in social and political 
relations, any quest for it turns out to appear redundant and dispensable. Its ubiquity, 
nonetheless, does not turn such a quest futile: as argued in the previous chapter, there 
are more and less justifiable accountability arrangements. Winnowing the wheat from 
the chaff, thus, requires attention to contextual nuances. 
When we restrict our appeal for decent politics to an evasive invocation of 
accountability tout court, we risk losing sight of what makes accountability desirable 
and beneficial in the first place.216 If the plea for accountability is going to be 
attractive, it cannot turn a blind eye to some minimal traces of the good old political 
ideals – those values, symbols and institutional practices to which we have tended, in 
modernity, to ascribe allegiance.217 Without them, accountability is just an empty 
container that structures and explicates a bilateral or multilateral power-relationship. 
Such a relationship is not presumptively valuable for its own sake. Some substantive 
normative view, thus, must flesh out this skeleton.218 
This methodological caution is not usually explicit in recent accountability 
literature. If the concept of accountability has any critical role to play (that is, to aid 
the assessment or reform of current institutional arrangements), it has to earn adequate 
normative traction. That is not derived from the idea of accountability itself, but from 
exogenous normative inputs. Turning power accountable is a misleading and 
superfluous enterprise most of the time. Turning power appropriately accountable is 
not. 
How should one understand, then, the demand of accountability directed 
towards the so-called ‘post-sovereign’ transnational institutions? What are the 
adequate conceptual and contextual standpoints from which that question can be 
answered? 
                                                 
216 As Philp maintains: “simply asking for more accountability is unlikely to contribute much to 
resolving the deep inequalities of power and wealth that systematically weaken the legitimacy of global 
institutions.” (2009, 47) 
217 MacDonald and Shamir-Borer, 2008, 3; Búrca (2007). 
218 Krisch, by acknowledging that “most institutions of global governance” are somehow accountable, 
pins down the specific notion of accountability that GAL needs to advance: “The problem with these 
institutions is, then, not an absolute accountability ‘deficit’, to be overcome by improving or 
strengthening accountability mechanisms in a technical exercise. Rather, the problem is that these 
institutions are often accountable in the wrong way: in part, they are accountable to the wrong 
constituencies.” (2006, 250-251) Therefore, knowing ‘to whom’ someone should be accountable is a 
crucial design choice, the answer to which can hardly be ‘to everybody’ or ‘to anybody’. 
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The state has been the centre of gravity of political imagination in modern 
times, a necessary part of our political cognitive horizon. It provided the primary 
boundary of a political community. The ruling ideals of democracy, constitutionalism 
and rule of law, as has been contended earlier, have all been (re)conceived within its 
frame.219 It is still the default vantage point of political argumentation and the 
ordinary locus of everyday political action. It stands as the chief reference of 
individual self-identification, political membership and loyalty. Pre-modern political 
ideals, not originally connected to states, happened to be envisioned under their 
mantle and became normalised as sides of the same coin. This is a contingent 
conceptual operation that produced a legitimating toolbox for the state through a 
variety of accountability arrangements. Let me call it ‘state-centred conceptualisation’ 
or, as some call it, “methodological statism”.220 
In that light, when we move to the transnational legal-political sphere, an 
immediate question arises: what normative framework should travel to this variegated 
environment? Constitutionalism, democracy, rule of law or, as far as possible, all of 
them together? Both scholars and institutional designers have been struggling to test 
the transferability of this state-based legitimating toolbox (its built-in concepts, 
institutional devices and analytical lenses). When it comes to the transnational sphere, 
a cacophony of ideals envelops the calls for accountability. They act like magnets that 
evoke a cluster of values and aspirations, more or less envisaged in, or requested 
from, existing international institutions. 
It is not simple to get rid of the state-centric analytical baggage.221 Neither is it 
necessarily commendable to pursue that path.222 The default methodological statism 
of international relations and international law is anything but pointless. It should, 
thus, be treated as worth accommodating, as a hurdle to be faced, not rejected.223 It 
                                                 
219 Dyzenhaus, 2011, 23-24. 
220 Chwaszcza, 2008, 132. 
221 As Stein eloquently puts it: “we still insist on translating solutions developed within the state to the 
novel phenomenon and using state nomenclature. This, in a sense, is a natural tendency since the state 
is, so to speak, the only show in town if one looks for a model and international law is of little help.” 
(2005, 1) 
222 For Rosenau, one has to break such “stranglehold”: “Perhaps the most dangerous trap involves what 
I call the ‘domestic analogy’: the tendency to think about the problem of accountability at the 
international level as if we had domestic processes in mind. (…) Does this mean that transnational 
accountability cannot be achieved? No, it does not if one can break free of the stranglehold that the 
domestic analogy has on our thinking.” (2001, 353-354) 
223 Krisch’s arguments echo this perception: “When we try to imagine the postnational space, it is not 
surprising then that we turn for guidance first to the well-known, the space of the national.” (2008, 1) 
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creates a sort of theoretical path-dependency, an unrelenting yet unsurprising 
cognitive bias: in order to conceive of accountable global governance, one would 
have to build upon state categories and institutions. The state still counts as the 
benchmark from which we depart (either to replicate or to innovate). The most refined 
and experimented elements of our institutional technology derive from that ground. 
At the domestic level, as I argued, the archetypes of each function are 
relatively consolidated. At the very least, their basic contours are widely 
disseminated. Free electoral competition, checks and balances, several principal-agent 
transmission-belts, insulated and impartial judicial oversight and rights protection: no 
political regime has been able to claim legitimacy or to earn the admiration and 
respect of the international community if not internally structured around these core 
institutional features. That set has become the threshold test to enter the ‘club’ of 
constitutional democracies. 
At the global level, the archetypes of each accountability function, mainly for 
reasons of magnified scale and deeper societal pluralism, are harder to replicate 
through identical mechanisms. Other mechanisms, though, might be available without 
necessarily disfiguring or abandoning those functions. There, the democratic function 
would entail, at the very least, the participation of the less powerful countries as well 
as of any affected communities and individuals in the relevant decision-making 
bodies; the constitutional function, to be credible, would have to mitigate the power of 
the most powerful, reduce asymmetries and re-equilibrate the arms; the epistemic 
function would have to be instantiated by the creation of competence for dealing with 
the problems of a global community; the populist function, finally, means gaining the 
allegiance of the multiple actors that interact in this sphere. 
How should these functions be implemented in institutions of global 
governance? Ingenuity, for Keohane and Grant, is more important than a “single-
minded and mechanical application of the ideals of democracy.”224 If one resolves to 
follow such common sense advice, one can conceive of two remedies for the 
obsolescence or unfitness of the state-based conceptual and procedural repertoire: on 
the one hand, one can invent a new one; on the other, rather than simply emulating, 
one can update, revamp and reconstruct the old one. Furthermore, in order to reach 
                                                 
224 Keohane and Grant, 2005, 41. 
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the desired destination, one can also plan the timing and rhythm of change, with 
different degrees of incrementalism . 
How to infuse the transnational agencies of decision-making, either regional 
or global, with the technology of good government (or governance)225 that modern 
states are supposed to have developed? Is there a need for an entirely new equipment, 
or should the domestic one just be transposed? 
The most influential discourses for legitimate global governance have been 
crafting a middle-ground between these two poles. In the course of this attempt to 
reconceptualise state-based references, it does not come as a surprise that the 
constitutional and administrative law registers at the domestic level appear as primary 
inspirational candidates for the reform and legitimation of transnational governance. 
Recasted as ‘global constitutionalism’ (GCon) and ‘global administrative law’ 
(GAL), these two “efforts of translation”226 depict and critically probe what is going 
on beyond the state from the political and legal points of view. Rather than readymade 
compulsory blueprints, domestic constitutional law and administrative law make up 
the level playing field for GCon and GAL.227 Both are concerned with the exercise of 
public power outside the purview of the state, and convey more or less divergent 
proposals about how far international institutions should reach and what the available 
and feasible historical routes towards such destinations are. They somewhat fill up, 
from their own standpoints, the four functions of accountability – with different 
perspectives on what has to be changed, when and in what magnitude. This 
dissertation will engage with the GAL’s framework more intimately, for reasons that 
                                                 
225 The distinction between “government” and “governance” has been serving to identify, respectively, 
thicker and thinner modes of the exercise of authority. States are the typical sites of “government”, 
whereas various transnational institutions are described as part of “global governance”. Krahman puts 
that shortly: “government and governance as ideal-typical poles at either end of a continuum ranging 
from centralization to fragmentation permits an analysis of the transformation of political authority at 
the national, regional, and global levels.” (2003, 340) Finkelstein summarises it: “Global governance is 
governing, without sovereign authority, relationships that transcend national frontiers. Global 
governance is doing internationally what governments do at home.” (1995, 369) Esty connects global 
governance more closely with law: it is the group of legal processes and institutions, either public or 
private, that manage international problems and address the respective collective decisions’ demands. 
(2005, 1497) See also Stoker (1998) and Krisch (2010). 
226 Krisch, 2010, 245. 
227 For Krisch, domestic administrative law comes as “inspiration and contrast: it serves as a 
framework for identifying converging and diverging developments in institutional practice, and it helps 
us sharpen our sensitivity to the problems and possibilities of establishing accountability mechanisms 
on the global level.” It is a “background rather than basis for prescription”, it aids the “reflection on the 
transferability of domestic concepts”. (2010, 256-257) 
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will become clearer, as we go along. The current section helps to locate and estimate 
the precise aspiration of GAL project’s account of global governance. 
 
5. “Global administration” in the search of a “global administrative law” 
 
The departing insight of the ‘GAL project’ is that much of contemporary 
‘global governance’ should be conceived as ‘global administration’.228 According to 
the project proponents, the concept of global administration is drawn by exclusion. It 
comprises all norm-generative practices that are not strictly legislative, like treaty-
making, and all dispute settlement procedures that are not strictly judicial, like 
international adjudication. It consists, in turn, of quasi-legislative rulemaking and 
quasi-judicial adjudicative functions.229 The boundaries of each function, just as it 
happens in domestic law, are indeed loose and volatile. The ‘quasi’ demarcation, 
nevertheless, conveys an attempt to apprehend the varying conceptual degrees and 
institutional forms through which these core public functions are manifested. 
The exact nature of ‘global administrative action’, thus, is first defined by 
what it is not. It basically falls short of the highly contested, vocal and politicized 
treaty-making events or judicialized dispute settlements. However, global 
administration – an institutional reflection of the administrative burdens generated by 
growing global inter-dependence – is not yet “global administrative law”.230 The 
former corresponds to an increasing institutional reality, whereas the latter is, first and 
foremost, a normative call, if not an embryonic set of procedural tools that are 
‘emerging’ in different sites of global public power. The modest “rhetoric of 
emergence”231 indicates a circumspect yet faithful portrait of what decisional 
processes are in place, but, at the same time, a confident normative ambition with 
respect to where these processes should go. That is why, for sure, this literature 
                                                 
228 Kingsbury et al., 2005, 17, Krisch, 2010, 255. MacDonald claims that: “much of global governance 
can be undestood and analyzed as administrative action”, which is the “argumentative platform of the 
entire project”. (2008, 4). As Cassese also points out: “Administration is becoming increasingly 
international. (…) Their number is increasing (…). Their staff is growing (…). Their influence is on 
the rise.” (2006b, 2) 
229 Kingsburyet al.: “As a matter of provisional delineation, global administrative action is rulemaking, 
adjudications, and other decisions that are neither treaty making-making nor simple dispute settlements 
between parties.” (2005, 17) 
230 This idea has been captured in three general statements of MacDonald: “Global administrative law 
doesn’s exist. (…) Global administration exists. (…) Global administrative laws exist.” (2008, 2-4) 
231 MacDonald, 2008, 2. Kingsbury et al. (2005). 
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introduces itself as an ‘advocacy project’,232 not only as a radiography of 
contemporary global governance. It is an analytical enterprise as much as the product 
of a mobilisation for institutional change. Not only an intellectual, but, as far as 
possible, a practical advocacy project. 
The project’s inaugural article233 starts off with a meticulous taxonomical 
effort to map and understand the “institutional topology”234 of contemporary global 
regulatory governance. That taxonomy allegedly helps us acknowledge and 
understand some blind spots that conventional categories of international law 
overlook. In other words, relevant international bodies operate below the radar screen 
of grand and highly visible events of transnational decision-making. Global 
governance, the argument continues, comprises not only (i) traditional inter-
governmental institutions, but also (ii) transnational horizontal networks between 
national regulatory officials, (iii) distributed transnational administration between 
national regulators, (iv) hybrid inter-governmental-private institutions, and (v) private 
bodies.235 Each type exercises more or less authoritative power at the global level and 
impacts on both domestic policies and non-state actors.236 
Within this global administrative space, complex interactions are forged 
between the global bodies and the addressees of their regulations. Among the 
addressees we find states, individuals, private companies and NGOs. The global 
administrative space is autonomous and distinct from the spaces governed either by 
international law or domestic administrative law.237 The GAL project tries to capture 
this institutional configuration that runs alongside the confines of classical 
international law. It conceptually ties up a web of cross-cutting transnational 
decisional bodies that has been increasingly constraining all sorts of actors in the 
transnational arena. 
                                                 
232 For MacDonald, GAL is “not simply identifying the emerging principles, but advocating their 
spread.” (2008, 27-28) 
233 Kingsbury et al. (2005). 
234 MacDonald and Shamir-Borer, 2008, 6. 
235 Kingsbury et al., 2005, 21-22. One can mention several representative examples of each type: (i) the 
UN Security Council or the International Labour Organization (ILO); (ii) the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision; (iii) several national environmental regulators which implement international 
environmental law; (iv) the Codex Alimentarius Commission or the Internet Corporation for Assigned 
Names and Numbers (ICANN); (v) the International Standardization Organization (ISO) or the World 
Anti-Doping Agency. 
236 Kingsbury et al., 2005, 23-24. 
237 Kingsbury et al., 2005, 26. 
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These global bodies have jurisdiction over topics as diverse as the issuance of 
commodities, the management of refugees’ camps, the declaration of a state’s non-
compliance with its agreed obligations, the sanctioning of individuals, the 
establishment of standards and certification requirements and so forth. To recall 
Weiler’s typology, which maintains that contemporary international law revolves 
around three overlapping geological strata (transactionalism, community and 
regulation), GAL project would be mostly concerned with two attributes of the third 
layer: the increasing importance of the administrative part of treaties and the 
development of cooperative policies that used to lie within the jurisdiction of states’ 
administrative apparatus.238 Still, the project’s framework transcends that typology by 
including hybrid and private bodies. 
Together with this large descriptive and classificatory endeavour, the project 
has an evaluative and prescriptive prong, which spells out the normative 
repercussions of global administration. This dimension of the project consists in a 
programme for institutional reform ‘writ small’, aiming at legitimising accountability 
arrangements of institutions beyond the state. Rather than proposing macro-structural 
reinvention, that is, institutional design ‘writ large’,239 the project addresses micro 
procedural variables that would enhance accountability at the margins. This task is 
equally important to and more quickly achievable than its macro-structural 
counterpart. 
If one attempts to catch a comprehensive view of the academic literature that 
the GAL project has so far produced, one would see at least three things: (i) a 
descriptive framework, as the one depicted above, (ii) a general normative stance for 
accountable global governance and, lastly, (iii) a large set of case-studies that 
somewhat combine both prongs – the descriptive and the normative.240 
                                                 
238 These two characteristics have been described by Weiler, 2004, 559. 
239 The distinction between institutional design ‘writ small’ and ‘writ large’ has been carefully 
developed by Vermeule. His analysis takes for granted the broad historical constraints of some 
structural elements of institutional choice, and focuses on “a repertoire of small-scale institutional 
devices and innovations that promote democratic values against the background of standard large-scale 
institutions.” (2007, 2) Ely, when delving into the role of judicial review, also draws a similar 
distinction between “process writ small” (individual disputes) and “process writ large” (the broader 
conditions of participation in government). (1980, 87) 
240 The case-studies published under the heading of the GAL project are numerous and include the 
examination of multiple institutions that exercise global governance. A short list of primary references 
would have to include: Krisch (2006) (on the regulation of genetically modified organisms);  Stewart 
and Sanchez (2009) (on the World Trade Organization); Kingsbury and Schill (2009) (on investment 
law and arbitration); Kingsbury and Donaldson (2011) (on the World Bank Handbook for assessing 
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In what follows, I will further elucidate the particular features of such 
normative prong of the GAL project, which is crucial for the purposes of this thesis. I 
organise this elucidation around three questions that the project has been trying to 
answer: (i) why does global governance have an accountability deficit; (ii) what 
would be, at least for the time being, appropriate accountability for that domain; (iii) 
what would be, under present circumstances, the feasible alternatives. This threefold 
expository order helps specifying exactly how the GAL project differentiates itself 
from other accountability discourses that have so far been set forth. 
 
5.1 A diagnosis of accountability deficit (or inappropriateness) 
 
Problem-solving demands that were traditionally dealt with by domestic legal 
machinery are shifting away from the state and sliding towards transnational centres 
of decision-making. Many of these centres, as pointed above, are located under or 
above the conventional corners of classical international law. This phenomenon 
certainly sparks serious misgivings. Mashaw, for example, perceived the difficulty of 
justifying bodies that are “outside domestic processes of political accountability, yet 
weakly policed by a still patchy international political and legal order.”241 He is 
worried about a power arrangement that is still rudimentary when compared to a 
reputedly more mature structure of accountability, like the one that is typical of states. 
The GAL project has the same unease with this “patchy and weakly policed” 
order. Like many other intellectual efforts directed to rethink global governance, the 
GAL project tackles the accountability deficit that springs from the fact that 
“transnational systems of regulation or regulatory cooperation” have expanded in 
“reach and forms”.242 These systems have become increasingly intrusive and, in some 
cases, directly regulate the behaviour of multiple actors without having to resort to 
states to implement their rulings. Rather than being mechanical agents of states, these 
                                                 
infrastructure regulation); Shamir-Borer (2006) (on the International Organization for Standardization); 
Barr and Miller (2006) (on the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision). 
241 Mashaw, 2006, 115 
242 Kingsbury et al., 2005, 16. 
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institutions exercise a significant measure of “de facto independence and 
discretion”.243 Examples of this practice abound.244  
This sense of accountability deficit is prompted, therefore, by the realisation of 
the fact that these bodies are controlled neither by states nor by any other sufficiently 
legitimate actor or process.245 Following that perception, the GAL project aims at 
turning global administration accountable in its own particular way, that is to say, 
through the infusion of traditional administrative law principles into the processes of 
such global bodies. To be sure, this distinct institutional setting strays from the logic 
of domestic administrative law. Whereas the domestic environment, as it has already 
been contended, is geared to an authoritative apex (an ultimate constituency to which 
administration is subordinate), global administration lies outside the delegation-belts 
of the states.246 Although global bodies are not free-floating entities, they still remain, 
as yet, insulated against what the GAL project deems as ‘appropriate’ accountability. 
 
5.2 A modest and sectorally sensitive proposal on appropriate accountability 
 
The normative prong of the GAL project considers whether and to what extent 
administrative law mechanisms are able to reduce or fix the accountability deficit 
explained above. As a matter of fact, Kingsbury et al. observe that procedural 
mechanisms of that sort are already being implemented as a response to that 
charge.247 The “rhetoric of emergence”, thus, refers to something that is not just an 
                                                 
243 Kingsbury et al. contend: “the global administrative bodies making those decisions in some cases 
enjoy too much de facto independence and discretion to be regarded as mere agents of states”. (2005, 
26) 
244 Kingsbury et al. enumerate examples like the certification of CDM projects by the Executive Board, 
the determination of refugees’ status by the UNCHR, the certification of NGOs to participate in 
meetings by U.N. agencies. (2005, 24) 
245 That is what Zürn highlights when he points to the “removal of numerous decisions from the circuit 
of national and democratic responsibility”. (2004, 260) 
246 As contended by Cohen and Sabel, 2006, 765. This point has been also raised by Stewart (2005a) 
and by Kingsbury et al.: “Domestic administrative law is (…) still built around a core of command-
and-control administration – of rules and decisions binding on private actors, emanating from a defined 
administrative entity. In global administration, no such core typically exists”. (2005, 53) Krisch also 
notes that the claim that delegation and control are touchstones of accountability in global governance 
bear “limited promise” for at least three reasons: first, when founding treaties contain no more than 
vague directives, delegation becomes thin and elusive; second, when outsiders to the treaty are, 
nonetheless, directly or indirectly affected by transnational decisions, delegation fails to do any 
legitimatory work; finally, when there are multiple principals, the possibility of state control is not only 
meagre, but also undesirable due to the risk of stalemate and collective inaction that anything similar to 
veto powers would bring about. (2010, 247-248) 
247 For Kingsbury et al., the accountability deficit “has begun to stimulate two different types of 
responses: first, the attempted extension of domestic administrative law to intergovernmental 
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aspiration, but an actual phenomenon.248 In the face of growing criticism, global 
bodies are opening themselves, if not to a complete overhaul of their very institutional 
character and identity, at least to internal reforms that echo some of those 
administrative law principles. This is a trend that, however fragmented and 
unsystematic, the GAL project praises and attempts to spread. 
This systematisation is put forward by means of a package of accountability 
tools; more precisely, by the institutional corollaries of two fundamental rights: the 
“right to participation” and the “right to defense”.249 Five are the dominant devices: 
transparency, participation, interest-representation, revisability and duty of 
justification.250 This is a rather crude package.251 An in-depth exploration of its five 
principles would highlight several variations through which each principle can be 
concretely carried out.  
Transparency, for example, can mean either access to gross information, or an 
active effort to provide a more intelligible and qualitatively superior piece of 
information. Participation, in the same way, can be widened through mechanisms of 
consultation, notice and comment, hearings and so on.252 Interest-representation can 
manifest itself through the ascription of actual weight to groups or individuals in 
                                                 
regulatory decisions that affect a nation; and second, the development of new mechanisms of 
administrative law at the global level to address decisions and rules made within the intergovernmental 
regimes”. (2005, 16) 
248 Cassese provides a number of examples: “a body of general principles is being consolidated in the 
global arena: the principle of legality, the right to participate in the formation of norms (‘notice and 
comment’, as recognized by the OIE), the duty of consultation (imposed by the World Bank on 
domestic administrations in the context of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initia- tive), the right to 
be heard (‘procedural participation’ recognized by the FATF and the WTO Appellate Body), the right 
to access administrative documents, the duty to give reasons for administrative acts (the duty to give a 
reasoned decision, affirmed by the WTO Appellate Body), the right to decisions based upon scientific 
and testable data, and the principle of proportionality.” (2006a, 690) Echoing the same realisation in 
another text, he claims that global administration is not “still ruled by secrecy, informality and 
arbitrariness”. (2006b, 2) 
249 As Cassese further explains, these rights engender a “chance to intervene” and a “right to appeal”. 
(2006a, 685) 
250 Kingsbury et al. argue that GAL include “mechanisms, principles, practices, and supporting social 
understanding that promote or otherwise affect the accountability of global administrative bodies, in 
particular by ensuring they meet adequate standards of transparency, participation, reasoned decision, 
and legality, and by providing effective review of the rules and decisions they make”. (2005, 17) See 
also Mashaw, 2005, 11 and MacDonald and Shamir-Borer, 2008, 11. 
251 The GAL package is quite similar to other proposals for accountability enhancement. Koppell, for 
example, proposes five “conceptions” or “dimensions” of accountability: transparency, liability, 
controllability, responsibility, and responsiveness (2005, 95) In his later book, he called these same five 
elements as “concepts” of accountability. (2010, 34) The “Global Accountability Framework 2011”, 
written by Hammer and Lewis under the auspices of One World Trust, establishes four core 
dimensions that make an organisation more accountable to its stakeholders: transparency, participation, 
evaluation, and complaint and response mechanisms. 
252 Cassese (2006b) furnishes a thorough classification of participatory channels. 
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decision-making. The right to review, in turn, can be implemented through a variety 
of appeal procedures. A duty of principled and public reason-giving, finally, may 
range from technical jargon conveyed through rigid structures of argumentation and 
to an accessible terminology and rhetoric.253 From the perspective of the 11 
descriptive coordinates of accountability discussed in the previous chapter, this 
package involves a range of permutations of those variables. 
Instead of a one-fits-all programme of accountability enhancement, the role 
and weight of those principles need to be grasped and adjusted to the context of each 
global administrative body, in accordance with its respective purpose and power.254 
Domestic administrative law may be a rich source of inspiration, but does not deliver 
definitive answers. In this spirit, the GAL project intends to be “modular”255 and 
sectorally sensitive, that is, to verify how, in each and every global body, those 
general principles of administrative law are and should be put into effect. The exact 
mix and form, or the particular version of due process that obtains in one sector,256 
“remains very much up for grabs”.257 Therefore, a “fully emerged” GAL, as the 
project envisions it, does neither possess universal homogeneity in terms of 
                                                 
253 Some of the GAL proponents include ‘accountability’ as a discrete device alongside the others of 
this package. See, for example, Stewart (2008). What is often meant by accountability is a particular 
procedure for sanctioning the power-holder. We could name this sense of accountability as 
‘accountability stricto sensu’. For reasons that have been clarified in chapter 1, however, reducing 
accountability to a proceduralised sanctioning device can lead to overlooking other accountability types 
and less formal sanctions that take place. I prefer, thus, keeping ‘accountability’ in its ‘lato sensu’ 
perspective, which covers all devices. 
254 This is what Krisch means by pointing to the “relative and provisional” features of the project: 
“GAL is a self-consciously ‘modest’ project” which comes up with “relative and provisional 
conclusions”. (2010, 262) 
255 MacDonald and Shamir-Borer explicate that feature: “Global administrative law thus has a modular 
quality: it provides a toolkit that allows us to pick and choose the mechanisms that best suit the 
particular regulatory structure in question.” (2008, 13) GAL’s modular quality would escape one of the 
traps pointed by Rosenau: “A third trap to avoid is that of aspiring to one instrument of accountability 
suitable to all situations.” (2001, 354) This quality would facilitate, moreover, what Nye has identified 
as “willingness to experiment”: “Increasing the perceived legitimacy of international governance is 
therefore an important objective and requires three things: greater clarity about democracy, a richer 
understanding of accountability, and a willingness to experiment.” (2001, 3) 
256 Cassese, 2006b, 57. 
257 MacDonald and Shamir-Borer, 2008, 53 
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procedural solutions, nor resembles an arbitrary “adhocracy”.258 It leads, instead, to a 
relative convergence between those devices.259 
 
5.3 A contextual and pragmatic claim on feasibility 
 
The normative aspiration of the GAL project is to improve global centres of 
decision-making through institutional devices ‘writ small’. Instead of contending that 
international institutions should resemble the institutional archetypes of the grandiose 
political ideals instantiated at the state level, it proposes some low-profile 
administrative law devices. Instead of defending the transference of the full box of 
thick procedural mechanisms that those ideals carry, it takes a less bombastic and 
controversial step: it disaggregates those ideals and tries to gradually embed some of 
their constituent components into transnational institutions. According to its 
supporters, then, one of the most appealing characteristics of the GAL project is its 
greater feasibility as compared to other approaches to global governance. 
The GAL project is reputedly more attentive to realpolitk, to the need of 
adjusting normative calls to what is politically viable and expedient. It elucidates the 
values underlying institutional alternatives that already are, so to say, ‘on the table’ of 
historical possibilities. It works “within a given institutional and social 
environment”.260 With that in mind, we can say that the GAL project strives not only 
to “rebuild the ship at sea”261 (to borrow a metaphor that suggestively conveys the 
burden of institutional design), but also to do so at a micro-level. It defends, as the 
most fitting approach to legal and political development, small-scale and opportune 
                                                 
258 This neologism was coined by Cassese: “From the organizational standpoint, the global legal order 
does not follow a single model. It is instead an example of ‘adhocracy,’ in the sense that it adapts to the 
functions to be performed, sector by sector.” (2006a, 679) In another text, Cassese also elaborates on 
sectoral conformations of global due process: “each regime has its own due process principle, not every 
one grants participatory rights and there is a lack of overarching principles, that can be applied to all 
regulatory regimes.” (2006b, 57) See also Chesterman, 2009, 77. 
259 As MacDonald and Shamir-Borer explain: “We suggest that we might expect to see this eventual 
unity manifest itself in three main ways: in a relative homogeneity of general, abstract principles that 
are then applied differently in different sectors; in a relative homogeneity in the more concrete rules 
and mechanisms applied within sectors both domestically and extranantionally; and in the creation of a 
generalised ‘culture’ of administrative law, in which it can be generally expected that some type of 
administrative law rules, some form of concretisation of the general principles, will attach to all 
exercises of public power in global governance.” (2008, 27) 
260 Krisch, 2010, 257. And Krisch complements: “It is a project with a partial, not a comprehensive 
aspiration and seeks an independent existence both as an analytical project and as a normative one, 
albeit on narrower (and potentially less contested) grounds.” (2010, 258) 
261 This metaphor is the title of a book co-organized by Elster, Offe and Preuss (1998). 
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improvements of existing regimes through taking into account all their constraints and 
path dependencies.262  It introduces itself as the ‘next step’, not as the ‘ultimate step’. 
In other words, the GAL project endorses a cautious tactic for walking ‘one step at a 
time’ on the way from ‘here’ to ‘there’. It allows for some prescriptions, but is 
prudent enough not to ignore the non-ideal factual contexts.263 To sum up, its 
philosophy adopts a measure of incremental pragmatism.264 
It still is important to remark that, although political ideals can be deflated by 
down-to-earth estimations of historical feasibility, such deflations do not render the 
said ideals less central for unveiling the critical grip of any accountability claim.265 
That the GAL project has no intent to build ‘global democracy’, whatever that might 
mean in practice, has been stated a number of times.266 Despite subscribing to 
“bracket questions of democracy”, the project does not abandon the purpose of 
“nurturing democratic attributes and tendencies where viable”.267 
Neither this pragmatic hands-on approach, nor the call for accountability, 
participation and so on has been advocated only by the GAL project.268 Nonetheless, 
the GAL proponents do not consider it only as a second-best strategy in the light of 
                                                 
262 Krisch, 2010, 255-258. 
263 Ferejohn addresses the question likewise: “My answer will be more or less optimistic: I think there 
are ways to improve things from a recognizably democratic perspective, even in the nonideal global 
context.” (2007, 2) 
264 The pragmatism of the GAL project, for MacDonald and Shamir-Borer, relies on “acknowledging 
and confronting the realities of globalization. It recognizes the structural nature of global governance 
‘as is’, and works from within.” (2008, 13) It would help escaping one of Rosenau’s traps: “A second 
mistake to avoid is that of focusing on radical rather than practical changes.” (2001, 354) 
265 Such theoretical vigilance, that aligns the ambition of normative arguments with what is believed to 
be historically realistic, is a common recourse in the literature of global politics that GAL resonates 
with. This point has not escaped the attention of Stewart, Kingsbury, Krisch, MacDonald, in the 
publications already mentioned. 
266 For instance, as Kingsbury et al. have argued: “This inquiry usefully highlights the extent to which 
mechanisms of procedural participation and review, taken for granted in domestic administrative 
action, are lacking on the global level. At the same time it invites development of institutional 
procedures, principles, and remedies with objectives short of building a full fledged (and at present 
illusory) global democracy.” (2005, 27) 
267 Kingsbury et al., 2005, 50. And they continue: “Perhaps, then, it would be advisable for global 
administrative law to pursue a less ambitious and more pragmatic approach. It could, for example, 
recognize that under current circumstances, no satisfactory democratic basis for global administration 
is available but that global administrative structures are nevertheless required to deal with problems 
national democracies are unable to solve on their own”. (2005, 50) 
268 For example, Keohane and Grant argue that global accountability requires “new, pragmatic 
approaches”, which should be sensitive to two types of accountability: to states (delegation model) and 
to those affected by its decisions (participation model). If the latter were always to trump the former, 
the immediate risk for international institutions would be to lose state-members’ support (financial and 
any other). At the same time, if the interests of those who are affected by international bodies’ 
decisions were overlooked, international institutions’ legitimacy might be questioned. For them, the 
key to have vigorous global accountability lies somewhere in between the two models. (2005, 34) 
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the impracticability of extending complex and costly participatory mechanisms to 
much larger scales. According to its proponents, the GAL project would rather be a 
first-best alternative under the circumstances of radical pluralism and given the need 
for reasonable accommodation.269 Instead of freezing arrangements that will likely 
mirror the current asymmetrical power relations in the transnational sphere, GAL 
mechanisms would achieve the feat of channeling a plurality of voices without 
foreclosing further contestation.270 
 
6. The shifting places of legitimacy discourses: GAL project and its partners 
 
The reshuffle of transnational institutions, as earlier explained, calls for fresh 
elaboration of the categories that have long served law and politics within and among 
the states. Nobody knows how imminent arrangements will look like, but we do have 
enough historical evidence to believe that whatever materialises will further mitigate 
and constrain state sovereignty.271 What is disturbing for some, and auspicious for 
others, is that the sovereignty-based conceptual apparatus and procedural devices are 
not automatically available for organising and legitimising this set of bodies and 
practices. In other words, that apparatus is not immediately applicable when we shift 
from the one context to the other. 
This chapter has so far focused upon some particular contexts of 
accountability discourses. These discourses consist in a set of claims about how 
accountable an institution ought to be. They follow a basic logical structure, which 
connects a factual premise – ‘as long as one holds power’ – to a prescriptive inference 
– ‘one should be accountable for how such power is exercised’. If one presses that 
inference a bit further – by asking, for example, in whose name and for the sake of 
what value power should be accountable – one will get trapped in inexorable 
normative debates. 
The concepts of accountability and legitimacy, not surprisingly, go hand in 
hand. They do not simply overlap though. Whereas all legitimate power is 
accountable power, not all accountable power is legitimate. The previous chapter 
                                                 
269 MacDonald, 2008, 18. 
270 According to Krisch: “In the divided, highly contested space of the postnational, ideal solutions are 
elusive – pluralism may be the best option we have.” (2009, 45) See also MacDonald, 2008, 21. 
271 Boyle, 1993, 95. 
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defended that claim through the distinction between normative and crude descriptive 
notions of accountability.272 A timely clarification about the relationship between 
accountability and legitimacy helps to appreciate the character of the GAL project. 
Legitimacy is a central normative category of legal and political thought.273 It 
is the moral flip side of power.274 Whether there are acceptable reasons to justify 
authority claims and whether an individual has a genuine duty to obey are the 
elementary questions it confronts. A conception of legitimacy devises counter-factual 
standards against which actual institutions and their decisions can be assessed. This 
assessment enables reflection, critique and institutional reform. Oftentimes, when the 
structure of power in question has reshaped itself in the course of history, the bell of 
legitimacy rang. This process of continuing stabilisation and destabilisation of 
legitimacy discourses is an essential feature and a constant burden of institutional 
development.  
Although legitimacy is an indispensable quality to the operation of legal 
institutions, when it comes to the province of transnational law, its meaning and 
demands are still far from straightforward.275 At the outset of such inquiry, one should 
be attentive to three methodological warnings: first, it is crucial to distinguish binary 
‘either-or’ from gradualist ‘more-or-less’ styles of legitimacy talk; second, one cannot 
ignore that international law is not a monolithic box composed of homogenous norms 
and institutions, but a combination of elements of strikingly different legal nature; 
third, legitimacy standards usually combine elements of input and output. Let me 
shortly explain these claims and then check how GAL handles them. 
                                                 
272 Zürn clarifies the two sides of the concept of accountability: the normative, associated with validity 
and a claim to legitimacy, and the descriptive, attached to societal acceptance. (2004, 260) 
273 Pitkin states: “To call something a legitimate authority is normally to imply that it ought to be 
obeyed. You cannot, without further rather elaborate explanation, maintain simutaneously both that this 
government has legitimate authority over you and that you have no obligation to obey it”. (1966, 39) 
274 Inadvertent uses of different definitions of the word ‘legitimacy’ may cause misunderstandings. The 
presently used normative definition should not be mistaken with the descriptive senses in which the 
term is sometimes used: legitimacy as the fact of obedience (sociological version) and legitimacy as 
legality (formal validity, sheer compliance with rules, whatever the content of the rules is). Fallon 
(2005) has satisfactorily analysed this distinction. There are, for sure, intricate interconnections among 
the moral, the sociological and the legal conceptions. These connections must be drawn carefully so 
that one avoids making the moral callapse into either descriptive senses. The risk is instrumentalising 
the former for the sake of either one of the latter, defending the putative moral quality of a certain 
arrangement only to the extent that it generates compliance, or worse, taking the ‘fact of compliance’ 
as an indicator of moral quality. 
275 See Franck (1990 and 1995), Bodansky (1999), Kahn (2000), Weiler (2004), Kumm (2004), Esty 
(2005). 
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By defining legitimacy as a matter of degree rather than an all-or-nothing 
attribute, the analysis enters a ‘compared to what’ basis and sidesteps a static ‘black 
and white’ conceptual straitjacket. Of course, this nuanced analysis does not ignore 
that, no matter how gradualist an approach might be, it does still need to establish a 
general threshold between the legitimate and illegitimate terrains (within which there 
might be, respectively, degrees of legitimacy or illegitimacy). This concession keeps 
us safe from the risk of ending up accepting that all decisions of international 
institutions have at least some grain of legitimacy. In a way, thus, there is a binary 
element even in a gradualist approach, and the line between legitimacy and 
illegitimacy must be drawn somewhere. However that may be, the acknowledgement 
of varying degrees of legitimacy allows for more refined contrasts between 
institutions. 
Secondly, being sensitive to the multiple types of transnational law also helps 
refining the analysis. It is not possible to think about legitimacy in transnational law 
without a diligent perception of the variety of norms and institutions with distinct 
abilities to make discretionary decisions, to affect the lives of other agents and to 
‘bite’. Law beyond the state constitutes a complex geological body,276 not a fixed 
container formed by indistinguishable components. Each one of these legal types 
entails different measures of authority and a particular relation between authority and 
state consent. Unpacking this “global legal configuration”,277 then, illuminates what 
precise legitimacy demand will be adequate to each institution.  
Finally, the ascription of legitimacy to a particular institution often hinges 
upon two sorts of concomitant standards: a formal source-based and a substantive 
result-based standard.278 To use a more common jargon in the literature of 
international law, they correspond, respectively, to input and output patterns of 
legitimacy. Although one can claim that legitimacy tends primarily, even 
instinctively, to be associated with sources and procedures, so that disagreement upon 
outputs can be outweighed by a previous endorsement to a modus operandi, outcomes 
                                                 
276 To use, again, Weiler’s metaphor (2004, 552). 
277 Walker (2008a) 
278 Typical examples of the former are the pouvoir constituent, elections, principal-agent delegations 
and consent, all of them embodying an autonomous act of will, an opportunity of an agent to have a say 
or exercise some influence upon a decision. Examples of the latter will necessarily bear upon rights, 
measures of reasonableness, proportionality and so on. 
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can hardly be excluded from the overall legitimacy assessment. That prima facie 
deference to procedures, therefore, can hardly withstand a flagrantly wrong outcome. 
The discourses on legitimate accountability at the transnational level are 
various. The quarrel between them can be linguistic, conceptual and structural. It is 
linguistic when the choice of terms that will carry the normative proposal engenders a 
‘politics of label’. It becomes conceptual when the actual elucidation of those terms 
points to different directions and prompts a “politics of definition”.279 It also might 
get structural when the concrete arrangements that try to put those concepts into effect 
finally lead up to a ‘politics of institutional design’. 
Among the main partners of GAL, global democracy is one such candidate. 
Scholars discuss whether the word, the concept and the conventional machinery of 
democracy, being an “indispensable normative component for the legitimacy of a 
legal order”,280 can be transposed into the transnational context. The absence of a 
demos at that level, for Weiler, makes that alternative innocuous.281 Whereas a demos 
– the shared sense of community and belonging to a political system – would help to 
explain why an opposing domestic minority should be bound by the decision of the 
majority, at the global level, for Weiler, the deeper cultural differences would make 
the acceptability of majoritarian decision-making unrealistic.282 
Cohen and Sabel, among others, go in the opposite direction. For them, the 
implausibility of replicating domestic democracy in the transnational setting does not 
render it pointless: “dismissing the possibility of global democracy, as often done, by 
saying ‘no demos, no democracy’ is no more helpful than responding to the chicken 
and egg problem by saying ‘no chicken, no egg’.”283 It is not clear how far the GAL 
project is from a flexible approach of the kind put forward by Cohen and Sabel. In 
spite of opting for a distinct label and of being more hesitant to associate itself with 
                                                 
279 For an example of the “politics of definition”, see Walker, 2008b, 524. 
280 Weiler, 2004, 547. 
281  Weiler argues: “The demos is an ontological requirement of democracy. There is no demos 
underlying international governance, but it is not even easy to conceptualize what that demos would be 
like.” (2004, 560) For Bodansky, unless there is an identifiable group able to “make decisions” either 
by themselves or through representatives, there is hardly a democratic arrangement. The formal devices 
of direct participation or some sort of representativeness are, as opposed to Weiler’s cultural notion of 
demos, inherent to democracy. (1999, 614). 
282 Bodansky, 1999, 615-617. 
283 Cohen and Sabel, 2006, 767. For Búrca, despite the usual attachment of the concept of democracy to 
the context of the state, one should not necessarily be satisfied with global governance without 
democracy. She argues: “any serious proposal for addressing the legitimacy of transnational 
governance must include a robust democratic aspiration.” (2007, 237) 
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democracy, what GAL project advances in terms of procedural mechanisms often 
resonate with democratic qualities.  
Global constitutionalism, in turn, as defined by GAL advocates, has a 
strikingly more wide-ranging scope. Its aim would be to develop a “fully justified 
global order”,284 and it basically pursues it by reproducing much of what is cherished 
in the domestic domain: human rights coupled with judicial review and strong 
legalisation of political relations, all under the auspices of a constitutional text.285 It 
would put the emphasis on the foundational moment (of a pouvoir constituent type), 
through which an all-encompassing polity makes a claim of agency. GCon, in sum, 
intends to keep the “C-word”286 when it moves beyond the state. It requires a vast 
institutional reconstruction and, therefore, for that operation to take hold, one cannot 
but presuppose a significant level of societal consensus in the global order. 
Despite sharing a departing goal – “correcting the legitimacy deficit that 
global regulatory governance suffers”287 or “subjecting public power to public 
control”288 – GCon and GAL convey different roadmaps for political action and 
reform. They have different prudential judgments on feasibility and timing,289 furnish 
different scales of legitimate accountability. 
The GAL project ascribes to GAL a myriad of advantageous features. If one 
gathers together the main adjectives used by GAL’s literature, a minimal list would 
include: open, plural, flexible and adaptable; versatile, pragmatic and modular; 
heterarchical, horizontal, soft; relative and provisional; realistic, feasible and modest; 
incremental, quotidian290 and bottom-up. These qualities should be contrasted with 
the ones attributed to GCon: unity, hierarchy, idealism, verticality, command-and-
control, top-down.  
Perhaps this contrast overstates their differences and underrates their 
similarities. In any event, arguments for the superiority of GAL are conditional and 
                                                 
284 Krisch, 2010, 253. 
285 Krisch, 2010, 253-254. 
286 To borrow Stein’s expression (2005). 
287 MacDonald and Shamir-Borer, 2008, 3. Krisch points out that, while both GCon and GAL are 
concerned with the legitimacy deficit of global governance, they do so from different angles. The 
peculiarity of the latter, as noted earlier, would be that it “focuses on questions of accountability”. 
(2010, 246 and 256) However, in light of what has been argued in chapter 1, this is a narrow concept of 
accountability, which nonetheless permeates part of the literature on the GAL project. 
288 MacDonald, 2008, 18. 
289 This ‘temporal self-restraint’ refers, as it has been constantly reminded by MacDonald and Shamir-
Borer, to the conditions that exist “now and for the foreseeable future”. (2008, 5) 
290 MacDonald and Shamir-Borer, 2008, 51. 
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context-oriented. GAL would be ethically,291 functionally292 and practically 
superior293 to the alternative candidates, but only under the specific historical context 
it departs from. It seems to be better shaped, moreover, to meet the requirements of 
the three methodological warnings submitted above: (i) by disaggregating the several 
devices ‘writ small’ and being open to the variety of combinations between them, it is 
more sensible to variable degrees of legitimacy; (ii) through its comprehensive 
taxonomy, it directs its normative grip to legal layers that GCon ignores;294 (iii) 
finally, unlike what Cassese’s emphasis on “global due process” might suggest, GAL 
does not only impact on input legitimacy, but also includes output considerations.295 
The GAL project vindicates regular yet minute refinement rather than root-
and-branch reinvention of global governance structures. To put it differently, it 
favours retail reform rather than wholesale revolution. Krisch contends that the 
project seeks the realisation of “narrower political ideals, especially 
accountability”.296 For him, concentrating on accountability would release GAL from 
the controversial normative connotations of ‘legitimacy’. That, however, is an 
equivocal statement, since accountability and legitimacy, as I have argued earlier, are 
inextricably tied up in one another. The difference between GAL and other discourses 
lies in the character of the latter’s proposals on legitimate accountability, not on the 
                                                 
291 MacDonald, 2008, 21. 
292 For MacDonald, GAL is “divested of a constitutional impulse to hierarchy and unity” and “well 
calibrated to respond to irreducibly plural and heterarchical conditions of contemporary global 
governance”. (2008, 24-25) As MacDonald and Shamir-Borer also claim: “In providing us with both a 
framework and tools for apprehending these institutions largely as they are (or in any event, to change 
them in a less invasive manner than constitutionalist approaches of necessity must), global 
administrative law is better adapted to protect the regulatory gains that have come from institutional 
and functional specification”. (2008, 37) 
293 For Chesterman, GAL would be practically superior because it is “more likely to find traction with 
decision-makers themselves.” (2009, 77) 
294 For MacDonald, GCon cannot account for the vast array of different bodies that exercise public 
power in global governance. (2008, 18) This partly leads up to MacDonald’s succinct conclusion: 
“Global administrative law is a necessary complement to any global constitutionalism; the inverse, 
however, does not hold.” (2008, 24-25) 
295 MacDonald and Shamir-Borer highlight the procedural side: “It is worth emphasizing that global 
administrative law – for the most part at least – focuses largely on formal and procedural, rather than 
substantive, requirements. These are intended not to definitively condition any substantive regulatory 
outcome, but rather to ensure, to the greatest degree possible, that all affected by public power have a 
say.” (2008, 53) Cassese goes in the same direction and coins the expressions “global due process” or 
“global proceduralism” to characterise the point of GAL. (2006b, 55) Chesterman, however, expands 
the agenda of GAL to accommodate the substantive/epistemic considerations: “The goals of global 
administrative law go beyond constraining decision-makers, however. In addition to providing ‘input 
legitimacy’ to decision-making processes, broadening participation, shining light on deliberations and 
providing the possibility of revisiting bad or unfair choices, global administrative law should improve 
the decisions themselves. This may be thought of as ‘output legitimacy’.” (2009, 88) 
296 Krisch, 2010, 246. 
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putative capacity of the former to bracket or shield itself from intricate normative 
debates. Accountability, in itself, stands for nothing and can hardly be understood as a 
political ideal per se. The distinctiveness of GAL is more plausibly associated with 
what its launching paper has suggested: to allow rethinking the usual legitimacy 
concerns in a more “specific and focused way”.297 
This interpretive effort situates the GAL project within a larger picture, and 
sheds light on the reasons that might answer persistent questions – about which 
normative spectre should undergird global governance for the time being; and about 
whether administrative law, in light of pragmatic considerations, should go first – in 
favour of GAL. In the forthcoming case-studies within the climate change sector, I 
will test the limits of GAL’s contribution to that overall endeavour. 
 
7. Prologue to the next chapters 
 
 Before proceeding to the next stage of the thesis, which undertakes an exercise 
of concrete institutional analysis, some recapitulation might be helpful. That is, it 
seems opportune to notice how chapter 1 harmonises with chapter 2 and how, if taken 
together, the two chapters give north to the forthcoming inquiry. I would like to take 
stock, thus, of the research questions announced in the general introduction of the 
thesis and check which of them has been answered so far, however shortly and 
tentatively, and what has yet to be addressed. 
The current chapter engaged in a threefold mapping review: (i) it portrayed, 
according to the basic divide between the angles ‘within the state’ and ‘beyond the 
state’, the geographical and functional contexts in which real-world political 
accountability mechanisms exist and interact; (ii) it interpreted one already influential 
legitimating discourse that is being used as a benchmark to appraise institutions and 
political processes beyond the state – GAL; lastly, (iii) it highlighted how this sort of 
accountability discourses is tied with demands for legitimacy in global governance. In 
other words, this chapter introduced us to the changeable institutional setting that 
chapter 1 lacked. It underscored the fact that one can grasp the actual operation and 
concrete roles of accountability only when immersed in a given context, however 
formalised or institutionalised that context might be.  
                                                 
297 Kingsbury et al., 2005, 27. 
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The articulation of concepts and contexts of accountability, to sum up, is the 
bond that fastens chapters 1 and 2 together. They provided us with a hopefully 
enlightening template for analysis. Undoubtedly, both chapters are abridged versions 
of what could constitute an entire research project in itself. Their scope was large, 
indeed. The purpose, however, was stipulative and demarcatory, so that the following 
stages of the thesis are grounded on a well-informed conceptual framework. In the 
context of the current work, the two first chapters are instrumental in examining the 
three particular institutions (IPCC, CCKP, CDM). Without this opening conceptual 
delineation, the exercise that follows would lack a stable anchor. 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 will restate, in a further contextualised way, the questions 
that chapters 1 and 2 approached at a still abstract level. These chapters will ask and 
try to answer both a descriptive question and a circumscribed normative question, 
namely: (i) How accountable is that institution? (ii) How appropriate is that specific 
accountability arrangement?  
Standing in between these two main stages of the thesis, chapter 3 will locate 
the main features and recent developments of the Climate Change Regime. It helps 
the transition to chapters 4, 5 and 6 get smoother. Checking whether those three 
international institutions fare well with regards to the critical rationales of 
accountability is an inherently controversial undertaking. To answer such question, 
one needs not only to be fully knowledgeable of how these institutions were designed 
and do actually work, but also to have a framework that structures such judgment and 
justifies the standards for preferring certain legal and institutional states of affairs 
over others. Normative criteria, whatever direction they point to, allow the observer to 
take such a stand. Without such criteria, one can hardly judge in a frank and open 
way. 
The literature on international law that was covered along this chapter has 
important facets. This familiar backdrop can be organised at three levels. First, when 
this literature inquires about what is happening, from the legal and political points of 
view, in the domain of international relations, it tends to take for granted a set of 
factual commonplaces: (i) that the most important political tests faced by states 
nowadays have a global scale, which is, intruiguingly enough, both a cause and a 
consequence of the level of inter-connectedness and interdependence between states; 
(ii) that classical institutional arrangements of international law are, thus, insufficient 
to handle those qualitatively knottier problems; (iii) that a multiplicity of relevant 
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non-state actors has appeared in this arena, and begin to play indispensable roles. 
Whereas the two former factual commonplaces are hardly disputed among the 
authors, the accuracy and credibility of the latter still generates widespread 
disagreement. 
Secondly, when this literature proceeds to inquire about why those facts are 
problematic, it generally resorts to some slightly disputed normative commonplaces: 
(i) that there is a need for deeper structures of global coordination and cooperation, so 
that those taxing collective tasks are efficiently pursued; (ii) that, at the same time, 
there is a legitimacy deficit of current arrangements, a critical diagnosis that, not 
rarely, is couched through the language of accountability. 
Thirdly, when this literature finally asks what should be done, both in the short 
and in the long run, it faces an overwhelming legal and political conundrum, which 
confirms that the calls for novel arrangements are widely disputed and variegated. 
Assuming that a renovated model of transnational law is necessary to tackle, for 
example, problems as costly and complex as climate change,298 it is widely accepted 
that states’ consent does not go far enough in neither facilitating coordination nor in 
legitimising transnational decision-making of that thicker kind.299 There is, however, 
little agreement about what this reformist endeavour should practically mean apart 
from the necessary mitigation of sovereignty.300  
How to build effective institutions and decision-making processes that do not 
suffer from the existing legitimacy or accountability deficits? Or, at least, how to start 
implementing further mechanisms that, pragmatically and incrementally, help 
improve the current state of affairs? For GCon and GAL alike, what is out there in the 
international and transnational institutional arena is troubling for various reasons. 
Both, as we have seen, point to alternative paths and are grounded on different ‘tests 
of appropriateness’, as I will maintain below. 
 
 
                                                 
298 See the Hague Declaration on Environment, March 1989, I.L.M 28 (1989) 1308, according to which 
24 countries called for “new institutional authority (…) which (…) shall involve such decision-making 
procedures as may be effective even if, on occasion, unanimous agreement has not been achieved.” See 
also Bodansky, 1999, 598-599.  
299 This is the thesis of Bodansky, 1999, 606-609. 
300 In this sense, see Bodansky, 1999, 596-624; Kahn, 2000, 1-18; Weiler, 2004, 547-562. About the 
necessary mitigation of sovereignty see: Chayes and Chayes, 1995, 25-26; Slaughter, 2004, 286-287; 
Franck (1995). 
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7.1 Test of appropriateness: which accountability for what institutional purpose? 
 
A test of appropriateness can be boiled down to a core general question: in 
what way is it sensible to call one particular institution to account? Or how should an 
institution, having its singularities in mind, be held accountable? Needless to say, 
there is no single and wholesale recipe or, to use a fashionable expression, no ‘one-
size-fits-all’ solution for warranted accountability arrangements. This is contingent 
upon an array of factors. Political institutions vary immensely in their purposes, 
mandates, power resources and decisional contexts.301 However, whereas domestic 
institutions have been operating in a relatively stabilised normative framework that 
defines what expectations they are supposed to attain and which accountability 
devices would better serve those expectations, the appropriate accountability of 
international institutions remains very much an open question, from both a normative 
and practical viewpoint. That is, the question about the general normative principles 
in the name of which practical accountability tools will be implemented is a highly 
contested issue. 
Philp offers a comprehensive yet compact formulation about what a test of 
appropriateness should entail. Accountability relationships, for him, “need to be clear 
about office holders’ formal obligations, about the extent to which office holders have 
discretion within those parameters and about the type of judgement they are 
exercising when they use their discretion – whether managerial, professional or 
political in character.” More straightforwardly, Philp adds that “the form that 
accountability takes needs to be appropriate to the scale and scope of that discretion, 
to the standing and qualities that are necessary to exercise that discretion and to the 
time frame required for decisions to take effect”.302 
There is a mixture of multiple components in this rich statement. By pointing 
out that appropriate accountability arrangements should be correlated to the type of 
judgment the power-holder is ordinarily supposed to make and to the scale and scope 
of the discretion she has, Philp’s account captures an indispensable set of information 
that has to be factored into any intelligent design. An observer, when producing a 
                                                 
301 Alvarez asserts: “And it is not just that IOs differ among themselves with respect to type of 
members, purposes, mandate and delegated powers. IOs differ with respect to how states have defined 
their own relationship with their institutional creations.” (2006, 27) 
302 Philp, 2009, 44 (the italics of the quotation are mine). 
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critical assessment of the accountability arrangement that takes place before her, 
needs to minimally pinpoint each of these elements, without which she would fail to 
say or offer anything constructive. 
The aforementioned passage registers the primary building blocks of 
appropriate accountability. It still does not stipulate, though, which exact amalgam of 
procedural devices will derive from each different configuration of those variables. It 
underscores, in sum, what should be the constitutive determinants of accountability, 
but does not specify what derivative arrangement will follow from each possible 
combination of those determinants. 
As already seen, GAL project offers one possible assortment of accountability 
devices (the derivative arrangement) to fill up the space that is left open by Philp’s 
generic statement of institutional design. His formal statement points to the pivotal 
determinants that will help tailoring devices like those furnished by the GAL project 
(transparency, participation, interest-representation, review and duty of justification). 
This missing link has not yet been thematised here and has to be further fleshed out. 
To put it differently, the precise shape that those GAL devices should have varies 
according to the particular features of the institution under inspection. 
The ‘context-oriented institutional designer’, therefore, needs to be aware of 
the test of appropriateness that accountability should pass. Such a test, indeed, can be 
firstly constructed from an external point of view, that is, as an inquiry about whether 
the institution itself, and its respective purpose, are adequate and legitimate. 
Nevertheless, as long as this overall purpose is justified and accepted (or, perhaps, 
taken for granted), the designer needs to grasp, this time from an internal point of 
view, which means will most likely and proficiently match those given ends. To sum 
up, the designer asks which accountability devices will duly equip the body to do 
what it is meant to do in the first place. 
This distinction, for sure, might be challenged by something along the lines of 
an insight aired by Mashaw: “at base, much of the dispute about accountability is a 
dispute about what particular institutions are meant to do, not how accountable they 
are in the doing of it.”303 What Mashaw notes, here, is that the external and internal 
perspectives, discriminated above, may well coalesce part of the time. In other words, 
in certain cases, one would not be able to define what role an institution will play 
                                                 
303 Mashaw, 2006, 117. 
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without thinking, simultaneously, on how accountable such an institution will be. The 
former question, then, would not have precedence over the latter. When ‘being 
accountable’ is part of the very institutional identity and purpose, both perspectives 
would turn out to be inherently intertwined and co-original. 
This remark is relevant to our analysis because it bears upon whether, and to 
what extent, a test of appropriateness can be a test of ‘pure instrumentality’,304 a 
scrutiny on the connection between means and pre-given ends. Accountability, for 
sure, cannot be fetishised as an end in itself, but its connection with the so-called 
institutional purpose can be more intricate than it appears at first glance. 
This caveat tries to avoid the potential misunderstanding that may spring from 
the absolute insulation of institutional ends with regards to the means assembled for 
their pursuit. The question comes up because accountability devices may also be 
ascribed, as argued by the previous chapter, epistemic and populist functions, the 
points at which accountability and the institutional purpose inevitably connect. When 
turning more accountable enhances the capacity of an institution to perform its 
assigned purpose (rather than simply making it more controllable or accessible), such 
separation between ends and means (or institutional purpose and accountability 
devices), although still analytically relevant, would be artificial in practice.305 
There is, therefore, a dialectical relation between the institutional purpose and 
the accountability package. It is not possible to entirely bracket the former and set it 
as an unshakable point of departure from which we discuss what the appropriate 
accountability devices should be. To be sure, one cannot be simply conflated with the 
other, but they are, at least sometimes, not free-standing entities either. 
The following example helps to clarify the issue. If one ascribes an agency the 
role of regulating the environmental impact of industrial activity, one can hardly think 
about the performance of its role and the effectiveness of its decisions without 
touching upon the question of how accountable that agency will be (in particular, 
again, as regards the epistemic and populist functions). As long as one is concerned 
with how satisfactory and effective that performance is likely to be, it is advisable to 
ponder over how accountability devices may reinforce the purpose itself. In other 
                                                 
304 MacDonald, 2008, 24. 
305 Unlike the constitutional and democratic functions of accountability, which might be pragmatically 
helpful to the pursuit of a given institutional end but remain generally independent from it, the 
epistemic and populist functions of accountability are directly driven to the decisional tasks the 
institution is in charge of.  
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words, one cannot ignore how those devices might also improve the capacity of the 
institution to take better decisions and be respected. 
A test of appropriateness involves an examination of how the plural functions 
of accountability are balanced and accommodated into an overall institutional 
structure. By slightly rephrasing Philp’s statement, the test requires a consistent 
answer as to (i) how a set of procedures logically correspond to the institutional 
purpose, (ii) the amount of power ascribed to the institution in question to pursue such 
purpose, and (iii) the respective accountability configuration that controls and 
enhances the performance of that purpose. 
The GAL project needs to advance its own test of appropriateness. The test 
cannot consist in just ticking the boxes of that procedural package tout court. Box-
ticking, on its own, will not shed light on anything significant. The concrete 
application of GAL’s framework will rather have to deliver an elaborate 
understanding of how those general principles should be actualised in each particular 
setting, in the light of each peculiar institutional purpose. In other words, the 
applicability of GAL’s framework is a matter not only of crudely attesting the 
presence or absence, for example, of transparency tools, but also of opting for a 
certain kind of transparency which is, in turn, appropriately connected to the 
respective institutional purpose. And so on and so forth with each further GAL’s 
principle. 
As it happens with interpretive exercises in general, and legal interpretation in 
particular, testing the appropriateness of a procedural arrangement does not resemble 
the machine-like application of an algorithm. This does not mean that a framework is 
not a necessary resource to gauge how the overall arrangement fares from the 
perspective of each normative vision on global governance. The GAL project counts 
as one such vision. This type of framework helps us check how each procedural 
device turns accountability stronger or weaker, consequential or pointless; what 
normative vision accountability meets, approximates or chases; or what can be done 
to refine it within the boundaries of the respective normative view. 
Just demanding the replication of GAL’s procedural package, in its brute 
form, over whatever type of transnational body, would be a misguided exercise. It 
would fail to comprehend the relevant determinants for shaping the set of components 
of that package. That package tells only half of the story. It lacks a preceding 
functional trigger that indicates how those general principles should be tailored. 
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7.2 The framework 
 
Echoing what numerous authors have contended, I claimed that to ask whether 
an authority is accountable is an uninteresting and misleading question. The critical 
query is whether there is appropriate accountability – whether there is too much, too 
little or just enough; whether the account-holders are the right ones; whether 
accountability is serving or impairing the pursuit of a justifiable institutional purpose; 
whether there is room for improvement; whether, ultimately, there is legitimate 
accountability. 
Institutions of global governance, however questionable their legal shape and 
power structures might be, are being accountable some way or another. This verdict is 
neither novel nor remarkable. It rather assumes a broader concept of accountability, as 
the one here adopted.306 Apart from scrutinising what types of accountability exists 
out there, then, one needs to further inquire into which type of accountability is 
desirable and how it can be strengthened. That is, apart from a descriptive portrait, 
one can also engage with the normative principles and equivalent procedural devices 
that turn an accountability relationship into a normatively attractive one. A normative 
step follows once the descriptive task has been completed. And that step cannot be 
taken in isolation from the overall institutional purpose. 
Chapters 1 and 2 supplied a large number of conceptual elements in aid of the 
concrete institutional analysis to be developed in the next chapters. Putting them 
together in a way that is serviceable both to the structural description and to the 
normative assessment is the challenge of the remaining parts of this thesis. On the one 
hand, we have a set of descriptive coordinates that can be blended, in each context, to 
perform the four key legitimate functions of accountability. On the other, as I outlined 
it, GAL project advances five basic procedural devices, which consist in nothing more 
than particular dispositions of those coordinates. 
GAL project intends to act as useful, if far from exhaustive, normative 
baseline for dealing with the current anxieties of institutional change in the domain of 
global governance. It does not confront, from an external point of view, the overall 
structure or purpose of an institution, but, from an internal point of view, defends the 
                                                 
306 See Keohane and Grant (2005), Philp (2009) and Krisch (2006 and 2010). 
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value of implementing those specific devices. I maintain that these devices would 
promote, or at least facilitate to some extent, the four-pronged functional task of 
accountability, as defined by the previous chapter: power-controlling, accessibility-
fostering, capacity-seeking and legitimacy-triggering. 
The pursuance of each of these four functions can be enhanced, obstructed or 
undermined by particular configurations of GAL’s package. Each function will be 
more or less evidently salient in each device. Since not all functions can be 
maximised, and cannot but be differently adaptable to each institutional purpose, the 
general arrangement will require inevitable trade-offs and cost-benefit calculus. The 
devices will have to be moulded, then, according to sectoral demands.  
To sum up, the test of appropriateness, as here stipulated, consists in 
contrasting a singular institutional purpose with a corresponding institutional design 
and, then, in checking what the accountability functions are and how they are pursued. 
The GAL’s package offers one possible prism of institutional design to be 
explored.307 This is the vantage point the chapters 4, 5 and 6 will approach in detail. 
First, chapter 3 will bring the overall Climate Change Regime to the fore and provide 
a bird’s eye view of its formative historical process. 
 
                                                 
307 Chesterman elaborates upon the point and adaptability of GAL project in a similar vein: “The term 
‘global administrative law’ does not presume that the normative response to these questions is uniform 
– or that it should be. But as an emerging area of practice, the concept of a global administrative law 
can help frame these questions of accountability and sketch some appropriate responses.” (2009, 77) 
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Chapter 3 
The international law of climate change:  
a particular context 
 
“While the crew is arguing,  




Climate has never been stationary or entirely predictable and consistent. 
Climate variability, that is, the natural and non-anthropogenic oscillation of climate, 
is a well-known phenomenon, already documented and described by historians and 
scientists. Climate change is a chapter of another story. This term was coined to 
single out the precise impact that human interference, along the industrial era, has 
made on climate.309 Its effect is believed to be deeper and, to some extent, 
irreversible. Its scale is reputedly global, but affects human life more heavily in some 
regions rather than others. Affected regions, moreover, are not necessarily those 
which have most contributed, by way of industry-led economic production, to the 
overall phenomenon.310 Predictably, climate change amounts to a complicated legal 
and political puzzle. Solving, or at least managing this puzzle is one of the most acute 
questions of contemporary international law. 
It took some time for international law to drive serious attention to these 
alarming facts. For the last three decades, though, politicians and law-makers have 
been far from indifferent to the increasing volume of evidences that science has 
                                                 
308 Dessler and Parson, 2006, 177. 
309 This understanding is embraced by article 1 of the Framework Convention on Climate Change. 
According to the FCCC, climate change means “a change of climate which is attributed directly or 
indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in 
addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods.” The IPCC has a 
different position, though. To the IPCC, climate variability occurs due to natural and anthropogenic 
causes. The glossary that was produced by the IPCC’s working group I, for the Fourth Assessment 
Report, states: “Climate variability refers to variations in the mean state and other statistics (such as 
standard deviations, the occurrence of extremes, etc.) of the climate on all spatial and temporal scales 
beyond that of individual weather events. Variability may be due to natural internal processes within 
the climate system (internal variability), or to variations in natural or anthropogenic external forcing 
(external variability)”. Available at: http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/glossary/ar4-wg1.pdf  
310 Jim Yong Kim, of the World Bank, warns: “While every region of the world will be affected, the 
poor and most vulnerable would be hit hardest.” (Foreword, p. x, World Bank Report, “Turn Down the 
Heat: Why a 4°C Warmer World Must Be Avoided”, November 2012.) 
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produced thereupon. The actual intergovernmental negotiations about climate change 
have timidly started in the 90s and have increasingly occupied the international 
agenda ever since.311 After a series of allegedly unsuccessful attempts to construct a 
legally concerted international response to the problem, the relevant academic 
literature has recently become more fatalistic on the prospects of a strong and capable 
enough international regime. Bodansky, for example, maintains that instead of leading 
towards substantive decisions, the current negotiations are trapped into a “meta-
negotiation about what to negotiate”.312 A “case for pessimism”, that is how others 
reckon the situation.313 The general mood of the climate community, in the early 
2010’s, is a gloomy one. 
This atmosphere, however, has a history, and the general mood has not always 
been that defeatist. The Climate Change Regime, which is the compendium of 
multilateral agreements specifically addressing this problem under the auspices of the 
United Nations, formally begins with the adoption of the Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (FCCC), in 1992.314 The FCCC does not impose substantive 
obligations on states to reduce emissions, but it establishes a set of principles and 
institutions that can lead the ongoing negotiations.  
The subsequent 1997 Kyoto Protocol seemed a more promising episode of the 
climate change legal-political narrative. It set binding targets and a timetable for 
developed countries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. On that opportunity, 
developed countries actually engaged in laborious negotiations and ended up not only 
with noteworthy targets, but also with market-based mechanisms tuned to achieve 
these targets in a cost-efficient manner, and a forthright compliance procedure. 
Developing countries, on the other hand, escaped any obligation related to the 
reduction of their own emissions. 
The optimistic expectations generated by these innovations, nonetheless, were 
not exactly met by the beginning of the 2010’s. The legal-institutional approach 
launched by the FCCC and scaled up by the Kyoto Protocol is currently under a 
                                                 
311 Skodvin and Andresen, 2011, 166-167. 
312 Bodansky, 2012, 12. 
313 The title of the article by Røgeberg et al. (2010).  
314 There are other types of cooperation, which are focused on certain countries or issues. They 
emerged outside the United Nations process: such as the Major Economies Forum on Energy and 
Climate Change, the G8, and the G20. These additional forums of dialogue and exchange on climate 
change have led Keohane and Victor to call the Climate Change Regime a “regime complex” - a loose 
set of complementary and non-hierarchical institutions instead of a comprehensive regime. (2010, 4) 
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process of reappraisal. Allegedly crucial aspects of the Regime have sparked 
opposing reactions. Disagreements range from the controversy about the very 
applicability of some of the foundational principles to the questions of who and how 
should implement the reduction of emissions. 
The current stalemate demonstrates how particularly difficult convergence is: 
it involves a partial displacement of states’ own authority regarding environmental 
regulation to international bodies; it has a bearing on the rhythm of economic 
development of each state because, whatever the final international agreement on the 
issue may be, if any such final agreement can be reached and implemented, it will 
have to reshape the structure and logic of production in favour of a deeply contentious 
international goal.315 
This chapter intends to draw an introductory yet comprehensive picture of 
what the Climate Change Regime entails. It is divided in five additional sections. The 
second section conceptualises the idea of a global common good and discusses how 
this concept applies to the climate, and how it affects the design of a regime that is 
supposed to tackle the issue. The third section describes the development of the 
Climate Change Regime, from its inception until the latest rounds of negotiations, and 
outlines its current structure. The fourth section delineates the reasons why I chose to 
examine, through the lenses of accountability and the GAL project, three specific 
actors of the Regime: the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the 
Compliance Committee of the Kyoto Protocol (CCKP), and the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM). In spite of the continuing transformations of the overall structure 
of the Regime, these three actors synthesize three indispensable functions of the 
overwhelming task of organising a transnational collective reaction against global 
warming. Finally, the fifth section describes the common expository structure of the 





                                                 
315 Bondansky contends: “Climate change implicates virtually every area of domestic policy, including 
industrial, agricultural, energy, transportation, and land-use policy. As a result, the Climate Change 
Regime raises much greater domestic sensitivities than other international regimes, which have a more 
limited scope.” (2012, 9)    
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2. Climate as a global common good: climate change as a global common threat 
 
In the midst of global anxiety after the proliferation of swine flu, Prime 
Minister Gordon Brown voiced a call for global instant mobilisation: “Swine flu is an 
international problem now. It is across two continents. It has got to be dealt with by 
international organisations”.316 At that moment, the international authority in charge 
of public health was already in action: the Emergency Committee of the World Health 
Organization declared that the situation constituted a “public health emergency of 
international concern” and pleaded for all countries to “intensify surveillance”.317 In 
the following days, as the flu was burgeoning in other locations, the WHO issued new 
recommendations, again addressed mainly to the states.  
One can easily read between the lines: the success of such mobilisation 
depends, to a large degree, on whether and to what extent countries are willing to 
cooperate. The swine flu episode is just one more example of how, in the 
contemporary world, local occurrences can reach a transnational scale with 
groundbreaking speed. They demand a prompt and concerted reaction of the political 
protagonists in the global scene – the nation-states. This protagonism, nevertheless, is 
far from having the same weight as it had in the heydays of the Westphalian 
international order, when it was traditionally ideated as a community of formally 
equal and sovereign states. The swine-flu story, like so many other stories that earn 
global interest, has an underlying moral logic: the promotion of global common goods 
is inimical to, or sits uneasily with, an outright sovereignty-based and fragmented 
international order.318 
One should be careful, for sure, with a too quick analogy between public 
health and climate problems. Public health crises tend to have clearer causal chains. 
Furthermore, the diagnosis and the assessment of success or failure of most collective 
measures, at the national or transnational levels, oftentimes unfold more quickly. 
Climate, in turn, does not have so visible and short-terms causalities. The very notion 
of crisis, if crisis is conceived as the outbreak of a systemic instability that can be 
controlled through timely measures, does not neatly apply to climate problems, or at 
                                                 
316 Carrell and Williams (2009). 
317 Carrell and Williams (2009). 
318 For Krisch, conceiving global politics only in terms of classical international law would “lead to 
severe costs in the provision of global public goods”. (2010, 251) 
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least not at the same time-scale: a climate crisis is a long-term, inter-generational 
crisis. These features render the issue even more divisive and contested. 
In his widely quoted “The Tragedy of Commons”, Garret Hardin foresees, 
back in 1968, the hurdles that international cooperation faces when it comes to 
regulating the global commons – the resources that pertain to everyone and, 
consequently, are free for each one’s enjoyment, such as the air we breath. Hardin 
offers a pedestrian allegory. He imagines a pasture, which is open to anyone to raise 
cattle, as a common. The tragedy occurs when each cattleman realises that it is more 
profitable to add as many animals as possible to the pasture irrespective of the 
collective loss he might thus incur over time. 
The reason underlying such behaviour is not difficult to detect: while the 
profits with the sale of the cattle will be enjoyed by the cattleman alone, the negative 
consequences of “overgrazing” the common will be shared by all other cattlemen. 
That metaphorical story provided a strong image for the discussion about the role of 
private property in incentivising rational economic behaviour, and about the role of 
political authority and law in coordinating collective action. Hardin’s explanation 
hints at the insurmountable difficulty of coordination in a world of sovereign states: 
“Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit 
– in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each 
pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the 
commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all.”319 
Climate faces a logically similar collective bind. “Overgrazing the pasture” at 
such global scale, however, leads to a collective loss of another sort. 
A global common good can be a purely normative category or be combined 
with a perception of the inevitable factual need of a concerted collective action in 
global scale.320 It is either derived from the sheer moral conviction that some material 
                                                 
319 Hardin, 1968, 1244. 
320 There is extensive literature on “global commons”. Wijkman, for example, argues that the absence 
of exclusive economic rights and a defined management strategy has led to an economic inefficiency of 
the global commons  (1982, 511). The core concept of the term is uniform: “A commons is a resource 
to which no single decision-making unit holds exclusive title.” (Wijkman, 1982, 512) In this sense, see 
also Brauniger and Konig (2000), Falkner (1997), Myers and Myers (1982), Olson (1982). Walker 
employs a similar idea when referring to a “global public good” (2008b, 535). Weiler, finally, develops 
an equivalent approach of global commons through employing the concept of “common assets” as 
follows: “The common assets could be material such as the deep bed of high sea, or territorial such as 
certain areas of space. They can be functional such as certain aspects of collective security and they can 
even be spiritual: Internationally defined Human Rights or ecological norms represent common 
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resources or purely political issues are of such importance that they must be protected 
globally, or from the empirical datum that some resources cannot be rationally 
deployed but by a coherent collective approach.321 Human rights are a handy example 
of the former. As for the latter, a further distinction could be drawn. First, there are 
those subject-areas that cannot be contained by geographical borders, like 
environmental and public health problems. Second, there are other subject-areas that, 
in theory, could be dealt with by states alone, but certainly not in a world with the 
level of interconnectedness our world has (like trade, finance, security etc.).322-323 
Climate change is, then, nothing but one of many global threats that can only 
be reasonably addressed collectively: any response provided by the states alone, or by 
a group of states acting in an uncoordinated manner will be, at best, limited.324 The 
global effects of environmental degradation will not be significantly sorted out if state 
A announces it is reducing its level of greenhouse gases emissions (the “trappers” of 
heat and, consequently, the main cause of climate change) and state B, which 
undergoes an economic boom, doubles its emissions. Artificial political borders do 
not help in controlling the level of greenhouse gases concentration in the 
atmosphere.325  
                                                 
spiritual assets where States can no more assert their exclusive sovereignty, even within their territory, 
then they could over areas of space which extend above their air-space”. (2004, 556). 
321 This notion corresponds to what Weiler calls “common assets” – everything over which states 
cannot claim sovereignty, like the deep bed of high sea, collective security, human rights or 
environment. (2004, 556) 
322 Slaughter maintains: “Global governance, from this perspective, is not a matter of regulating states 
the way states regulate their citzens, but rather of addressing the issues and resolving the problems that 
result from citzens going global”. (2004a, 16) 
323 One could say, of course, that the distinction is fragile because the level of interconnectedness (that 
characterises the second type) also impacts on the scale and speed of environmental and public health 
problems (the first type). This is surely true, but still does not entirely undermine the distinction 
between issues in respect of which the lack of a global concerted action is likely to cause serious 
natural disasters (like global warming or pandemic diseases), putting under risk basic standards of 
human existence, and issues that, in theory, the countries may choose not to interfere with or even to 
regulate through much weaker integration (in areas like commerce etc.), without causing comparably 
serious harms. In the former case, there is not much choice to leave the matter untouched, whereas in 
the latter, arguably, countries could opt to step back at a lower level of integration. Whereas one 
involves inescapable natural causality, the other is a product of human convention. The distinction may 
be important to show that environmental problems have a greater degree of urgency than other global 
commons and may justify more experiments in modes of transnational authority.  
324 Nye claims: “The solutions to many current issues of transnational interdependence will require 
collective action and international cooperation. These include ecological changes (acid rain and global 
warming), health epidemics such as AIDS, illicit trade in drugs, and terrorism. Such issues are 
transnational because they have domestic roots and cross international borders.” (1990, 163-164)  
325 The assumption that the world would not be better off if countries, unilaterally, decide to reduce 
their GHGs emissions can be defended by reference to the results of three model simulations. These 
simulations calculate how much global temperatures could decrease if one major emitter (US, India, or 
China) reduces up to 100% of its GHGs emissions from business-as-usual by 2200. The results are 
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Alan Boyle notes that, with respect to the global environment, the old notion 
of sovereignty “no longer meets contemporary needs.”326 In the field of climate 
change, the case for transnational coordinating bodies, whatever institutional features 
they have, seems to be the strongest. Such bodies, together, would have to avoid the 
irrational outcome that tends to be produced by atomised, inward-looking and self-
interested state actions. The sum of rational individual actions (if we take ‘rational’ as 
‘self-interested’), in the absence of external rules that bind all agents and coordinate 
their actions, is collective irrationality.327 That is the gist of the prisoner’s dilemma.328 
Building international coordination is not an elementary task.329 The 
hierarchical legal mechanisms that create authority within nation-states are not 
available in that broader domain. Not, at least, and for the time being, with the same 
capacity of enforcement, as the previous chapter has argued. Nonetheless, states have 
not stayed inert in the face of such difficulty and have been trying to live up to that 
task through the use of creative international law instruments. In the next section, I 
will depict the type of coordination the international community has so far provided to 
address climate change. The question of whether the current arrangement of 







                                                 
quite modest. An utopian reduction of 100% of US GHGs emissions by 2200, for example, would 
result in a reduction of global warming of only 0,15 degree Celsius. (Røgeberg et al., 2010, 184)             
326 Alan Boyle argues that “(b)ecause these problems affect other states and the global environment, the 
traditional concept of territorial sovereignty within which states have been free to pursue their own 
national development policies, no longer meets contemporary needs.” (1993, 95) 
327 As Keohane and Victor say, global commons “are therefore not self-managing; promoting sustained 
cooperation requires formal institutions involving rules and social norms”. (2010, 9)  
328 Dworkins grasps it in the domain of international law: “We are already seized by devastating 
prisoners’ dilemmas: about terrorism, climate change, Internet communication, and economic policy. If 
we had an entirely different form of international organization – a worldwide federal system, for 
instance, with a supreme parliament – we could attack those problems through comprehensive global 
legislation. The unmitigated Westphalian system allows no comparable opportunity.” (2013, 27) 
329 As Henkin emphasises: “We have had some cooperation, but it has been limited in the name of 
sovereignty. We pursue a quest for world order, but a limited world order. We created a United 
Nations, but it is a limited United Nations. We have a World Bank and an International Monetary Fund 
and other specialized agencies, and they are all limited, not only in achievement but even in aspiration, 
by a persistent addiction to this notion of sovereignty”. (1999-2000, 3) 
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3. The Climate Change Regime 
 
The big picture of the Climate Change Regime can be divided into three major 
phases.330 The first phase led to the adoption of the FCCC, in 1992, which lays the 
legal foundation of the Regime, but did not create any coercive mechanism to control 
the greenhouse gases emissions, or GHGs. The second phase is inaugurated by the 
adoption of the Kyoto Protocol, in 1997. The Kyoto Protocol has thickened the 
governance regime to address climate change by defining clear targets and a 
timetable, from 2008 to 2012, for developed countries (“Annex I countries”) to reduce 
emissions. The last phase deals with the future steps of the regime. What should be 
done as the Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment period expired in 2012? The 2009 
Copenhagen Accord, the 2010 Cancun Agreements, the 2011 Durban Platform, and 
the 2012 Doha Decisions are components of this last period. In what follows, I will 
discuss these stages and point to the deadlocks that hinder progress in climate 
negotiations. 
 
3.1 Mobilisation around the scientific advice  
 
Climate change has initially emerged as a scientific concern. In the early 60s, 
scientists discovered increasing anthropogenic emissions of gases that trap the heat in 
the atmosphere, such as carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide.331 Climate 
change only transcended the scientific milieu and reached the political domain when a 
group of scientists, associated with the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), 
were successful in publicising the growing scientific body of evidence around climate 
change and its alarming consequences, such as unusual warming trends of global 
temperatures. The creation of the intergovernmental body (IPCC), in 1988, by a joint 
resolution of the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) and the WMO, 
to assess the scientific aspects of climate change, signalled the intention of 
                                                 
330 Bodansky, 2010, 231. 
331 Agrawala explains: “The role of human activities in increasing greenhouse gas concentrations has 
come under growing scrutiny only since the late 1950s when monitoring of atmospheric carbon-
dioxide concentrations began in Antarctica and Hawaii.” (1998a, 606) See also Bodansky and 
Rajamani, 2013, 4-5; Skodvin and Andresen, 2011, 166. 
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governments to finally engage with the scientific community and strive for concerted 
action.332 
In 1990, a resolution from the United Nations General Assembly established 
an Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee, through which states should agree on 
“an effective framework convention on climate change, containing appropriate 
commitments”.333 Such resolution indicated the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development (UNCED), in 1992, as the deadline for completing a 
first stage of international cooperation on the issue.334 
 
3.2 Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) 
 
As expected, the FCCC was adopted at the 1992 UNCED, held in Rio de 
Janeiro. At that time, the international community was deemed mature enough to start 
negotiating framework conventions. Framework conventions, says Bodansky, have an 
inherent “catalytic role” – they prepare the groundwork for tougher and specific 
measures being issued with a subsequent protocol.335 Put differently, such 
frameworks denote an incremental technique of international lawmaking and 
institution-building. Doubtful states tend to accept more easily general governance 
regimes that do not pose an immediate threat to their sovereignty.336 
In line with such framework approach, the ultimate objective of the FCCC is 
that its 195 parties337 stabilise the “greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere 
at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate 
system.”338 Such objective is considered ambitious, and the majority of nations in the 
world agree towards the need to stabilise GHGs.339 The message becomes weaker, 
however, when the FCCC attempts to establish the safety threshold for 
                                                 
332 See Bodansky and Rajamani, 2013, 6, and also Skodvin and Andresen, 2011, 167. Agrawala says: 
“An important point which is often overlooked is that the IPCC was the product of an intensely 
political process within the US and the UN system. The specific purpose for setting it up was also 
political: to engage governments worldwide in climate change decisionmaking.” (1998a, 617) 
333 UN General Assembly, A/RES/45/212, paragraph 1. 
334 UN General Assembly, A/RES/45/212, paragraph 7. 
335 Bodansky, 1993, 495. To Brunnée, the “‘framework-protocol’ model has established itself as the 
MEA approach that is most commonly used to foster conditions under which common understandings 
of the problem at hand can be developed”. (2002, 7) 
336 Bodansky says that the FCCC is actually a middle ground between a framework and a protocol. It 
stops short of establishing specific emissions control. (1993, 496) 
337 Which correspond to “almost all nations of the world” (Skodvin and Andresen, 2011, 171) 
338 FCCC, article 2. 
339 Skodvin and Andresen, 2011, 170-171. 
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concentrations, which is “at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system”. To decide on what the word “dangerous” 
actually means in the context of climate change has been a complicated task.340 In 
2009, the majority of states that were present in Copenhagen hinted, with the support 
of scientific evidence, that a global temperature change above “2 degrees Celsius” 
amounts to a dangerous interference with the climate change.341 
The FCCC established the principle of “common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities”, according to which all parties should 
protect the climate, but developed countries “should take the lead”.342 This principle 
has legitimated the division of obligations, under the Climate Change Regime, 
between developed and developing countries ever since.343 
The culprit of climate change, which is the increasing levels of GHGs 
concentration in the atmosphere, was seen as the end product of industrialization – a 
process initiated by developed countries.344 Developing countries argued, then, that it 
would be only fair to attribute to developed countries the main responsibility to take 
the necessary measures to avoid global warming.345 Hence, developed countries were 
given additional obligations under the FCCC. First, they have to provide financial and 
technical assistance so that developing countries can comply with their new 
                                                 
340 Skodvin and Andresen observe: “The word ‘dangerous’, however, is ambiguous and contested”. 
(2011, 171) Pershing and Tudela also comment: “Translating ‘dangerous’ into concrete terms is 
anything but clear-cut. It requires consensus on the level of acceptable risk, an inherently political 
determination resting on value judgments.” (2003, 18) 
341 Copehagen Accord, paragraph 1, reads as follows: “We underline that climate change is one of the 
greatest challenges of our time. We emphasise our strong political will to urgently combat climate 
change in accordance with the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities. To achieve the ultimate objective of the Convention to stabilize greenhouse gas 
concentration in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference 
with the climate system, we shall, recognizing the scientific view that the increase in global 
temperature should be below 2 degrees Celsius, on the basis of equity and in the context of sustainable 
development, enhance our long-term cooperative action to combat climate change (…)”  
342 FCCC, article 3, paragraph 1. 
343 FCCC, article 3, paragraph 1. “This principle [common but differentiated responsibilities] has been 
important in the sense that it has legitimised the South’s rejection of taking on emissions 
commitments”. (Skodvin and Andresen, 2011, 171) 
344 The preamble of the FCCC conveys the historical responsibility of developed countries when it 
comes to GHGs emissions: “Noting that the largest share of historical and current global emissions of 
greenhouse gases has originated in developed countries, that per capita emissions in developing 
countries are still relatively low and that the share of global emissions originating in developing 
countries will grow to meet their social and development needs”. See also Bodansky, 1993, 479. 
345 Bodansky further clarifies this point when he tells that developing countries saw climate change as a 
“developmental” question, whereas developed countries equated climate change as an environmental 
problem. (1993, 479) 
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obligations.346 Second, developed countries were also assigned a “quasi-target and 
quasi-timetable” to reduce emissions.347 As a quasi-target, developed countries shall 
have the “aim of returning individually or jointly to their 1990 levels” of emissions.348 
The quasi-timetable indicates that such return should be done “by the end of the 
present decade to earlier levels of anthropogenic emissions”.349 
The prefix ‘quasi’, also borrowed by Bodansky, reveals that these articles do 
not actually impose real targets or timetables. Werksman, in turn, adopts the 
expression “constructive ambiguity” to refer to these commitments, since they “create 
the impression of bindingness, without holding countries to any specific change in 
behaviour”.350 As we can see below, the vagueness of obligations referring to 
emissions reductions would be subject to further negotiations among the parties to the 
FCCC. 
The guiding principles of the FCCC include, among others: the protection of 
the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations; attention to 
specific needs and circumstances of developing countries; the necessity to take 
precautionary measures, even in the absence of scientific certainty, to mitigate and 
adapt to the consequences of climate change; and, finally, the right to a sustainable 
development, which suggests that any measure against climate change should take 
into consideration the economic development of each party.351 
All parties to the FCCC, irrespective of being developed or developing 
countries, have to discharge a set of commitments. Most importantly, they have to 
produce national inventories of anthropogenic emissions, and to formulate and 
implement national programmes with the view of combating global warming. In 
addition, the FCCC encourages continuous production of scientific knowledge about 
                                                 
346 FCCC, article 4, paragraphs 3, 4, 5, and 7. There are two classes of developed countries in the 
FCCC. Those entitled to provide financial and technical assistance (the Annex II parties) were 
members of the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development), in 1992. FCCC, 
Parties & Observers, 2012. 
347 Bodansky, 1993, 512. According to Bodansky, the United States were the main opponent to the 
adoption of “targets and timetable”. Instead, they argued that a “bottom-up” approach would be more 
equitable in terms of costs and national circumstances. (1993, 514) 
348 FCCC, article 4, paragraph 2(b). This goal is imputed to the second class of developed countries in 
the FCCC, the Annex I parties, who are the OECD countries plus those undergoing the process of 
transition to a market economy. FCCC, Parties & Observers, 2012. 
349 FCCC, article 4, paragraph 2(a). Bodansky explains the content of the “quasi-target and quasi-
timetable” of the FCCC. (1993, 515-517).   
350 Werksman, 2010, 675. 
351 FCCC, art. 3 paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4. 
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climate change and the establishment of channels for the exchange of information.352 
In general terms, these commitments aspire to expand the understanding of the 
phenomenon through the documentation of data and domestic policies furnished by 
each state.353 
The Conference of the Parties (COP) is the “supreme body” of the FCCC. 
Every year, the COP meets to supervise the implementation of the Convention and to 
decide on whether further actions are needed to effectively implement it. The COP 
has a dynamic and reflexive function.354 Its decisions should take into consideration 
the social, economic and environmental effects of the parties’ implementation of their 
obligations, and the current developments of science and technologies against global 
warming.355 As of November 2012, the COP has met eighteen times and its decisions 
have had an important role in the development of the Regime. The COP created 
subsidiary bodies, implemented the Kyoto Protocol, and organised new rounds of 
negotiations. 
The decision-making authority of the COP is based on its “Rules of 
Procedure”.356 The parties to the FCCC have not decided whether they will allow 
matters of substance being decided by a majority vote, or if they will maintain the 
current arrangement, which is to take decisions by consensus only.357 Some authors 
have criticised the current voting rules, as they allow a small minority to block 
necessary decisions and ascribe them disproportional power.358 That is what happened 
to the 2009 Copenhagen Accord. The document is the outcome of the fifteenth COP. 
Instead of being adopted, as an actual decision, by the COP, the Copenhagen Accord 
was “taken note of”, since it did not manage to gather consensus around its terms. As 
                                                 
352 FCCC, article 4, paragraph 1.  
353 See Bodansky and Rajamani, 2013, 18. 
354 Brunnée argues that the COP and its counterpart, the COP/MOP, have evolving law-making roles 
under the Climate Change Regime. As a way to make sense of their legitimacy, according to the 
traditional “consent-based framework” of international law, the COPs’ mandates should be probed 
through different theoretical lenses. Brunnée says that it is mainly the ongoing interactional process, 
rather than the formal consent, that attributes to international norms the potential to influence state 
conduct. (2002, 4-7) 
355 FCCC, article 7, paragraph 2, in particular (a) and (e). 
356 FCCC, Adoption of the Rules of Procedure. 
357 See FCCC, Adoption of the Rules of Procedure, Rule 42. 
358 According to Bodansky, if COP was ambitious enough, then its decisions would be taken by a 
majority vote: “By participating in an institution that allows decisions to be made by a qualified 
majority vote, or that establishes bodies with limited membership (…), a state accepts a process that 
can result in decisions that it opposes.” (2010b, 122) 
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for its status, the Copenhagen Accord is a political rather than a legal agreement, and 
it does not have “an official status as a UNFCCC document”.359 
In the wake of the FCCC, demands for intensifying the commitments of 
developed countries gained momentum. At the second meeting of the COP, in 1996, 
the heads of delegations specifically called for “quantified legally-binding objectives 
for emission limitations and significant overall reductions within specified time-
frames.”360 
 
3.3 Kyoto Protocol 
 
The plea for stronger commitments led to the adoption of the 1997 Kyoto 
Protocol, which came into force only in 2005, after Russia’s ratification.361 In a 
mandatory and clear language, the Protocol determines that developed countries shall 
ensure that their emissions “do not exceed their assigned amounts (…) with a view to 
reducing their overall emissions (…) by at least 5 per cent below 1990 levels in the 
commitment period 2008 to 2012.”362 Thanks to the Kyoto Protocol, then, each 
developed country has acquired its own emissions target – the “quantified emission 
limitation or reduction commitment”,363 and a five-year period to achieve it. 
The success in assigning legally binding targets to developed countries had 
been, however, partially offset by the absence of the United States in the deal and by 
the lack of commitment of the largest emerging emitters, like China, India, and Brazil, 
to switch to a low-carbon path of development.364 Despite such flaws, which taint the 
                                                 
359 Werksman and Herbertson, 2010, 115. See below the discussion about the importance of legal 
agreements to international law.  
360 The Geneva Ministerial Declaration, paragraph 8. 
361 Kyoto Protocol, art. 25, paragraph 1, determines that the Protocol shall enter into force only when 
“55 per cent of the total carbon dioxide emissions for 1990 of the Parties included in Annex I, have 
deposited their instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.”  
362 Kyoto Protocol, art. 3, paragraph 1. 
363 Kyoto Protocol, Annex B. As Baumert explains, each party’s emissions target is different. There are 
countries allowed to increase emissions above 1990 levels, and Iceland is one of them, and countries 
required to reduce emissions below 1990 levels, such as the European Union.  (Baumert, 2006, 372-
373) 
364 Nordhaus argues: “The Kyoto Protocol is defective on both spatial and temporal efficiency criteria 
because it omits a substantial fraction of emissions (thus failing the spatial criterion) and has no plans 
beyond the first period (thus failing the temporal dimension of the cost-effectiveness criterion). The 
two largest emitters (the United States and China) are not included in the current protocol.” (2007, 33)  
The absence of the US and other big emitters is not the only complaint. According to Skodvin and 
Andresen: “Further weakening the significance of the commitments is the fact that emissions from 
aviation and shipping are not included.” (2011, 173)  
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effectiveness of the deal, the Kyoto Protocol managed to create original mechanisms, 
subsidiary bodies and procedures in order to set its wheels in motion. 
The first marker of such institutional ingenuity had been the three market-
based mechanisms to reduce the costs of implementation with emissions targets. They 
are the Joint Implementation (JI), the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), and the 
Emissions Trading (ET).365 These market mechanisms allow, at a lower cost, the 
trading of credits for emissions reduction. These credits can be generated from 
climate-friendly projects put forward either by developing countries (through the 
CDM) or by developed countries (through the JI). Alternatively, still, emissions 
credits can also be traded between developed countries themselves (through the ET). 
At the end, developed countries can use these credits to comply with their targets.366 
The second marker of the institutional originality of the Kyoto Protocol is the 
robustness of its compliance procedure. A strong non-compliance procedure was 
specially designed to “facilitate, promote, and enforce compliance”.367 A compliance 
committee can declare an Annex I party to be in non-compliance with its 
commitments. Such decision must be supported by a technical assessment of the 
situation, which is prepared by experts. 
The Marrakesh Accords, which consist in a set of decisions taken at the 
seventh meeting of the COP, in 2001, were responsible to put the Kyoto Protocol into 
action.368 The Accords detailed, for example, the rules and guidelines of the market-
based mechanisms, as well as the procedures relating to compliance. 
The ultimate decision-making authority of the Kyoto Protocol is also the COP. 
However, with respect to this task, it serves as the Meeting of the Parties (MOP), due 
to its different composition of members.369 It is mandated to review the 
                                                 
365 Kyoto Protocol, articles 6, 12 and 17.  
366 Brunnée maintains: “The main arguments in support of the transfer mechanisms are that they 
provide avenues for more efficient and cost-effective emission reductions. Countries that face high 
compliance costs can elect to acquire lower-cost reductions (or emission units) elsewhere and thus 
reduce the need for emission reductions at home. The expectation is that market dynamics will create 
incentives to both generate tradable reductions and find lower cost domestic solutions that reduce the 
need to acquire emission units abroad.” (2003, 269)  
367 Decision 27/CMP.1, Objective. 
368 According to Decision 1/CP.7, the Marrakesh Ministerial Declaration, paragraphs 1: “the decisions 
adopted by the seventh session of the Conference of the Parties in Marrakesh, constituting the 
Marrakesh Accords, that pave the way for the timely entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol;” 
369 Kyoto Protocol, article 13, paragraphs 1 and 2. 
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implementation of the Kyoto Protocol and to make the necessary arrangements to 
effectively implement it.370 
 
3.4. Copenhagen, Cancun, Durban and Doha: new patterns? 
 
The necessity of agreeing on a forward-looking regime ahead of 2012 has 
recently troubled the negotiations. Two forums were conceived to deal with the issue 
– one under the FCCC, and the other under the Kyoto Protocol.371 
In 2007, the COP adopted the “Bali Action Plan”, which aimed at engaging 
the parties in further negotiations on the effective implementation of the FCCC, 
through the newly constituted subsidiary body, the “Ad Hoc Working Group on 
Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention”. The Bali Action Plan 
envisaged deliberation on important points, such as: a “long-term global goal for 
emission reductions”; “nationally appropriate mitigation commitments or actions” for 
developed countries and “nationally appropriate mitigation actions” for developing 
countries; adaptation measures; technical and financial resources.372 By that time, the 
Kyoto Protocol had already established, in 2005, its own “Ad Hoc Working Group” to 
consider “further commitments for Parties included in Annex I for the period beyond 
2012”.373 The future of the Climate Change Regime, which should have the form of 
an “agreed outcome”,374 was left to be decided at the fifteenth COP, in 
Copenhagen.375 
Copenhagen did not deliver what many had initially expected or hoped.376 
Those who were aspiring to close the deal with a legally binding agreement like the 
FCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, had to compromise and accept an essentially political 
and non-consensual instrument instead, the Copenhagen Accord.377 The longing for 
                                                 
370 Kyoto Protocol, article 13, paragraph 4. 
371 Bodansky, 2010, 232-233. 
372 Bali Action Plan, paragraph 1 (a), (b) i and ii, (c), (d), (e). 
373 Decision 1/CMP.1, paragraph 1.  
374 Rajamani explains the uncertainty that surrounds the term “agreed outcome […] indicates a lack of 
agreement on both the legal form that the likely outcome of this process could take, and the level of 
ambition that it should reflect”. (2012, 503) 
375 Bali Action Plan, paragraph 1. 
376 Dubash and Rajamani report: “Never before had an international negotiation attracted 125 heads of 
state and government, and expended as much political capital, yet failed to deliver in quite so 
spectacular a fashion. And never before had outcomes been this dramatically misaligned with popular 
expectations.” (2010, 593)  
377 See Decision 2/CP.15, Copenhagen Accord.  
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stronger legal mechanisms was frustrated. In international relations, legally binding 
agreements represent the strongest effort of sovereign states to generate coordination 
through the means of law and legal institutions. States reinforce such commitment by 
promoting the necessary international and domestic arrangements to further develop 
and legitimise the deal.378 
Negotiations in Copenhagen revealed the extent and nature of disagreements 
on elementary issues, such as the architecture of the future Climate Change Regime, 
which revolves between top-down and binding targets versus bottom-up and national 
voluntary targets,379 and the level of legal obligations to which developed and 
developing countries should be subjected. While developed countries were pushing 
for “legal symmetry”, developing countries wanted to maintain their “legal 
differentiation”.380 In the end, the Accord distanced itself from the Kyoto Protocol 
and moved towards a bottom-up approach, inasmuch as countries, both developed and 
developing, have to list their own objectives for reducing their emissions. It also 
promoted more symmetry among developed and developing countries, although many 
differences in their duties persist. For the first time, developing countries have to 
register mitigation actions that aim at tackling climate change. 
Despite the uncertain and weak status under the United Nations process, the 
Copenhagen Accord is surprisingly hailed as a landmark in negotiations.381 For the 
first time, an agreement has struggled to follow the IPCC scientific advice by 
                                                 
378 According to Werksman, legally binding agreement or LBA “is the highest expression of the 
political will of the LBA’s Parties to take the agreement and its subject matter seriously. For many 
countries, entering into an LBA requires parliamentary ratification and thus becomes binding and 
enforceable domestically through implementing legislation.” (2010, 673) As for the institutional 
structure that is promoted with an LBA, Werksman claims: “Finally, and perhaps most importantly, 
LBAs can generate – through the mandates provided to their Conference of the Parties and other 
institutions under the COP’s authority – new and more specific guidelines and rules that promote the 
harmonization of standards around reporting and implementation, can encourage a more consistent 
deployment of financial resources, and can maintain public, media and diplomatic pressure on the 
progressive development of the regime.” (2010, 674) In the same vein, Bodansky recalls: “Ultimately, 
what makes a norm ‘hard’ is not that violations can be sanctioned, at least in the way that we ordinarily 
mean, or that the norm can be applied by courts. Instead, what matters is the state of mind of the actors 
that comprise the relevant community— what we referred to earlier as the actor’s internal point of 
view—a sense that the norm represents an obligation and that compliance is therefore required rather 
than optional.” (2010b, 101) Apart from the legal form, Bodansky alludes to other elements that, if they 
are present in a treaty, indicate stronger levels of commitments, such as: more precise norms, longer 
agreement’s duration, international supervision and enforcement. (2010b, 180)     
379 About the architecture, see Dubash and Rajamani, 2010, 594-596. 
380 Werksman, 2010, 672. 
381 As Werksman and Herbertson maintain: “For the first time in the climate change negotiations, all 
major emitters, including more than ninety developed and developing countries, have come forward 
with pledges that reflect what they are willing to do to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.” (2010, 109-
110) 
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establishing a limit for the change in global temperatures, which is below 2 degrees 
Celsius. Such limit, allegedly, would avoid a “dangerous anthropogenic interference 
with the climate system.”382 
In order to reach the aforementioned limit, of course, there should be 
significant cuts in global emissions. Forty-two Annex I countries have “committed to 
implement” quantified emissions targets, listed by Appendix I, until 2020.383 Such 
targets will be “measured, reported and verified in accordance with existing and any 
further guidelines adopted by the Conference of the Parties.” The objective of such 
process is to produce “rigorous, robust and transparent” targets.384 As for the non-
Annex I countries, forty-three of them have listed, in Appendix II, their “mitigation 
actions”, which they “will implement”.385 These mitigations actions may be subject to 
international or domestic “measurement, reporting and verification”. The international 
scrutiny only applies if developing countries seek international support for their 
mitigation actions. Apart from that, a domestic measurement, reporting and 
verification takes place and its results should be communicated “with provisions for 
international consultations and analysis under clearly defined guidelines that will 
ensure that national sovereignty is respected”.386 
In terms of financial help, the Accord promised to generate “new and 
additional, predictable and adequate funding”. More precisely, developed countries 
have collectively committed themselves to provide $30 billion for developing 
countries’ adaptation and mitigation measures, as well as $100 billion a year by 2020 
“in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on 
implementation”. A “Green Climate Fund” was established to manage a great part of 
such funding.387 
The following step of negotiations was the 2010 Cancun Agreements – a 
consensually adopted decision by the COP that, as for its consensual status, can be 
said to be in contrast with the Copenhagen Accord. The Cancun Agreements are 
                                                 
382 Copenhagen Accord, paragraphs 1 and 2.  
383 These targets are listed in “Compilation of economy-wide emission reduction targets to be 
implemented by Parties included in Annex I to the Convention”, FCCC/SB/2011/INF.1/Rev.1.  
384 Copenhagen Accord, paragraph 4.  
385 The mitigation actions are listed in the “Compilation of information on nationally appropriate 
mitigation actions to be implemented by Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention”, 
FCCC/AWGLCA/2011/INF.1. 
386 Copenhagen Accord, paragraph 5.  
387 Copenhagen Accord, paragraph 8.  
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considered to be an extension of the latter.388 There was no breakthrough, but they 
were, nevertheless, applauded for bringing negotiations back in line with the United 
Nations process.389 They incorporate both the emission targets put forward by Annex 
I parties to the FCCC,390 and also the mitigation actions to be implemented by the 
non-Annex I parties by 2020.391 
The crucial doubt with respect to the Copenhagen and Cancun pledges has 
been whether they are sufficient to hold the change of global temperatures below the 
2 degrees Celsius limit. Although these pledges reduce the level of emissions that 
would have occurred in the absence of those measures (what is usually called a 
“business as usual scenario” of emissions), studies have concluded that they are still 
not enough to avoid a global warming above the 2 degrees Celsius.392 More ambitious 
targets and actions would be necessary to achieve such goal. Yet, timid targets are not 
the only problem. The absence of clarity with respect to their implementation makes 
the assessment of what is to be achieved a difficult task as well.393 
The 2011 Durban Decisions focus on the period after 2020. The new “Ad Hoc 
Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action” was established to lead 
a process to “develop a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with 
legal force under the Convention applicable to all Parties”.394 
This decision is quite emblematic. Not only is it the launching of a new set of 
climate negotiations, without the two forums established by the Bali Action Plan, but 
it makes no reference whatsoever to the principle of “common but differentiated 
                                                 
388 Skodvin and Andresen note: “the substance of the Agreement is fairly similar to the Accord.” (2011, 
182) Bodansky refers to both documents as “Copenhagen/Cancun”. (2012, 2) 
389 Skodvin and Andresen note: “Most analysts see a positive development in the Cancun Agreement, 
as it is, in constrast to the Accord, embedded in the UN system”. (2011, 176)  
390 Cancun Agreements, paragraph 36. 
391 Cancun Agreements, paragraph 49. 
392 “Although the country pledges help in reducing emissions to below a business-as-usual level in 
2020, they are not adequate to reduce emissions to a level consistent with the 2°C target, and therefore 
lead to a gap.” (UNEP, 2011, 8) 
393 Levin and Finnegan argue that “many of these pledges do not specify aspects such as which sectors 
or gases are covered, which methodologies are used for estimating expected reductions, if applicable, 
and/or the role of offsets. Without this and other information, it is challenging to track progress towards 
fulfillment of pledges, to ensure transparency, to estimate resulting emissions reductions, and to assess 
whether overall global emissions reductions are adequate for meeting global temperature limits.” 
(2011, 1) 
394 Durban Platform, paragraph 2.  
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responsibilities and respective capabilities”.395 In fact, in two different opportunities, 
the Durban Platform underlines “all Parties” as the subjects of its provisions.396 
During the last COP, held in Doha, in 2012, two recently launched reports, 
one from UNEP and the other from the World Bank, provoked outspoken reactions 
among parties and non-governmental organisations. The first reveals the gap between 
the countries’ pledges to reduce emissions and the objective to avoid global warming 
above 2°C.397 The second calculates that the world is, actually, in the path of getting 
4°C warmer, if no other measures to reduce emissions are devised and 
implemented.398 The preamble of the Doha Decisions urged the parties both not to 
forget such downside and to take action in order to achieve the common global 
goal.399 
Doha also advanced the deadline for concluding negotiations initiated with the 
Durban Platform: by 2015, in Paris, a “protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed 
outcome with legal force”, applicable to all parties, should be adopted with a view to 
coming into effect from 2020.400 
The decision to establish “institutional arrangements”, which might include an 
international mechanism “to address loss and damage associated with the impacts of 
climate change in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse 
effects of climate change” was celebrated in the aftermath of the COP.401 Such 
institutional arrangement, however, is still in its infancy, and the objective so far is to 
gather data and build up knowledge with respect to actions and techniques that help 
us address the problem.   
At Doha, the parties finally managed to extend the Kyoto Protocol to a second 
commitment period, from 2013 to 2020, as it has already been foreseen in Durban. 
                                                 
395 Bodansky, 2012, 2-3. Rajamani, 2012, 507-508. 
396 Like in the following passages: “Also decides to launch a process to develop a protocol, another 
legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all Parties” 
(Durban Platform, paragraph 2); “Decides to launch a workplan on enhancing mitigation ambition to 
identify and to explore options for a range of actions that can close the ambition gap with a view to 
ensuring the highest possible mitigation efforts by all Parties” (Durban Platform, paragraph 7). 
397 UNEP, 2011. 
398 “Indeed, present emission trends put the world plausibly on a path toward 4°C warming within the 
century” (World Bank, 2012, xiii). 
399 See Doha Decisions, CP.18, “Agreed Outcome pursuant to the Bali Action Plan”.  
400 See Durban Platform. 
401 See “Approaches to address loss and damage associated with climate change impacts in developing 
countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change to enhance adaptive 
capacity”, FCCC/CP/2012/L.4/Rev.1, paragraph 9. 
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Canada, Japan, and Russia did not accept the second commitment period, which was 
only embraced by the EU, Australia, Switzerland, and Norway.402 
The first phase of the Kyoto Protocol has already attracted criticisms due to 
the absence of the two biggest emitters, the US and China. This time, the slice of 
global emissions covered by the Kyoto Protocol is even lower, which possibly 
indicates that the political support around its architecture is on the wane. The overall 
impression is that the parties have moved towards “a more flexible design”, one that 
embraces voluntary, bottom-up targets and actions.403 
 
4. Science, compliance, and cost-efficient emissions reduction 
 
The three following chapters are dedicated to the study, through the analytical 
lenses of accountability and GAL project, as previously defined, of three institutional 
actors of the Climate Change Regime: the IPCC, the CCKP, and the CDM. As already 
explained at the outset, two inter-related questions will be addressed: how 
accountable these institutions are, and how appropriate their respective accountability 
arrangements happen to be. 
The reason for the selection of these three specific institutions should be 
further developed. The choice relates to the pivotal yet distinct functions each one 
exercises within the overall regulatory system devised by the Climate Change 
Regime: to inform policymaking about the state-of-the-art of scientific knowledge 
concerning climate change (IPCC), to promote compliance of the parties (CCKP), and 
to bolster cost-efficient reduction of emissions (CDM). 
The IPCC, the CCKP and the CDM, just like the Climate Change Regime 
itself, are still in the process of experimentation and consolidation. Indeed, every 
single institution, however traditional it might be, is inevitably subject to further 
development. The institutions currently considered, though, are in a different 
historical stage – states are grappling to strike the right institutional mixture to deal 
with novel problems in a novel sphere. No matter how different these institutional 
                                                 
402 See Decision 1/CMP.8 “Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol pursuant to its Article 3, paragraph 9 
(the Doha Amendment)”, FCCC/KP/CMP/2012/13/Add.1. Canada’s deviation from its target under the 
Kyoto Protocol was substantial: “The Canada's current greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are 23% over 
the country's Kyoto protocol target, and federal government estimates place Canada 28.8% over the 
target by 2014.” (Doucet, 2012) 
403 Bodansky and Rajamani, 2013, 33. 
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actors might turn out in the future, the core functions they exercise are essential in the 
long run for any regime tailored to address climate change. 
The IPCC, again, informs a broad audience about the science of climate 
change. It does not produce knowledge, but takes stock and translates to the political 
community, through reasoned assessment reports, the conclusions provided by the 
scientific literature on climate change. Considering that the political process is the 
ultimate trigger of any global response to complex environmental problems, 
responsible, legitimate and efficient political decisions are dependent on taking 
scientific evidences into serious consideration. 
Scientists were the first to blow the whistle on climate change and on its tragic 
consequences. There are further and more recent examples of the IPCC’s influence on 
policymaking. Since the Copenhagen Accord, the parties have agreed that a deep 
global emissions reduction is required so as to limit the global temperature change 
below 2 degrees Celsius. Such limit was established “as documented by the IPCC 
Fourth Assessment Report”.404 
The CCKP adopts a dense procedure with a view to inducing the parties’ 
compliance with their commitments under the Kyoto Protocol. In general terms, a 
compliance committee, which works through the facilitative and the enforcement 
branches, decides on questions of implementation. Developed countries, in particular, 
have to report on their performance and should receive a technical review of such 
material, through expert review teams. The CCKP enables one party to know whether 
and how other parties have been implementing their share of commitments. There is 
an element of enhancing mutual trust. Additionally, there is also the objective of 
documenting and strengthening the data with respect to efforts to reduce GHGs 
emissions.405 
Since the Bali Action Plan, in 2007, the Regime introduced the concept of 
“measurement, reporting, and verification” of the actions chosen by the parties to 
respond to climate change. According to the Copenhagen Accord, for example, both 
developed countries’ emissions targets and developing countries’ mitigations actions, 
                                                 
404 Copenhagen Accord, paragraph 2.  
405 Werksman and Herbertson talk about the benefits of the CCKP in similar terms: “transparency and 
accountability have been improved trough monitoring and evaluation of developed country parties’ 
performance by Expert Review Teams authorized to conduct in-country visits, deploy third-party data, 
and raise questions of implementation” (2010, 130) 
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should be “measured, reported, and verified”.406 Such process is still underdeveloped 
under the Regime, but it has similar functions to those advanced by the CCKP. It 
intends to devise a set of standards against which the parties’ efforts could be 
measured in order to permit the mutual knowledge of each other’s performance, and 
to check on whether the information reported is trustworthy.407 
Finally, the CDM is one of the market-based mechanisms devised under the 
Kyoto Protocol. It is specifically intended to structure the financing of climate-
friendly projects between developing and developed countries, with the purpose of 
achieving cost-efficient emissions reductions. By means of the CDM, developing 
countries run projects that generate specific credits, the Certified Emissions 
Reductions, and developed countries buy these credits in order to comply with their 
emissions reductions commitments under the Kyoto Protocol. The cost-efficient side 
of this trading mechanism relates to the fact that the actual emissions reductions occur 
in developing countries, where the costs of building climate-friendly facilities are still 
cheap compared to the costs that could be incurred if similar facilities were built in 
developed countries.408 
The continuity of market-based mechanisms in the future Climate Change 
Regime has gained a strong political support. The 2011 COP, in Durban, decided that 
a new market-based mechanism is to be created in order to “enhance the cost-
effectiveness of, and to promote, mitigation actions”.409 
The three institutions, in sum, are central instances of the intense institutional 
experimentation undertaken by international law to handle the functional demands 
                                                 
406 Copenhagen Accord, paragraphs 4 and 5. The Accord implies that the “measurement, reporting and 
verification” process applied to targets and actions are different from each other. 
407 On the “measurement, reporting and verification”, see Breidenich and Bodansky, 2009. These 
authors provide a good summary of the goals and functions of such process: “MRV can serve a wide 
range of purposes in a new climate agreement. It can provide an important means of tracking parties’ 
progress individually and collectively toward the Convention’s ultimate objective. The very process of 
measurement can facilitate parties’ actions by establishing baselines and helping to identify mitigation 
potentials. The reporting of actions can allow for their recognition internationally. The review or 
verification of parties’ actions can enhance action through expert advice on opportunities for 
improvement. MRV could play a particular role in the linkage between developing countries’ action 
and support for those actions. Finally, credible MRV can strengthen mutual confidence in countries’ 
actions and in the regime, thereby enabling a stronger collective effort.” (2009, 1) 
408 Wara examines the cost-effectiveness aspect of the CDM: “The CDM was designed around the 
insight that the marginal cost of emissions reductions in developing, and especially rapidly developing, 
countries would be less than those faced by developed nations. The basis for this insight was that the 
cost of building more efficient, lower-GHG-emitting industrial and energy facilities in the developing 
world would be far lower than the cost of prematurely retiring or retrofitting existing developed-world 
capital stock.” (2008, 1763) 
409 Durban Platform, paragraph 83. 
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that climate change lays upon global cooperative action. These functional demands 
comprise the challenges of 1) translating for policy-makers how science understands 
and measures the causal chains of climate change, 2) prompting obedience and hence 
inter-state coordination, and 3) operationalizing emission reductions through market-
based mechanisms.  
These are delicate functions for the pursuit of which the IPCC, CCKP and 
CDM were specifically empowered, and to which an appropriate accountability 
arrangement is necessarily tied. Despite not exhausting all that a climate change 
regime is supposed to do, and although other bodies could also be selected for this 
research, the three institutions have been sufficiently active and running through 
interesting procedural reforms, in order to allow for illuminating intra-regime 
comparison. Such functional differentiation implies the particularisation of 
accountability demands, which, in principle, should lead to different combination of 
devices.. 
Locating the three institutions within the typology of GAL project is not a 
complex task either. The place that the IPCC, CCKP and CDM occupy in the map of 
international law is not as extravagant or conceptually disturbing as other novel 
institutions spotted by the GAL project might be (like the hybrid or intermestic 
institutions). They are part of “international administration”410 and their 
administrative tasks are exercised within a formal intergovernmental arrangement. 
 
5. The structure of the following chapters 
 
The thesis scrutinises three institutions that have been recently refining their 
respective decision-making procedures. It considers their respective accountability 
regimes and shows the extent to which these reforms can be apprehended as iterations 
of GAL. GAL project, for sure, does not provide the only conceptual lenses through 
which one can observe them, but enables the analyst to perceive relevant features. 
The three following chapters share a common structure. This structure 
comprises two descriptive steps and one evaluative step. They couple, in other words, 
a detailed depiction of these institutions with some conjectures about their 
appropriateness and room for transformation. 
                                                 
410 Kingsbury et al., 2005, 7. 
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The first descriptive step addresses the ‘institutional configuration’, which 
comprehends the identification of the purpose, actors and decisional processes in 
place. Put differently, it explains the institutional mandate, draws its organogramme 
(who is who) and its flow chart (how they interact: who does what, when and how). 
The second descriptive step purports to interpret the ‘accountability structures’ 
through the coordinates delineated by the first chapter. That is, it tells a similar story 
from a somewhat different angle, fleshing out the descriptive blueprint earlier 
systematised: Who accounts to whom? For what and how? When? On the basis of 
which standards? Under pain of what consequences? The evaluative step, in turn, 
proceeds through a ‘test of appropriateness’, according to the general framework 
outlined by the previous chapter.  
The design of the 3 bodies can partly be seen as 3 particular iterations of GAL 
principles. Whether ‘GAL for science-policy dialogue’ (IPCC), ‘GAL for 
compliance’ (CCKP) and ‘GAL for finance’ (CDM) have any significant difference in 
procedural terms is a question to be checked.411  
It is not clear how a “fully emerged” GAL will eventually look like, assuming 
that this is the route through which global bodies will develop. Its proponents expect 
some degree of homogeneity in heterogeneity, some degree of unity in diversity. It 
remains to be investigated whether something close to that achievement is present 
within the sector of climate change. The GAL’s framework invites institutional 
introspection and facilitates intra-regime comparison. I will rehearse that 




Climate change is believed to be among the most challenging global 
environmental problems to date. As seen above, climate negotiations face many 
obstacles before reaching a regime that keeps the world away from a “dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system”.412 
                                                 
411 Chesterman, for example, considers that the “procedural remedies” of transparency, rights of 
participation and review “do not exist for the Basel Committee, the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean 
Development Mechanism (…)”. (2009, 79) 
412 FCCC, art. 2. 
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One of these obstacles is the deepening of the conflict between developed and 
developing countries. Developing countries have been pushed to engage more 
actively in tackling climate change, since their share of global emissions is on the 
rise.413 The interpretation of the principle “common but differentiated 
responsibilities” has been, and is likely to remain, a hotly contested issue.414 
In addition, negotiations have become harder because of the political 
reverberations of the topic. Public support around it, though, has been dwindling. 
From 2005 to 2008, climate change occupied the terrain of “high politics”, as 
Andersen and Skodvin have understood it. It was a priority on many political 
meetings, first of all, due to the stronger scientific consensus about the problem, and 
second, because of the current grasp of climate change’s dire consequences: “tropical 
storms, shrinking glaciers, and pictures of polar bears looking for ice”.415 This 
ascendant trajectory, however, reversed after the outbreak of the global economic 
crisis in 2008. The public consciousness about climate change tends to oscillate 
between hesitating scepticism and outright denial. A recent BBC poll shows that the 
number of people who believe climate change is really happening and is the result of 
human behaviour has dropped from 41% to 26%.416 
In any case, the Climate Change Regime, already twenty years old, is a sign 
that the “crew” is not just arguing, but starting to act.417 However modest, still messy, 
and far from sufficient that action might be, what is emerging is an institutional 
architecture that needs to be studied under well-crafted concepts and probed through 
plausible normative assumptions. 
The analysis that follows in the next three chapters intends to better 
understand the functioning of essential bodies of the still dynamic international 
Climate Change Regime. It is not far-fetched to assume that a credible flow of 
                                                 
413 “The fastest growth until 2025 is projected in developing countries, whose collective emissions are 
projected to rise 84 percent (compared to 35 percent growth for industrialized countries). By 2025, the 
developing country share of global emissions is projected to be approximately 55 percent (compared to 
48 percent in 2000).” (Baumert et al., 2005, 17) 
414 Dubash and Rajamani explain the anxiety that pierces climate politics: “The UNFCCC, born of the 
earlier period, sits uneasily in today’s world of level playing fields. The developing world is 
undoubtedly far better placed – economically and politically – than in 1992, and it is disingenuous to 
pretend otherwise. But it is equally problematic to deny that there remain vast disparities between 
developing countries, and heavy burdens of underdevelopment within many developing countries, both 
of which buttress the salience of differentiations as a concept.” (2010, 598)   
415 Skodvin and Andresen, 2011, 165. 
416 BBC climate change poll, February, 2010. 
417 I am here referring to the metaphor that was quoted at the epigraph of this chapter: “While the crew 
is arguing, the ship is getting closer to the rocks.” (Dessler and Parson, 2006, 177). 
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scientific information, an effective practice of states’ compliance with its obligations, 
and a successful market-based mechanism may create better conditions for 
cooperation between states. Testing and improving the accountability configurations 





The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC):  
holding science and policymaking to account 
 
“The science of the situation is clear – 




The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is the cornerstone of 
the Regime Complex for Climate Change.419 It was set up in 1988, by a joint 
resolution by the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) and the World 
Meteorological Organization (WMO).420 Its responsibility is to politically test what 
science tells us with respect to climate change. More precisely, it is an institution for 
the political certification of the scientific evidences on the basis of which global 
action can be envisioned and worked out. Its institutional mission is to “assess on a 
comprehensive, objective, open and transparent basis the scientific, technical and 
socio-economic information relevant to understanding the scientific basis of risk of 
human-induced climate change, its potential impacts and options for adaptation and 
mitigation.”421 
The climate change has been considered a serious issue for more than 50 
years. About 30 years ago, due to its disquieting consequences, climate change has 
entered the international political agenda. It has only become a prime political issue, 
however, through the momentous series of IPCC assessment reports.422 Since its 
inception, the IPCC has managed to build, despite the strident handful of climate-
sceptics, a non-negligible consensus around key factual claims: 1) that climate change 
is indeed occurring,423 2) that it is, to a large extent, the product of human activity,424 
                                                 
418 Hanse (2012). 
419 Keohane and Victor (2010).  
420 WMO (1998) and UNEP (1997). For a detailed account of the IPCC history, see Agrawala (1998a 
and 1998b). 
421 IPCC, 1998, paragraph 2. 
422 Skodvin and Andresen, 2011, 165. Agrawala (1998a). 
423 The Summary for Policymakers of the IPCC Fourth Synthesis Report maintains that “Warming of 
the climate system is unequivocal, as is now evident from observations of increases in global average 
air and ocean temperatures, widespread melting of snow and ice and rising global average sea level.” 
(IPCC, 2007, 2). 
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and 3) that, unless effective mitigation and adaptation plans emerge,425 the 
environment, hence mankind itself, will be seriously threatened.426 The key role of the 
IPCC within the Climate Change Regime is reflected in most related institutional 
documents: the FCCC,427 the Kyoto Protocol,428 and the Principles Governing IPCC 
Work.429  
This chapter will look into how the procedures of the IPCC attempt to enable 
it to fulfil its central role of policy advice-giving. It proceeds through three major 
steps. First, I describe the IPCC institutional edifice, which comprises the purpose, the 
correlated actors and their interacting processes. Second, I explicate that same 
institutional structure through the language of accountability that has been developed 
by the first two chapters. Thirdly, I put forward an evaluative account of the 
appropriateness of such institutional structures and the archetypes it seeks to bring 
about. Along this assessment, I consider how the normative lenses of GAL project 
might illuminate the IPCC accountability and the direction of its past reforms. 
At first sight, it sounds suspicious to contend that science should be 
accountable to politics. It might correctly seem that it should be the other way around. 
However, the claim that scientists should not be accountable to politicians passes over 
the institutional nuances of the IPCC. The phenomenon of accountability, as I have 
previously argued, is not an all-or-nothing matter. Rather than questioning whether 
the IPCC should be accountable, the relevant inquiry is to know how that might be 
appropriate without affecting the integrity of the scientific enterprise. Accountability 
is not so much a choice as it is an almost inevitable fact of the exercise of power, and 
it becomes an even heavier burden at the stage of high-profile global decision-
making. The IPCC exercises a tremendous non-coercive power of attesting what 
science can credibly claim about climate change already. The present chapter will 
investigate how its institutional structure engenders bidirectional accountability 
relationships between scientists and politicians. 
 
                                                 
424 “Most of the observed increase in global average temperature since the mid-20th century is very 
likely due to the observed increase in anthropogenic GHG concentrations.” (IPCC, 2007, 5) 
425 “There is high confidence that neither adaptation nor mitigation alone can avoid all climate change 
impacts; however, they can complement each other and together can significantly reduce the risks of 
climate change.” (IPCC, 2007, 19) 
426 IPCC, 2007, 9-10. 
427 FCCC, art. 21 (2). 
428 Kyoto Protocol, art. 5 (2) and (3). 
429 IPCC, 1998, paragraph 1. 
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The purpose of the IPCC can be conceived both at a general and at a practical 
dimension. Generally speaking, the IPCC mediates between science and politics in 
order to digest, translate and synthesize what the former knows about climate. It is 
ultimately about “policy advice-giving”, a multifaceted task that consists in 1) 
certifying whether and how climate change is happening, 2) gauging what impact it 
might precipitate on natural and social life, and 3) reckoning what can be done to 
adapt, mitigate or even to avert it.430 The IPCC is, in other words, a “scientific 
intermediary” on that particular matter of global concern.431 
More practically and straightforwardly, this means that the IPCC has to 
deliver a periodic assessment report about the state-of-the-art of scientific knowledge 
on the phenomenon of climate change, apart from occasional special reports or papers 
that might be commissioned for more precise inquiries.432 Taking stock of the latest 
and cutting-edge scientific literature, therefore, is the kernel of its institutional 
responsibility. The IPCC neither discovers nor produces new knowledge properly so 
called. Its process is rather one of scrutiny, confirmation and public authentication.  
To date, the IPCC has elaborated and published four of these reports. The fifth 
is planned to be ready by the end of 2014.433 An IPCC assessment report has a 
compound formal structure. It is made up of the separate reports and the respective 
summary for policymakers (SPM) produced by each of the three working groups 
(WG), and also by a synthesis report (SYR) and its own summary for policymakers. 
The SYR “distills and integrates” the main conclusions of the three WG reports.434 
                                                 
430 Bolin called it a “science advisor”: “The scientist serving in a position of science advisor must 
acquire insight into other aspects of the problem under consideration in order to provide the decision 
maker with the most essential information.” (1994a, 25) 
431 For Vasileiadou et al., the IPCC was established as “the primary intermediary institution to 
synthesize scientific knowledge for policymakers”. (2011, 1053) 
432 These other kinds of documents are usually made in response to requests of the COP/MOP. They 
are: Special Reports; Methodology Reports; Technical Papers; and Supporting Material. 
433 The First Assessment Report (FAR) was published in 1990, the Second Assessment Report (SAR) 
in 1995, the Third Assessment Report (TAR) in 2001 and the Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) in 
2007. The release of the Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) is scheduled for December 2014. See IPCC, 
2008, item 4. 
434 Pachauri, 2007. 
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This means that, altogether, the IPCC report consists of eight different pieces. The 
four summaries for policymakers play a crucial and sensitive political role. Because 
they are supposed to orient political agents that are working on the ground, they need 
to be written in a style that is non-technical, intelligible and accessible to the general 
public.435 
The interrelation between science and policymaking in contemporary 
international law and politics, indeed, goes far beyond climate change. This is not a 
novel conclusion, and we can conjure up several examples thereon. Scientific 
evidence, for instance, has sparked a number of controversies involving state-
members to the World Trade Organization Agreements. One well-known case is the 
dispute promoted by Canada and the United States against the European Community 
because of the ban, upheld by the latter, on importing meat products from cows 
treated with hormones. According to the European Community, the justification of the 
ban has been constructed on the basis of scientific evidence that meat products 
containing hormones were harmful to human health.436 In another oft-cited example, 
the International Whaling Commission, in 1982, established a moratorium of 
commercial whaling thanks to the lack of scientific certainty as to what could be 
considered a sustainable catch limit of whaling stocks.437 
These examples indicate how scientific knowledge may play a relevant role in 
the making and evolvement of various areas of international law. This entwined 
relation, however, is not as plain as it may seem, and some further clarification on the 
ways in which science can have a bearing on international policymaking is helpful to 
grasp this dynamics. 
Scientific evidence does not, by itself, trigger collective action.438 It is the 
political process, rather than science, that shapes collective responses towards 
phenomena diagnosed by science. There are, indeed, cases in which the enacted 
norms and policies adopt a precautionary approach towards the issue at hand, exactly 
because of the absence of scientific evidence beyond reasonable doubt. The Whaling 
Regime is an example thereof. The subordination of scientific knowledge to politics, 
                                                 
435 IPCC, 1999, Definitions.  
436 European Communities - Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones). 
Complainants: United States (WT/DS26) and Canada (WT/DS48).  
437 Information provided by the International Whaling Commission at: 
http://www.iwcoffice.org/commission/iwcmain.htm#committee 
438 See Andresen and Skjaerseth (2007). 
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for sure, should not be seen as a problem per se. After all, it is in the context of the 
political sphere that individuals can hope to govern and to be governed as equal and 
autonomous, yet inter-dependent, beings. Nonetheless, one would hardly dispute that, 
first, science should be produced free from political interference and, second, that 
responsible political decisions should take scientific evidences into serious 
consideration rather than strategically ignore or manipulate them on the basis of self-
interest. 
Andresen and Skjaerseth carried out an enlightening empirical work about this 
interrelation. After scrutinising five multilateral environmental agreements, they 
pondered over how science had been essential not only to spot the nature of the 
problem underlying each regime, but also to advance possible solutions or collective 
interventions.439 This dual role, however, does not exhaust their explanation. The 
authors also report that the relationship between scientific findings and collective 
responses tends to follow a certain pattern. This pattern hinges upon how intense 
controversies the evidences might stir, and how readily available or costly the 
solutions are.  
When it comes to constructing a collective response, the authors list the 
elements that might increase or decrease the chances of scientific knowledge being 
followed. According to them, if a problem revolves around a less controversial piece 
of scientific knowledge, if the potential or actual harm is tangible and easily visible,440 
and if there is a cheaper available technology to substitute the existing harmful 
technologies, scientific evidence is more likely to be observed. The problem is 
deemed easier to solve and convergence from states becomes less troubling. On the 
other hand, when these premises do not obtain, there will likely be meager chances 
for scientific evidence to shape the regime. A harder political process, then, ensues.441 
This dynamics is not, indeed, so surprising or counter-intuitive, but it hints at the 
complex tensions that concrete cases might prompt. Apparently, climate change 
belongs to the latter category, hence its political and legal intricacy. 
Science, with more or less degree of certainty depending on the specific issue, 
reveals important causalities with regards to the global warming phenomenon. It may 
                                                 
439 Andresen and Skjaerseth, 2007, 190. The five analysed regimes were: Whaling, Ozone, Marine and 
Air Pollution, and Climate Change 
440 Such as the increase of skin cancer triggered by the depletion of the ozone layer. (Barrett, 2003, 
228) 
441 Andresen and Skjaerseth, 2007, 193. 
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even go beyond its factual role and propose a way to better forestall the problem at 
stake: what the greener energy alternatives are, what sorts of adaptation and 
mitigation plans the countries could use, and so forth. At the end of the day, however, 
it is up for political and legal institutions to deal with these evidences, envisage the 
plausible scenarios, manage the respective risks and, above all, take responsibility for 
the choices that are made. Policymakers have to contemplate how to deal with the 
reduction of carbon emissions. They have to decide, for example, whether they should 
finance alternative energy sources or create a climate market and so forth. 
Bodansky rightly contends that “decision making depends not only on what is 
scientifically known about climate change, but also on a non-scientific judgment 
about how to act in the face of uncertainty”.442 This does not mean that science will 
only have a limited impact on the design of the international climate change regime. 
The history of political institutions, national or international alike, has vastly shown 
otherwise. 
The IPCC and, thus, the scientific input it has produced so far, was essential to 
provoke the political mobilisation and concrete actions with respect to climate 
change, however modest, with hindsight, they might have been. The IPCC has been 
placed in a strategic position to persuade and influence decision-makers through its 
reports.443 Therefore, further inquiries into what processes should command the 
production of scientific advice for authoritative decision-makers are in order. 
As it happens, while the IPCC is not unique for connecting science with 
policymaking, it is rather singular for its scope and scale: as a matter of scope, it 
covers an entire scientific field that cuts across the multiple disciplinary boundaries 
surrounding the question of climate change; as a matter of scale, it embraces the 
causes and effects of climate change on a global perspective. The function of the 
IPCC, thus, is both encyclopaedic in substantive terms and all-inclusive in geographic 
terms.444 
The tension between science and politics is embedded in the IPCC identity, 
inoculated in its DNA and inescapably reflected in its institutional structure. This 
tension might be virtuous or counter-productive, rewarding or harmful in informing 
                                                 
442 Bodansky, 1999, 622. 
443 Andresen and Skjaerseth, 2007, 194. 
444 Vasileiadou et al. contend that the IPCC has a “general ‘encyclopedic’ function as the most 
authoritative resource in the field.” (2011, 1059) Skodvin also reflects upon the unique breadth and 
magnitude of the IPCC. (2000, 409) 
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policymaking. The fact that the IPCC recognises itself as “policy relevant but not 
policy prescriptive or policy driven”445 does not reduce such permanently latent risk. 
The IPCC equilibrates itself on this volatile tightrope. Through the design of its 
structure and processes, it needs to find a way that enables the body, colloquially 
speaking, to “have the cake and eat it”: to protect scientific integrity by incorporating 
science into the process, without setting politics aside. It settles the apparent 
oxymoron of “quality scientific assessments by democratic consensus”.446 This feat 
has not been pursued without hostilities and fierce antagonists, and the short history 





The institutional structure of the IPCC boldly mirrors that close entanglement 
between science and politics. Unsurprisingly, scientists and politicians are the two 
natural actors that operate the machinery of the IPCC. These two generic groups, 
however, come up under various forms and are allocated in different bodies with 
specific responsibilities. Scientists might be more or less directly involved with the 
assessment reports. They may enter the process as either lead authors, contributing 
authors, peer reviewers or review editors. Political representatives, in the same way, 
might be called to participate and contribute in different stages of the process. 
The IPCC operates in three basic levels. The Panel is the ultimate political 
decision-making organ where government representatives assemble at plenary 
sessions once a year. Below the Panel, there are three working groups (WGs), the job 
of which is divided according to a thematic area.447 Working Group I (WGI) is in 
charge of the “physical science basis”, Working Group II has the task of assessing 
“impacts, adaptation and vulnerability”, and Working Group III evaluates the 
literature regarding “mitigation of climate change”.448 Each WG, therefore, raises an 
independent sort of scientific question that is, of course, interconnected with many 
other questions. First, what is the relationship between anthropogenic activities and 
                                                 
445 IPCC, 2001, appendix 2, paragraph 2 (a).  
446 Agrawala, 1998a, 606 
447 Skodvin, 1999, 17-18. 
448 IPCC, 2008, item 4.  
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climate change? Second, how does climate change impact the conditions of 
communal living in different parts of the world and how should we act so that we 
adapt to it? Third, can the ongoing process of climate change be attenuated? The sum 
of these questions, which should be answered through the interaction between 
scientists and politicians, fittingly encapsulates the institutional ambition of the IPCC. 
The Panel, therefore, is the first and top level of decision-making. The other 
two levels are internal to the WGs: the second is the WGs plenaries and the third is 
the WGs respective writing teams. The WGs plenaries promote the official encounter 
between political representatives and a selected group of scientists that contributed to 
the report drafting. The writing teams, in turn, are composed by lead authors and 
contributing authors, and also assisted and probed, along the process that will be 
described below, by peer reviewers, government reviewers and review editors. 
Surrounding the Panel and the WGs, there are four administrative bodies: the 
Bureau, the Executive Committee, the Secretariat, and Technical Support Units 
(TSU). The Bureau comprises the IPCC Chair, the Vice-chairs and the Chairs of the 
WGs, who are elected by government representatives at a single Panel session. This 
group should embody a “balanced geographic representation with due consideration 
for scientific and technical requirement”.449 They are elected for one term, which 
represents the period during which an assessment report is prepared.450 
Bureau members have a set of responsibilities. They provide scientific and 
technical guidance to the Panel, develop and agree on the list of experts who will 
work to produce the assessment reports, oversee the scientific quality of the reports, 
and perform editorial tasks.451 The Secretariat provides the day-to-day organisation of 
the body. It arranges the sessions of the Panel, the Bureau, the Executive Committee, 
and the WGs, manages funds, and helps with travel expenses.452 Each WG is also 
assisted by one technical support unit. 
An Executive Committee was recently created with the purpose of 
strengthening the implementation of the IPCC’s activities between the sessions of the 
Panel. Among its responsibilities, it has to oversee the responses to potential errors in 
                                                 
449 IPCC, 1998, paragraph 5. 
450 IPCC, 2006, Rule 8 and Rule 10. 
451 IPCC, 2011, Annex A, Terms of Reference of the Bureau. 
452 IPCC, 2012, Functions of the IPCC Secretariat. 
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the previously completed assessment report.453 The Chair, the Vice-chair, and the Co-
chairs of the WGs compose this Executive Committee. The head of the Secretariat 
and the heads of the TSUs are “advisory members”.454 The Executive Committee has 
to submit a report of its activities to the Panel and to the Bureau.455 
As an external actor, the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological 
Advice (SBSTA) was created to provide the COP with “timely information and 
advice on scientific and technological matters relating to the Convention”.456 
Composed mainly by government representatives, the SBSTA is mandated to draw 
upon “existing competent international bodies”.457 In fact, the SBSTA turned out to 
be a vehicle for the flow of information between the IPCC’s conclusions and the 
COP.458 
This overall structure might raise, and has already sparked, some suspicion 
and anxiety. After all, science and politics, for the sake of the former’s autonomy, are 
usually set in separate vessels. Yet, the IPCC was designed to promote this 
partnership, however tense and uneasy that might become. The active participation of 
government representatives throughout the assessment process would strategically 
serve to facilitate the political approval of scientific conclusions and 
recommendations.459  
These three levels are supposed to pull a long line of gradual distension 
between “pure science” and “pure politics”.460 The “impurity” of that mixture was the 
ingenious solution furnished by IPCC designers in order to carve a space of 
conversation, persuasion and consensus-building without corrupting the core 
independence of the scientific endeavour.461 
                                                 
453 IPCC, 2011, Governance and Management, 2.3.2 (c). 
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458 Yamin and Depledge, 2004, 465, and Bodansky 1993, 536. See also information at: 
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technical, socio-economic and other information provided by competent bodies including, inter alia, 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), into forms appropriate to the needs of the 
Conference of the Parties, including in support of the review of the adequacy of commitments;”. 
(Decision 6/CP.1, Annex 1, 1(a))   
459 Agrawala, 1998b, 627. 
460 See the useful three-layered diagram drawn by Skodvin and Alfsen, 2010, 5. 
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 The IPCC process aims for nothing less than to make the scientists liaise with 
the policymakers at the same table.  Before we describe the core process of drafting, 
reviewing and approving the assessment reports, it is important to describe the 
ancillary process that has been issued by the IPCC itself for the appointment and 
enrolment of its actors and participants. 
 
2.3.1 Constituting the IPCC: rules of membership and appointment 
 
Governments and participating organisations provide the names of the experts. 
The names are, then, assembled into lists and made available to all IPCC members. 
The respective WG selects the experts from the lists according to their scholarly 
publications and works. The large group of coordinating lead authors, lead authors, 
contributing authors, peer reviewers and review editors must be indicative of a 
balanced representation from developed, developing, and countries with economies 
in transition.462 
A set of criteria determines the selection of experts. They have to embody 
wider scientific, technical and socio-economic expertise, geographical diversification 
and gender balance. There should be a mixture of experts with and without experience 
in the IPCC. A report on how the selection process took place should be sent to the 
Panel.463 
Non-governmental and other intergovernmental organisations, either national 
or international, and “qualified in the matters covered by the IPCC”, can participate, 
under Panel’s approval, as observers in various kinds of meetings of the IPCC and of 
the WGs.464 These organisations can have an active involvement in the IPCC 
activities: they are invited to identify experts for each area of the report together with 
                                                 
climate change. My reply is that science, with its emphasis on robust data, repeatability, balance, 
accuracy and integrity and its reliance on argument and debate to reach a conclusion, provides an ideal 
process for such an endeavour.” (2008, 738) 
462 IPCC, 1999, paragraphs 4.3.1 and 4.3.2.  
463 IPCC, 1999, paragraph 4.3.2. 
464 IPCC, 2006b, paragraph 1. 
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government representatives,465 and even to contribute “in their own right” with 
comments and opinions.466 
 
2.3.2 The assessment cycle 
 
 The so-called “assessment cycle” comprises three elemental collective tasks: 
(i) scientists, under diverse status within the process, are in charge of drafting the 
respective documents; (ii) political representatives, in turn, have the chance to provide 
inputs and, at final stages, endorse those previously prepared drafts; (iii) in between, 
peer reviewers and government reviewers suggest occasional corrections to the drafts. 
The separation between these three tasks – writing, reviewing and upholding – 
implies that there might be slight (and rhetorically relevant) differences between the 
“draft report”, the “reviewed draft report”, and the “final report”. It is only the latter 
that receives the IPCC official imprimatur and is launched for the assimilation of the 
public. This separation is a crucial device for understanding the terms of the 
relationship between scientists and politicians. 
If one takes a closer look, nonetheless, one can realise that these three 
elemental tasks are actually distributed along seven phases: (i) the ‘scoping meeting’ 
of the Panel, which opens the assessment cycle by outlining its exact focus and setting 
its overall schedule;  (ii) the report drafting by writing teams; (iii) the first review, by 
expert peer reviewers; (iv) the second review, by government reviewers; (v) the 
redrafting, in the light of the comments of reviewers, by the respective writing teams 
and with the assistance of review editors; (vi) the WG plenaries, for endorsement acts; 
and (vii) the Panel plenary, for endorsement acts and for ‘scoping’ the next cycle. In 
the two latter plenary phases, as will be later explained, the documents are subject to 
different procedures of formal “endorsement”: “section-by-section acceptance”, 
“line-by-line approval” and “section-by-section adoption”. 
The drafting phase of an assessment report involves a large number of experts 
who exercise different responsibilities and authority. The Fourth Assessment Report, 
for example, congregated 800 contributing authors, 450 lead authors, and 2.500 peer 
reviewers, all of whom worked on a voluntary basis.467 The coordinating lead authors 
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467 IPCC, 2010b.  
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are in charge of overseeing and ensuring the overall coherence of the report. The lead 
authors are in charge of writing pre-commissioned chapters. The contributing authors 
provide the technical input to be considered by the lead authors.468 These reports 
should take into account primarily peer-reviewed and published literature, but some 
exceptions to this general rule are now accepted by the IPCC, as will be explained 
further below.469 
Once the draft report is ready, a two-stage back-and-forth review process takes 
place. Expert peer reviewers scrutinise the content and balance of the drafts and have 
to comment “on the accuracy and completeness” of the reports.470 In order to fulfil 
this responsibility, the reviewers can request any “material referenced in the 
document being reviewed”.471 Based on these commentaries, the drafts are revised by 
the writing teams and, then, sent to the next round of review. This phase replicates the 
conventional mode of self-regulation, which is the main tool for quality control within 
the scientific community. It is a “link” between the designated authors and the general 
scientific community.472 
The government review, in turn, is performed by a number of departments and 
ministries within a member-state and it aims at analysing the accuracy and 
completeness of the draft report.473 While the first round of review remains within the 
scientific community, since only experts are entitled to participate, the second round 
is undertaken both by government representatives and by the experts.474 It is the first 
opportunity for political input, a way “to intercept conflicts before the reports reach 
WG plenaries”.475 
Three principles inform such review process. First, the review should aim at 
gathering “the best possible scientific and technical advice”. Second, the work should 
be subject to a “wide circulation process”, in which a variety experts, from developed 
and developing countries, who have not participated in the preparation of that 
                                                 
468 IPCC, 1999, Annex 1, paragraphs 1, 2 and 3. 
469 IPCC, 1999, Annex 2 
470 IPCC, 1999, Annex 1, paragraph 4. 
471 IPCC, 1999, paragraph 4.3.4.1. 
472 Skodvin, 1999, 26. 
473 IPCC, 1999, Annex 1, paragraph 6. 
474 IPCC, 1999, paragraph 4.2. 
475 Skodvin, 1999, 27. 
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particular chapter, are invited to take part in the process. Third, the process should be 
“objective, open, and transparent”.476  
Lead authors have to analyse, incorporate (or justify why not to incorporate) 
the comments prepared by both experts and government representatives. Review 
editors are in charge of overseeing this two-stage review phase. They help in selecting 
expert peer reviewers, check whether the reviewers’ comments were “afforded 
appropriate consideration” and assist lead authors in handling contentious opinions on 
scientific matters.477 They also gather, in consultation with the writing team, peer 
reviewers and government reviewers in order to face “particular points of assessment 
or areas of major differences”.478 Of great importance is the determination that any 
sound disagreement should be singled out in the report, particularly if it is “relevant to 
policy debate”.479 Review editors, in short, allow for the “separation between writing 
and reviewing”,480 a principle that strengthens impartiality. 
After the second round of review, each of the three authors’ team, assisted by 
their respective review editors, prepare the reviewed draft of the report. Such report 
and its summary for policymakers have to be endorsed by each WG plenary in order 
to move to the Panel for final approval. The main participants of these WG plenaries 
are governmental representatives.481 Coordinating and lead authors have also acquired 
throughout the years an active role in these deliberations. Substantive changes in the 
drafts are not made without their consent, which enables them to keep a level of 
control over the final text.482 Decisions at the WG sessions have to be taken by 
consensus. Exceptionally, if consensus is not possible, “differing views shall be 
explained and, upon request, recorded”.483 It might also be possible, when 
disagreement cannot be dissolved, to qualify statements in footnotes. 
The reports and the accompanying summary for policymakers are treated 
differently during the WG sessions.484 The report itself is not subject to close scrutiny 
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480 Skodvin, 2000, 411. 
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since “the large volume and technical detail of this material places practical 
limitations upon the extent to which changes (…) will normally be made”.485 Without 
much discussion, the report, which consists of a comprehensive view on the matter, 
gets “accepted”. The summary for policymakers, on the other hand, undergoes a 
cumbersome and painstaking deliberative process, in which the wording of the text is 
subject to detailed examination. Each summary for policymakers has to be subject to 
“approval”, a time-consuming and line-by-line discussion of its content.486 
The summary for policymakers is the document that usually gets broadly 
exposed to the global press and the general public. It is not difficult to understand, 
thus, why it receives such an intense political scrutiny. Representatives from the 
south, the north, the small islands, and from the oil exporting countries, with their 
opposite views and interests and stakes on climate change, have to achieve a common 
denominator regarding the content of the document.487 
According to Skodvin, the need for consensus among politicians, despite the 
risk of harming the scientific credibility of the whole enterprise, is actually what 
makes the final document stronger. Skodvin empirically shows that the polarised 
arguments of government representatives tend to “somehow outweigh each other” and 
reach an equilibrium.488 Besides, coordinating and lead authors ensure that any 
suggestion for rephrasing a certain conclusion is in accordance with the substantive 
findings of the respective report, and hence help keeping the respectability of the final 
document. Scientific findings are “tried out and digested by policy-makers”.489 The 
concrete effect of this interactive process, Skodvin remarks, is the actual assimilation 
and embrace of the scientific knowledge by the political community. 
After the WG plenaries, there comes the seventh and final stage. The Panel 
sessions, in some way, are both the end and the beginning of the process that leads to 
the assessment reports. The Panel sessions give the final endorsement to the report 
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elaborated by the WGs and, in scoping meetings, set up plans for the next assessment 
cycle, defining the breadth, scope and structure of the future report.490 
The SYR is put down by a distinct writing team. This team, which must 
embody broad technical expertise, geographical representation, and gender balance, is 
selected and led by the IPCC Chair. The SYR, as noted earlier, comprises a somewhat 
condensed, or matter-specific, version of the three WGs reports and a joint summary 
for policymakers. It follows a procedure that, to a large extent, replicates the one that 
takes place at the level of WGs. Once more, the summary for policy makers will pass 
through another line-by-line approval process.491 The main difference lies in the 
adoption process of the condensed report. Government representatives must review it 
“section-by-section”, meaning one page, or less, at a time. Changes may be required 
at that stage. Review editors must analyse how the writing team implements the 
changes vis-à-vis the content of the assessment reports of the three WGs. The revised 
version of the condensed report is then submitted for “adoption”. 
Formally, the approval and adoption of the SYR is held at the Panel plenary, 
hence among government representatives only. However, in the fourth and last 
assessment cycle, the IPCC decided to send the final draft of the SYR to observers’ 
organisations, which were encouraged to provide their scientific and technical 
comments before the draft was finally submitted for the regular endorsement by 
government delegates.492 
The final content of an overall assessment report (and, in different degrees, of 
each of its eight pieces), therefore, is the product of an exhaustively debated writing 
process. Apart from acknowledging disagreements, the IPCC is also concerned with 
accurately recognising and communicating the level of uncertainty of its 
conclusions.493 Science for policymaking is doomed to be, most of the time, “frontier 
knowledge” rather than “core-knowledge”, that is, relies on insufficiently proved 
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hypotheses rather than on indubitable and stabilised knowledge.494 Over the years, the 
IPCC has published guidance notes on how lead authors should deal with 
uncertainties consistently and credibly. In the Fourth Assessment Report, for example, 
authors were cautioned against “trivializing statements just to increase their 
confidence”.495  
Such provisions, which point out the need to keep uncertainties transparent, 
are pivotal in the context of science about climate change, which has matured over 
time but has not yet answered a number of central questions. Uncertainties still 
abound in the literature, and the overcoming of uncertainties demands institutional 
strategy and prudence to perceive not only the differing political sensitivities but also 
sheer cognitive dissonances.496 
Studies on the economic effects of climate change offer a useful example. The 
challenge of this type of research is to quantify and monetise the impact climate 
change will have on the health system, the agriculture, and the biodiversity of a 
certain country. Unsurprisingly, there is a significant degree of doubtfulness on these 
questions with respect to highly contingent circumstances.497 In this context, the duty 
of the IPCC is to convey every dimension about a certain topic, which means not only 
being clear on what science does and does not know, but also quantifying levels of 
certainty. Hiding uncertainties and drawing a prettier picture of the problem would 
betray the scientific ambition.498 
Fairly and candidly communicating uncertainties, however, is not the only 
linguistic challenge of the IPCC. There have been several episodes of overscrupulous 
                                                 
494 Skodvin, 1999, 10. 
495 IPCC, 2005.  
496 Campbell, 2011, 4910. 
497 Tol, for example, contended that “(p)oliticians are proposing to spend hundreds of billions of dollars 
on greenhouse gas emission reduction, and at present, economists cannot say with confidence whether 
this investment is too much or too little”. (2009, 46) 
498 Having this in mind, in the circumstance of the fourth assessment cycle, the IPCC elaborated a 
formal guidance for addressing uncertainties. (IPCC, 2005) This document recommended an 
extensively categorised repertoire of expressions so that the report could be written in a calibrated 
language and with the greatest level of precision and candour. First, it provided a three-tiered typology 
of uncertainties: “unpredictability”; “structural uncertainty”; “value uncertainty”. Second, it furnished a 
five-tiered set of categories relating to level of confidence: “very high”, “high”, “medium”, “low” and 
“very low”. And thirdly, a seven-tiered scale of likelihood: “virtually certain”, “very likely”, “likely”, 
“about as likely as not”, “unlikely”, “very unlikely”, “exceptionally unlikely”. Each of these categories 
has an arithmetic expression of probability. One can see this repertoire reflected in the text of SPM of 
the fourth SYR: the style is sometimes forthright, outspoken and confident, but, more often, hesitant, 
cautious and indecisive. (IPCC, 2007, 2) 
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linguistic disputes during the past endorsement processes.499 They probably sound 
like a nitpicking legalistic exercise, a pedantic deviation from the essentials of the 
policy-science conversation. More deeply, they reveal the importance of the rhetorical 
side of the reports: the way they speak is as important as what they speak.500 Different 
kinds of stakeholders will have contrasting approaches and incentives as to the 
report’s wording and linguistic calibration.501 
IPCC parlance, thus, is a product of the interaction between, on the one hand, 
a detailed technology of collective drafting and conveying an accurate degree of 
uncertainty of the message, and, on the other, a careful wording of the scientific 
message so that it sounds respectful and convincing to the public. A rhetorical 
analysis of the successive versions between the initial draft report until the finally 
endorsed report would show how this interaction materialises and detect the nature of 
the linguistic amendments. 
 
2.4 Responding to external pressure: the incremental evolvement 
 
The descriptive task is not yet finished. It is hard to give a critical account of 
the IPCC current structure without taking its history of incremental construction into 
consideration. This diachronic elucidation, interspersed with the synchronic 
                                                 
499 On the occasion of the panel meeting for the 2nd assessment report approval (held in Madrid, in 
November 1995), the draft summary for policymakers stated that “(m)ore convincing evidence for the 
attribution of a human effect on climate is emerging from pattern based studies”. The panel spent more 
than 2 hours discussing whether “more convincing” or, under request of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, 
“some preliminary” reflected more accurately what they wanted to convey. In the end, they reached the 
formulation “More convincing recent evidence…”, with a footnote that registered the dissenting 
opinion of the two oil-producing countries. Another famous linguistic dispute related to the second 
report revolved around whether there was a “discernible”, “detectable” or “appreciable” human 
influence on global climate. The correspondent statement of the third and fourth reports, years later, 
shifted to a probabilistic expression: the former contended that climate change is “likely” to be caused 
by anthropogenic greenhouse gases, and the latter said it is “very likely”. (see Houghton, 2008, 737-
738; Vasileiadou et al, 2011, 1059; Skodvin, 1999, 20) 
500 Campbell casts light on the tension between the writer’s intention of precision and the reader’s 
comprehension. That tension might ultimately be solved by contextually-crafted rhetorical sensibility, 
one that anticipates how the particular audience will receive the message: “The values of openness and 
transparency in communication to stakeholders and publics, not to mention a modicum of due humility, 
necessitate an explicit acknowledgement of scientific uncertainties. But this obligation flies in the face 
of a strong concern that expressed uncertainties can themselves undermine public trust. Resolution of 
this contradiction depends on the context and on how you tell it.” (2011, 4892) 
501 As Agrawala commented, small island states are expected to push for more severe language. Oil 
producing countries, in turn, make the best they can to cast light on the uncertainties. Developing 
countries concentrate on reminding the developed countries of the historical unfairness underpinning 
any attempt to mitigate their emissions, after more than two centuries of unchecked emissions by the 
already industrialised countries. Developed countries, in turn, emphasise that they are increasingly 
becoming lower emitters. (1998b, 627) 
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description provided above, is a helpful way to understand the meaning of each 
structural or procedural change that leads up to the current accountability 
arrangements.  
To the extent that they help to illuminate devices and features that are useful 
to ground the institutional analysis, these events deserve to be mentioned. I do not 
intend to reconstruct the thread of institutional development in any far-reaching sense, 
but to see how the institution responded to some important situations of crisis that led 
to self-reflection and reform. I recount some episodes of public pressure to which the 
IPCC responded by improving its process. 
The IPCC has been, one could fairly say, an institution in constant search of 
self-correction under pain of falling into irrelevance.502 Over the years, it has faced 
serious public pressure with regards to, unsurprisingly, its proximity to politics. The 
dialectics between public pressure and institutional reform laid the ground for an 
incremental evolvement. This path, as we shall see, follows a single direction towards 
more transparency, participation, confidence-building and overall representation of 
the body. 
Accusations of dishonesty, fraud, methodological recklessness or sheer 
incompetence are common since the beginning of the IPCC work. Among the lessons 
that can be drawn from the almost 25 years of the IPCC existence is that every 
assessment cycle is likely to include a credibility crisis, or, at the very least, a serious 
credibility trial. That has proved to be almost unavoidable. The IPCC has predictable 
enemies, for whom the belief that climate change is caused by human action and the 
practical measures recommended on the basis of such belief go against their economic 
interests. In the short life of the IPCC, and along the way of four assessment cycles, 
there were two specially noisy moments of pressure: in 1996, in the aftermath of the 
publication of the Second Assessment Report (SAR), and in 2009, succeeding the 
publication of the Fourth Report (AR4). 
In 1996, when the IPCC launched the SAR, an American physicist, Frederick 
Seitz, declared that he had never witnessed a “more disturbing corruption of the peer-
review process”.503 According to Seitz, the published version of the chapter 8 of the 
                                                 
502 Agrawala notes that the IPCC “has shown a capacity for iterative improvements and institutional 
learning” by promoting a constant dialogue between the producers and the users of assessments. 
(1998b, 637) 
503 Seitz (1996). 
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report was rather different from the approved version at the WG plenary and at the 
Panel.504 The text, at bottom, sounded somewhat less sceptical about the existing 
evidences of man-made global warming. The specific spot of criticism was that the 
two texts, the one officially approved and the one finally published, would have 
revealed a corruption of IPCC’s own rules of procedure and portrayed the IPCC as a 
biased source of advice for governments. 
In 2007, after being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, the international 
reputation of IPCC reached its peak. In 2009, nonetheless, two incidents turned that 
favourable scenario upside down. First, the IPCC acknowledged a mistake regarding 
essential data about the “rate of recession and date of disappearance” of the 
Himalayan glaciers.505 Such misreported data was picked up from a non-peer-
reviewed reference: a report from the environmental group WWF.506 Second, leaked 
emails from the University of East Anglia’s Climatic Research Unit have suggested 
that a group of scientists, who were contributing authors to the IPCC assessment 
report, have supposedly manipulated data in order to produce a more pressing public 
assertion. That event was known as the “Climategate”. At the time of the 
investigation, a variety of anti-scientific behaviour has surfaced, such as the “attempts 
to cover up flawed data; moves to prevent access to climate data; and to keep research 
from climate sceptics out of the scientific literature”.507 
According to various independent reviews, the scientists involved in the 
Climategate storm were cleared of malpractice.508 What is worth noting, though, is 
how the acknowledged mistake (the misreporting of Himalayan glaciers data) and the 
allegedly lack of transparency and misconduct of scientists (the Climategate) had the 
ability to shake the positive image of the IPCC. Climategate opened room for the 
climate sceptics to advocate that too intrusive collective measures to tackle climate 
                                                 
504 One notorious protagonist of the effort to discredit the Second Assessment Report was the Global 
Climate Coalition, a former lobby institute of the fossil fuel industry. Ben Santer (1996), the lead 
author of one chapter of the Second Report, was heavily criticised for editing some sentences: “This 
appears to be a skilful campaign to discredit the IPCC, me and my reputation as a scientist.” 
505 IPCC (2010).  
506 Guardian editorial (2010a). 
507 Guardian editorial (2010b). 
508 Lord Oxburgh’s Scientific Assessment Panel remarked that “(w)e saw no evidence of any deliberate 
scientific malpractice in any of the work of the Climatic Research Unit and had it been there we believe 
that it is likely that we would have detected it”. (Oxburgh et al, 2010) Russel et al. also declared that 
“(o)n the specific allegations made against the behaviour of CRU scientists, we find that their rigour 
and honesty as scientists are not in doubt.” “We do not find that their behaviour has prejudiced the 
balance of advice given to policy makers.” (2010, 11) 
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change are not necessary, since scientific research that indicates that, thanks to human 
action, the world is getting warmer is biased, unreliable and purposefully 
overstated.509 
The IPCC has reacted to each of these moments of crisis by refining its 
procedures and structures. There were three significant procedural reforms by the 
Panel: in 1993, in 1998-1999, and in 2010. In 1988, when it was born, the IPCC had 
very few formalised rules of procedure. From these succinct and fragmentary “terms 
of reference”, they incrementally developed to its extremely codified current 
procedure. The two last reforms are worth mentioning. 
Between the Second Assessment Report (1995) and the Third Assessment 
Report (2001), the Panel meetings of 1998 and 1999, apart from publicly formalising 
consolidated practices, also enacted some new rules, of which three were central for 
(i) allowing the use of non-peer-reviewed and unpublished materials by the reports, 
(ii) establishing “review editors” as a new actor within the writing process and (iii) 
creating another kind of formal endorsement for the SYR – the “adoption”. 
The writing teams were still advised for the most part to consider peer-
reviewed and internationally available literature.510 The justification for widening the 
range of sources, however, was to turn the assessment report “as up-dated as possible 
when they eventually are published”.511 From then onwards, information from the 
private sector could be taken into account. The previous rule assumed that only peer-
reviewed or published articles entail sound and trustworthy research, but it ended up 
ignoring occasionally useful information. The downside of this new rule, as Skodvin 
warned, is that such material tends to be more “network-related” and might reinforce 
the impression of “IPCC as a club”. 512 
In view of the crisis of 2009, the IPCC perceived the need of being scrutinised 
by an independent institution with scientific prominence. The InterAcademy Council 
(IAC), a multinational organization of science academies, was asked to review 
IPCC’s procedures “for strengthening the capacity of IPCC to respond to future 
                                                 
509 As stated by an editorial of The Observer (2010): “Despite the sceptics, climate change must remain 
a priority: Public confidence will be inspired more by frankness about what science cannot explain”. 
510 IPCC, 1999, paragraph 4.3.3. 
511 “It is increasingly apparent that materials relevant to IPCC Reports, in particular, information about 
the experience and practice of the private sector in mitigation and adaptation activities, are found in 
sources that have not been published or peer-reviewed”. (IPCC, 1999, Annex 2) 
512 Skodvin, 2000, 413-414. 
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challenges and ensuring the ongoing quality of its reports”.513 The final report of IAC, 
released in 2010, recommended a number of institutional changes and remedies to 
tackle that credibility crisis. It addressed, among other issues, the questions of how to 
correctly communicate the level of uncertainty about a topic and how to deal with 
non-peer-reviewed literature, as well as the need to increase the level of transparency 
of every decision taken in the course of the assessment process.514 
The recommendations of IAC leaned towards yet more rigorous procedures 
for the approval of IPCC’s assessment reports. Whether the IAC’s recommendations, 
which are detailed below, actually improve the quality of the assessment reports, turn 
them less prone to mistakes and give them greater credibility to policymaking is still a 
matter of speculation that will be tested in the course of the fifth assessment cycle. In 
any event, it is crucial to observe how the regime of accountability increasingly 
becomes denser. I enumerate seven core suggestions made by IAC. 
First, the IAC considered that the IPCC governance structure was too thin to 
handle the complexity of the current assessment reports. It proposed the creation of an 
executive committee with formal decision-making authority to act on behalf of the 
Panel between the plenary sessions in order to improve the timing of decisions and 
responses that cannot be delayed.515 The plenary of the IPCC partially accepted the 
suggestion and created an executive committee with interstitial administrative 
functions. The new organ has to oversee responses to possible errors in the review 
process of draft reports and to strengthen the coordination between the working 
groups.516 Originally, the IAC suggested that three independent members, outside the 
climate community, should be included as members of the executive committee in 
order to “improve the credibility and independence” of the body.517 The IPCC, 
though, limited the composition of the executive committee to technical staff from the 
bureau, and left open the possibility of “invit(ing) additional individuals” to the 
meetings.518 
Second, the IAC advised that more transparent rules were needed for selecting 
the writing teams. In IAC’s view, credibility can be enhanced if it is clear that an 
                                                 
513 IAC, 2010, Foreword.  
514 IAC, 2010, Executive Summary. 
515 IAC, 2010, 45.  
516 IPCC, 2011, Governance and Management. 
517 IAC, 2010, 46.  
518 IPCC, 2011, Governance and Management, paragraphs 2.3.3. and 2.3.4. (e). 
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expert was chosen because of her/his specific scientific credentials.519 The IPCC 
accepted this suggestion and determined that the composition of the group of 
coordinating and lead authors should echo a wide range of scientific views, 
incorporate experts from developing and developed countries as well as from 
countries with economies in transition, experts with and without previous experience 
in the IPCC, and gender balance. The IPCC now requires a report with a detailed 
account of the nominations’ processes and of the extent to which such diverse 
composition has been achieved.520 
Apart from that, the IPCC has also enacted, on the basis of IAC’s suggestion, 
a “Conflict of Interest Policy”.521 The Policy aims at protecting the “legitimacy, 
integrity, trust, and credibility of the IPCC” and at avoiding the possibility that the 
IPCC faces “a situation that could lead a reasonable person to question, and perhaps 
discount and dismiss, the work of the IPCC simply because of the existence of a 
conflict of interest”. It applies to every actor who plays a role in the making of the 
assessment reports and calls for a nuanced consideration of an individual’s share of 
responsibility. Conflict of interests refers to professional, financial and other interests 
that can compromise one’s impartiality, impair one’s appearance of impartiality or 
create an unfair advantage for any person or organization.522 
Thirdly, although the IAC recognised the importance of including “grey 
literature” among the IPCC sources – that is, the non-peer-reviewed or unpublished 
literature, it urged the body to adopt more stringent rules regarding its use.523 The 
IPCC responded by enacting new rules that place an extra responsibility on the 
writing teams to ensure the validity and quality of any information that is not peer-
reviewed or published.524 Authors should have a clear argument to justify the use of 
such literature, with particular reference to the following issues: (i) why the relevant 
piece of information has not been published, (ii) what it adds to the content of the 
report, (iii) what the qualifications of the researchers are and (iv) what type of fund 
they have received. Accessibility is also considered a critical matter when dealing 
                                                 
519 IAC, 2010, 14-15. 
520 IPCC, 2011, Procedures, paragraph 3. 
521 IPCC, 2011, Conflict of Interest Policy. 
522 IPCC, 2011, Conflict of Interest Policy, Appendix 1, paragraph 3, 4, 6, 9 and 11. The document also 
offers a set of examples of the kind of interests that should be disclosed no matter whether they might 
lead to a conflict of interests, like senior editorial roles, membership on boards of non-profit or 
advocacy groups, employment and consulting relationships, among others (paragraphs 15 and 16). 
523 IAC, 2010, 16-17. 
524 IPCC, 2011, Procedures, paragraph 4. 
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with grey literature. Hence, authors must provide access to any article that is cited, 
and the respective technical support unit should make it available on request.525 
Fourthly, the IAC focused on the review process. Despite the elaborate 
division of labour between the actors, IAC pointed out a major weakness in it: authors 
and review editors have not been able to effectively spot and respond to important 
comments from reviewers. A major reason for such weakness is the amount of work 
that is demanded during the review phase. The last report is said to have attracted 
more than 90.000 review comments.526 The Himalayan glaciers event can serve as a 
good example. According to IAC, the writing team did not consider two important 
expert comments that could have avoided the mistake. Moreover, not only did the 
review editors fail to ensure these comments were properly addressed, but they also 
failed to transpose the disagreement into the text of the report. IAC focused on 
strengthening the role of the review editors, who can minimise mistakes if dully 
attention is paid to any comment that points out “contradictions, unreferenced 
literature, or potential errors”.527 
Furthermore, IAC suggested that a more targeted review process should be 
designed in order to simplify and enhance the effectiveness of the assessment cycles. 
In such process, review editors would have the responsibility for writing a summary 
of the issues submitted by reviewers, which would include three categories: most 
significant, noneditorial and editorial issues. The authors, in turn, would have to 
respond, in detail, to issues of the first category, to provide short answers to issues of 
the second category and none to issues of the third category.528 The IPCC recognised 
the weight of such suggestion and issued a new guidance note on the role of review 
editors, which requires them to identify critical issues that are likely to spark 
discussion within the writing teams due to the nature of scientific controversies.529 
However, the IPCC has not yet amended its procedures to reflect the recommended 
targeted process.530 
Fifthly, the IAC also explored the criteria for communicating uncertainty and 
found out about situations in which the IPCC failed to fulfil this task adequately. 
                                                 
525 IPCC, 2010d, Appendix 1, paragraphs 2 and 4. 
526 IAC, 2010, 3. 
527 IAC, 2010, 21-22. 
528 IAC, 2010, 18-19. 
529 IPCC, 2010d, Appendix 2. 
530 IPCC, 2011, Procedures, paragraph 6. 
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Some statements of WGII fourth report illustrate IAC’s conclusion. WGII declared 
having “high confidence” in some of its predictions in spite of the fact that they were 
weakly supported by evidence. Their “high confidence” and allegedly “substantive 
finding”, turned out to mislead policymakers about the evidentiary status of the 
data.531 Pure rhetoric, in this case, was harming the ability to communicate a 
trustworthy and candid degree of uncertainty.  
In order to avoid such ill assertions, IAC maintained that the best approach to 
resolve uncertainty is to use the “qualitative level-of-understanding scale”. This scale 
evaluates any finding in accordance with two variables: the level of evidence 
available (limited, medium, or robust), and the degree of agreement (low, medium, or 
high). Two further scales should supplement judgements that involve “high agreement 
and robust evidence” and “high agreement or robust evidence”. The first pertains to 
the extent of confidence of the authors’ teams about the validity of the finding (very 
low, low, medium, high, and very high). The second scale refers to the likelihood of 
an outcome to obtain, and needs to quantify “uncertainty with calibrated language”. 
On the one side of the spectrum, it can be “exceptionally unlikely”, when the 
probability of the outcome ranges between zero and 1%. On the other side, it can be 
“virtually certain”, when the probability of the outcome ranges between 99 and 100%. 
The IPCC accepted and incorporated such recommendations. To sum up, the amount 
of evidence and the level of agreement a conclusion gathers, the level of authors’ 
confidence in its content and a quantified probability of its outcome are the 
dimensions believed to correctly and frankly transmit the level of uncertainty.532 
Sixthly, the IAC also cautioned against the possibility of an escalation of 
political interference during the approval process. The usual prolonged sessions, for 
example, might benefit large and richer delegations at the cost of smaller ones. The 
former would be more qualified to exert greater influence on the outcomes. The line-
by-line discussion of the SPM between government representatives prompted special 
concerns of IAC and other commentators. Despite recognising the importance of the 
process, the SPM still gives the impression of being a reinterpretation of the technical 
                                                 
531 IAC, 2010, 27-41. 
532 IPCC, 2010d, Appendix 4, paragraphs 8, 9 and 10. The IAC has also pointed to the differences as to 
the degree of certainty that literature covered by each working group might have. The literature 
assessed by WGI deals at length with measurements. WGs II and III examine a literature that is mainly 
concerned with future projections of climate change. This latter kind of literature has an inherently 
higher degree of uncertainty as to its conclusions. (IAC, 2010, 30-39) 
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report according to political considerations and tactical manoeuvres.533 It would, in 
other words, sweeten the pill or politically sugarcoat the hard conclusions of science. 
According to Agrawala, such intense plenary sessions offer one of the few 
opportunities that developing countries, in particular, have to hold the IPCC 
accountable for how it treats these countries’ review commentaries during the review 
phase. The best way to improve the process, in Agrawala’s view, would be to adopt a 
“significant majority” instead of “complete consensus”. In that way, the IPCC would 
avoid being hostage to one or two governments’ unpredictable views.534 To date, 
however, no major change in the approval process of the summary for policymakers 
took place. 
Finally, the IAC has also criticised the lack of transparent rules regarding the 
selection of participants for the scoping meetings and its respective decision-making 
process.535 This criticism encouraged the IPCC to amend its rules and set up new 
criteria, already discussed above, to select participants. 
The IAC report, therefore, further paved the way for the improvement of 
procedures that “breed trust” for the IPCC.536 Not all recommendations, so far, have 
brought about actual procedural changes. The over-encompassing IAC portrait, 
however, stands as an exhaustive benchmark for further reforms. 
 
3. Accountability structures 
 
The coordinates of accountability allow us to delineate the operation of the 
IPCC through a refreshing language. In distinct ways, the IPCC is accountable to 
governments and scientists, both inside and outside the body. There are, thus, two 
enlightening angles for this recount: an extramural and an intramural and they both 
contain formal and informal features. The former angle refers to how the IPCC relates 
to the external world (either political or scientific), whereas the latter dissects the 
accountability structures embedded in the assessment cycle itself, with its elaborate 
                                                 
533 IAC, 2010, 23-24. 
534 Agrawala, 1998b, 628. 
535 IAC, 2010, 13.  
536 An editorial of The Economist (2010) commented upon how the IAC report illuminates some yet 
unfulfilled targets, which can only be met by serious reform rather than mere “codification of best 
practice”. It contends that “(i)n many areas it lacks procedures for defining what is needed. Without 
these there is no agreed standard against which to judge its performance. In a contentious area where 
the good faith of scientists is frequently challenged, this lack of transparency and explicit procedure 
breeds distrust.” 
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division of labour and multi-layered path from writing the report to the final 
ascription of political endorsement. 
In the extramural dimension, the intergovernmental quality of the IPCC is the 
key to the very formal constitution of the body. Governments appoint their 
representatives, setting a vertical and direct principal-agent relationship with them. 
From this perspective, the IPCC is accountable in the retail (as many), that is, each 
representative is accountable to his respective appointing government. This 
relationship may be more or less shaped by expertise and more or less technocratic 
because, even though they make part of the political structure of the IPCC, 
representatives are expected to be minimally versed in climate change. As in every 
strict principal-agent relationship, sanctions are hard and may happen at any time, that 
is, the removal of the representative by her government according to an integrity-
based assessment of their performance. 
So far, the formal side of this extramural dimension was highlighted. Only 
from an informal point of view, however, is the IPCC held accountable in the 
wholesale (as one): it is supposed to be as globally representative as possible, the only 
way through which global credibility is believed to emerge. The loss of credibility 
and overall ridicule is, despite its informality, a hard sanction it needs to avoid. 
Otherwise, its soft power of persuasion cannot be exercised. In order to build its 
reputation, thus, the IPCC depends partly on the composition and quality of its direct 
participants. Geographical plurality is a standard applicable to both kinds of 
participants: political representatives and scientists. Secondly, reputation also hinges 
on the capacity of the report-making process to build trust and to prevent that 
individual mistakes de-moralise the institution as a whole. 
Unlike political representatives, however, scientists are held to account 
through a more complicated process. Although countries, by preparing lists of local 
experts, have some role in the way scientists are appointed, there are no formal 
mechanisms to hold scientists accountable to governments in any meaningful sense. 
The obvious point is to protect the impartiality (and the image of impartiality) of the 
reports’ authors.  
First, authors may be held accountable to their own peers, again in two ways. 
From an extramural perspective, they are informally accountable to the scientific 
community at large (the epistemic community where they come from, and which 
establishes the standards of professional respectability and competence). Intramurally, 
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during the assessment cycle, they may be held accountable to expert reviewers and 
review editors through the review process, with all its formal requirements and 
burdens of justification. 
Second, authors may also be held accountable to political representatives 
through their various interactions along the assessment cycle: at the initial review 
stage, to the government reviewers, and, later, to the respective plenaries that endorse 
their reports. The written exchange of the review process and the face-to-face plenary 
sessions are important intramural accountability events.537 It is important to note, 
however, that there are absolute limits as to how far political inputs might alter, 
against the experts’ will, the report’s language and content. 
The overall drafting and certifying process is shaped by reason-giving and 
consensual endorsements. These are qualified by a set of procedural escape-valves to 
accommodate dissents and record clarifications. The IPCC sets up, thus, a kind of 
checks and balances that moderates the friction between science and politics. 
Internally, this involves bi-directional accountability dynamics. First, from politics to 
science: lead authors have the ultimate say on what gets changed in the final text of 
the report. This is a way to avoid any attempt to free-ride on the legitimising effect of 
science, or to couch a self-interested political position in scientific terms. Second, 
from science to politics: authors have to publicly respond and justify, in different 
stages, the content of the report and, almost as importantly, its exact wording. 
 
4. Test of appropriateness: which accountability for what institutional purpose? 
 
After this broad depiction of the IPCC role and configuration, it is time to 
raise the normative question. This section is divided in two parts. First, in order to 
grasp the status of the IPCC in relation to the status of similar scientific bodies within 
global governance, I recycle a usual comparison that is made between the IPCC and 
the Ozone Regime. Second, I reflect upon the appropriateness of the overall 
accountability arrangement to meet the expected institutional purpose. 
 
                                                 
537 Agrawala has pointed out the accountability function of plenary sessions: “plenary sessions often 
serve as the only forum for many governments, particularly developing countries, to openly hold the 
IPCC accountable for whether or not it adequately considered the views sent in by their experts during 
peer review.” (1998b, 628) 
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4.1 An oft-made parallel with the Ozone Regime 
 
It has been common to draw comparisons between the Climate Change 
Regime and the Ozone Regime.538 Both, arguably, address slightly similar problems 
through institutional arrangements that intend to play equivalent roles. They tackle a 
transnational demand that cannot be properly dealt with but by a coherent collective 
approach.539 Both problems are the outcome of man-made activities. Both require 
substantial changes in industrial and individuals’ behaviour. Both reinforce the 
disparities between north and south, or what Sunstein calls “problems of international 
equity”:540 the north that historically emitted ozone-depleting substances and 
greenhouse gases and, thanks to that, achieved a wide economic development, and the 
south which, in order to control the emission and production of such substances, 
requires incentives to undertake more restrictive regulation. 
Moreover, the fact that the Ozone Regime, particularly the Montreal 
Protocol,541 is perceived to be one of the most successful international environmental 
agreements to date, has been a reason generally invoked for this comparison.542-543 
Authors are constantly writing about the differences and similarities between the 
Montreal and the Kyoto Protocols.544 They try to explain the reasons why the former 
achieved a greater success compared to the latter. It is a legitimate effort. By 
identifying the points of success of the Montreal Protocol, these authors can shed 
some light on the ongoing discussion about the future of an international climate 
change agreement.  
According to Sunstein, the different fates of both Protocols can be explained 
by the United States’ cost-benefit analysis of acceding to each Protocol: “[t]o the 
United States alone, prominent analyses suggested that the monetized benefits of the 
Kyoto Protocol would be dwarfed by the monetized costs.”545 In the same way, if we 
                                                 
538 See, for example, Agrawala, 1998b, 639. 
539 As I argued in chapter 1, by way of describing the idea of global common good. 
540 These reasons and others are better explained by Sustein, 2007, 2-3. 
541 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 26 I.L.M. 1541. 
542 According to a recent Synthesis Report: “The Montreal Protocol is working. There is clear evidence 
of a decrease in the atmospheric burden of ozone-depleting substances in the lower atmosphere and in 
the stratosphere; some early signs of the expected stratospheric ozone recovery are also evident.” 
(UNEP, 2007, 3) 
543 Barrett, 2003, 221 and Benedick, 1998, 5-8, vocally express the success of the agreement. 
544 Sunstein (2007), Thoms (2002-2003). 
545 Sunstein, 2007, 5, 30-35.  
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return to the list proposed by Andresen and Skjaerseth at the introduction of this 
chapter, it is also conceivable to claim that, between the ozone and the climate change 
problems, there is a large difference of degree with respect to the consensual 
knowledge, available technology, public opinion, and interests of political actors, 
which might probably have influenced the different outcomes of both Protocols.546 
Most of all, a comparison is enlightening because it invites us to consider the 
role that science played by triggering the Montreal Protocol and still plays by 
boosting the success of the regime.547 This role is established by article 6 of the 
Montreal Protocol, which creates scientific assessment panels to review the control 
measures agreed by the parties.548 
Some background facts help to understand the historical circumstances of the 
Protocol. At the root of the ozone problem were industrial chemicals 
(Chlorofluorocarbons – CFCs), largely used in refrigerators, air-conditioners, and as 
propellants in aerosols spray cans.549 These chemicals were triggering a strong 
depletion of the ozone layer.550  
This initial stage opened the way for robust unilateral actions. A number of 
countries, notably the United States, succeeded in banning or capping the 
consumption and production of CFCs.551 Further international measures would not be 
taken without the antagonism between the United States and the European Union. The 
former remained actively engaged in signing an international agreement and had 
already enacted thorough domestic policies against the proliferation of CFCs, whereas 
the latter emphasised the scientific uncertainties of the case.552 
Somehow, the global reduction in CFCs consumption, influenced by the 
unilateral actions mentioned above, and the lack of striking evidences regarding the 
ozone depletion, led to a weak framework convention, the Vienna Convention in 
1985.553 The most relevant quality of the Vienna Convention was the provision that 
                                                 
546 Andresen and Skjaerseth, 2007, 193. 
547 The head of the U.S. delegation, Richard Benedick, points out more straighforwardly the 
significance of this responsibility of scientists: “Scientists were drawn out of their laboratories and into 
the negotiating process, and they had to assume an unaccustomed and occasionally uncomfortable 
shared responsibility for the policy implications of their findings.” (1998, 5) 
548 Montreal Protocol, art. 6. 
549 Parson, 2003, 20-21. 
550 In 1974, Rowland and Molina were among the first scientists to draw public attention to the fact that 
the release of chlorine atoms was damaging the ozone layer. (Parson, 2003, 23) 
551 Barrett, 2003, 223. 
552 Benedick, 1998, 27-37. 
553 Barrett, 2003, 224. 
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allowed UNEP to convene further international negotiations in order to achieve a 
legally binding control protocol.554 
Apart from the Vienna Convention, 1985 was an important temporal landmark 
for the ozone cause: it was the year of the discovery of the Antarctica ozone hole. The 
commotion surrounding the hole dragged public’s attention to the problem,555 
alongside with new scientific evidences linking ultraviolet radiation to skin cancer.556   
The Montreal Protocol was signed in September 1987. Initially, it only aimed 
at 50% cut of five major CFCs by 1998, and a freeze on three major halons. The 
Montreal Protocol was subsequently amended in order to include control measures on 
other ozone-depleting substances, and also to tighten the control measures on the 
already controlled substances.557 Parson argues that these adaptations over time were 
of key importance in the Ozone Regime success. Much of this success, in turn, can be 
credited to the activities developed by the scientific assessment panels.558 
Unlike the IPCC, that has an intergovernmental character, the scientific body 
of the Ozone Regime has a subsidiary nature.559 Subsidiary bodies are usually created 
under the shadow of a more political body, such as the conference of the parties, in 
order to assist it with the implementation of the overall objectives of the agreement. 
They are more closely attached to its creator and bounded to discharge strict 
obligations.560 
As said above, the article 6 of the Montreal Protocol determines the creation 
of assessment panels in order to review the control measures adopted by the parties to 
the Protocol. The assessments should take place “on the basis of available scientific, 
environmental, technical and economic information”.561 Four assessment panels were 
                                                 
554 Benedick, 1998, 45. 
555 Barrett, 2003, 225. 
556 Benedick, 1998, 21. 
557 Parson, 2003, Table 8.1, 240.  
558 Parson, 2003, 242. This statement is illustrated by Barret’s account of the history of Montreal 
Protocol: “In 1989, the assessment panels set up by Montreal reported their findings. Chief among 
these was that, even if CFCs were phased out, the ozone layer would continue to be depleted by 
increased chlorine loading from carbon tetrachloride and methyl chloroform.” (2003, 234) 
559 There is, to be sure, a “Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice” (SBSTA) under 
the Climate Change Regime. Unlike the ozone technical and scientific subsidiary body, however, the 
SBSTA does not have a meaningful scientific role within the Regime, as explained earlier in the 
chapter. 
560 In this sense, Bankobeza, 2005, 139-142.  
561 Montreal Protocol, art. 6. 
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created at the first Meeting of the Parties and, collectively, they are the subsidiary 
body entitled to provide scientific and technological advice.562 
Together with the assessment panels, an open-ended working group was 
created and assigned with two crucial tasks: the revision of the reports of the four 
panels and the subsequent preparation of a SYR; secondly, the preparation of draft 
proposals for any amendments to the Protocol.563 
The workload of each assessment panel is defined by “terms of reference”. 
The terms of reference are the product of the meeting of parties and may change from 
time to time in accordance with the parties’ needs.564 These assessment panels have 
an advisory function and hence do not evaluate policy issues nor do they recommend 
any policy. This is a less intrusive role than the one played by the IPCC, however 
cautious the policy recommendations of the latter might be.565 
Instead of a comprehensive set of rules on matters relating to how the 
assessment works take place, the “Terms of Reference for the Panels” of the first 
Meeting of the Parties give an overarching view of the dynamics of this subsidiary 
body.566 Similarly to the IPCC, the experts that form the assessment panels must serve 
on their individual capacity irrespective of the origin of their nomination. They have 
to be “internationally recognized” and shall come from “the widest possible 
geographical balance of representation”. There is an internal division of functions 
among each panel. Executive summaries “written in a style understandable and useful 
to policy makers” should precede each technical report. Once ready, the three reports 
should be consolidated by the “Integration Working Group”. 
The Technology and Economic Assessment Panel (TEAP) deserved a specific 
and more detailed version of its Terms of Reference.567 The procedure followed by 
                                                 
562 The four panels are: Scientific, Environmental, Technical and Economic (UNEP, 1989, Decisions, 
paragraph 3). See also Bankobeza, 2005, 143. Later, the Technical and Economic Panels merged into 
one, called the Technology and Economic Assessment Panel (TEAP). It appears in the Report of the 
3rd Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol. (UNEP, 1991) 
563 UNEP, 1989, Decisions, paragraph 5. 
564 UNEP, 1996, Annex V, Scope of Work. 
565 UNEP, 1996, Annex V, Scope of Work. 
566 UNEP, 1989, Annex VI. 
567 UNEP, 1996, Annex V, Code of Conduct (5). TEAP is formed by six Technical Options 
Committees and, should the case require, can be joined by other Temporary Subsidiary Technical 
Bodies. All members of TEAP are expected to follow a rigid Code of Conduct, which dictates how 
members should handle eventual conflicts arising from their private and public capacities. Of great 
importance to enhance the transparency and credibility of the work carried out by panel members is the 
“disclosure of interest declarations”, according to which “members shall disclose activities including 
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the TEAP reports embodies some similar, however less intricate, patterns than those 
of the IPCC procedures. TEAP reports follow the basic rule of consensus. In case 
there are differing opinions among members, the Terms of Reference laconically 
mention: “reports must reflect any minority views appropriately”. The whole 
procedure has a pitch of secrecy: observers do not have access to TEAP meetings and 
its materials and drafts are not available to the public. Still, members of the public are 
encouraged to make commentaries regarding the final report.568 
As for the peer-review, the touchstone of IPCC procedures, it seems to be a 
practice followed by each report, despite the lack of written provisions about it. The 
1998 Synthesis Report outlines the different peer-review methods applied by each 
panel.569 The report of the Scientific Panel undergoes a first mail peer-review, with 
several reviewers per chapter. The draft report goes through a weeklong panel review, 
which will be in charge of preparing the conclusions of each chapter of the report. 
Within the Environmental Panel, the first round of peer-review is internal: the 
chapter’s authors review each other’s chapters. The draft is then sent to external 
scientific reviewers. 
The TEAP is the closest to, and yet very distant from, the complex peer-
review followed by the IPCC. In such a panel, three standing committees prepare the 
reports.570 These reports are reviewed internally and by the broader technical 
communities. 
This quick description helps highlight how the process of the IPCC can be 
regarded as a more mature version for the pursuit of a reasonably similar institutional 
task. The most evident difference between them is not exactly related to their content, 
but to the degree of development and thoroughness achieved by the IPCC procedures 
in relation to those employed by the scientific body under the Montreal Protocol. In 
this sense, both procedures indicate the need to have a geographically balanced group 
of independent experts, and to assess the latest scientific knowledge about the 
problem at hand. Both of them require that assessment reports undergo a review. Both 
procedures even indicate the need to acknowledge differing views in their assessment 
reports.  
                                                 
business or financial interest in production of ozone-depleting substances (…) which might call into 
question their ability to discharge their duties and responsibilities objectively”. 
568 UNEP, 1996, Annex V, Report of TEP/TOC/TSBs (4). 
569 UNEP, 1999, Preface, vii-viii.  
570 The committees are: Industries, Government, and Academic experts. 
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In any case, one cannot refrain from looking for the reasons why the IPCC 
procedures went the extra mile to provide a more intricate and refined approach to the 
endorsement of its reports. The role of review editors, the diversifying of the possible 
sources of information between non-peer and peer-reviewed literature, the laborious 
line-by-line approval of the summary for policymakers, and the explicit guidance on 
how to address uncertainties probably tell us something significant about the more 
taxing and controversial institutional role of the IPCC. One could validly say that the 
difference lies in the intergovernmental nature of the IPCC in comparison to the 
subsidiary nature of the scientific body of the Montreal Protocol. An 
intergovernmental nature requires a more intense participation from government 
representatives and, thus, more complex organizational rules. It might be the case that 
the IPCC procedures are simply the outcome of a more reflective learning on how 
assessment reports of complex international environmental problems should be 
conducted by international bodies. Agrawala mentions a third possible answer that 
would explain the difference: the more vexed political nature of the climate change 
problem in comparison with the ozone problem.571 
The Himalayan glaciers episode provides intriguing insights into an additional 
answer. Roughly, what the IPCC declared about the episode is that a mistake only 
happened because its procedures were not rigorously followed. If the experts who 
were involved in assessing the data regarding the Himalayan glaciers had followed 
the IPCC guidance, the outcome would probably have been different.572 Likewise, the 
Climategate affair triggered two consecutive statements from the IPCC that go in the 
same direction.573 According to such statements, the strength of IPCC and, thus, of its 
assessment reports come from its principles and procedures, which place emphasis on 
four crucial elements: balanced representation of experts; comprehensive treatment of 
the scientific literature; broad and independent two-layers of review; and the line-by-
line approval of the summary for policymakers.574 
These statements may not explain the reasons involved in the creation of a 
much more detailed procedure, but they reveal the high expectations attached to 
release of each report. The line of thought is simple: the distinctive features of the 
                                                 
571 Agrawala, 1998b, 639. 
572 IPCC (2010). 
573 IPCC (2010b) and IPCC (2010c).  
574 IPCC, 2010b, 1. 
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IPCC procedures are essential for producing good assessment reports, what the IPCC 
calls “the international gold standard in the scientific assessment of climate 
change”.575 Accordingly, it is expected that mistaken assessments will be minimised 
should the procedures be rigorously observed. IAC’s revision of the procedures and 
processes buttresses this expectation.     
Within the Climate Change Regime, the IPCC has a daunting task, which is to 
provide policymakers with scientific knowledge about climate change. It develops 
such task in an incendiary political setting among government representatives and the 
scientific community. In order to maintain scientific rigour and also to promote 
participation of government representatives in the assessment reports, detailed 
procedures, which give particular importance to transparency, openness, peer-review, 
and geographical balance of experts were crafted. Such elements are expected to stand 
up for the IPCC in the light of permanent challenges and to place IPCC assessment 
reports as valuable and authoritative sources of advice. 
 
4.2 Engendering the encounter between (world) science and (global) politics 
 
How does the interaction between science and politics, in the context of a 
body like the IPCC, matter for accountability? Articulating the right terms for such 
relationship is the initial step towards conceiving an institutional configuration that is 
appropriate for a body of this sort. This is the fine line of IPCC’s overall design. 
Metaphors could be tried out to capture the institutional mission of the IPCC. 
It can perhaps be insightfully seen as a cushion that keeps the independence of 
science while translating their findings to policymakers, or, as Skodvin suggested, as 
“institutional buffers”576 between the two. These binary metaphors, however, do not 
work quite well. The IPCC is not exactly a wall or a shield that sever two spaces. A 
more gradualist metaphor would be more apt to describe the process. The IPCC can 
perhaps be considered a transitional space or a channel between the ivory tower, the 
public square and the top-level decision-making tables. Or, as Skodvin alternatively 
proposed, a “zone rather than a clear-cut border”.577  
                                                 
575 IPCC, 2010b, 1. 
576 Skodvin, 1999, 28.  
577 Skodvin, 1999, 17. 
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Whichever the best image might be, the IPCC’s institutional point is both to 
protect and to probe science, to insulate and to check the process of scientific 
production. In its original context, science is concerned with discovering and 
explaining facts and causal relations. From an optimistic viewpoint it can be described 
as a disinterested truth-seeking endeavour, undertaken in a de-politicised institutional 
setting. Politics, in turn, is a sphere in charge of generating collective decisions. As 
phrased by Skodvin, they are two discrete “systems of behaviour”: “science is 
everything that politics is not: pure, objective, subject to rational analytical reasoning 
and thus not hostage to manipulation tactics and coercive power”.578 
This image, however inaccurate it might be, shapes the perception of the 
public about the role of the IPCC. The ‘science for policy’ enterprise merges those 
two systems. It somewhat instrumentalises science for the sake of political problem-
solving, and, thus, mutates its original context significantly. The institutional 
designer, thus, faces a demanding task: it must both keep them separate from each 
other and merge them with one another. In doing so, it should also represent or reflect 
the conflicts that internally pervade the scientific field.579 
The three-tiered process of the IPCC – from the scientific core (the writing 
teams, reviewers and editors) to the politicised plenaries (WGs plenaries and Panel) – 
nurtures that aim. It softens the encounter between science and sheer self-interested 
politics and facilitates conversation. It avoids direct political interference without, at 
the same time, cloistering scientific conclusions against critical public scrutiny. 
Rather than a mere compilation and translation, which even competent scientific 
journalists could arguably do, the hybrid institutional structure entails an active, yet 
mediated, engagement. This institutional set-up strikes a balance between, on the one 
hand, the autonomy of science and, on the other, the “adversarial scrutiny” with 
politicians. The process “invites and depends” upon the interaction between both 
fields.580 Such design is allegedly more apt than the experimented alternatives to 
achieve that taxing end.581 
                                                 
578 Skodvin, 1999, 4. 
579 As Skodvin contends: “processes of science-policy interaction are most likely to succeed if they are 
organised within institutions capable of both separating and integrating science and politics” (1999, 11) 
Note that she has previously acknowledged that “(v)ery few pieces of (core) knowledge are readily 
available for policy-maker to ‘apply’.” (1999, 10) 
580 Skodvin, 2000, 409 
581 See Agrawala (1998a). Bolin (1995) also defends the virtues of this mixed structure: “Of course no 
single scientist can be completely objective, particularly about as complex an issue as that of human-
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This architectural ingenuity of the IPCC, however, is also its Achiles’ heel: its 
outputs remain under permanent threat of politicisation. Such vulnerability can only 
be avoided, on the one hand, by the quality and reliability of the process, and, on the 
other, by the leadership and respectfulness of the scientists involved. Institutional 
experiments that preceded the IPCC have proved that this desired level of respect 
could hardly accrue were this body completely isolated from the political milieu.582 
Unlike a governmental think tank or its congeners, the IPCC does not do 
research or produce knowledge. Unlike regulatory bodies, it does not make normative 
choices properly so called or exercise any sort of coercive power. What it does is to 
grant a comprehensive body of scientific knowledge a political status, a rather unique 
sort, if at all, of political agency. Credibility is not obtained through an unbridled vote 
of confidence or blind deference towards scientists and expertise, but rather by 
bringing policymakers together into the process. The interaction is a device for trust-
building.583 However banal that might sound, after all any institution ultimately needs 
a measure of trust, for the IPCC this is primordial. 
Harnessing trust depends very much on following a process that is beyond 
suspicion, that is, a process that inspires trustworthiness.584 The IPCC, however, is set 
within an inflammable political context. Some of the largest global economic interests 
are financially harmed by the reduction of GHGs emissions. These mighty adversaries 
have tangible incentives to doubt and distort any scientific evidence that recommends 
such a policy. What’s more, there are abundant conspiratorial theories about what 
intimately drives climate scientists to assure that climate change is a veritable and 
                                                 
induced climate change, but the collective work led by IPCC is generally much more reliable than 
other attempts to summarise scientific research results for the political process.” Bolin and Houghton 
(1995) further elaborate on that: “The IPCC process has two main strengths. First, in its assessments it 
has succeeded in involving a very large proportion of active scientists (many of them world leaders) 
working in the field over a wide range of countries. IPCC reports have therefore achieved a large 
degree of ownership by the worldwide scientific community. In a field as complex and controversial as 
global warming, assessments by smaller groups of scientists would not carry the same degree of 
acceptance. Second, because the IPCC is intergovernmental and involves government scientists in its 
approval process, it has also been recognised as their prime source of information. This is absolutely 
essential. To move the policy debate forward requires the broad acceptance by governments of the 
uncurling science. Any body chosen to advise the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change must 
ensure that these two strengths are maintained.” 
582 For Agrawala, the greatest contribution of the IPCC “has not been at the level of aiding spectacular 
decisions but rather at the level of low-key process interactions with its users.” (1998b, 639) 
583 Vasileiadou et al, 2011, 1060; O’Neill (2007). 
584 See O’Neill, 2007, 166. 
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dangerous phenomenon.585 Accusations of manipulation have constantly been 
creeping through the back door. And plainly enough, this renders the process 
suspicious. 
The only safeguard against climate-denialists is the way the process is 
designed and actually put into practice. However accurate the IPCC reports are with 
regards to the scientific conclusions, watchful denialists will keep an eye on every 
minute failure, technical or linguistic.586 In such a context, the need to furnish arenas 
of dialogue and to insulate dialogue against campaigns that strive to taint the 
consistency and authority of the reports, is paramount. The process of the IPCC, 
however fallible any process might be, has to withstand such incessant tribulations. 
After the Climategate episode, the scientific and political communities have not 
withdrawn their confidence on the conclusions of the IPCC reports. However, as 
Skodvin and Andresen pointed out, “the way the process is organised does not live up 
to requirements for transparency and accountability.”587 
A test of appropriateness, as explained by chapter 2, seeks to contrast the 
existing accountability arrangement with the normative lenses of GAL. The central 
function of the IPCC, again, is to deliver an assessment report that imbues a group of 
scientists and policymakers with a sense of co-authorship. This group, in addition, 
needs to be qualified by geopolitical representativeness.588 Globally representative 
co-authorship is a matter of persuasion: to convince and sensitise policymakers inside 
and outside the body about the seriousness of the phenomenon, overcome occasional 
reluctances and trigger political action. Scientific stature, moral standing and political 
reliability are the chief accountability currencies in play. 
IPCC’s decisions, therefore, are not commands. The IPCC cannot enforce its 
policy recommendations and there is no coercive power at stake. In fact, it has 
                                                 
585 Schellnhuber, for example, informs us about how the “global warming denial machine” may even 
threaten the lives of climate scientists. (Omidi, 2012) 
586 In the light of criticisms, supporters of the IPCC assessment work claimed that: “having failed to 
win the scientific debate, critics are now using the procedural error to discredit the whole IPCC 
process.” (Dickson, 1994, 467) 
587 Skodvin and Andresen, 2011, 172. 
588 Skodvin has actually elaborated on the functions of the IPCC in a slightly broader way. For her, 
apart from providing (i) reports that have (ii) representativity, it is important to think about the 
functions of (iii) “interpreting” the reports, executed by the WGs, and (iv) “conflict resolution” fulfilled 
by the Chair’s informal leadership and strategy for consensus-building. (1999, 25-26) On leadership, 
she contends that: “(t)he leadership provided by individual actors is, in a sense, the ‘glue’ of the 
system.” (1999, 31) 
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deliberately tried to avoid “getting its hands dirty”.589 Neither a tension between 
empowerment and disempowerment, nor a danger of human rights’ violation is 
directly implicated in the IPCC’s activities (even if that conclusion might not be true 
with regards to other components of the Climate Change Regime). Therefore, the 
global constitutionalist framework (GCon), as conceived by chapter 2, would be little 
telling with regards to the IPCC. 
IPCC’s self-perception, however, as revealed by its public statements and 
constant procedural reforms, is very much in tune with GAL’s scholarly suggestions 
and institutional comparisons. To the extent that GAL’s suggested devices are 
adaptable to an institution with the particular task of the IPCC, they are already in 
place. Because the standard model of scientific accountability and self-regulation – 
review by peers – does not suffice, the procedures of the IPCC are permeated by 
complementary administrative law-like principles that shape its collective writing 
process. The question as to whether these principles are enshrined to a sufficient 
degree or modulated in the right way remains to be answered.  
Each of GAL’s principles manifests itself in a quite clear way along the 
process. ‘Transparency’ is present in two ways: accessibility-transparency (the 
prompt availability of norms, documents and outputs) and content-transparency (the 
linguistic candour and precision recommended by the guidelines for communicating 
uncertainty). The two-stage review process, mediated by review editors, allows for 
inputs from outsiders and corrections by writing teams. This process fulfils, at the 
same time, the principle of ‘review’ and of ‘participation’. Each correction, or refusal 
to correct, is expected to be clearly justified, an important demand of ‘reason-giving’. 
The plenaries at the WGs and the Panel, in turn, furnish some degree of interest-
representation (which will vary, for sure, depending on how much geopolitical 
representativity the IPCC enjoys). 
There is, hence, an accountability package that somehow translates and 
significantly instantiates each of GAL’s principles. Furthermore, the diachronic 
description of the procedural evolvement shows that the IPCC has increasingly 
become more accountable. From the standpoint of GAL, at least, this is certainly so. 
                                                 
589 Agrawala points to the ambivalent nature of this strategy: “It studiously stays clear from policy 
recommendations. It even avoids shaping the priorities of global change research programs to avoid 
unnecessary politicisation of its assessment process. Many argue that this sanitized approach and 
IPCC’s reluctance to ‘get its hands dirty’ may have made it less useful than it could have been.” 
(1998b, 638) 
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The credibility of the IPCC derives from its process, which constitutes, as we 
have already seen, a highly refined structure of accountability. It needs to tackle, 
above all, three kinds of risks: (i) under-inclusiveness, (ii) misreporting science and 
(iii) not convincing people that the reports are trustworthy. These risks can only be 
prevented, to invoke the functions of accountability devised in chapter 1, by 
respectively reinforcing the democratic, epistemic and populist functions of 
accountability.  
Two features of the IPCC structure address these concerns: its 
intergovernmental quality – the “famous I”590 – and a participatory and representative 
process that promotes a sense of “ownership by the worldwide scientific 
community”.591 
 The optimal measure of these principles is impossible to grasp through a 
precise abstract rule. As it happens with institutional design, it inevitably remains an 
open question. The level of complexity of the process, for example, which leads to a 
time-consuming assessment cycle, might become dysfunctional at some point.592 
Certain observers and participants now question whether a step back would be 
desirable. At some points of the cycle, the IPCC might have reached accountability 
overburden. Simplifying that intricate process, however, runs the risk of 
compromising the democratic, epistemic and populist functions.593 With regards to 
the timing of each cycle, there is also a delicate trade-off between duration of the 





                                                 
590 The intergovernmental character helps, according to Agrawala, “educating many government 
bureaucrats”. (1998a, 611) It also carries, as Skodvin and Andresen remind, an inevitable 
“vulnerability to politicisation”. (2011, 172) 
591 Bolin and Houghton (1995) 
592 Skodvin called attention to the review process: “the time spent on the collection and incorporation 
of review comments exceeds the time spent on actually writing the reports, and there are limits as to 
how much more of this kind of non-productive time-consuming procedures the IPCC process can 
bear.” (2000, 411) 
593 Skodvin and Andresen (2011) 
594 The problem of low speed and the intricacy of the procedures, Agrawala notes, sometimes make the 
IPCC suffer from the “Frankenstein Syndrome”: it sparked the whole negotiation process that led to the 
creation of the FCCC, but sometimes cannot timely deliver what the FCCC demands. (1998b, 636) The 
diversification of “assessment outputs”, which opened the possibility for more rapid and less 




The power of the IPCC is based upon the credibility of its voice. Whenever 
the public withdraws this pedigree, its capacity to influence and persuade shrinks. 
Hence, its institutional raison d’être evaporates. Dispelling distrust and preventing 
bias is the only way to succeed. The weight of the official statement that each of its 
reports embodies is entirely contingent upon its iterative process. 
The IPCC does neither solve conflicts nor mediate disputes, it does neither 
generate nor apply law, however law is conceived. It lodges, through a meticulous 
process, a periodical political stamp to the up-to-date scientific knowledge on climate 
change. It double-checks scientific consistency and ponders on what to do with 
regards to the discoveries. It tries to reach an agreed factual point of departure from 
which further political debate on what to do will go on. It seeks to grasp, first, 
whether and how climate change is happening, or what we know about it. Second, it 
estimates what differences climate change makes in our lives and what can 
collectively be done to counter it (that is, both to adapt and to mitigate). 
It is fair to ask why a political body is needed to attest or confirm what science 
has already discovered. The IPCC is usually referred to as a “scientific body”. This 
qualification might be misleading. Irrespective of whether that name is appropriate or 
not, it certainly does not intend to portray a body that practices or generates science, 
as a laboratory or a research institute, but rather as a body with a set of interrelated 
public responsibilities. These include certifying the scientific findings already out 
there, acknowledging their validity, systematising and digesting their monumental 
complexity, contextualising and deriving implications for concrete collective action. 
Remarkably, the IPCC strives to merge two communities and make them speak with a 
single voice, a single composite “we”: “we the scientists and political 
representatives”, “we the experts and the lay public”. 
Pachauri’s closing interrogation of his Nobel Peace Prize speech captures the 
heart of IPCC institutional challenge: “Will those responsible for decisions in the field 
of climate change at the global level listen to the voice of science and knowledge, 
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which is now loud and clear?”595 The opening epigraph also reflects the same idea: 
“The science of the situation is clear – it’s time for the politics to follow.”596  
I do not know how clear the “science of the situation” actually is, although we 
can confidently assert that it has been loud for some years. This thesis obviously does 
not address a question that only climate scientists are able to answer. Pachauri and 
Hanse, however, sharply capture the challenge of the IPCC: the need for science to 
persuade politicians on what the stakes are, and how high they can reach. The issue is 
too serious to be left exclusively in the hands of either scientists or politicians: it is 
too complex and technical to leave to the former; it demands efficacious collective 
decisions, aggravated by uncertainty and thorny value judgments, that can’t be left to 
the latter alone. In other words, scientists cannot and should not pay lip service to to 
politicians and vice versa. 
Efforts to discredit the ‘inconvenient truths’ of science are not new. Potent 
interest groups are usually against scientific findings. To name popular examples, the 
policymaking consensus over the effects of tobacco and second-hand smoke on 
health, or the question about what drives acid rains and ozone depletion, emerged 
after long-lasting and hard-fought public contestation. The IPCC, in its particular 
field, provides a forum for that contestation. It has to neutralise the strategy “if you 
don’t like the message, discredit the messenger”.597 It needs to give climate-sceptics 
due consideration and to outclass them in the credibility contest. 
There is no way out of this conundrum except through a rigorous process of 
mutual engagement and accountability between the inputs – a multifaceted scientific 
literature – and the final output – the “mammoth” assessment reports.598 This is, at 
least, the assumption that underlies the IPCC structure and overall endeavour. Despite 
the convulsions after each credibility crisis, it currently has an “unrivalled hegemony” 
in climate assessment. That was not and could not be spontaneously inbuilt into its 
identity. It was rather an accomplishment.599 
 
                                                 
595 Pachauri (2007) 
596 Hanse (2012). 
597 Agrawala, 1998b, 625. 
598 As an editorial of The Economist has called it: the “mammoth assessments of climate science”. 
(2010, 78-79) 
599 Agrawala, 1998b, 640. 
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Chapter 5 
The Compliance Committee of the Kyoto Protocol (CCKP):  





Compliance procedures have become an indispensable element for the 
reliability and effectiveness of multilateral environmental agreements. Such 
procedures seek to induce independent nation-states to comply with their international 
obligations and, thus, check whether and how each country is implementing its share 
of the agreed commitments. ‘Inducement’ very much synthesises the legal philosophy 
that informs the concept of this allegedly ‘soft’ kind of authority. An arrangement of 
this kind presupposes, therefore, a fine comprehension of, or plausible empirical 
conjectures about, the behavioural determinants of international actors. Fomenting 
congruent collective behaviour is its evident aspiration. 
The first non-compliance procedure was established by the 1987 Montreal 
Protocol to the 1985 Vienna Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer. This is 
the original experience to have inspired others that followed, like the Kyoto Protocol 
itself. Authors usually applaud the innovation that was brought by non-compliance 
procedures as an ingenious alternative to the traditional dispute settlement 
procedures, both of which may exist alongside each other. After all, non-compliance 
procedures are perceived as minor or as less invading threats to state-sovereignty. The 
main goal of this specific machinery is not exactly to sanction the defaulting state-
party, but rather to help it return to the path of compliance.600 
The compliance system under the Kyoto Protocol, which is working since 
2006, aims at facilitating, promoting and enforcing compliance with the commitments 
                                                 
600 Handl defines non-compliance procedures as “forward rather than backward looking”. (1997, 34) 
Handl claims that non-compliance procedures are crafted to deal with collective problems that involve 
a great number of parties, whereas dispute settlement procedures are characterised for its bilateralism 
(injured v. injuring state). (1997, 35) This opinion is also shared by Fitzmaurice and Redgwell: “The 
distinctive character of certain multilateral environmental treaty obligations arises from a number of 
factors: the pace, magnitude and irreversibility of environmental problems which renders enforcement 
inter partes ineffective; the failure to operationalise traditional rules on state liability and 
responsibility”. (2000, 41)  
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that were established by the Protocol.601 This specific compliance mechanism is 
believed to be of a peculiar type. Oftentimes, compliance procedures are praised for 
emphasising facilitative and non-confrontational solutions towards compliance. The 
compliance system under the Kyoto Protocol, however, has turned the spotlight on 
slightly thicker enforcement measures: for the first time, an independent body might 
declare a party to be in non-compliance with its commitments. Thus, sanctions or, in 
the euphemistic jargon of the non-compliance procedure, certain “consequences” 
should follow in order to enhance compliance rates.602 
Promising though as this system might seem, it has recently faced a moment 
of uncertainty and anxiety as to its prospects. As one of the most important 
commitments of the Kyoto Protocol – the binding emissions targets assigned to 
developed countries603 – expired at the end of 2012, there have been tough 
negotiations with respect to the next round of commitments. The Kyoto Protocol, as 
already mentioned in chapter 3, was finally extended to a second commitment period, 
from 2013 to 2020. That anxiety was due to the fact that, even in the absence of a 
commitment period, the compliance system has been praised as a pivotal building 
block of the Climate Change Regime.604 In parallel to the Kyoto Protocol, the parties 
                                                 
601 The compliance system of the Kyoto Protocol is shaped by three main sources: (i) Kyoto Protocol, 
art. 18: “The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall, at its 
first session, approve appropriate and effective procedures and mechanisms to determine and to address 
cases of non-compliance with the provisions of this Protocol, including through the development of an 
indicative list of consequences, taking into account the cause, type, degree and frequency of non-
compliance. Any procedures and mechanisms under this Article entailing binding consequences shall 
be adopted by means of an amendment to this Protocol”. (ii) Decision 27/CMP.1, which corresponds to 
the Procedures and mechanisms relating to compliance under the Kyoto Protocol (Non-Compliance 
Procedure), and (iii) Decisions 4/CMP.2 and 4/CMP.4, which are the Rules of Procedure. The FCCC 
has a similar compliance procedure – the Multilateral Consultative Process, which is described in art. 
13. Such procedure, however, was never implemented due to the fact that the Kyoto Protocol was 
being negotiated in parallel. (Werksman and Herbertson, 2010, 127) 
602 Werksman analyses the negotiations of the compliance system of the Kyoto Protocol and reports the 
ultimate preference towards harder enforcement measures. (Werksman, 2005) To Mitchell, however, 
the regime should be more about facilitating compliance than about deterring non-compliance. He says: 
“The regime’s response to non-compliance with targets appear somewhat harsher on paper but, like 
most sanctions in environmental agreements, seem unlikely to be used for several reasons”. (2005, 75) 
Mitchell goes on to contend that facilitating compliance instead of sanctioning non-compliance may be 
a better instrument to alter the beliefs of society and states. They would internalise as legitimate any 
actions that protects the climate: “The very ease of complying makes it more difficult for a country to 
sustain an argument that not complying is appropriate: if compliance is easy for the country complying 
but non-compliance is expensive to the environment and other countries, then non-compliance is likely 
to be increasingly viewed as deserving social opprobrium.” (2005, 65)     
603 Kyoto Protocol, art. 3, paragraph 1.  
604 The paper provided by the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties 
under the Kyoto Protocol concluded that the compliance system should exist even if there is no 
commitment period: “The operation of the procedures and mechanisms relating to compliance adopted 
under Article 18 of the Kyoto Protocol and contained in the annex to decision 27/CMP.1 is not 
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committed to putting forward, until 2015, “a protocol, another legal instrument or an 
agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all Parties”.605 
The expectation, therefore, is that an occasional new instrument will preserve the 
general design features of the current compliance system. 
The compliance system is, at its core, an accountability mechanism. Despite 
not being usually referred to in these terms, it intends to turn the parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol accountable (or compliant, in this case). The Compliance Committee of the 
Kyoto Protocol (CCKP), therefore, is an account-holder of the countries that have 
acceded to Kyoto Protocol’s obligations. This perspective, nonetheless, illuminates 
just a part of the accountability story that moulds this compliance system. If the 
CCKP is a sort of ‘guardian’ of this international regime, one may still ask the ‘old 
chestnut’ about political authority: who guards the guardian? Who holds the 
accountor to account? 
This chapter is concerned with how accountable this very mechanism is. It 
examines, so to say, the ‘accountability of the accountability’. The CCKP, indeed, is 
an instrument for holding states to account.606 This ‘first-order accountability’, 
however relevant, will not be the dominant angle of this study. Instead, it is the less 
examined ‘second-order accountability’ dimension of the CCKP that will be carefully 
considered. Chapter 2 has already furnished the main arguments to answer why this is 
neither a trivial nor an epiphenomenal dimension. 
The chapter is divided into three sections, generally replicating the structure 
and logic of the previous chapter. The first section delineates the institutional 
configuration of such compliance system. It comprises the purpose that any 
institutional strategy towards compliance intends to fulfil, its main actors, the process 
and the guarantees ascribed to any party with compliance issues. This section also 
recalls a few examples of what the system has so far delivered. The second section 
explores the accountability structures that surround the CCKP. The third section 
engages with a preliminary assessment of the appropriateness of these structures vis-
à-vis the overall institutional mission that is embedded in the compliance procedure. 
 
                                                 
conditional on the existence of a commitment period.” (Legal considerations relating to a possible gap 
between the first and subsequent commitment periods, 2010, paragraph 52)   
605 Draft Decision CP/18, Advancing the Durban Platform, paragraph 4.   
606 This is the question that has more often worried international lawyers. See Boyle (1991 and 1993) 
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Why states decide to comply with their international commitments and how 
compliance should be instigated are intriguing and debatable explanatory issues. In 
order to have a clearer picture of the question, this section follows two steps. The first 
entertains the inquiry about, according to the literature, the motivations behind a 
states’ decision to comply with its international obligations. This step pays attention 
to the dispute between two schools of legal thought with regards to the available 
methods to ensure adequate levels of compliance in multilateral treaty regimes. 
Eventually, this dispute has shaped the format of various compliance systems, 
including the design of the compliance system under the Kyoto Protocol. The second 
step explains the nature of the commitments under the Kyoto Protocol and its chosen 
compliance mechanism. 
The answer to the question about the roots of compliance in international law 
can be quite contentious. Burgstaller describes the state-of-the-art in the field. He 
classifies the vast body of scholarship thereupon into three general theories.607 The 
first and most accepted theory maintains that states follow international law whenever 
it is in their interest to do so. As self-interested actors, their behaviour and interactions 
with other states would be the outcome of prior cost-benefit analysis.608 This is the 
self-styled “realist” take on the matter. 
The second strand is labelled “institutionalist”. Supporters of such theory 
consider that international institutions are capable of influencing and incentivising 
compliance in international law. According to its general slogan, “institutions matter”. 
Centralised monitoring and the reduction of information asymmetry are some of the 
tools available to international institutions.609 Most importantly, these institutions 
                                                 
607 Kingsbury reminds that each theory has its own view on the determinants of state behaviour and, 
ultimately, on how compliance is obtained. (1997-1998, 368) 
608 Burgstaller, 2005, 97-99. 
609 Kingsbury enumerates some of the benefits the institutionalist approach seems to bring to 
international cooperation: “Rules and institutions help stabilize expectations, reduce transaction costs 
of bargaining, raise the price of defection by lengthening the shadow of the future, increase the 
availability of information, provide or facilitate monitoring, settle disputes, increase audience costs of 
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would influence the behaviour of states because their processes of “authoritative 
decision-making” generate legitimate rules.610  
The third theory emphasises the norm as the main element pushing states to 
comply with their international obligations. States would follow international law out 
of their “sense of moral and ethical obligation derived from considerations of natural 
law and justice”.611 
Accordingly, concrete answers to these questions end up selectively 
borrowing from the premises and recommendations of all these theories. This means 
that some sort of combination between self-interest, institutional ingenuity and the 
quality of norms or processes is believed to drive or bear an impact upon compliance 
with international law. 
Different models, therefore, spring from such combinations. The contrast 
between the “managerial model”, thoroughly elaborated by Abram and Antonia 
Chayes,612 and the “enforcement model”, defended by Downs et al,613 has resonated 
across treaty regimes in general. The Climate Change Regime, in particular, is no 
exception. Such debate takes place mostly within the confines of the institutionalist 
theory and highlights the challenges of institutional design in the light of the problem 
it intends to manage.614 
                                                 
commitments, connect performance across different issues, and increase reputational costs and benefits 
related to conformity of behavior with rules.” (1997-1998, 352) 
610 Burgstaller, 2005, 99-101. 
611 Burgstaller, 2005, 101. Thomas Franck is one of the exponents of such theory. His main question is: 
“Why do powerful nations obey powerless rules?” And his answer: “Because they perceive the rule 
and its institutional penumbra to have a high degree of legitimacy”. For Franck, this degree of 
legitimacy is essential to “exert a powerful pull toward compliance”. In his view, the degree of 
legitimacy of a rule, and, consequently, its ability to pull towards compliance, is measured in 
accordance with four variables: determinacy, symbolic validation, coherence, and adherence. (1990, 3 
and 25) Jutta Brunnée is another supporter of this theory. She explains the adherence to international 
law through an interactional account, which is based on substantive and procedural grounds. As for the 
substantive character, lawmaking should be sensitive to the internal quality of norms (transparency, 
predictability, and ability to guide the discretion of officials). Procedurally, all relevant actors should 
be allowed to participate in the establishment of these norms. (Brunnée, 2003, 261-262) 
612 Chayes and Chayes (1995) 
613 Downs et al (1996) 
614 There is disagreement about whether such debate really pertains to the institutionalist theory. 
Brunée clarifies that both authors, the Chayeses and Downs et al., ultimately rely on self-interest to 
explain compliance with international obligations. For the enforcement group, for example, states are 
rational actors that work according to incentives and disincentives. As for the Chayeses, despite their 
theory about the importance of management and persuasion within treaty regimes, the basic argument 
is that states follow international law in order to be part of the international community. (Brunnée, 
2003, 260) 
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The working assumption of the Chayeses is that states have a primary 
tendency to comply.615 Such tendency is the normal behaviour after a treaty is 
formally accepted. As consensual instruments, the Chayeses continue, treaties are 
indicative of the interests of states and, therefore, the agreed rules are the usual 
guidance for their conduct. They reject the realists’ main belief – that states do only 
comply with their commitments after a crude calculation of costs and benefits – and 
argue that violations are frequently the result of three elements: first, the ambiguity of 
the treaty language; second, the limited capacity of the parties to comply; and third, 
the change of the states’ situation between the moment an agreement is signed and the 
consecutive moment the parties start implementing its terms.616 
According to the authors, at the root of the compliance problem are factors 
impairing the capacity of states to fulfil their commitments. It is not a matter of states 
deliberately disobeying their obligations, but rather of states being unable to observe 
them.617 Because of this fact, the Chayeses maintain that sanctions are useless policy 
tools to influence deviant states to comply. In a widely quoted passage, they claim: 
“sanctioning authority is rarely granted by treaty, rarely used when granted, and likely 
to be ineffective when used”.618 
Instead of enforcement techniques, the Chayeses believe in a “management 
strategy” to deal with compliance demands. According to this strategy, the situation 
that leads to non-compliance should be exposed, collectively analysed, and, if 
necessary, tackled by adapting the treaty requirements to the specificities of the 
concrete situation. When it comes to compliance, the keyword for the Chayeses is 
‘persuasion’,619 which means leading a “verbal, interactive, and consensual” process 
with the potential wrongdoer.620 
Concretely, such management strategy requires transparency, which is 
obtained through self-reports that account for how the party has been implementing 
its commitments. As the authors explain, transparency is a crucial engine to facilitate 
                                                 
615 Chayes and Chayes, 1995, 3. 
616 Chayes and Chayes, 1995, 4-10. 
617 Chayes and Chayes, 1995, 9-10. A detailed account of these circumstances can be seen at 10-17. 
618 Chayes and Chayes, 1995, 32-33.  
619 Chayes and Chayes, 1995, 24-25. 
620 In the complete passage: “For the most part, compliance strategies seek to remove obstacles, clarify 
issues, and convince parties to change their behavior. The dominant approach is cooperative rather than 
adversarial. Instances of apparent non-compliance are treated as problems to be solved, rather than as 
wrongs to be punished. In general, the method is verbal, interactive, and consensual”. (Chayes and 
Chayes, 1995, 109) 
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cooperation, since actors can check on whether and how the other actors are 
complying with their own obligations and make sure “they are not being taken 
advantage of”.621  
Dispute settlement is another managerial strategy to handle the ambiguous 
provisions of the treaty. The only requirement is that the dispute settlement 
mechanism should be able to produce “authoritative interpretation of controverted 
provisions”.622 Finally, technical and financial capacity-building, usually directed at 
developing countries, is the last ingredient on the managerial menu. 
Downs et al, on the other hand, defy the conclusions reached by the Chayeses, 
which would be “contaminated by selection problems”.623 They say that the high level 
of compliance and the disregard for enforcement measures within some regulatory 
regimes happened only because those treaties did not require significant behavioural 
change from states. The claim is that, in these specific regulatory regimes, the parties 
were required “to make only modest departures from what they would have done in 
the absence of an agreement”.624 
According to Downs et al, the more a treaty demands cooperation from states, 
the more it will need enforcement strategies to avoid cheating.625 As they say, “the 
only relevant criterion is that the punishment must hurt the transgressor state at least 
as much as that state could gain by the violation”.626 One of the authors’ examples 
regarding the correlation between deeper cooperation and enforcement measures is 
the World Trade Organization (WTO). They argue that the institutional purpose of the 
WTO, which is, by and large, the reduction of trade barriers, was only implemented 
due to the adoption of harder consequences with respect to violations.627  
Rather than a competition in which either the managerial or the enforcement 
models compete for supremacy, both schools are said to complement one another.628 
Indeed, such polarisation seems to be more artificial than real. Even the Chayeses 
                                                 
621 Chayes and Chayes, 1995, 22. 
622 Chayes and Chayes, 1995, 24. 
623 Downs et al, 1996, 380. 
624 Downs et al, 1996, 380. 
625 To the authors, the level of cooperation that a treaty is capable of bringing about can be measured 
by the “extent to which it requires states to depart from what they would have done in its absence”. 
(Downs et al, 1996, 383) 
626 Downs et al, 1996, 386. 
627 Downs et al, 1996, 391-392.  
628 Koh, 1997, 2639. 
 177 
recognise the importance that certain informal types of sanctions do have for 
compliance.629 
The compliance system of the Kyoto Protocol combined both models. Its 
declared purpose, again, is “to facilitate, promote and enforce compliance”.630 The 
reasons attached to such design can be traced back to the nature of the obligations 
agreed in the Kyoto Protocol. Differently from the FCCC, the Kyoto Protocol 
imposes emissions targets and a deadline for developed countries. Each developed 
country has its own “assigned amounts”, which are based on individualised 
“quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments”.631 The goal of these 
emissions targets is to reduce overall emissions “by at least 5 per cent below 1990 
levels in the commitment period 2008 to 2012”.632 The Kyoto Protocol has also 
compensated for such hardship. It established three market mechanisms to enable 
compliance in a cost-effective way: joint implementation, clean development 
mechanism, and emissions trading.633 
The combination of emissions targets and market mechanisms could only 
work properly if reliable information with respect to emissions of developed countries 
are provided. Otherwise, the general goal of the Kyoto Protocol to comprehensively 
reduce emissions would be difficult to achieve.634 In view of that, the emissions of 
developed countries have to be calculated and reported. According to the Kyoto 
Protocol, Annex I parties are required to establish a national system to estimate their 
GHGs emissions and, consequently, to submit this information through annual 
inventories and national communications.635  
A compliance system that encompasses both traditional managerial elements 
and other enforcement techniques, such as sanctions, was judged more suitable to 
oversee how developed countries conform to their obligations. Werksman points out 
to two main reasons in favour of the decision of the parties to the Kyoto Protocol to 
                                                 
629 The Chayeses argue: “In the background, more generally, there is the threat of various 
manifestations of disapproval: exposure, shaming, and diffuse impacts on the reputation and 
international relationships of a resisting party. In the conditions of the new sovereignty, a state’s willful 
and persistent refusal to comply can mushroom into a situation in which its overall status in the 
international system is threatened.” (1995, 110) 
630 Decision 27/CMP.1, section I. 
631 Kyoto Protocol, art. 3, paragraph 1.  
632 Kyoto Protocol, art. 3, paragraph 1.  
633 Kyoto Protocol, articles 6, 12 and 17.  
634 Brunnée, 2003, 269. 
635 Kyoto Protocol, article 5, paragraph 1, and article 7, paragraphs 1 and 2.  
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design a tougher compliance mechanism. First, it would reduce competitiveness 
concerns, especially among the Annex I parties, since sanctions would presumptively 
deter non-compliance and, therefore, the risk of free riders. Second, the market 
mechanisms would gain in integrity as long as the compliance procedure is more 




The main actors that operate the compliance system under the Kyoto Protocol 
are: the COP/MOP, the Compliance Committee (CCKP), the Expert Review Teams 
(ERTs), and the parties to the Kyoto Protocol themselves. The CCKP, in turn, 
comprises four decision-making instances: (i) an enforcement branch, (ii) a 
facilitative branch, (iii) a plenary (which consists of the two previous branches sitting 
together), and (iv) a bureau.637 
The COP/MOP implemented the compliance system after the approval and 
adoption of “the procedures and mechanisms relating to compliance under the Kyoto 
Protocol”.638 In such procedure, the tasks assigned to the COP/MOP are limited. 
Apart from providing general policy guidance, its main role consists in deciding 
appeals.639 Any Annex I party may appeal to the COP/MOP against a final decision of 
the enforcement branch. The grounds for such appeal are, nevertheless, restricted to 
due process issues.640 And even if the COP/MOP concludes the decisions of the 
enforcement branch to have violated due process – and it needs a three-fourth 
majority vote for that – it can only refer the matter back to the branch.641 It has no 
self-standing power of invalidation. 
The enforcement branch of the CCKP has the jurisdiction over the “questions 
                                                 
636 Werksman, 2005, 22. As this author explains: “The managerial approach is designed to respond to 
parties that wish to comply, but lack the financial and technical means of doing so. (…) many perceive 
the Kyoto Protocol’s commitments as imposing serious economic and political costs on industrialized 
countries. These countries are donors rather than recipients of development assistance.” And 
Werksman completes: “markets in these offsets depend upon the regulatory incentives created by a 
credible compliance system. Offsets and allowances only take on a marketable value when they are in 
demand by regulators as part of a strong compliance system.” (Werksman, 2005, 22-23)    
637 Decision 27/CMP.1, section II, paragraph 2.  
638 Decision 27/CMP.1. 
639 Decision 27/CMP.1, section XII (a). According to Oberthür and Lefeber, up to now the COP/MOP 
has not provided any policy guidance. (Oberthür and Lefeber, 2010, 138) 
640 As the decision declares: “if that Party believes it has been denied due process.” Decision 
27/CMP.1, section XI, paragraph 1. 
641 Decision 27/CMP.1, section XI, paragraph 3. 
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of implementation” in relation to Annex I parties.642 It determines whether Annex I 
parties are in compliance with: (i) quantified emission limitation and reduction 
commitments; (ii) methodological and reporting requirements; and (iii) the eligibility 
requirements to participate in the market mechanisms of the Protocol.643 For each of 
these three situations, the enforcement branch applies prescribed consequences. Such 
consequences are not exactly seen as sanctions. They are described as means to 
restore compliance and to ensure environmental integrity.644-645 
If the party does not comply with its emissions targets (“situation a”), which is 
a question that can only be decided after 2012,646 the enforcement branch shall 
determine three consequences: deduction from the party’s assigned amount for the 
second commitment period, development of a compliance action plan, and the 
suspension of the eligibility to trade emissions.647 The declaration of non-compliance 
with reporting requirements (“situation b”) results in the development of a compliance 
action plan.648 Finally, the non-compliance with eligibility requirements under the 
market mechanisms (“situation c”) calls for the suspension of eligibility under the 
mechanism.649 
The facilitative branch of the CCKP, in turn, provides “advice and facilitation 
                                                 
642 Marrakesh Accords, Decision 24/CP.7 “Procedures and Mechanisms relating to Compliance under 
the Kyoto Protocol” V. 
643 Decision 27/CMP.1, section V, paragraph 4 (a), (b) and (c).  
644 Decision 27/CMP.1, section V, paragraph 6.  
645 Comparing the competences of the enforcement branch with the mission of two similar bodies under 
different non-compliance procedures may help putting them in perspective. The non-compliance 
procedure under the Montreal Protocol establishes an Implementation Committee to oversee the 
compliance of the parties with their commitments. The members of such Implementation Committee, 
however, do not have the power to decide about compliance. They report their findings and 
recommendations to the Meeting of the Parties, which is the ultimate decision-making authority of the 
system. (Decision IV/5, Annex IV, art. 9) The second example is the Compliance Committee set up by 
the compliance system of the Aarhus Convention. This procedure is praised for being innovative as 
members of the public are allowed to bring communications about compliance of a party with the 
Aarhus Convention’ commitments before the Compliance Committee. (Decision I/7, art. 18) The 
members of the Compliance Committee do not decide on compliance, but rather review the case and 
make recommendations to the Meeting of the Parties, who then decide upon the measures to bring the 
party into full compliance. (Decision I/7, arts. 13, 14 and 37) Exceptionally, the Compliance 
Committee may also recommend certain measures to facilitate the compliance of a party with its 
commitments, but this has to be in consultation and subject to agreement with the party concerned. 
(Decision I/7, art. 36, (a) and (b)) 
646 After 2012 there is still an “additional period for fulfilling commitments”, when the parties to the 
Kyoto Protocol with emission limitation or reduction commitments can continue acquiring emissions 
allowances in order to comply with their emissions targets. (Decision 27/CMP.1, Section XIII)      
647 Decision 27/CMP.1, section XV, paragraph 5 (a), (b), (c).  
648 Decision 27/CMP.1, section XV, paragraph 1 (a), (b).  
649 Decision 27/CMP.1, section XV, paragraph 4.  
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to Parties in implementing the Protocol”.650 It is the managerial hand of the system. 
Apart from that, the facilitative branch shares some of the responsibilities given to the 
enforcement branch “with the aim of promoting compliance and providing for early 
warning of potential non-compliance”.651 Therefore, the facilitative branch is 
responsible to help Annex I parties with their emissions targets and reporting 
requirements.652 
The plenary of the CCKP does not decide on compliance. This function is the 
exclusive responsibility of the enforcement and of the facilitative branches. The 
plenary receives the “questions of implementation”,653 which shall then be distributed, 
by the bureau, to either the enforcement or the facilitative branches, depending on the 
issue to be ultimately decided upon and their respective mandates.654 The plenary, in 
addition, is the forum to discuss general matters of the system and to exchange 
information about the activities performed by the two branches.655 It provides 
information to the COP/MOP about the decisions that have been taken by them.656  
The plenary is composed of twenty members: ten from the facilitative branch 
and ten from the enforcement branch.657 The COP/MOP elects these members.658 
They are climate change experts, who must serve “in their individual capacities”.659 
They have to agree with a written oath of service that requires independence, 
impartiality and early warning of potential conflict of interests.660 The members of the 
enforcement branch, apart from expertise within the climate change field, must also 
have legal experience.661 
In theory, the “formal” independence of each individual member denotes that 
parties facing a question of implementation before the facilitative or the enforcement 
                                                 
650 Decision 27/CMP.1, section IV, paragraph 4. 
651 Decision 27/CMP.1, section IV, paragraph 6. The facilitative branch has already exercised such 
competence. The branch invited Canada to engage in a dialogue after the release of the ERT’s report on 
Canada’s fifth national communication, where the ERT expressed the possibility of Canada becoming 
non-compliant with its commitments under Article 3, paragraph 1, of the Kyoto Protocol. As an answer 
to such invitation, Canada said that any engagement with the facilitative branch would be useless since 
it had already submitted a notification of withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol. 
(FCCC/KP/CMP/2012/6, Annex II)   
652 Decision 27/CMP.1, section IV, paragraph 6 (a) (b).  
653 Decision 27/CMP.1, section VI, paragraph 1.  
654 Decision 27/CMP.1, section VII, paragraph 1.  
655 This function is the result of practice, according to Oberthür and Lefeber. (2010, 138)  
656 Decision 27/CMP.1, section III.  
657 For each member there is an alternate member. Decision 27/CMP.1, Annex, section II paragraph 3.  
658 Decision 27/CMP.1, section II, paragraph 3.  
659 Decision 27/CMP.1, section II, paragraph 6.  
660 Rules of Procedure, Rule 4 (2). 
661 Decision 27/CMP.1, section V, paragraph 3.  
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branch do not have to fear political or arbitrary decisions.662 Experts ought to decide 
according to the applicable norms and facts put before them, regardless of any 
political leaning.  
Climate change, however, is a subject embroiled in multiple clashing interests. 
A balance of different points of view and interests needed to be struck in order to 
design these bodies.663 The branches are composed of: (a) six members of interest 
groups within the Climate Change Regime (according to the proportion of one 
member from each of the five regional groups of the United Nations, and one member 
from the small island developing States); (b) two members with binding emissions 
targets from Annex I parties; and (c) two members with no binding emissions targets 
from non-Annex I parties.664 They serve for a term of four years, which can be 
renewed only once.665 
The antagonism between Annex I and non-Annex I parties is further reflected 
throughout the procedure. Each branch elects a chairperson and a vice-chairperson: 
one from an Annex I, and the other from a non-Annex I party. They rotate continually 
between Annex I and non-Annex I parties.666 The chairperson and the vice-
chairperson from each of the two branches, in turn, compose the bureau.667 
According to the practice of the CCKP, the chairperson and the vice-
chairperson have the responsibility to draft the text of the decisions for their 
respective branch.668 The voting procedure once again discloses that antagonism 
(specially in the realm of the enforcement branch). In both branches, decisions should, 
in principle, be adopted by consensus. Failing consensus, three fourths (eight out of 
                                                 
662 According to Ulfstein and Werksman, the wording of the non-compliance procedure gives the 
appearance that the members of the branches are detached from the COP/MOP. However, the fact that 
the COP/MOP elects them opens the possibility of “non-professional factors” being taken into account. 
(2005, 47)     
663 In fact, the composition of the branches was a highly disputed question in the negotiations. 
Werksman says that, from the beginning, developing countries pushed for the equitable geographical 
representation within the branches, which provoked a rift with developed countries. The reason behind 
the disagreement was the fact that the requirement of an equitable geographical representation led to a 
majority of developing countries. This was particularly problematic in relation to the composition of 
the enforcement branch, since only the performance of developed countries would be subject to their 
jurisdiction. (Werksman, 2005, 28)    
664 Decision 27/CMP.1, section IV, paragraph 1 (a), (b), (c), and V. 1 (a), (b), (c). The five UN regional 
groups are: Asia-Pacific Group, African Group, Eastern European Group, Latin America and the 
Caribbean Group, and the Western European and Others Group. The terms of the negotiation are 
described by Ulfstein and Werksman, 2005, 41-43.   
665 Decision 27/CMP.1, section IV, paragraph 2, and section V, paragraph 2. 
666 Decision 27/CMP.1, section II, paragraph 4. 
667 Decision 27/CMP.1, section II, paragraph 4.  
668 Oberthür and Lefeber, 2010, 136. 
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ten) of the members decide. In order for decisions of the enforcement branch to be 
taken, there must be a quorum of a majority of Annex I and of non Annex-1.669 In the 
light of this requirement, the absence of two members from the Annex I parties could 
block the decisions of the enforcement branch. It is claimed to be a procedural 
guarantee for Annex I parties against unreasonable claims advanced by non-Annex I 
parties.670 
The Expert Review Teams (ERTs) fulfil two main functions within the Kyoto 
Protocol. The first one is to provide a “thorough, objective and comprehensive 
technical assessment” of how Annex I parties have been implementing their 
commitments.671 When performing these functions, the ERT should advise and give 
some time for the party to avert potential problems towards compliance. Only if this 
problem becomes “unresolved” should the ERT indicate it as a question of 
implementation before the enforcement branch.672 The second function is to “promote 
consistency and transparency” when reviewing the information furnished by Annex I 
parties.673  
These experts, who are selected from the FCCC roster of experts, serve in 
their personal capacities. They cannot have any attachment to the party under review, 
which, in practice, means being of a different nationality and not having received 
funding or being nominated by it.674 The composition of the ERTs should strike a 
balance between experts coming from Annex I and non-Annex I parties.675 Finally, it 
is within the job description of ERTs to undertake “in-country” visits to Annex I 
parties, which must be done with the previous consent of the party being reviewed.676 
The plenary is responsible to receive questions of implementation that can be 
raised by any party with respect to itself, by any party with respect to another party, 
and by the reports of ERTs.677 The practice of compliance mechanisms in other 
                                                 
669 Within each branch, just to make that clearer, there are 4 members from developed countries (two 
from the Annex 1 countries, one from the Eastern European group and one from the Western European 
group) and six from developing countries. Therefore, the quorum corresponds to 3 from the former and 
4 from the latter countries. See Decision 27/CMP.1, section II, paragraph 9. See also Ulfstein and 
Werksman, 2005, 47. 
670 Ulfstein and Werksman, 2005, 42, 50 and 53. 
671 Decision 22/CMP.1, paragraph 2 (a). 
672 Decision 22/CMP.1, paragraphs 7 and 8. 
673 Decision 22/CMP.1, paragraph 2 (b). 
674 Decision 22/CMP.1, paragraphs 23 and 25. 
675 Decision 22/CMP.1, paragraphs 32. 
676 Decision 22/CMP.1, paragraphs 55 and 56. 
677 Decision 27/CMP.1, section VI, paragraph 1 (a) and (b).  
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multilateral regimes has shown that the two former hypotheses seldom take place.678 
Therefore, from the beginning, the reports provided by the ERTs were perceived to be 
the main trigger of the compliance procedure in relation to the commitments of Annex 
I parties.679 As a matter of fact, the seven cases so far presented before the 
enforcement branch were submitted as questions of implementation by the ERTs. 
Finally, as the last category of actors, there are the parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol, which comprise both the Annex I parties, which have “quantified emission 
limitation and reduction commitments”680 and are required to report and calculate its 




The general task of the CCKP is to monitor whether the parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol meet their agreed obligations. According to specific criteria, it pursues this 
task either through the facilitative branch, which aims at aiding the parties to identify 
effective ways to comply, or through the enforcement branch, which has the power to 
take more intrusive measures, like a declaration of non-compliance. 
Questions of implementation need to fulfil a series of procedural requirements 
in order to be analysed and decided upon by either branch. The parties concerned are 
entitled with several judicial-like guarantees. The process of the enforcement branch, 
due to its more sensitive nature, which reverberates in both the national and the 
international spheres, is particularly enhanced with these sorts of protections. 
Any question of implementation is subject to a “preliminary examination” by 
the relevant branch. The preliminary examination consists in analysing whether there 
is sufficient information to proceed with the case and whether the case is not ill 
founded.681 The party concerned must be notified of the decision of the branch to 
proceed or not to proceed with the question of implementation. If the decision of the 
branch is not to proceed, it must be made public.682 Otherwise, the decision should be 
clear about the information on the basis of which the question of implementation is 
                                                 
678 Oberthür and Lefeber, 2010, 141. 
679 Ulfstein and Werksman, 2005, 43. 
680 Kyoto Protocol, art. 3, paragraph 1. 
681 Decision 27/CMP.1, section VII, paragraph 2 (a), (b) and (c).  
682 Decision 27/CMP.1, section VII, paragraph 6.  
 184 
grounded.683 Furthermore, the party concerned must have the opportunity to comment 
on such decision.684  
From this moment onwards, the communication between the party concerned 
and the branch follows a certain pattern. First, the party concerned has the right to be 
technically represented before the branch.685 Second, all information considered must 
be available so that the party concerned has the possibility to produce its 
commentaries.686 Third, decisions must clearly indicate their “conclusions and 
reasons”.687 Fourth, the party concerned should always be notified about the decisions 
of the branch.688  
The decisions of the branches should be substantiated with information 
furnished by various actors, namely: the party concerned; the ERTs, in the case of 
Annex I countries; the party that has submitted the question of implementation, if that 
is the case; the COP and the COP/MOP, if that is the case; other subsidiary bodies of 
the FCCC and of the Kyoto Protocol; and, finally, the other branch.689 Apart from 
these, other external actors, like intergovernmental and non-governmental 
organisations, are also allowed to submit information to the relevant branch.690 As a 
further guarantee for the party concerned, each branch may seek expert advice.691 The 
branch shall identify the experts, define the procedures these experts should follow, 
and enumerate the questions they should answer.692  
The policy behind the system is to keep the meetings of the plenary and of the 
branches open to the public.693 The date and venue of each meeting should be 
advertised in advance in the FCCC website. An interested observer can follow the 
meeting in loco, but she has to be previously registered.694 Alternatively, meetings can 
be watched through the Internet.695 Nevertheless, the public is not allowed to be 
present during the elaboration and the adoption of decisions, which is restricted to the 
                                                 
683 Decision 27/CMP.1, section VII, paragraph 4.  
684 Decision 27/CMP.1, section VII, paragraph 7.  
685 Decision 27/CMP.1, section VIII, paragraph 1.  
686 Decision 27/CMP.1, section VIII, paragraph 6.  
687 Decision 27/CMP.1, section VIII, paragraph 6.  
688 Decision 27/CMP.1, section VIII, paragraphs 7 and 8.  
689 Decision 27/CMP.1, section VIII, paragraph 3 (a), (b), (c), (d), (e).  
690 Decision 27/CMP.1, section VIII, paragraph 4.  
691 Decision 27/CMP.1, section VIII paragraphs 5.  
692 Rules of Procedure, Rule 21 (a), (b) and (c).  
693 Rules of Procedure, Rule 9 (1). 
694 Working Arrangement, 2007, paragraph 16, (b).  
695 Working Arrangement, 2007, paragraph 16, (a).  
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members of the branches and secretariat officials.696  
The procedure of the enforcement branch has additional guarantees for the 
party concerned. First, there are specific time limits for the branch to consider the 
information and adopt decisions, and for the party concerned to submit written 
commentaries.697 Moreover, with respect to eligibility requirements of the market 
mechanisms of the Protocol,698 there is also a fast track procedure that enables the 
parties, in case of a positive decision, to be swiftly reinstated into the carbon-offset 
market without serious losses.699 
Second, there are additional opportunities for the party concerned to vocalise 
its opinions. In the event of a decision to proceed with the question of 
implementation, after the preliminary examination of the case, the party concerned 
has the possibility to make a written submission rebutting the information used by the 
enforcement branch. It is also opened to the party the opportunity to request a hearing 
where it can present its views and expert testimony about the question of 
implementation.700  
Following this stage, the enforcement branch may decide to proceed on a 
preliminary finding of non-compliance or not to proceed with the question. In the first 
hypothesis, the party concerned has one more opportunity to communicate with the 
enforcement branch, through a “further written submission”, before a final decision is 
taken. 701 
Third, the party concerned may appeal to the COP/MOP against the decision 
of the enforcement branch. This appeal, however, is limited to due process concerns, 
as seen above. A brief grasp of the cases so far dealt with by the branches help to 




The cases bring up the issue about the legal character of the CCKP decisions. 
In particular, it regards the binding nature of a declaration of non-compliance by the 
                                                 
696 Rules of Procedure, Rule 9 (2). 
697 Decision 27/CMP.1, section IX, paragraphs 2 and 3, for example.  
698 Decision 27/CMP.1, section X.  
699 Ulfstein and Werksman, 2005, 49. 
700 Decision 27/CMP.1, section IX, paragraphs 1 and 2.  
701 Decision 27/CMP.1, section IX, paragraphs 4, 7, and 8.  
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enforcement branch. This was a very disputed matter during the period the 
compliance procedure was negotiated.702 At the bottom of such controversy is the rule 
of article 18 of the Kyoto Protocol, which determines the need to amend the Kyoto 
Protocol in order to secure the binding character of the compliance system.703 
Many delegations, both in favour of and against legally binding consequences, 
saw the requirement of article 18 as problematic. Apart from being time-consuming, a 
labourious amendment process could disturb the fair treatment among the parties. 
After all, only the parties that have their related decision ratified by amendment 
would be bound by it.704 In the end, the topic proved little workable politically and no 
clarification on that legal character was ever issued.705 According to Werksman, 
however, the mandatory language of the compliance procedure and the hard 
consequences that can be applied by the enforcement branch compensates for the lack 
of agreement on legally binding consequences.706 
As of date, the facilitative branch has faced only one case whereas the 
enforcement branch has reached a final decision on seven cases (Greece, Canada, 
Croatia, Bulgaria, Ukraine, Romania, and Lithuania) and still proceeds with one more 
case (Slovakia). The five former cases will be shortly described below as examples of 
the concrete functioning of such procedures. 
 
2.4.1 Facilitative Branch  
 
The only question submitted to the facilitative branch to date was triggered, in 
2006, by South Africa on behalf of the Group 77 and China. It was proposed against 
fifteen Annex I countries due to their alleged lack of reported progress in achieving 
their commitments under the Protocol.707 This question of implementation ended 
                                                 
702 As Werksman puts it, “the alpha and omega of the negotiations”. (2005, 31) 
703 Kyoto Protocol, art. 18.  
704 Werksman, 2005, 31. The amendment procedure is described in art. 20. The hurdles of the 
procedure range from the fact that it needs to be accepted by the parties and that there is a long time lag 
between the proposal of the amendment and its entry into force. Art 20.2  “(…) The text of any 
proposed amendment to this Protocol shall be communicated to the Parties by the secretariat at least six 
months before the meeting at which it is proposed for adoption.” Art. 20.4 “An amendment adopted in 
accordance with paragraph 3 above shall enter into force for those Parties having accepted it on the 
ninetieth day after the date of receipt by the Depositary of an instrument of acceptance by at least three 
fourths of the Parties to this Protocol.” 
705 Werksman, 2005, 32.    
706 Werksman, 2005, 32.    
707 CC, South Africa, 2006a. 
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without any formal decision from the branch. Both a decision to proceed and a 
decision not to proceed were attempted but equally failed to reach the required 
majority of three-fourths of the members.708 The draft of the decision not to proceed 
puts forward the several procedural doubts about the particularities of the case: 
whether it was possible for a group of parties to present submissions; whether the 
submission had named each one of the parties concerned; and whether the question of 
implementation had been clearly identified.709 Because none of these three questions 
were clearly regulated, the body did not manage to overcome the stalemate. This 
frustrating result has sparked procedural improvements that will be dealt with later in 
the chapter. 
 




The ERT raised a question of implementation concerning the Greek national 
system of emissions calculation. According to the report of the ERT, the deficiencies 
of such system referred to institutional, procedural and competence of the Greek 
technical staff.710 The enforcement branch, on a preliminary analysis, decided to 
proceed with the question of implementation and sought expert advice.711 In its 
written submission, Greece explained that the gaps highlighted by the ERT were the 
outcome of a transitional period, and that the country had since implemented an 
improved version of its national system.712 The enforcement branch, based on expert 
advice, declared the country to be in non-compliance with its reporting requirements 
and, consequently, suspended it from participating in the market mechanisms while 
pending decision about the question of implementation. 
Concretely, the enforcement branch determined that Greece should develop a 
plan in order to demonstrate measures to ensure the good continuity of its national 
system of emissions calculation.713 Greece presented a further written submission 
                                                 
708 CC, South Africa, 2006b.  
709 CC, South Africa, 2006b, 4 (a), (b), (c).  
710 CC, Greece, 2007, paragraph 244. 
711 CC, Greece, 2007a. 
712 CC, Greece, 2007b. 
713 CC, Greece, 2007c, paragraphs 18 (a), (b), and (c). 
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where it challenged the decision of the enforcement branch based on the fact that its 
greenhouse gases emissions inventory, together with the inventory of the whole 
European Union, had been presented before the FCCC Secretariat and had been 
successfully approved.714 In a final decision, the enforcement branch maintained its 
preliminary findings and reasoned that the EU inventory could not adjust for the 
deficiencies specifically found in Greece’s national system.715  
Submitted to a new ERT scrutiny, the new national system of Greece was 
reported to be operational and capable of assembling timely inventories.716 The 
enforcement branch determined that the question of implementation with respect to 
Greece was resolved and that the country could be reinstated into the market 




In 2008, the ERT raised a question of implementation in relation to Canada’s 
national registry for accounting its assigned amounts. In accordance with the report of 
the ERT, such national registry was not in conformity with certain provisions of the 
Kyoto Protocol.718 The question was allocated to the enforcement branch since it 
refers to reporting requirements. On a preliminary analysis, the branch decided to 
proceed with the question of implementation and sought expert advice.719 Canada 
clarified that, by the time the ERT produced its report, the country’s national registry 
had not been completely implemented, but that it has since managed to successfully 
enact it. Canada then urged the enforcement branch to decide not to proceed with the 
question of implementation.720 Based on Canada’s written submission and on the 
expert advice, the enforcement branch decided not to proceed further. The phrasing of 
such decision, however, brought out uncertainty regarding the status of Canada. At a 
certain point, the decision declared that: “(a) the status of Canada’s national registry 
resulted in non-compliance with the guidelines and the modalities on the publication 
date of the review report”, and (b) “there is a sufficient factual basis to avert a finding 
                                                 
714 CC, Greece 2007d. 
715 CC, Greece 2007e. 
716 CC, Greece 2007f, paragraph 164. 
717 CC, Greece 2007g, paragraph 13. 
718 CC, Canada, 2008a, paragraphs 139-140. 
719 CC, Canada, 2008b. 
720 CC, Canada, 2008c, paragraphs 3, 8 and 18.  
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of non-compliance on the date of this decision.”721 
The use of the word “non-compliance” was heavily criticised by Canada. 
According to a further written submission, Canada welcomed the decision of the 
enforcement branch not to proceed, but it argued that the branch had overstepped its 
competence when it declared, nonetheless, that Canada was not in compliance with its 
commitments. In Canada’s view, the substance of the decision was misleading since 
Canada had never been declared to be in non-compliance and, besides, the situation 
that could potentially steer into non-compliance was resolved. Canada then suggested 
that the word “non-compliance” should be excluded from the decision.722 There is no 
further decision on the matter, but such submission was annexed to the annual report 
of the compliance committee to the COP/MOP.723 
        
c) Croatia 
 
The ERT brought up a question of implementation in relation to Croatia’s 
calculation of its assigned amount, which was supposedly not in conformity with 
some provisions of the Kyoto Protocol.724 The enforcement branch, on a preliminary 
examination, decided to proceed and sought expert advice.725 In a written submission, 
Croatia argued that the calculation of its assigned amount was in tune with a decision 
undertaken within the FCCC. That decision allowed a degree of flexibility for 
countries undergoing the process of transition to a market economy, and, in Croatia’s 
view, the Compliance Committee should take that determination into account.726 The 
enforcement branch, in a preliminary finding, reasoned that the Kyoto Protocol has a 
different degree of flexibility for countries undergoing the process of transition to a 
market economy and that any decision taken under the FCCC needed also to be 
analysed by the highest decision-making body of the Kyoto Protocol (the COP/MOP). 
That did not happen.  
Croatia was then declared to be in non-compliance, not eligible to participate 
in the market mechanisms under the Protocol, and finally constrained to develop a 
                                                 
721 CC, Canada, 2008d, paragraph 17 (a) and (b). 
722 CC, Canada, 2008e.  
723 Annual Report of the Compliance Committee 2008, paragraph 30.  
724 CC, Croatia, 2009a, paragraph 157. 
725 CC, Croatia, 2009b.  
726 CC, Croatia, 2009c.  
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plan to address the calculation of its assigned amount.727 In a further written 
submission, Croatia urged the enforcement branch to reconsider its position.728 
However, the enforcement branch confirmed its preliminary findings and added that it 
was not within the competences of the enforcement branch to address the specific 
circumstances of Croatia.729 
Croatia appealed against the final decision of the enforcement branch to the 
COP/MOP, but withdrew it. Although the appeal was not formally analysed by the 
COP/MOP, it prompted a technical paper, at the request of the COP/MOP, to 
understand the scope and the law that is applicable to appeals under the compliance 
procedure of the Kyoto Protocol.730      
Croatia submitted a plan related to the calculation of its assigned amount, 
together with a request to the enforcement branch to reinstate the country into the 
market mechanisms. The enforcement branch decided to postpone the decision 
regarding the reinstatement of Croatia in view of the fact that Croatia’s plan still did 
not meet all the requirements.731  
Croatia submitted a new revised plan and reasoned that it is now able to accept 
“the values calculated by the ERT that conducted the review of Croatia’s initial 
report”.732 Croatia, then, once again, requested its reinstatement into the market 
mechanisms. In view of Croatia’s revised plan, the enforcement branch decided that 
the question of implementation was resolved and declared Croatia’s eligibility to 
participate in the market mechanisms.733 
 
d) Bulgaria   
 
The ERT found problems in the national system of Bulgaria and identified it 
as a question of implementation. According to the report of the ERT, it was not in 
tune with FCCC reporting requirements nor with the IPCC guidelines. More 
specifically, it was not “sufficiently transparent, consistent, comparable, complete and 
                                                 
727 CC, Croatia, 2009d, paragraphs 15, 21 (a), and 23 (a), (b), (c). 
728 CC, Croatia, 2009e. 
729 CC, Croatia, 2009f, paragraph 4. 
730 FCCC/TP/2011/6, Mandate.  
731 CC, Croatia, 2009i, paragraphs 3 and 9. 
732 CC, Croatia, 2009j, 3. 
733 CC, Croatia, 2009l, paragraph 12. 
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accurate”.734 The enforcement branch decided to proceed with the question and 
sought expert advice.735 In a written submission, Bulgaria reported its progress to 
tackle the deficiencies spotted by the ERT.736 
In a preliminary finding, the enforcement branch took into account the facts 
presented by Bulgaria in its written and oral submissions as well as the advice 
received from the invited experts. Although the branch noted progress, that was not 
sufficient to ensure the operation of Bulgaria’s system in accordance with the 
guidelines for national systems. Bulgaria was declared to be in non-compliance, not 
eligible to participate in the market mechanisms, and constrained to develop a plan to 
address the problems found in its national system.737  
In a further written submission, Bulgaria challenged a specific passage from 
the preliminary finding as falling outside the mandate of the enforcement branch. 
According to such passage, the experts predicted improvements in the quality of 
Bulgaria’s annual submission around the year of 2011. In Bulgaria’s view, the 
enforcement branch should not be prone to make predictions and requested the 
passage to be removed from the text of the preliminary finding.738  
In a final decision, the enforcement branch confirmed its preliminary finding 
and noted that the branch is authorised to seek expert advice and that Bulgaria could 
request the reinstatement of its eligibility at any time.739 Bulgaria submitted a 
compliance action plan in accordance with the final decision,740 and went through 
another ERT review. The new report of the ERT confirmed that Bulgaria’s national 
system is performing in accordance with FCCC and IPCC provisions, which, among 
other reasons, led the enforcement branch to decide that the question of 




The ERT raised a question of implementation in relation to Ukraine’s national 
                                                 
734 CC, Bulgaria, 2010a, paragraph 194.  
735 CC, Bulgaria, 2010b.  
736 CC, Bulgaria, 2010c.  
737 CC, Bulgaria, 2010d, paragraphs 16 and 20 (a), (b), and (c).  
738 CC, Bulgaria, 2010e, paragraphs 12, 16 and 17.  
739 CC, Bulgaria, 2010f.  
740 CC, Bulgaria, 2010h.  
741 CC, Bulgaria, 2010i, paragraph 15.  
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system for estimating anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions because, as in the 
previous case, it was not “sufficiently transparent, consistent, comparable, complete 
and accurate”.742 The enforcement branch decided to proceed and sought expert 
advice.743 In an extensive written submission, Ukraine purported to demonstrate that 
the question of implementation has been fully resolved.744 
On its preliminary findings, the enforcement branch, which declared having 
taken into account Ukraine’s written and oral submissions as well as the guidance of 
experts, noted that there were still unsolved problems within the operation of the 
country’s national system. Ukraine was then declared to be in non-compliance, not 
eligible to participate in the market mechanisms, and constrained to develop a plan to 
address the problems of its national system.745 In a further written submission, 
Ukraine maintained that the enforcement branch erred when it did not consider, in its 
preliminary findings, Ukraine’s special circumstances: a country undergoing the 
process of transition to a market economy, which calls for an extra flexibility in 
decision-making. Substantively, Ukraine requested the branch to defer its final 
decision until the country could have a new review of ERT.746 The branch confirmed 
its preliminary findings and, coherently following the rationale adopted in the 
Croatia’s case, added that it is not within its competence to defer decisions or to grant 
flexibility in the absence of a decision from the COP/MOP.747  
As a consequence of the enforcement branch’s decision, Ukraine presented a 
plan with a view to solving the situation that originally led to its non-compliance. 
According to Ukraine’s declaration, the plan was a “detailed and updated account of 
its efforts to comply”.748 Ukraine then requested the enforcement branch to reinstate 
its eligibility to participate in the mechanisms under Articles 6, 12, and 17 of the 
Kyoto Protocol.749 In its final decision, the enforcement branch, based on the ERT’s 
report and expert advice, verified that Ukraine’s national system and annual 
                                                 
742 CC, Ukraine, 2011a, paragraph 184. 
743 CC, Ukraine, 2011b. 
744 CC, Ukraine, 2011c. 
745 CC, Ukraine, 2011d, paragraphs 18 and 24 (a), (b) and (c). 
746 CC, Ukraine, 2011e, paragraphs 18-38 and 53 and sequel. 
747 CC, Ukraine, 2011f. 
748 CC, Ukraine, 2011g, paragraph 10. 
749 CC, Ukraine, 2011h. 
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submission were prepared in accordance with guidelines. The enforcement branch 
decided to reinstate Ukraine’s eligibility to participate in the market mechanisms.750  
 
3. Accountability structures 
 
The institutional configuration presented above reveals the central features of 
the power relations that underlie the compliance procedure of the Kyoto Protocol. 
This section attempts to sketch these features through the accountability lenses. The 
coordinates of accountability enable us to depict the interactions between the CCKP, 
organically considered, and the parties to the Kyoto Protocol in two different 
perspectives.  
First and foremost, again, the CCKP is supposed to be an account-holder of 
the parties to the Kyoto Protocol – the signatory states. The CCKP holds them to 
account whenever it decides questions of implementation or monitors their behaviour 
through technical reports. Together with ERTs, if that is the case, and based on expert 
advice, the enforcement branch has to determine whether the parties have been 
discharging their agreed duties (related to emissions targets, reporting rules and 
eligibility requirements). If the parties have not, that branch has to establish the 
consequences that should be applied to the non-compliant behaviour. All these acts 
cannot ensue but through quasi-judicial litigious procedures and on the basis of public 
reasons that ground each decision. This requirement offers the parties the possibility 
to engage with and expose how the authority of the branches is being exercised. 
Formal constraints of coherence – of ‘deciding like cases alike’, with a credible 
notion of ‘likeness’ – shape this argumentative onus. The maintenance of the 
integrity, publicness and transparency of these procedures, thus, are part of the 
conditions upon which the legitimacy of the CCKP, as it happens with many other 
courts, depends. 
Resorting again to the coordinates of accountability, one notes that the 
relationship between the CCKP and the parties is formal and legalised. Previously 
enacted legal rules specify the authority of each branch, regulate how questions of 
implementation are to be brought before the branches, and the procedural guarantees 
any party concerned (and additional actors, like NGO’s) should be granted. The 
                                                 
750 CC, Ukraine, 2011i. 
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interaction is established directly, without the need of surrogates. The centre of 
command of this accountability relationship is clearly identifiable according to 
explicit legal criteria, a characteristic that avoids jurisdiction overlap. Therefore, the 
mechanism adopts a unitary rather than a pluralistic or multilateral mode of 
accountability.  
One can reasonably tell, from the pattern of cases depicted above, that the 
CCKP has so far been successful in bringing states to a path of compliance. The cases 
themselves cannot prove, indeed, that every single occasional act of non-compliance 
has been captured by and has formally reached the CCKP. Still, one can plausibly 
maintain that the set of cases, at the very least, indicates that very distinct countries, 
among the Annex I list, have displayed a good level of concern with rectifying its 
diagnosed non-compliant practices so as to avoid bearing the repercussions and actual 
costs that a declaration of non-compliance entails domestically and internationally. 
From a second perspective, the CCKP may itself be held accountable,751 
however appropriately or not, by two potential account-holders: (i) formally and 
directly, by the COP/MOP; (ii) informally and somewhat indirectly, by the group of 
parties and the general public. Let me elaborate on that.  
The COP/MOP is the decision-making body that represents the parties to the 
Kyoto Protocol as a whole. Unlike the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), which 
is hierarchically subordinated to the COP/MOP’s ultimate authority, as later described 
by chapter 6, the institutional architecture of the CCKP gives the COP/MOP a fairly 
limited sort of formal authority over the facilitative and the enforcement branches. 
The COP/MOP is in charge of providing general policy guidance and of deciding 
upon a single type of appeal: the one concerned with due process questions.752 That is, 
the CCKP is formally sovereign with respect to the technical judgments it delivers, 
because these decisions are non-reviewable on their substance. And even if the 
COP/MOP picks out a breach of due process by the CCKP, it may only refer the 
matter back to the branch.753 This potential accountability link, if one can plausibly 
claim so, is a rather thin one. 
                                                 
751 In a broader perspective, as I mentioned earlier, this can be conceived as ‘second-order’ 
accountability. 
752 Decision 27/CMP.1, Section XII. 
753 Decision 27/CMP.1, section XI, paragraph 3. 
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The COP/MOP, nevertheless, also determines the composition of the two 
branches. The power to elect decision-makers is traditionally conceived as a 
mechanism to set a principal-agent relationship grounded on the idea of 
representativeness. However hard it might be to square a principal-agent relationship 
with the nomination of experts that are expected to be impartial and independent, this 
is surely not a unique feature of this compliance system.754 If, on the one hand, 
members of both branches have a measure of stability during their four years term, on 
the other, the possibility of having their term renewed once by the COP/MOP may 
affect that impartiality. That is, the arrangement opens for the COP/MOP the 
possibility of ex post assessment of the performance of the respective member when 
deciding upon his or her term renewal. The CCKP, here, becomes accountable “as 
many” (according to the respective individual performances). 
There is still more to be told with regards to the branches’ and the ERTs’ 
composition. The deep-seated tension between developed Annex I and developing 
non-Annex I countries to the Kyoto Protocol (and to the climate change issue as a 
whole) is reflected and institutionally expressed across the board. The struggle for the 
equitable and balanced composition needs to be managed by the COP/MOP when 
electing the experts of the two branches and when choosing the experts of the ERTs. 
The demand for equilibrium also resurfaces in the division of labour between the 
chairperson and vice-chairperson of each branch and in the qualified quorum that is 
needed for each branch to make a decision (which gives relevant veto power to the 
experts from both types of countries). Members of both branches and of the ERTs 
serve in their individual capacities, that is, as climate change experts rather than 
political representatives with an interested agenda. Nonetheless, in such an explosive 
political context, nationalities unavoidably matter. 
Finally, apart from being peculiarly accountable to the COP/MOP, one should 
not ignore how the CCKP is diffusely accountable to the general public and to the 
interest groups of climate change. This accountability facet is a product of mutual 
monitoring: the CCKP is held accountable to the group of parties and interest groups 
that mutually check on each other with respect to how commitments are being 
followed and simultaneously track how the branches of the CCKP handle this 
                                                 
754 This tension between political nomination of experts and their expected impartiality is common in 
national and international bureaucracies. This is usually handled through the mechanism of ‘tenure’. 
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matter.755 The Chayeses had pointed out this dimension of accountability by stressing 
that compliance is enhanced whenever each party is assured that it is not “being taken 
advantage of”.756 It is in this sense that the group of parties inspects how the CCKP is 
dealing with questions of implementation. This type of accountability takes place 
through the less formal means of pressure and public exposure. These subtle informal 
sanctions, which can culminate in more serious ones, like sheer disregard or open and 
outspoken non-compliance, might become feasible as the institutions loses its 
respectability. 
In a nutshell, who accounts to whom? The facilitative and the enforcement 
branches account primarily to the COP/MOP, which has the formal power to review 
the appeals grounded on due process and, most of all, to elect and re-elect the 
members of the branches, a power that naturally creates informal channels of 
intramural influence and pressure. The branches may also be held accountable by 
interest groups and parties that monitor the consistency of their work. For what and 
how? For the task of supervising the compliance system and deciding, in a judicial-
like manner, the questions of implementation. When? Along the whole process of 
monitoring and of decision-making. On the basis of which standards? The procedural 
guarantees and the technical substantive targets defined in the Kyoto Protocol. Under 
pain of what consequences? When the CCKP is grasped as the sum of experts acting 
in their individual capacities (as many), the possibility of not having their terms 
renewed is an important concern for the members of each branch. When the branches 
are seen in their organic institutionality (as a whole), their performance can be 
publicly questioned by the parties, an informal process that could drive the 
compliance system into a legitimacy crisis.  
 
4. Test of appropriateness: which accountability for what institutional purpose? 
 
This section proceeds with a normative test: how appropriate are the 
accountability arrangements of the mechanism that was set up to be the chief 
                                                 
755 Handl gives an economic explanation for the accountability component in non-compliance 
procedures. He says: “as the economic cost of compliance with such environmental regulations rises, 
states have an increased interest in making sure that other states, subject to the same international 
regulations, live up to their obligations, thereby ensuring competition on a level playing field”. (1997, 
31) 
756 Chayes and Chayes, 1995, 22. 
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enforcement device under the Kyoto Protocol? Put differently, it attempts to reflect 
upon ‘how the guardian should be guarded’. I do not intend to ask the descriptive 
question – ‘how is the guardian being guarded?’ – nor the explanatory one – ‘why is it 
being guarded this way?’ – both of which escape the feasible scope of this thesis and 
the competence of the author. Before answering that normative question, however, I 
start by pondering over some aspects of the cases that have challenged the facilitative 
and the enforcement branches to improve their procedures. 
 
4.1 First-order accountability: cases and procedural improvements 
 
The reported deadlock that has occurred with the first and only case submitted 
before the facilitative branch raises an important inquiry, especially if such case is 
compared with the ones presented before the enforcement branch. The facilitative 
branch, unlike the enforcement branch, does not declare a country to be in non-
compliance with its commitments. Its competence to advise and facilitate compliance 
is, in many aspects, a common one in other multilateral environmental agreements, 
and yet the parties did not reach an agreement with a preliminary examination of the 
situation. 
It is difficult to speculate on why the case ended prematurely. Even the most 
straightforward explanatory hypothesis, which would be the mistrust sparked by a 
case originally presented by non-Annex I parties against Annex I parties, seems to be 
misleading. Despite the majority of non-Annex I parties within the facilitative branch 
(six out of ten), they did not vote together on the matter. 
Oberthür and Lefeber explain that the stalemate was partially diagnosed as a 
result of the lack of clear procedural standards regarding submissions. In order to 
make up for the shortfall, the Rules of Procedure were amended so as to require (i) the 
names of the submitting party and of the party concerned, (ii) the provision of the 
Kyoto Protocol that grounds the question of implementation, (iii) a clear identification 
and corroborating information about the question of implementation, among other 
things.757 
In turn, when it comes to the questions of implementation that fall into the 
jurisdiction of the enforcement branch, the cases show the branch’s engagement, for 
                                                 
757 Oberthür and Lefeber, 2010,141 and 143. See CCKP Rules of Procedure, Rule 14, 15, and 18. 
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the most part, with the parties’ national system for estimating GHGs emissions and 
their reporting requirements. It is a crucial moment for both the enforcement branch 
and the parties, since these inventories will be essential to calculate the compliance of 
developed countries with their emissions targets. So far, it is possible to identify three 
relevant features of the system. 
First, findings and recommendations of experts carry a great weight within the 
decisions of the enforcement branch. As said, the ERTs have been the main actor to 
challenge the reports of the parties. They have triggered each one of the proceedings 
by spotting problems or potential obstacles towards compliance. In some cases, such 
as the question involving Greece, the close cooperation between the ERT and the 
party concerned seemed essential to solve the matter.758 Expert advice is a second 
example of this claim. Despite the ambivalent wording of the legal provision (“each 
branch may seek expert advice”),759 the enforcement branch has always availed itself 
of such instrument. The experts have assisted the members of the enforcement branch 
with the content of the ERTs’ report, which comprehensively can be filled up with 
technical references. 
Second, the enforcement branch perceives this initial period of questions of 
implementation as an ongoing learning process to enhance its decision-making 
process. In 2008, with the benefit of hindsight, the branch undertook a stocktaking 
exercise in order to “look back at the branch’s work for the year and to reflect on 
improvements that can be made to its consideration of question of 
implementation”.760 From such exercise, certain amendments to the Rules of 
Procedure regarding deadlines and representation were proposed.761 Additionally, it 
was agreed that the members of the enforcement branch should explain their 
                                                 
758 The decision states: “The expert review team (ERT) concluded that the national system of Greece is 
performing its required functions, as set out in the annex to decision 19/CMP.1. The ERT further 
concluded that the institutional, legal and procedural arrangements of the new national system are fully 
operational, and that Greece has the capacity, including relevant arrangements for the technical 
competence of staff within the national system, to plan, prepare and manage inventories and their 
timely submission to the secretariat. During the review, no questions of implementation were identified 
by the ERT. The review report also confirmed that the ERT had in-depth discussion on all aspects of 
the national system with the relevant staff, and that the transfer of information and data from the 
institution with previous technical responsibility for the inventory preparation to the new team has been 
completed”. (CC, Greece 2007g, paragraphs 7 and 8) 
759 Decision 27/CMP.1, Section VIII, paragraph 5.  
760 Compliance Committee, List of issues for enforcement branch stocktaking exercise, 24 September 
2008, CC/EB/6/2008/2. 
761 Such amendments were accepted by the COP/MOP, Report of the Conference of the Parties serving 
as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its fourth session, held in Poznan from 1 to 12 
December 2008, FCCC/KP/CMP/2008/11/Add.1.  
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dissenting votes in future decisions. It was decided that such stocktaking exercises 
should remain a periodical effort to develop the activities of the enforcement branch 
further.762 
Third, the lack of binding consequences did not prevent the parties from 
engaging with the decisions of the enforcement branch. According to the cases, the 
concerned parties took every opportunity to respond to the findings of the 
enforcement branch and, in some cases, made an effort to bring themselves into 
compliance.763 Such behaviour could be the outcome of two determinants. 
The first, and perhaps more realistic, is that there are tangible losses for the 
parties that do not comply with their commitments. Greece, Croatia, Bulgaria, and 
Ukraine were all declared, at a certain point, not eligible to participate in the market 
mechanisms. Such decision has a direct impact on the rights of the parties and, 
consequently, on the cost of their compliance.764 The second cause is that there are 
other types of damages contained in any declaration of non-compliance. Canada’s 
case is a good example. Canada was not declared to be in non-compliance, but when 
the enforcement branch mentioned such term in the decision it provoked a strong 
reaction. This could be evidence that few countries regard the tag “non-compliant 
state” of no concern even if such declaration and the consequences attached to it are 
not legally binding. 
 
4.2 Second-order accountability: handling political pressure 
 
The test of appropriateness was stipulated as an examination of how the 
institutional purpose and the desired accountability functions attached to it (or the 
inevitable imbrication between both) are reflected in the body’s institutional design. 
In order to be regarded as a normatively legitimate decision-maker, the CCKP must 
be held accountable not in whatever way, but in an appropriate way as defined by a 
normative discourse. This truism is derived from the comprehensive concept of 
                                                 
762 Compliance Committee, Report on the Sixth Meeting of the Enforcement Branch, 30 October 2008, 
CC/EB/6/2008/3, paragraphs 6-9.  
763 Werksman and Herbertson argue that, “while it is operating on somewhat unstable legal grounds 
due to the language in Article 18, the KP’s Compliance System is developing an important track record 
in promoting compliance.” (2010, 130) 
764 According to Oberthür and Lefeber: “There can be little doubt, however, that the application of 
consequences by the EB is effective even without a formally binding status (…). Its consequences are 
self-enforcing, even though their continued effectiveness depends on the creation of subsequent 
commitment periods (…)”. (2010, 151)  
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accountability described and endorsed by chapter 1 and further contextualised by 
chapter 2. 
The central role of the CCKP, once again, is to verify whether and how the 
parties to the Kyoto Protocol comply with their obligations, and to decide what 
‘consequences’ should ensue in case of non-compliance. The CCKP has so far 
overseen, with the aid of experts, the accuracy of the parties’ national systems for 
estimating emissions, as well as their inventories and communications. Such oversight 
aims at enabling the parties to present more accurate information with regards to 
GHGs emissions – an essential step in the final verification of the parties’ compliance 
with their 2012 emissions targets. 
As far as the procedure of the enforcement branch is concerned, it has a 
judicial-like character that emphasises the need to give the concerned parties enough 
opportunities to challenge the branches’ or the ERTs’ assertions, to respect strict 
deadlines, and to commit to public reason-giving based on expert information. As to 
the facilitative branch, according to earlier description, procedures are more flexible 
and collaborative. They intend to push the parties into compliance. In both domains, 
there are possibilities for the participation of external actors, like intergovernmental 
and non-governmental organisations. 
The type of standard through which the decisions of the branches can be 
appraised, thus, lies somewhere in between the compliance-based and the integrity-
based systems. On the one hand, in order to establish the consequences that should be 
applied against parties that were declared in non-compliance, the enforcement branch 
does not have discretion (except the one that is conceivably inherent to legal 
interpretation).765 There are fixed consequences for each of the non-compliant 
situations. In this particular respect, the members of the enforcement branch are 
expected to be rule-followers. As earlier described, only with regards to the 
“compliance action plans” are the members of the enforcement branch given some 
leeway to review and assess the content of such proposals.766 The facilitative branch, 
in turn, has a higher degree of discretion to apply the consequences “taking into 
                                                 
765 See Decision 27/CMP.1, section XV, paragraphs 1, 4 and 5.  
766 See Decision 27/CMP.1, section XV, paragraphs 2 (a), (b), (c) and 6 (a), (b), (c). According to 
Ulfstein and Werksman, due process would be better achieved if the system could strike a balance 
between the automaticity of consequences while still conferring some discretion to the members of the 
enforcement branch to consider the differences of each case. (2005, 41) 
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account the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities”.767  
Technically, the power exercised by the CCKP as a whole is not coercive or 
legally binding. Nevertheless, as the cases indicate, the CCKP still exerts a non-
negligible constraint upon the parties. In spite of the relevant differences between 
both branches, their common purpose is probably less original and epistemically 
intricate than the one played, for example, by the IPCC. Still, their responsibility is 
not politically lighter. In the unsteady and legally fragile territory of international 
relations, holding states to account, according to the laws of action and reaction of 
realpolitik, may well backfire. As a matter of institutional survival, therefore, 
institutional devices should equip the body to bear such impact and to withstand this 
political burden or pressure. 
Under such decisional context, three main functions of accountability are 
naturally at stake. First, accountability structures have a clear expert-based epistemic 
function that combines legal/adjudicative and managerial aspects distributed between 
both branches. Second, the democratic function is also manifested in who gets the 
chance to somehow participate in and contribute to the process besides the concerned 
party itself. Third, accountability structures seek to deliver the populist dividend of 
respectability and hence compliance with CCKP’s decisions by means of the balanced 
composition of both branches with experts from developed and developing countries. 
This is a sort of representativeness that cannot exactly be seen as democratically-
oriented, because the determinant variable is not the proportionality among the 
represented countries or peoples. It can rather be seen as strategically and 
geopolitically-oriented representativeness. 
Thus, distinct currencies of accountability are simultaneously in play. This co-
existence, as argued by chapter 1, is rarely untroubled. Tensions might specially arise, 
in the current case, between the expert-based epistemic demand and the populistic 
demand for a particular kind of representativeness in the composition of the bodies. 
The challenge, again, is to keep both plates spinning: to insulate experts so that their 
impartiality remains credible and trustworthy, and to concede that the not-so-
democratic power-equilibrium between developed and developing countries, 
                                                 
767 Decision 27/CMP.1, section XIV. 
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translated by the body’s membership rules, is a pragmatic necessity for the sake of the 
effectiveness of the body. 
Displaying impartiality in spite of the geopolitical component that is 
embedded within the body’s composition is, thus, a core institutional hurdle to be 
faced by the CCKP. One should have already perceived that most of the GAL 
principles are somehow lurking behind the overall CCKP’s procedures, and have even 
oriented the few reforms undertaken along the years. Documents, sessions and 
decisions are subject to transparency rules, decisions need to be justified, the 
nomination of decision-makers takes into account the representation of their 
respective geopolitical provenance, and third parties have specific opportunities to 
participate in the process. As for the revisability, there is a right to appeal to the 
COP/MOP, however weak and limited that is. 
Rather than simply identifying the presence of GAL devices, the analyst needs 
to observe the form of their presence and check whether and how they might help to 
smooth the tension between the epistemic and the populistic functions as 
characterised above. That is, she needs to spot whether and how those principles 
manage to neutralise or minimise the perception of political bias that may naturally 
derive from the polarised interest structure reflected within the CCKP. 
Expert-based public reason-giving is a first requirement that helps the body to 
display an appearance of impartiality and, to some extent, constrains it towards truly 
impartial decision-making. Apart from that, the four years tenure of the experts may 
also shield them from political interference. In addition, unlike the Implementation 
Committee of the Montreal Protocol and the Compliance Committee of the Aarhus 
Convention, which are more clearly subordinated to the respective meeting of the 
parties,768 the CCKP enjoys broader independence to decide on questions of 
compliance. As for the participation of external actors, an opportunity is given to 
them to provide information and to engage with the CCKP, although these actors do 
not have any decisional weight that a strict principle of proportional representation 
would require. 
This is how, in sum, the GAL principles get instantiated in the CCKP and 
articulate the three accountability functions that bear upon the body (epistemic, 
democratic and populistic). Besides, from the point of view of GAL, or, in other 
                                                 
768 This was already explained by an earlier footnote.* 
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words, from the definitional premises of accountability offered by GAL, the few 
procedural reforms undertaken by the CCKP have made the body gradually more 
accountable. It is early to assess whether, from the angle of GAL, there is still 
something missing or any remaining procedural gap. From what GAL’s framework is 





It has become a commonplace, when talking about compliance in international 
law, to resort to Henkin’s vivid and ironic statement aired in his classic book: 
“Almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of 
their obligations almost all of the time.”769 
This sociological statement is artfully ambivalent, and can be interpreted 
through either pessimistic or optimistic light. Somehow, though, it summarises the 
core challenge of international law. When it comes to post-Westphalian regimes, in 
which transnational bodies enjoy greater decision-making autonomy, that challenge 
gets more acute. 
The compliance system devised by the Kyoto Protocol addresses Henkin’s 
concern with an innovative design. The chapter has tried to characterise how 
innovative it is, to map what accountability phenomena derive from this design and to 
identify the functions it is expected to play. Its special burden of expert-based 
impartiality in the face of the polarised politics of climate change has led to a 
geopolitically balanced composition of the CCKP and to incrementally more intricate 
decision-making procedures. The extent to which these features, which are very much 
in tune with the GAL principles, are able to promote such an institutional “feat of 
self-legitimation”,770 is a question that needs to be continuously raised and candidly 
taken into consideration. 
 
                                                 
769 Henkin, 1979, 47. See also Zürn and Joerges, 2005, xiii. 
770 To borrow an expression from Walker. (2010a, 22) 
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Chapter 6 
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM):  





The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is a financial instrument 
that sets up a market between developed and developing countries in order to 
nourish and catalyse the overall global reduction of greenhouse gases (GHGs) 
emissions.771 The former actors are the hosts of climate-friendly projects772 that 
generate specific credits – the Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs), whereas 
the latter actors are the buyers of these credits in order to comply with their 
commitments to curtail or limit their emissions under the Kyoto Protocol.773 In 
other words, the amount of emission reductions that take place in developing 
countries as a consequence of greener projects is translated into tradable CERs, 
which are then bought and used to offset developed countries’ own emissions. 
This market is believed to work both ways: for developed countries, as a tool for 
cost-effective compliance with their Kyoto Protocol commitments; and for 
developing countries, as a trigger to their sustainable development.774 
Such sketchy picture hides a complex structure and a multitude of actors 
that are essential to the functioning of this global carbon market. There are three 
pivotal actors for the operation of this legal mechanism: the Executive Board 
(EB), which is the treaty-body that regulates the CDM; the Designated 
Operational Entities (DOEs), which are private legal entities in charge of 
monitoring and auditing functions; and project participants, who can be either a 
state-party, or a public or private entity authorised by a state-party to participate 
as project developer or as buyer of CERs. The architecture of the CDM also 
                                                 
771 Kyoto Protocol, art. 12, paragraph 1. 
772 Climate-friendly projects registered by the CDM may range from landfill gas, hydropower, 
wind power, to the distribution of wood stoves. For an overview, see: 
<http://cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/registered.html> These projects, according to their technical 
particularities, are categorised in “sectoral scopes” upon which hinge some regulatory 
implications. See: <http://cdm.unfccc.int/DOE/list/index.html>  
773 Kyoto Protocol, art. 12, paragraph 3 (a) and (b). 
774 Kyoto Protocol, art. 12, paragraph 2. On the cost-effectiveness of the mechanism, see Wara, 
2008, 1763. 
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needs to take into account local stakeholders, who are individuals and 
communities affected, or likely to be affected, by a CDM project in developing 
countries. 
The CDM, therefore, allows non-state actors to take part in this global 
financial endeavour. This fact has been the object of increasing attention as it 
departs from traditional patterns of international law, which is usually structured 
around the rights and obligations of its main protagonist, the nation-states. In 
that orthodox account, non-state actors would be the addressees of international 
law only indirectly. International organisations and their supporting bodies 
would have to rely on states to enact and implement national legislation in order 
to regulate the behaviour of private actors.775  
The CDM has a different logic though. The status of non-state actors is 
directly dependent on the decisions of the EB. DOEs are accredited and then 
hired to assist the EB with information regarding CDM projects and to guarantee 
the soundness of emission reductions. Public and private entities, together with 
state-parties, and authorised by them, have helped to create a prolific CDM 
business. They develop and sponsor projects as well as trade the resulting 
credits.776 Lastly, local stakeholders, who endure the consequences of each 
CDM project, are granted some voice in its making, which shall be discussed 
later. 
The participation of non-state actors raises notable questions to my 
inquiry: does this type of involvement heighten the political sensitivity of the EB 
decisions? Which are the accountability structures prompted by the mechanism? 
Are they appropriate to discipline this relationship between the EB and the non-
state actors? Are the decision-making procedures sophisticated enough to give 
voice to all relevant parties and grant them due weight? 
Besides the academic interest, there are crucial practical reasons that 
justify why these questions are worth asking. According to many, some of the 
                                                 
775 See Kingsbury, Krisch and Stewart, 2005, 23-24. See also Meijer, 2006-2007, 886-889. 
776 Lin and Streck explain: “Today, an overwhelming majority of the entities trading in the CDM 
market are private entities. They participate in the market either through investments in funds 
(for speculative purposes or compliance); through intermediaries; or through direct purchases.” 
(2009, 84) Private companies from developed countries participate as buyers of CERs either 
because they have to achieve emission cuts (and the European Union’s Emissions Trading 
System is an example of a group of private companies in this situation) or because it is a 
profitable market. Profit is also the justification for private parties from non-Annex 1 countries 
to participate as project developers. 
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CDM features and actors, or the whole mechanism itself, could serve as a model 
for other emission-trading schemes in a post-2012 climate change regime.777 
This chapter addresses this set of problematic queries. I intend to analyse the 
CDM governance and to assess the value of recent efforts to strengthen its 
overall responsiveness. I particularly focus on the role played by DOEs and the 
EB. 
The chapter is structured in three main sections that mirror the sequence 
of chapters 4 and 5. First, it describes the institutional configuration of the CDM, 
which encompasses the purpose that this mechanism is supposed to fulfil, the 
actors that operate it and the various processes through which they interact. The 
second section explores the accountability structures in which DOEs, the EB and 
other actors are enmeshed. The last part assesses the appropriateness of these 
structures for the overall institutional mission of the CDM.  
 




The CDM represents one of the most heated topics that has yet to find its 
way on a post-2012 international climate change agreement. How to financially 
organise the fight against climate change and to distribute the costs of such 
enterprise still incites the creativity of institutional architects and political 
negotiators. To be sure, the puzzle of how financial assistance should be 
provided in view of global environmental problems is not exclusively related to 
climate change. In similar situations, like those that demand a comprehensive 
collective response to environmental risks, the common approach has been to set 
up mechanisms that allow the flow of investments from developed to developing 
countries. Such financial tool would have two functions: to attract the 
                                                 
777 According to Wara, the CDM has managed to create powerful political institutions and, at the 
same time, to engage developing countries in a way that is unprecedented in climate change 
negotiations. (2008, 1763-1764) To Green, the analysis of the CDM is important because many 
national and sub-national emission’s trading schemes are already using the same DOEs for 
monitoring activities. (2008, 23) Finally, Werksman and Herbertson remind that the CDM has 
developed procedures that conform to the concept of measuring, reporting and verifying (MRV), 
such as the responsibility of the EB to approve baselines and to certify emission reductions. 
(2010, 131) 
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participation of developing countries, and to provide them with technical and 
financial capacity to comply with their (new) environmental commitments.778 
The success of a future climate change agreement is dependent, as 
observed since the Copenhagen negotiation rounds, upon achieving a consensus 
with regards to cost-effective mechanisms to curb emissions and to provide 
funding to developing countries for mitigation and adaptation projects.779 Such 
goals, however, have expectedly proved to be quite controversial. On the one 
hand, developed countries, due to their early industrial expansion, bear the 
historical responsibility for the level of GHGs concentration in the atmosphere.  
However that may be, they cannot, or do not want to pay for that costly bill 
alone.780 On the other hand, developing countries will be responsible for 55% of 
the global GHGs emissions by the year of 2025.781 Yet, they argue that it is 
against any sense of fairness to slow down their own economic development if 
they have to retrench their emissions in favour of the international community. 
The Climate Change Regime has created a web of funds, trusts and other 
instruments to buttress mitigation and adaptation activities. Let me contextualise 
the particular type of finance provided by the CDM in contrast to other financial 
structures created by the FCCC. This contrast highlights CDM’s unique feature 
– the trading of emission credits – as opposed to conventional donations or 
direct aid transfers from the rich to the poor. 
The FCCC declares that developed countries have financial 
commitments towards developing countries in order to help the latter to comply 
with their newly established obligations. Such financial assistance should be 
“new and additional”782 and it “shall take into account the need for adequacy and 
predictability in the flow of funds and the importance of appropriate burden 
sharing among the developed country Parties”.783 The Global Environmental 
Facility (GEF) was, from the beginning, the entity entitled to oversee, under the 
                                                 
778 Werksman, 2009, 190. 
779 Copenhagen Accord, paragraphs 7 and 8. 
780 There is an extensive bibliography that addresses the responsibility of developed countries. 
For a minimal overview, see Chang (2002). 
781 Baumert, Herzog and Pershin, 2005, 17. 
782 FCCC, art. 4.3. 
783 FCCC, art. 4.3. 
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guidance of the COP, the financial arrangements established under the FCCC.784 
The GEF manages two climate related funds: the Special Climate Change Fund 
(SCCF),785 and the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF).786 Additionally, 
there is the Adaptation Fund (AF), supervised by the Adaptation Fund Board 
(AFB),787 which finances projects and programmes in developing countries with 
a view of adapting to the unavoidable effects of climate change.788 Developed 
countries are invited to contribute to the first two funds,789 while the AF is 
financed from “the share of proceeds on the clean development mechanism 
project activities”.790 The recently created Green Climate Fund (GCF) has 
prompted some excitement because of the additional resources it pledges.791 
Although the GCF is still in its initial stages, the parties to the FCCC have 
already agreed on a broad governing instrument that should start operating in the 
near future.792   
As for the Kyoto Protocol and its internal logic of emission reductions, a 
different approach was established in order to foment financing. Faced with the 
                                                 
784 See Decision 12/CP.2, Memorandum of Understanding between the Conference of the Parties 
and the Council of the Global Environment Facility. 
785 Decision 7/CP.7.This fund has a complementary character and it focuses on providing funds 
for adaptation, transfer of technologies, and energy, transport, industry, agriculture, forestry and 
waste management; See paragraph 2 (a); (b); (c) from Decision 7/CP.7.  
786 Decision 7/CP.7. According to Decision 27/CP.7, paragraph 1, the fund should “support the 
work programme for the least developed countries, including, inter alia, the preparation and 
implementation of national adaptation programmes of action (NAPAs)”. The GEF website 
indicates that the fund has mobilised more than half a billion dollars. At: 
http://www.thegef.org/gef/LDCF  
787 Created under Decision 1/CMP.3, paragraph 3. 
788 Decision 10/CP.7, paragraph 1.  
789 Decision 7/CP.7, paragraph 1 (c). 
790 Decision 10/CP.7, paragraph 2.  
791 Decision 1/CP.16, paragraph 102. The Green Climate Fund was first mentioned in the 
Copenhagen Accord and its promise is to mobilise part of the amount of USD 30 billion to 100 
billion pledged by developed countries. As declared by the Accord: “The collective commitment 
by developed countries is to provide new and additional resources, including forestry and 
investments through international institutions, approaching USD 30 billion for the period 2010–
2012 with balanced allocation between adaptation and mitigation. Funding for adaptation will be 
prioritized for the most vulnerable developing countries, such as the least developed countries, 
small islands, developing States and Africa. In the context of meaningful mitigation actions and 
transparency on implementation, developed countries commit to a goal of mobilizing jointly 
USD 100 billion dollars a year by 2020 to address the needs of developing countries. This 
funding will come from a wide variety of sources, public and private, bilateral and multilateral, 
including alternative sources of finance. New multilateral funding for adaptation will be 
delivered through effective and efficient fund arrangements, with a governance structure 
providing for equal representation of developed and developing countries. A significant portion 
of such funding should flow through the Copenhagen Green Climate Fund.” (Copenhagen 
Accord, paragraph 8) 
792 Decision 3/CP.17, Annex, Governing Instrument for the Green Climate Fund. 
 209 
binding commitments to limit or reduce their GHGs emissions,793 Annex I 
countries were given the possibility to meet these obligations in a cost-effective 
way through three market-based mechanisms: Emissions Trading, Clean 
Development Mechanism and Joint Implementation.  
The establishment of such market-mechanisms implies that 
environmental problems in general, and climate change specifically, yield to 
“economic reasoning”.794 In other words, it assumes that such challenges should 
be faced by measures of market-oriented economic policies. Such measures 
shape individual behaviour, as well as structure market forces “to work for 
rather than against environmental protection”.795  
The CDM is considered, among these market mechanisms, the most 
important and successful one.796 Its official intention is twofold: “to assist 
Parties not included in Annex I in achieving sustainable development” and “to 
assist Parties included in Annex I in achieving compliance with their quantified 
emission limitation and reduction commitments”.797 As for the first objective, 
apart from channelling the financial flow from developed to developing 
countries,798 the CDM enables the awaited participation of developing countries 
in the collective effort to reduce global GHGs emissions.799 The second 
objective suggests that developed countries have a higher incentive to comply 
with their emission reductions because the overall cost to do so through a project 
based in a developing country is much lower than it would otherwise be in their 
own national boundaries.800 
                                                 
793 Kyoto Protocol, art. 3, paragraph 1.  
794 Expression used by Keohane and Olmstead, 2007, 2.  
795 Keohane and Olmstead, 2007, 2. 
796 “The CDM occupies a unique space in international carbon markets. It is by far the largest 
international offset mechanism and enjoys broad support from developed and developing 
countries alike. Operational since 2001, it has more than 4,400 registered projects in 76 
developing countries and has generated approximately one billion credits, which can be traded 
and used by developed countries to offset their emissions and to support meeting their mitigation 
targets.” (Report of the High-Level Panel on the CDM Policy Dialogue, 2012, 17) 
797 Kyoto Protocol, art. 12, paragraph 2. 
798 Barker et al., 2007, 91. 
799 Wara, 2008, 1764. Some like Prouty (2009), however, challenge this objective because, 
arguably, only the richests among developing countries (like Brazil, India and China) would be 
able to attract profitable projects. 
800 Wara, 2008, 1763. 
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Whether and to what extent the CDM has succeeded in achieving these 
goals, according to the opinion of analysts, will be described later. First, I depict 




As already contended, the operation of the CDM comprises state and 
non-state actors. In this sub-section, I identify these key actors and describe the 
task each one is assigned within the CDM. The actors are the COP/MOP, the 
EB, the DOEs, the Designated National Authority (DNA), the project 
participants, and local stakeholders.  
The ultimate source of authority and guidance to the CDM is the 
COP/MOP, the body that convenes the parties that have ratified the Kyoto 
Protocol.801 The COP/MOP triggers the dynamics of the protocol through the 
adoption of procedures, rules and guidelines, as well as through the creation of 
subsidiary bodies. The COP/MOP implemented the CDM through the Decision 
3/CMP.1, which is called the “Modalities and Procedures for a Clean 
Development Mechanism”.802 
The second vital body is the EB, which supervises the day-to-day 
activities of the mechanism.803 The EB is competent to decide the fate of every 
CDM project. Its decisions, therefore, have a direct impact on the investments 
made by project participants. It approves methodologies, registers CDM 
projects, and issues CERs. The EB also determines whether and which private 
companies can be accredited as DOEs. The nature of the powers of the EB has 
prompted some authors to compare it to domestic administrative agencies.804 
When referring to its own competence, the EB recognises its “rule-making and 
                                                 
801 Kyoto Protocol, art. 12 (4).   
802 Kyoto Protocol, art 12 (7) determines the implementation of the CDM: “The Conference of 
the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall, at its first session, 
elaborate modalities and procedures with the objective of ensuring transparency, efficiency and 
accountability through independent auditing and verification of project activities.” 
803 Kyoto Protocol, Article 12 (4).   
804 Stewart realised that a comparison between domestic agencies and the EB was feasible and 
illuminating. He contends that the EB engages in real rulemaking and adjudicative 
administrative decisions. (2005a, 91) Meijer also equates the  decisions of the EB to domestic 
administrative decisions and believes that the decisions of the COP/MOP may sometimes fall 
within this category. (2006-2007, 890) 
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rule-enforcing roles”, and further categorises the nature of its decisions as 
pertaining to the domain of regulation, rule-making, and of an administrative 
kind.805 
The EB is composed of ten members and ten alternate members.806 These 
members act in their personal capacity and are chosen for their technical and/or 
policy expertise in the range of subjects that are dealt with by the EB.807 They 
should not have “pecuniary or financial interest in any aspect of a CDM project 
activity or any designated operational entity”.808 Consensus is the standard 
working mode of the EB. However, as a last resort decisional rule, “a three-
fourths majority of the members present and voting at the meeting” are able to 
take a decision.809 
In order to accomplish its functions, the EB is allowed to establish 
committees, panels, and working groups.810 The EB has availed itself of such 
possibility by instituting a number of specialised bodies. Among these bodies, 
the Accreditation Panel (CDM-AP) is responsible to advise the EB about 
accreditation matters of DOEs.811 The CDM-AP, in turn, is supported by the 
work of ad-hoc assessment teams (CDM-AT).812 The Registration and Issuance 
Team (RIT) assists the EB in considering the requests for registration and 
issuance of CERs submitted by DOEs.813 The members of the RIT are not 
attached to any state party. They are experts chosen by the EB through a “public 
call for experts”. The composition of the team, in any event, should respect a 
                                                 
805 “CDM Executive Board Decision Framework: Decision Hierarchy, Document Types and 
Control of Documentation issued by the Board”, (Version 03.2), 61st meeting of the EB 61, 
Annex 25, paragraph 5 (a), (b), (c). 
806 This composition must be balanced in accordance with the following equation: “one member 
from each of the five United Nations regional groups, two other members from the Parties 
included in Annex I, two other members not included in Annex I, and one representative of the 
small island developing States”. See Decision 3/CMP.1, 7 and 9.  
807 Decision 3/CMP.1, paragraph 8 (c). 
808 Decision 3/CMP.1, paragraph 8 (f). 
809 Decision 3/CMP.1, paragraph 15. 
810 Decision 3/CMP.1, Annex, paragraph 18. Decision 4/CMP.1, Annex 1, Rule 32. 
811 3rd Meeting of the EB, Report, Annex 1, paragraph 4 (a), (b), (c), (d). See 67th Meeting of the 
EB, Report, Annex 3, “Terms of Reference of the Support Structure of the CDM Executive 
Board”, (Version 02.0), paragraph 5, (a), (b), and (c). 
812 9th Meeting of the EB, Report, Annex 1, paragraph 5.  
813 67th Meeting of the EB, Report, Annex 2, “Terms of Reference for the Registration and 
Issuance Team, paragraph 1. 
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regional balance.814 Finally, the Secretariat of the FCCC provides the 
institutional and technical support for the EB and its specialised bodies.815 
DOEs are the next crucial actors of the CDM. They are private legal 
entities, either domestic or international,816 which will be evaluated by the EB 
and ultimately by the COP/MOP in order to perform the monitoring functions 
within the CDM cycle. DOEs validate projects, verify and certify the promised 
emission reductions, and requests the EB to issue the equivalent amount of 
CERs.817 DOEs are hired by project participants818 and are “accountable to the 
COP/MOP through the Executive Board”.819  
The Designated National Authority (DNA) is the national body 
established by each state-party to the Kyoto Protocol,820 which must approve the 
participation in a CDM project. The DNAs from developing countries, in 
particular, have a specific task: they have to confirm whether the CDM project 
helps the country to achieve a sustainable development.821  
A project participant is defined as a party that “intends to participate, or a 
private and/or public entity authorized by the DNA of a Party involved to 
participate in a CDM project”.822 Private and public entities can only participate 
in a CDM project activity if a Party to the Kyoto Protocol, through their DNAs, 
ensures their compliance with CDM procedures.823 
Finally, local stakeholders are “the public, including individuals, groups 
or communities affected, or likely to be affected, by the proposed clean 
development mechanism project activity”.824 Local stakeholders have the 
opportunity to comment on the CDM project at the earliest stage of its 
conception. These comments should be taken into account, together with the 
                                                 
814 59th meeting of the Executive Board, Annex 13, paragraph 11. 
815 Kyoto Protocol, art. 14. See 67th Meeting of the EB, Report, Annex 3, “Terms of Reference of 
the Support Structure of the CDM Executive Board”, (Version 02.0), paragraphs 7 and 8.  
816 See Decision 3/CMP.1, Appendix A, “Standards for the accreditation of operational entities”, 
1 (a). 
817 See Decision 3/CMP.1, Appendix A, “Standards for the accreditation of operational entities”. 
818 Decision 3/CMP.1, Annex, paragraph 37 “the designated operational entity selected by 
project participants to validate a project activity, being under contractual arrangement with them 
(…)”. 
819 Decision 3/CMP.1, Annex, paragraph 26. 
820 Decision 3/CMP.1, Annex, paragraph 29.  
821 Decision 3/CMP.1, Annex, paragraph 40 (a).  
822 66th meeting of the EB, Annex 63, “Glossary of CDM terms”, (Version 06).  
823 Decision 3/CMP.1, Annex, paragraph 33. 
824 Decision 3/CMP.1, Annex, Definitions, paragraph 1 (e).  
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technical description of the project, before the project is duly registered by the 




 There are distinct yet interconnected processes within the CDM 
institutional architecture. I will describe them separately. First, one needs to 
observe how a private legal entity can be accredited a DOE status and keep such 
status over time. Second, once DOEs are officially constituted within the CDM 
system, one should be attentive to the CDM cycle itself, that is, how climate-
friendly projects in developing countries can be issued the correspondent CERs. 
Third, a set of surrounding procedures adds a further layer of complexity to the 
interaction between the EB, the DOEs and other actors.  
 
2.3.1 Becoming and remaining a DOE: accreditation and 
reaccreditation 
 
Any legal entity willing to be assigned a DOE formal status must 
undergo the cumbersome process of accreditation. In order to keep its status, 
moreover, a DOE is periodically subject to a reaccreditation process, and may 
occasionally face sanctions of withdrawal and suspension. All these processes 
are oriented by procedural, economic and technical standards, which are 
explained below.  
The CDM-AT has the task of verifying whether the applicant entity (the 
potential DOE) meets all the accreditation standards. Such standards relate to the 
general competence to perform the CDM monitoring activities,826 the existence 
of “sufficient arrangements to cover legal and financial liabilities arising from its 
activities”,827 and the absence of any pending judicial proceedings for 
                                                 
825 Decision 3/CMP.1, Appendix B, Project design document, 2 (g).  
826 Decision 3/CMP.1, Appendix A, “Standards for the accreditation of operational entities”, 1 
(b). 
827 Decision 3/CMP.1, Appendix A, “Standards for the accreditation of operational entities”, 1 
(d). This is a serious requirement. If a DOE is found to have caused issuance of CERs in excess, 
it might be compelled to “acquire and transfer (…) an amount of carbon dioxide equivalent equal 
to the excess CERs issued”. Decision 3/CMP.1, Annex, paragraph 22. 
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malpractice or fraud.828 The verification of whether the applicant entity meets 
those standards requires the CDM assessment team (CDM-AT) to conduct on-
site assessments and to witness the execution of activities.829 The CDM-AT 
reports its findings to the CDM accreditation panel (CDM-AP), which prepares 
the final recommendation of the applicant to the EB.830 
The scrutiny by the EB and the CDM-AP over the DOEs does not end 
with the act of accreditation. DOEs are also bound by a series of routine 
controls. Every three years, DOEs have to go through reaccreditation to ensure 
they still comply with the up-to-date accreditation requirements. Apart from that, 
a third specialised body, the RIT, is in charge of permanently checking whether 
the validation, verification and certification requirements “have been 
appropriately dealt with by the DOE”.831 Finally, at any time, DOEs can also be 
“spotted-checked” by the EB.832 
It is very important for a DOE to prove its impartial position when 
performing its tasks.833 In this sense, DOEs must demonstrate that they do not 
have real or potential conflict of interest in a CDM project.834 They have to 
submit annual reports of their activities to the EB835 and always make publicly 
available the information obtained from project participants.836 
DOEs have to abide by the “Validation and Verification Manual”, which 
contains a detailed guidance on how they should perform their validation and 
verification roles, how to deal with project participants, what method should be 
used to assess the documents it receives, and the principles that should direct 
their work – namely, transparency, independence, impartiality and consistency. 
The manual, in other words, aims at standardising the conduct of DOEs, at 
assuring the integrity and fairness of how they treat project participants. It 
                                                 
828 Decision 3/CMP.1, Appendix A, “Standards for the accreditation of operational entities”, 1 
(h). 
829 56th Meeting of the Executive Board, Annex 2, paragraph 4.  
830 56th Meeting of the Executive Board, Annex 2, paragraph 13 (f).  
831 59th meeting of the Executive Board, Annex 13, paragraph 3 (a) and (b).  
832 See Decision 3/CMP.1, Annex, paragraph 20 (d) and (e). The possibility of spotted-checks is 
confered upon the EB on a discretionary basis, to be exercised at any time. For an exemplary 
enumeration of hypotheses, see 56th Meeting of the Executive Board, Annex 2, paragraphs 117 
to 135. 
833 See an implementation of the principle on “CDM Accreditation Standards for Operational 
Entities (Version 03)”, 62nd Meeting of the Executive Board, Annex 1, paragraphs145 and 146. 
834 Decision 3/CMP.1, Annex, paragraph 27 (d). 
835 Decision 3/CMP.1, Annex, paragraph 27 (g). 
836 Decision 3/CMP.1, Annex, paragraph 27 (h).  
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indicates, at the same time, the benchmark through which their acts can be 
judged.837 
Project participants and stakeholders are entitled to bring complaints 
against DOEs. Both actors, thus, also integrate the web of constraints faced by 
DOEs. A committee, created within the Secretariat, will carry out the initial 
examination of such complaints. If the committee considers that a complaint is 
“substantiated”, the DOE has a right of response.838 Based on the information 
received from all parties involved, the Secretariat prepares an assessment report 
about the facts investigated.839 The CDM-AP has the last word on whether such 
complaint will succeed and lead to a sanction.840 
DOEs can be penalised with suspension or withdrawal of their 
designation as an operational entity.841 These hard consequences, however, 
cannot be implemented without DOEs being granted the right to be heard and, in 
case of decisions of suspension, without precise time limits to implement 
corrective or remedial actions.842  
Furthermore, applicant entities and DOEs have the opportunity to appeal 
against any adverse recommendation from the CDM-AP that affects or 
constitutes an obstacle against obtaining, maintaining, or extending their 
accreditation status.843 An ad hoc appeal panel is then formed within the EB to 
evaluate the arguments of the appeal and, if that is the case, to recommend a 





                                                 
837 55th meeting of the Executive Board, Annex 1, “Clean Development Mechanism Validation 
and Verification Manual” (Version 01.2). 
838 56th meeting of the Executive Board, Annex 2, Appendix 3, paragraph 8.  
839 56th meeting of the Executive Board, Annex 2, Appendix 3, paragraph 10.  
840 56th meeting of the Executive Board, Annex 2, Appendix 3, paragraph 15.  
841 Decision 3/CMP.1, Annex, paragraph 21. 
842 56th meeting of the Executive Board, Annex 2, paragraphs 154 and 155 (b). At its 53rd 
meeting, the EB suspended one DOE, and partially suspended other, following the 
recommendation of the CDM-AP. (53rd meeting of the EB, Report, 26 March 2010, paragraphs 8 
and 10)  
843 56th meeting of the Executive Board, Annex 2, Appendix 2, paragraph 2 (a) and (b).  
844 56th meeting of the Executive Board, Annex 2, Appendix 2, paragraph 9.  
845 56th meeting of the Executive Board, Annex 2, Appendix 2, paragraph 13.  
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2.3.2 CDM cycle: the path towards the issuance of CERs  
 
A CDM project, from its conception to the generation of CERs, goes 
through four specific phases: (i) validation, (ii) registration, (iii) verification and 
certification, and (iv) issuance of CERs.  
The outset of the CDM process is the Project Design Document (PDD), 
which is prepared by aspiring project participants. The PDD contains a detailed 
technical description of the future project.846 It must also incorporate the 
comments of stakeholders and show that “due account” was taken of them.847 
The PDD needs to be accompanied by the previous approval of a DNA from the 
country that hosts the climate-friendly project. In case there are project 
participants from Annex I countries, they would also need the approval from 
their respective DNAs.848 
The PDD is remitted to a DOE for validation. In this phase, the DOE 
attests whether the project has fulfilled all the requirements of the CDM. Among 
these requirements, the DOE has to attest whether the comments of stakeholders 
were duly contemplated by the project proponent, and whether the project 
activity is likely to truly reduce emissions that are additional to any that would 
occur in the absence of the proposed activity.849 A validation report is submitted 
to the EB, which has to ponder over whether the proposal can be registered as a 
“CDM project activity”.850 
Once the project is registered and fully operative, it is time for a DOE to 
verify and certify the actual emission reductions from the project. Such DOE 
should be different from the DOE that has validated the project in the first place, 
because of potential conflicts of interests that would affect its impartiality.851 At 
                                                 
846 See the content of the PDD in Decision 3/CMP.1, Appendix B, Project Design Document, 
paragraph 2. 
847 Decision 3/CMP.1, Appendix B, Project design document, 2 (g).  
848 Decision 3/CMP.1, Annex, paragraph 40 (a).  
849 Decision 3/CMP.1, Annex, paragraph 35 and 37 (a)-(g). The functions of a DOE are generally 
described in 3/CMP.1, Annex, paragraph 27. 
850 Decision 3/CMP.1, Annex, paragraph 36.  
851 This general rule should be followed unless otherwise stated by the EB. Decision 3/CMP.1, 
Annex, paragraph 27(e). Green contends that the separation between, on the one hand, validation 
and, on the other, verification and certification occurs to avoid potential conflict of interests 
between the two functions. However, according to her, such separation is not always possible 
because of the small number of DOEs to perform such activities in the sectoral scope they have 
been accredited. (2008, 35-36 and 49)       
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this stage, the DOE checks whether the latest documentation provided by project 
participants is compatible with the CDM project that was initially registered. In 
order to perform its assigned function at this point, the DOE might conduct on-
site inspections, review the data records and the monitoring methodology, and 
interview project participants and local stakeholders.852 The crucial task for a 
DOE is to determine with reliability whether the project has actually resulted in 
lower levels of GHGs emissions, that is, whether it has fulfilled the additionality 
targets.853 Following the verification and certification phase, a report must be 
forwarded to the EB. Such report amounts to a request for the issuance of CERs. 
The final phase is the actual issuance of CERs by the EB, which should be 
“equal to the verified amount of reductions of anthropogenic emissions by 
sources of greenhouse gases”.854 
The registration and issuance of CERs might be delayed if the party 
involved, or at least three members of the EB, request a review either of the 
proposed project or of the issuance of CERs. The scope of the former review is 
related to validation requirements, whereas the scope of the latter is “limited to 
issues of fraud, malfeasance or incompetence of designated operational 
entities”.855 
In both types of review, the status of project activities and of DOEs can 
be affected by a final decision on the matter. New procedures were enacted in 
2010 and 2011, respectively, with the intention to provide DOEs and project 
participants with adequate time to address the queries raised in the review and to 
include a better technical assessment of the matter.856 Two expert teams – one 
formed within the Secretariat and the other within the RIT – are instituted to 
work “concurrently and independently” in the assessment of the crucial points 
raised by the review. They need to take into account the answers of project 
                                                 
852 Decision 3/CMP.1, Annex, paragraph 62 (a)-(h). 
853 Decision 3/CMP.1, Annex, paragraph 62 (f). 
854 Decision 3/CMP.1, Annex, paragraph 64.  
855 Decision 3/CMP.1, Annex, paragraphs 41 and 65, respectively.  
856 Decision 2/CMP.5, paragraphs 38 and 39 revoked the previous procedures for review and 
asked for a revision of the procedures. These new procedures are described in: 55th meeting of 
the Executive Board, Annex 40, “Procedures for Review of Requests for Registration” Version 
(01.2) (30th July, 2010). 64th Meeting of the EB, Annex 4, “Procedures for Review of Requests 
for Issuance of CERs”, Version 2.0 (26th October, 2011).  
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participants and of DOEs, and have to give “reasons and rationale” for any 
decision or objection made throughout the process.857 
The decisions of the EB with respect to registration and issuance of 
CERs are final and do not allow any type of redress. In 2010, the COP/MOP 
requested the EB to design an appeal procedure against decisions of the EB 
involving “the rejection or alteration of requests for registration or issuance”.858 
The COP/MOP categorically demanded the EB to focus on due process when 
drafting such appeal device.859 In order to collect ideas from stakeholders about 
the makeup of this appeal mechanism, the EB set in motion a “call for inputs”, a 
new device to be explained below. The issue is not uncontroversial. One 
example of impasse relates to the scope of the appeal: whether the mechanism 
should only be triggered vis-à-vis negative decisions of the EB or whether it 
should also include positive decisions of the EB.860 As of the time of this 
writing, however, negotiations are still on hold about its final architecture. 
 
2.3.3 Ancillary procedures 
 
The COP/MOP established a set of rules to guide the EB. These rules 
highlight the importance of transparency, public participation and openness.861 
According to these rules, transparency is a principle that needs to inform every 
aspect of the EB work, and includes the public availability of documentation and 
open channels of communication between all interested actors.862 The meetings 
of the EB, in turn, should happen under the scrutiny of the public.863 The EB is 
only allowed to limit attendance as a consequence of weighing up the 
importance of other interests, such as “economy and efficiency”.864 In these 
limited circumstances, the EB should find, as defined by proper rules of 
                                                 
857 55th meeting of the Executive Board, Annex 40, “Procedures for Review of Requests for 
Registration” Version (01.2), paragraphs (12), (13), (16), (21), (27),  
64th Meeting of the EB, Annex 4, “Procedures for Review of Requests for Issuance of CERs”, 
Version 2.0, paragraphs (12), (13), (16), (21), (28).  
858 Decision 2/CMP.5, paragraph 42 (b). 
859 Decision 2/CMP.5, paragraph 43. 
860 Synthesis Report of the call for input on the CDM policy dialogue, paragraph 13. 
861 Decision 4/CMP.1, Annex 1, “Rules of Procedure of the Executive Board of the Clean 
Development Mechanism”, (March 30th, 2006), FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.1. 
862 Decision 4/CMP.1, Annex 1, Rule 26.  
863 Decision 4/CMP.1, Annex 1, Rule 27 (1). 
864 Decision 4/CMP.1, Annex 1, Rule 27 (2).  
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procedure, “other ways” to accommodate the interests of those willing to be 
observers or watchdogs.865 
In addition to these rules, the rhetoric of the EB reveals a constant 
concern with transparency issues and with a serious engagement with 
stakeholders. In the 2009 Annual Report to the COP/MOP, the EB recognised 
transparency as a “key priority”866 and detailed measures to address the 
perceived lack of reasoning of its decisions.867 The 2011 Annual Report 
acknowledges the importance of ameliorating its rules regarding the comments 
of stakeholders.868 
Beyond rhetoric, some concrete tools reveal how the EB faces its 
commitments to achieve transparency and a better engagement with 
stakeholders. In 2011, the EB launched the “Modalities and Procedures for 
Direct Communication with Stakeholders”.869 Such document is the result of a 
campaign, initiated by the COP/MOP, to enhance the communication with 
project participants and stakeholders.870 The goals of the document are fourfold: 
to enhance the regulatory functions of the EB; to obtain the latest information 
from stakeholders; to improve stakeholders’ understanding of the CDM rules; 
and to ensure transparency.871 Within this general code of procedures, three 
mechanisms are worth a further scrutiny. Two of them are related to the policy-
making function of the EB and the other to case-specific issues.  
The first is the procedure identified as “call for inputs”.872 This procedure 
aims at gathering public commentaries on any revised or new regulatory 
document that may be of importance for project participants, DOEs and 
                                                 
865 Decision 4/CMP.1, Annex 1, Rule 27 (2).  
866 2009 Annual Report of the Executive Board of the clean development mechanism to the 
Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, (November 
4th, 2009), Doc. n. FCCC/KP/CMP/2009/16, paragraph 23. 
867 2009 Annual Report of the Executive Board of the clean development mechanism to the 
Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, (November 
4th, 2009), Doc. n. FCCC/KP/CMP/2009/16, paragraph 115. 
868 2011 Annual report of the Executive Board of the clean development mechanism to the 
Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (November, 
17th, 2011), FCCC/KP/CMP/2011/3, paragraph 29. 
869 62nd Meeting of the Executive Board, Annex 15, July 15th 2011, “Modalities and Procedures 
for Direct Communication with Stakeholders” (Version 01).  
870 Decision 2/CMP.5, paragraph 8, (March 30th 2010), FCCC/KP/CMP/2009/21/Add.1, and 
Decision 3/CMP.6, paragraph 22, (March 15th 2011), FCCC/KP/CMP/2010/12/Add.2. 
871 62nd Meeting of the Executive Board, Annex 15, paragraph 7 (a), (b), (c), and (d). 
872 This is not a new mechanism to the CDM and it has been extensively used by the EB.  
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DNAs.873 The EB has the duty to take into consideration the inputs received and 
to publicise a summary of them.874 If appropriate, the EB should justify its 
decision when it deviates from the proposals of stakeholders.875  
The second mechanism is the “communication initiated by stakeholders”, 
which is an open channel to DOEs, DNAs and project participants to trigger a 
direct communication with the EB about policy-related issues. These actors can 
publicly express their views on CDM rules and request further clarification from 
the EB.876 The EB is required to respond to communications and to make the 
documents publicly available.877 
The third device is the “communication of case-specific issues”, which 
gives the CDM actors and the Secretariat, on behalf of the EB, a leeway to 
communicate with each other about the processing of specific-cases (like, for 
example, accreditation matters).878 DOEs and project participants are entitled to 
respond and to clarify, via this instrument, some issues raised by the 
Secretariat.879 Such device does not allow DOEs and project participants to 
challenge any concrete decision. It still keeps, however, a useful channel for 
mutual engagement and regulatory improvement.880 
Finally, the EB has also introduced the “policy dialogue”. The purpose of 
this “policy dialogue” is to assess the past experience of the CDM in order to 
make proposals for the future of the mechanism.881 The “policy dialogue” 
consists of a panel composed by twelve members from civil society, 
policymakers and the market.882 The members of the panel have to prepare a 
report to the EB and to the COP/MOP with suggestions and criticisms about the 
CDM. How to address new challenges and how to ensure effectiveness in the 
struggle against climate change are issues to be included in the report.883 The 
                                                 
873 62nd Meeting of the Executive Board, Annex 15, paragraph 27. 
874 62nd Meeting of the Executive Board, Annex 15, paragraphs 30 and 31. 
875 62nd Meeting of the Executive Board, Annex 15, paragraph 31. 
876 62nd Meeting of the Executive Board, Annex 15, paragraph 40 (a) and (b). 
877 62nd Meeting of the Executive Board, Annex 15, paragraphs 41 and 42. 
878 62nd Meeting of the Executive Board, Annex 15, paragraph 57. 
879 62nd Meeting of the Executive Board, Annex 15, paragraph 59 (c). 
880 62nd Meeting of the EB, Annex 15, paragraph 59 (d). 
881 63rd meeting of the EB, September 29th 2011, paragraph 8(d).  
882 64th meeting of the EB, Annex 1, Terms of Reference for the Policy Dialogue on the Clean 
Development Mechanism (Version 01.0), paragraph 6.  
883 64th meeting of the EB, Annex 1, Terms of Reference for the Policy Dialogue on the Clean 
Development Mechanism (Version 01.0), paragraph 6.  
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panel works independently from the political structure of the CDM,884 although 
it can use the existing infrastructure (like the Secretariat), or even create new 
working groups, in order to fulfil its objective.885 The only demand directed 
towards the work of the panel is that it should rely on inputs from a wide range 
of representatives, including “governmental, intergovernmental, business, 
environmental, research and other communities.”886 
 
3. Accountability structures 
 
It would be slightly misleading to ask whether and how the CDM, as 
such, is accountable. Unlike the IPCC and the CCKP, which, internal divisions 
aside, are themselves organic bodies that take decisions and are held to account 
as a whole, the CDM is not a single body properly so called. It is rather a 
financial technique that enrolls various actors who trigger emission reductions as 
defined by the Kyoto Protocol. Thus, if one is concerned about the 
accountability of the CDM, one actually needs to specify which are the precise 
actors that should be scrutinised through such critical lenses. 
The mapping of actors and the explanation of how they interact through 
various processes already enabled us to envision a multitude of accountability 
relationships. The intensity, formality and desirability of each connection may 
vary significantly. It is relevant to identify how this accountability chain is 
shaped. Every actor of this chain, in a more or less visible way, is 
simultaneously an account-holder and an accountee. This section intends to 
unpack the main vectors of this chain and reiterate the main processes earlier 
described through the language of accountability. In other words, it quickly re-
reads those interactions in the light of the coordinates that mould an 
accountability relationship. 
The narrative that follows will depict how accountable, in principle, the 
DOE and the EB are. These are the two entities that have sparked the main 
                                                 
884 64th meeting of the EB, Annex 1, Terms of Reference for the Policy Dialogue on the Clean 
Development Mechanism (Version 01.0), paragraph 3.  
885 64th meeting of the EB, Annex 1, Terms of Reference for the Policy Dialogue on the Clean 
Development Mechanism (Version 01.0), paragraph 4.  
886 64th meeting of the EB, Annex 1, Terms of Reference for the Policy Dialogue on the Clean 
Development Mechanism (Version 01.0), paragraph 7.  
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anxieties about putative accountability deficits in the respective literature about 
the CDM. How constrained are they to give an account of their acts and 
decisions? Where do these constraints come from? The coordinates of 
accountability help us to answer these questions. In the fourth section, I will then 
assess the appropriateness of some of these structures for the general function of 
the CDM. I remain, for the moment, at a strictly descriptive level. 
 
3.1 The Designated Operational Entities (DOEs) 
 
The architecture of the CDM assembles a multi-layered delegation belt, a 
vertical continuum of principal-agent relationships: from state-parties to the 
COP/MOP; from the COP/MOP to the EB; from the EB to the DOEs. DOEs are 
key decision-making actors within such edifice and there are several 
accountability relationships in which they are involved. Three are vital to my 
analysis: first, that with the EB and its internal specialised bodies (CDM-AP and 
RIT); second, the one with project participants and local stakeholders; third, 
with the market generally conceived. In all of them, without necessarily 
stretching the concept of accountability, one can perceive DOEs occupying the 
positions of both account-holder and accountee.  
DOEs are, first and foremost, accountable to the EB.887 As it happens 
with any principal-agent delegation bond, such relationship materialises along a 
vertical line. The relationship, in each and every aspect from accreditation 
onwards, is entirely constituted by formal rules that discipline such direct 
interaction, which takes place without the intermediation of a surrogate. Because 
there is a straightforward centre of command, this system instantiates a unitary 
rather than a pluralistic or multilateral mode of accountability, with an 
unambiguous division of labour and responsibilities. As for the institutionality, 
the EB holds DOEs to account “as one”, that is, as an autarchic entity 
irrespective of its individual members. For that same reason, such relationship 
also configures an “external” accountability, since DOEs are distinct legal 
entities. The terms of engagement between them, and, in truth, the very language 
through which DOEs communicate and are assessed is utterly shaped by 
                                                 
887 Decision 3/CMP.1, Annex, paragraph 26. 
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expertise: meeting the requisites of accreditation and exercising the acts of 
validation and verification demands from them the display of technical 
proficiency and the actual observance of strict methodologies and baselines for 
calculating additionality, a competency which the EB is supposed to control 
meticulously. This interaction is wholly informed by the detailed standards 
through which the EB can assess the performance of DOEs.888 Rather than based 
on judgment and trust, this is a clear compliance-based set of standards. 
The interaction between accountee and account-holder, in this case, is 
highly proceduralised. The ways in which DOEs are appointed, monitored, 
appraised and sanctioned by the EB follow explicitly codified steps which are, at 
least in the official rhetoric, qualified by principles of openness, transparency 
and participation. From the temporal perspective, this accountability friction 
happens both ex-ante and ex-post. The accreditation phase is a mechanism of 
preventive control, a type of “screening” through which the account-holder 
seeks to eliminate the incentives for the accountees, who are private and profit-
seeking agents, to evade their duties.889 At the same time, DOEs are expected to 
keep its accreditation status intact and are frequently subject to checks by the EB 
and its specialised bodies. Sanctions may also operate ex post when the EB 
reviews the DOEs’ acts of validation and verification. With regards to the 
weight of the consequences that might ensue from its performance, DOEs may 
face the hard sanctions of suspension or withdrawal of their designation as an 
operational entity. 
Project participants and stakeholders also contribute in holding DOEs to 
account. However ancillary that may be, this creates a more compounded 
accountability regime than one grasps when looking exclusively towards the 
interaction between DOEs and the EB. Although project participants and 
stakeholders do not have the same power to constrain, they contribute to monitor 
DOEs’ behaviour. DOEs are bound to project participants by means of a 
contract on the basis of which they will perform validation, verification and 
certification tasks. Project participants, as well as the members of the EB, have 
the right to request a review of the proposed project and of the issuance of 
                                                 
888 These standards are defined in the “Validation and Verification Manual”. 
889 Green, 2008, 39. 
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CERs. Apart from prompting review procedures, they can also file complaints at 
the EB against the acts of the DOEs. 
The position of DOEs as accountees of both the EB and, in a way, of 
project participants triggers indubitable complexity. The public role of the EB 
and the private interests of project participants, although not always 
irreconcilable, may frequently differ. The EB has the duty to ensure that projects 
result in lower levels of GHGs emissions. The aim of project participants, on the 
other hand, is ultimately to profit through the issuance of CERs.890 Their 
monitoring of DOEs is unlikely to be public-spirited.891 As for local 
stakeholders, in turn, the incentives tend to be more apposite for a more diligent 
oversight of DOEs. International NGOs accredited by the FCCC may also 
supplement or even act on behalf of local stakeholders in that activity, 
establishing, in this latter case, a relation of surrogacy. 
Lastly, DOEs are also accountable to the specific market founded by the 
CDM. As in every market, companies compete with their counterparts for 
consumers of their products or services. Under this perspective, each DOE has to 
offer an attractive economic package to potential project participants, and its 
competitors – the other accredited DOEs – have a role in setting such standards. 
Project participants are free to hire a DOE, and the elements that are taken into 
account in such choice are also constitutive of an accountability relationship. 
The plausibility of this accountability dimension, for sure, will hinge upon how 
competitive that market is. The lesser the number of accredited DOEs from 
which project participants can choose, the weaker that constraint would be. 
Monopolistic structures would undoubtedly ruin the plausibility of this 
accountability dimension. 
In a nutshell, to use Keohane’s typology, DOEs are mainly entangled in 
supervisory, market and public reputational accountability forms.892 One can 
perhaps rehearse an answer to that descriptive blueprint advanced in chapter 1. 
Who accounts to whom? In the case of DOEs, they primarily account to the EB, 
but this relationship is also deeply informed by how DOEs deal with project 
                                                 
890 Synthesis Report of the Call for Input on the CDM Policy Dialogue, paragraph 18. 
891 Indeed, Green does confirm that so far there has been no case of this “fire-alarm monitoring”. 
(2008, 50) 
892 Keohane (2002). 
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participants and local stakeholders and, potentially, with other DOEs 
themselves. For what and how? DOEs account for their procedures and 
decisions on validation and verification. When? At any moment of the CDM 
cycle. On the basis of which standards? On the basis of its obedience to the 
technical methodologies and procedural requirements. Under pain of what 
consequences? DOEs might be suspended or even have their accreditation 
revoked by the EB. They might also, in some cases, simply fail to attract clients 
to whom they can sell their services. This is what the institutional design of the 
CDM tells us about how accountable DOEs are expected to be. Looking 
upstream, DOEs see the presence of the EB, who has the typical powers of a 
principal. Looking downstream, DOEs are constrained by stakeholders and 
project participants. Alongside them, they see other DOEs disputing clients. This 
connection, however weaker, is not just peripheral.  
 
3.2 The Executive Board (EB) 
 
The place of the EB as an account-holder has been fairly depicted above 
by way of inquiring how accountable DOEs are supposed to be in accordance 
with the CDM framework. The EB holds DOEs to account when it accredits, 
monitors or suspends them, when it decides about the register of a CDM project 
or about the issuance of the exact number of CERs. The extent to which the EB 
itself can be held to account, on the other hand, is a crucial complementary step 
for an overall assessment of the CDM. Again, three angles are indispensable to 
this analysis: the first regards the relationship of the EB with the COP/MOP, its 
predominant account-holder; the second refers to the relationship of the EB with 
the other actors that have a bearing on the CDM: DOEs, project participants and 
stakeholders; thirdly, market accountability also lurks behind this overall 
structure, although, in the specific case of the EB, in a slightly different way 
from the market accountability faced by DOEs. 
The CDM, as already described, comprises a set of actors that are mainly 
governed by the EB. Ultimately, however, the whole system, and the EB itself, 
is directed by the COP/MOP. The authority the COP/MOP exercises over the 
EB is being developed through an incremental process. Even without a 
consolidated comprehensive code, this relationship has been disciplined through 
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a sequence of decisions and procedural routines that already provide useful 
guidance. The controlling normative source that disciplines this relationship 
states that the EB is bound to act “under the authority and guidance of the 
COP/MOP, and be fully accountable to the COP/MOP”.893  
The purported “authority and guidance” of the COP/MOP, as 
inconclusive as it might sound in and of itself, is translated into practice by the 
recurrent interaction between the two actors. A good example is the way the 
rules of procedure of the EB were firstly applied in their draft status until they 
could be officially adopted by the COP/MOP under recommendation of the 
EB.894 Moreover, open questions of interpretation have been remitted to the 
COP/MOP for clarification.895  
If we look through the lenses of the descriptive coordinates, this constant 
provision of account by the EB to the COP/MOP896 reveals that this principal-
agent accountability relationship is clearly formal and vertical. It is also direct, 
unitary, predominantly centripetal897 and external. With regards to the substance 
of this interaction, unlike the compliance-based accountability to which DOEs 
are subject, the terms of engagement between the EB and the COP/MOP are 
integrity-based. This means that, despite the extensive duty of reporting and 
recommending decisions to the COP/MOP, the EB has a large measure of 
discretion when it comes to the substance of its decisions. The EB decision-
making routine, in addition, has to obey a set of typical administrative 
procedural principles like participation and transparency, apart from the 
increasing burden of reason-giving for its choices. Lastly, although there is no 
explicit provision about sanctions that the COP/MOP may apply to the EB at 
                                                 
893 See 3/CMP.1, Annex, paragraph 5. 
894 The final adoption took place at COP 8 (21/CP.8, paragraph 1, a), and was further amended at 
COP 9 (18/CP.9, paragraph 1, d) and COP 10 (12/CP.10, paragraph 7). 
895 “The Board agreed that in the event of a question of interpretation arising on decision 17/CP.7 
and the CDM modalities and procedures, which the Board is unable to resolve, it would refer the 
question(s) to the COP or COP/MOP, as appropriate, for further clarification”. (EB 5, Annex 4, 
paragraph 14). 
896 The enumeration of the functions of the EB, provided by the 3/CMP.1 Annex, paragraph 5, 
give an idea of its permanent burden of account-giving through recommendations and reports 
addressed to the COP/MOP. 
897 It is predominantly but not exclusively centripetal because the EB may arguably be 
accountable not just “as one”. Since the COP/MOP holds the power to appoint the members of 
the EB, a form of individual constraint may also take place in particular moments. On the 
balanced composition of the EB, see 3/CMP.1, Annex, paragraph 7. On the way the members of 
the EB are appointed, see 3/CMP.1, Annex, paragraph 8(a). 
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discrete points in time, their process of interaction is established in such a way 
that important choices by the latter can hardly be upheld without either the ex 
ante or ex post ratification of the former. An occasional non-ratification of EB’s 
suggested measures can be envisioned as a functional equivalent of sanction. 
Second, one should not ignore how the EB might be held accountable to 
the very same actors that are bound by and bear the impact of the EB’s 
decisions. However counter-intuitive the capacity of actors positioned at the 
lower end of a vertical authority relationship to hold superiors to account, in 
cases of complex structures with multiple actors, that might well happen. The 
duty of the EB to follow settled procedures, to commit with a credible 
understanding of the principle of transparency and, most of all, to give public 
reasons that ground its decisions create plausible constraints on decision-making 
and open avenues for bottom up engagement and participation. In this sense, 
other actors, apart from the COP/MOP, have ways to monitor, and to some 
degree embarrass and control, the operations of the EB. This weaker yet non-
trivial accountability friction is also supposed to be stimulated by the 
independent members of the recently instituted policy dialogue panel. 
Third, the EB is peculiarly accountable to the market. This is not because 
it needs to compete, like the DOEs, with counterparts in the search for clients. 
Rather, it is responsible to convince, in partnership with DOEs, that the whole 
system of the CDM works in an impartial, non-politicised and independent way. 
It also has to assure beyond reasonable doubt that CERs are well-founded 
financial titles, generated according to rigorously constructed and strictly applied 
methodologies. By withdrawing the confidence and credibility of the CDM, the 
market may turn marginal or even insignificant this elaborate institutional 
construction. 
To summarise, who accounts to whom? In the case of the EB, it 
primarily accounts to the COP/MOP, but this relationship is also shaped, 
however lightly, by how the EB deals with project participants and local 
stakeholders. Moreover, it has the non-negligible task of developing and 
protecting, against the market players, the credibility of the whole CDM 
rationale. For what and how? For its whole set of regulatory tasks. When? At 
any moment of the CDM cycle. On the basis of which standards? On the basis of 
the quality of its decision-making procedures and of the soundness of the 
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methodologies it is supposed to develop. Under pain of what consequences? The 
EB is closely supervised by the COP/MOP, who can review and rectify its 
decisions. Other actors, moreover, have formal and informal ways to probe the 
consistency of the EB behaviour and to expose the whole CDM to a crisis of 
credibility. 
 
4. Test of appropriateness: which accountability for what institutional 
purpose? 
 
The design of the CDM has not been bereft of criticisms. This section 
reports where exactly these criticisms have targeted and evaluates whether and 
how the accountability mechanisms that shape the decision-making processes of 
the EB and DOEs can respond to these challenges. Identifying procedural 
drawbacks in the system is a necessary step in order to enhance not only its 
credibility but also the other functions that accountability, in this particular case 
of the CDM, is supposed to perform. 
 
4.1 Current criticisms 
 
Criticisms have explored different fronts of the CDM institutional 
landscape, from the consistency of CERs to deficiencies concerning its 
governance structure. The early ones aimed at the environmental soundness of 
the emissions’ reductions stemmed from project activities. It is only possible to 
know whether a project has achieved lower levels of emissions if one compares 
it with a baseline scenario. The baseline scenario indicates the estimation of 
GHGs emissions “that would occur in the absence of the proposed project 
activity”.898 However, because the baseline scenario is a speculative state-of-
affairs, the determination of the actual reduction is a highly controversial 
matter.899 It is not difficult to imagine project participants stretching their 
                                                 
898 Decision 3/CMP.1, Annex, paragraph 44.    
899 Schneider, 2007, 7.  
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baseline in order to take the greatest possible financial advantage out of such 
distortion.900 
A second type of attack questions whether the CDM projects have had 
the ability to effectively promote sustainable development in host countries. In 
an important article, Karen Olsen concludes that the goal of achieving 
sustainable development is constantly trumped by the monetised goal of the 
mechanism, i.e., being cost-effective. In concrete terms, and considering that 
market forces and incentives also shape each CDM project, such a project will 
be chosen for its capacity to generate cheap emission reductions and not for its 
sustainable development benefits.901 
Finally, some authors criticise certain deficient aspects of the CDM 
decision-making process. They claim that the credibility of the CDM depends on 
strengthening the administrative law-type rules of the mechanism, such as 
transparency and review mechanisms, which would still be underdeveloped.902 
The independent evaluation promoted by the members of the policy dialogue 
also devoted a great deal of energy to analyse and criticise the current 
governance arrangements of the CDM. At the end, its final report recommended 
several changes so that the CDM could “become a more accountable and 
efficient organization” on the whole.903 
There are two relevant points of dispute as regards to governance 
matters: the first relates to how transparent the EB is. A common criticism is that 
the meetings of the EB that decide on specific cases are closed to observers.904 
The second relates to the type of interaction the EB holds with stakeholders. 
This point can be distinguished into two interrelated criticisms. Many claim that 
                                                 
900 Wara exemplifies this situation with the HFC-23 capture projects. The HFC-23 is a by-
product of the gas used as refrigerant (HFC-22) and it is considered a very potent and persistent 
GHG. Developed countries tend to minimise the production of the HCF-23 because it is 
considered an expensive waste product. Developing countries, on the other hand, with the CDM 
subsidy, had incentives to increase the production of HFC-23 in order to gain more CERs. 
(Wara, 2008, 1781-1787)  
From 2013, CERs aquired from HFC-23 capture projects are banned from the European Union’s 
Emissions Trading System. (State and Trends of the Carbon Market 2011, Carbon Finance at the 
World Bank, 10) 
901 Olsen, 2007, 67-71. 
902 Streck and Lin (2008); von Unger and Streck (2009); Meijer (2006-2007). 
903 Report of the High-Level Panel on the CDM Policy Dialogue, Climate Change Carbon 
Markets and the CDM: A Call to Action, 20012, 3. Apart from a broad governance reform, the 
policy dialogue recommended that substantial changes should be performed in the CDM design 
and role.   
904 “Synthesis Report of the call for input on the CDM policy dialogue”, paragraph 11.  
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comments of local stakeholders have been disregarded or not taken seriously 
enough.905 In addition, the decisions of the EB are final and cannot be 
appealed.906 Below, I give extra details of these allegations. 
The fact that “half of each EB meeting takes place behind closed 
doors”907 would, on its face, infringe CDM’s own rules on transparency and 
openness. In addition, stakeholders believe that it represents a lack of 
willingness from the EB to effectively engage with them.908 It seems that the 
members of the EB keep the meetings closed to public scrutiny because they 
fear being prosecuted in national courts.909 
Further criticism has been driven against the device that allows local 
stakeholders to comment on projects, and the respective obligation of project 
participants to take due account of them. Some argue that because project 
participants control this process, they would have incentives to conceal negative 
opinions and DOEs would be unable to spot such bias. Apart from the 
inadequate structure of incentives, the fact that the documents dealing with the 
CDM projects are always in English is also a source of serious concern for they 
hamper an effective engagement with local stakeholders in places with low 
percentages of literacy and proficiency in a foreign language.910 
The prohibition of redress against the decisions of the EB has attracted 
considerable academic debate as to the character of the relationship that should 
exist between the EB and project participants,911 as well as a wave of 
                                                 
905 “Synthesis Report of the call for input on the CDM policy dialogue”, paragraph 55. 
906 “Synthesis Report of the call for input on the CDM policy dialogue”, paragraph 13. 
907 Streck and Lin, 2008, 425. 
908 “Synthesis Report of the call for input on the CDM policy dialogue”, paragraph 12.  
909 See Synthesis Report of the call for input on the CDM policy dialogue”, paragraph 11. 
Actually, the members of the EB are granted “privileges and immunities” whenever they act in 
their official capacity in meetings convened in Germany as a consequence of the Headquarters 
Agreement of the secretariat. If the members of the EB convene in other countries, the host 
country of these meetings should sign a special agreement containing provisions concerning 
“privileges and immunities”. See “Privileges and Immunities for individuals serving on 
constituted bodies under the Kyoto Protocol Implementation of Decision 9/CMP.2”, 29 
September 2008, FCCC/KP/CMP/2008/10, paragraph 5 (a) and (b). However, as Werksman 
reminds, these agreements would not protect a member of the EB from being sued in other 
national courts for her role in a decision of the EB. (Werksman, 2007-2008, 682) 
910 See the “Synthesis Report of the call for input on the CDM policy dialogue”, paragraph 55. 
911 Meijer, for example, invokes the “fundamental right” of access to justice to criticise the fact 
that the decisions of the EB affecting the rights of private entities remain unchallengeable under 
the CDM. (2006-2007, 875) Werksman, on the other hand, does not characterise the relationship 
between the EB and private entities as being grounded on the duties of the former and the rights 
retained by the latter. To Werksman, in a similar fashion as other domestic offsets schemes, the 
EB has discretion to “review, withhold and/or invalidate Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs) 
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disapproval from project participants. The EB received, between 2006 and 2007, 
twelve letters from private and public legal entities complaining of their 
financial losses because of the decisions of the EB to reject requests for 
registration and to issue only a lower portion of the requested CERs. The 
complainers argued that such decisions lacked consistency, ignored due process 
and transparency.912 In 2008, the EB received five more letters from project 
participants with the same type of concerns. One of the letters suggested that the 
EB should create a pertinent mechanism of dispute resolution, otherwise that 
private entity would “initiate judicial proceedings to protect its rights”.913 
 
4.2. Probing the accountability of the Executive Board (EB) 
 
The CDM is a credit-generative system. If a green project is successful in 
prompting additionality and hence reducing emissions, it is entitled to be 
awarded with CERs. CERs are a new type of currency to be traded in an open 
market. 
The concept of “additionality” is key to the logic of the emission 
reductions scheme embedded in the CDM. Upon the precise gauging of 
additionality hinges the credibility of the CDM as a market mechanism charged 
with facilitating emission reductions. The methodology for measuring 
additionality is the central technical challenge of the EB. 
The credibility of the EB, however, does not only depend on being 
technically effective, but also rests on gathering a positive reputation among its 
stakeholders, which includes the DOEs, project participants, local stakeholders, 
and DNAs. That is the message of the independent evaluation promoted by the 
policy dialogue panel. According to its final report, the CDM, as a sensitive 
“policy instrument”, would only achieve its purpose if the general public 
                                                 
prior to and subsequent to their issuance”. (2007-2008, 690) Therefore, instead of property 
rights, private entities have “legitimate expectations”, and a certain amount of procedural 
safeguards with regard to CER matters. (Werksman, 2007-2008, 690) 
912 “Privileges and immunities for individuals serving on constituted bodies under the Kyoto 
Protocol: implementation of decision 9/CMP.2”, 13 November 2007, FCCC/KP/CMP/2007/2, 
page 5.        
913 “Privileges and Immunities for individuals serving on constituted bodies under the Kyoto 
Protocol Implementation of Decision 9/CMP.2, 29 September 2008, FCCC/KP/CMP/2008/10, 
paragraph 9 and 8. 
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supported its operation and rules.914 In other words, the report stresses that any 
global institution, and particularly the CDM, because of its special features, 
should be more attentive to what chapter 1 called the “populist aspect of 
accountability” – the ability to sustain public confidence and hence better 
compliance rates. 
The fact that the EB is grossly perceived as an opaque decision-maker 
only hinders the possibility of securing such populist function of accountability. 
In all fairness, however, the EB has been attempting, over the years, to 
enhance its techniques of interaction with stakeholders. The “call for inputs”, the 
“communication initiated by stakeholders”, and the “communication of case-
specific issues” are tools meant to such end, regardless of how inconsistently 
implemented they still are.915 
These tools, if properly put into practice, could arguably also improve 
the two other functions of accountability: the democratic and the epistemic. The 
democratic function is fulfilled whenever these mechanisms, primarily but not 
exclusively the “call for inputs”, give the affected or otherwise interested 
members of the CDM community, an opportunity to influence the decision-
making process. With the public record of the commentaries in the FCCC 
website, the EB is pushed to take them on board and, consequently, to give 
reasons for each decision it takes.916 As explained in chapter 1, the practice of 
public reason-giving operates in two different ways for stakeholders and the EB. 
While, for the former, reason-giving is a clear opportunity to air disagreements, 
to share their views, and to request further reasons, for the second it is an 
obligation to respond and to justify its actions. 
As for the epistemic function, the above mechanisms have the capacity to 
empower the EB to take better decisions through the provision of valuable 
information by the stakeholders. The EB has already recognised that certain 
interactions with stakeholders can be epistemically significant. The 2009 Annual 
                                                 
914 Report of the High-Level Panel on the CDM Policy Dialogue, Climate Change Carbon 
Markets and the CDM: A Call to Action, 20012, 56. 
915 As noted by the policy dialogue’s final report (Report of the High-Level Panel on the CDM 
Policy Dialogue, Climate Change Carbon Markets and the CDM: A Call to Action, 20012, 56)  
916 A criticism that could be raised is that such type of constraint on the EB decision-making 
power is of a different kind or even less stringent than the one seen in domestic administrative 
agencies, since there is not the judiciary to check on whether and how seriously the 
commentaries and data were taken into consideration.  
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Report gives a few examples of such functional expectation. According to this 
report, the comments of stakeholders can improve the “efficiency and 
effectiveness” of the EB regarding matters that range from methodologies to 
operational entities.917 Yet the EB cannot be truly effective in the performance 
of its roles unless it manages to put the procedural improvement of an appeal 
device through. 
The creation of such appeal is believed to strengthen the quality of 
decisions. A second look at the case could correct flawed reasoning, permit a 
different understanding of the appellant’s claims, or even incorporate better 
justifications for the same decision. Meijer says that the mere awareness that 
decisions are to be revised is an incentive for the original decision-making body 
(in this case, the EB) to think more carefully about its decisions and to justify 
them accordingly.918 Esty maintains the same position. Because judicial checks 
in the international realm is largely lacking, any review mechanism, which Esty 
calls “power-sharing”,919 would be essential to detect “analytical errors, and 
special interest manipulation of the policy process”.920 
The final report of the policy dialogue drew attention to the 
accountability-enhancing character of the appeal process: 
“Most importantly, this would promote accountability, owed both to entities 
affected by such rulings and also to the source of delegated power (i.e. the CMP). 
Other reasons include the need for greater transparency of decision-making, 
consistency, and predictability, all of which will enhance the legitimacy of the 
CDM as a whole”.921 
 
                                                 
917 Two examples, in particular, reverberate this function: “Paragraph 27: The efficiency and 
effectiveness of the CDM is facilitated by constructive input from stakeholders. For example, six 
public calls prompted valuable input from stakeholders, while the submission of comments 
assisted the Board in its consideration of proposed new methodologies and application of 
operational entities.” Paragraph 46: “Taking into account the responses to a call for public input 
on the reasons for some methodologies rarely or never being applied, the Board decided to 
increase its interaction with project developers when considering methodology submissions, to 
help ensure usability.” See the 2009 Annual Report of the Executive Board of the clean 
development mechanism to the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to 
the Kyoto Protocol, (November 4th, 2009), Doc. n. FCCC/KP/CMP/2009/16. 
918 Meijer, 2006-2007, 918.  
919 Esty, 2005-2006, 1534. 
920 Esty, 2005-2006, 1536. 
921 Report of the High-Level Panel on the CDM Policy Dialogue, Climate Change Carbon 
Markets and the CDM: A Call to Action, 20012, 59. 
 234 
In addition to the appeal process, the final report of the policy dialogue 
recommended the creation of a “grievance” mechanism, which should be used 
by any local stakeholder affected by CDM projects.922 The reason for 
implementing the grievance mechanism is twofold: it could reputedly solve early 
problems of CDM projects and also have a deterrent effect on the use of the 
appeal process.     
The EB occupies a central and strategic position in the operation of the 
CDM. In the end, the EB will not only be assessed for its technical capacity to 
deal with methodologies and baselines but also for the means through which it 
handles its decision-making process and interacts with stakeholders. Calls for 
more transparency, consistency, and accessibility will still be heard if the EB 
does not manage to implement these goals. These calls clearly reverberate the 
whole set of GAL principles. 
 
4.3 Probing the accountability of the Designated Operational Entities (DOEs) 
 
Jessica Green was the first author to test the effectiveness of the control 
exercised by the EB over DOEs. She analysed 752 projects submitted to 
registration between 2004 and 2007, and examined how often and why the EB 
has questioned DOEs’ recommendations.923 In overall, Green’s conclusion is 
ambivalent. On the one hand, the author recognises that there are accountability 
mechanisms that seem to be working in practice. On the other, however, she 
acknowledges some factors that may hinder an effective control over DOEs. 
On the positive side, the oversight function of the EB was well praised. 
The EB triggered reviews and eventually rejected projects that raised doubts 
with regard to their additionality. This fact indicates that the EB has been using 
its oversight powers, and, in this exercise, tends to be more concerned with 
substantial problems than with minor or distractive procedural issues.924 
                                                 
922 Report of the High-Level Panel on the CDM Policy Dialogue, Climate Change Carbon 
Markets and the CDM: A Call to Action, 20012, 59. 
923 Green, 2008, 44. 
924 Green, 2008, 45 and 47.  
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On the negative side, she worries that the small number of accredited 
DOEs increases the chances of monopoly within the sector.925 Her study shows 
that only three DOEs are responsible to validate 84,7% of the projects, and that 
these companies also control 84% of the verification market. As a result, these 
three DOEs have ended up validating or verifying each others’ projects.926 In 
addition, she believes that the large number of incoming projects may challenge 
the capacity of the EB to maintain an in-depth examination of each project.927 
At the time of her writing, however, there were still a small number of 
accredited DOEs (only 18 in comparison to 58 at the moment).928 This fact does 
not necessarily mean that concerns with respect to monopolistic behaviour are 
solved. It might be a sign that the number of accredited DOEs had to keep up 
with the increasing number of new CDM projects. One cannot deny, however, 
that there is an instrumental value in the plurality of DOEs. It increases market 
competition and, as Green recognises, avoids “incentives for reciprocity” among 
them.929 
The empirical questions of whether the EB is materially equipped to be 
an effective account-holder, or of whether the DOEs are in sufficient number 
and adequately placed in order to eliminate any conflict of interest, are outside 
my scope. It would obviously be a revealing research endeavour to empirically 
assess the working order of these accountability structures. 
In any case, there is an understanding that the highly technical work 
assigned to DOEs can only be effectively assessed if stronger standards are 
available.930 The recently enacted “Validation and Verification Manual”, in 
2010, which aims at standardising the conduct of DOEs and also indicates the 
benchmark through which their acts can be judged is a step closer to this end.  
Apart from the standards against which DOEs’ output are assessed, we 
have seen that the ways in which DOEs are appointed, monitored, appraised and 
                                                 
925 “A small number of firms lower competition among them, and the importance of maintaining 
reputation to ensure business.” (Green, 2008, 50)  
926 Green, 2008, 47 and 49.  
927 Green, 2008, 50.  
928 Green, 2008, 34 and 52. The current list of DOEs is available online.  
929 Green, 2008, 36.  
930 Report of the High-Level Panel on the CDM Policy Dialogue, Climate Change Carbon 
Markets and the CDM: A Call to Action, 20012, 63. The request for developing tougher 
standards for DOEs’ performance was done in accordance with a study prepared in 2009, 
therefore, before the “Manual” was enacted in 2010.  
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sanctioned are disciplined by a consolidated set of procedures. That is how it 
should be if one wants to select entities more capable to perform the functions of 
validation of complex projects, verification and certification of the promised 




From the beginning, the CDM was a vow of many expectations. The 
hope was to attract and steer finance towards the challenges prompted by climate 
change, to engage developing countries into a low-carbon path of development, 
and finally, to allow developed countries to achieve their emission targets in a 
cheaper way. Many promises turned out to be reality. Particularly, this market 
has been praised for having included developing countries, together with 
developed countries, in the fight against climate change.931 However distinct the 
role and responsibilities between developed and developing countries remain, 
the latter actors have turned into more than mere recipients of foreign aid. 
The CDM has already displayed impressive numbers, in spite of the fact 
that interests in such global carbon market have considerably receded due to the 
low ambition of states’ mitigation pledges.932 The first CDM project was 
registered in 2004. As of May 2012, the EB registered 4.000 projects, from 74 
countries, and issued 900 million CERs to 1.500 projects.933 According to a 
2010 World Bank Report about Development and Climate Change, the 
international carbon market, instituted by the CDM, has mobilised around $95 
billion in clean energy investment from 2002 to 2008.934 
                                                 
931 Wara, 2008, 1763-1764. 
932 Because of this fact the first measure recommended by the policy dialogue is to strengthen the 
ambition of states’ pledges so to restore demands in carbon transactions. See Report of the High-
Level Panel on the CDM Policy Dialogue, Climate Change Carbon Markets and the CDM: A 
Call to Action, 20012, 3.   
933 “CDM reaches milestone: 4000th registered project”, Bonn, April 2012. 
934 “World Development Report 2010: Development and Climate Change”, Chapter 6, 
“Generating the Funding Needed for Mitigation and Adaptation”, 262. This same Report, 
however, states that such figure might still be considered insufficient if it is compared with the 
numbers that are estimated to start tackling climate related problems in developing countries. 
The figures range from $140 to $175 billion/year by 2030 for mitigation purposes and $30 to 
$100 billion/year for adaptation. Id., 259. A more recent Report explains that the carbon marked 
growth has been suffering from the lack of clarity in the climate change negotiations. State and 
Trends of the Carbon Market 2011, Carbon Finance at the World Bank, (Washington, DC, June 
2011), 9.   
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If one wants to know how accountable DOEs and the EB have actually 
been, only an extensive empirical inquiry would be able to respond. There are, 
nevertheless, growing claims of unaccountable behaviour on the specific part of 
the EB. As the main governing body of the CDM, the EB has authority to affect 
projects and, hence, those who participate in such global carbon market. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that the EB is exposed to a closer scrutiny as to how it 
exercises its powers. When looking through these lenses, we can see the EB as 
an opaque decision-maker, which, oftentimes, may overlook stakeholders’ 
interests. 
A different sort of question is how accountable the EB should be. GAL’s 
principles shed lights on a possible answer to such query. The incremental 
reforms vis-à-vis the criticisms, which includes the policy dialogues’ final 
report, are already directed towards enhancing the administrative law-type 
mechanisms of the system. Although the EB has become more accountable 
throughout time, a stronger accountability package is still in need to respond to 
ongoing challenges, one that is able to instil more transparency, a consistent 
implementation of the tools that promote stakeholders’ participation in different 
processes, and, finally, the creation of an appeal procedure against the EB’s 
decisions. 
The success of this global carbon market is dependent on the ability of 
the CDM to adapt itself and quickly respond to the supposedly flaws of the 
system. In the case of the CDM, this means to reinforce the democratic, 







International law has been a laboratory of intense institutional experimentation 
in the last few decades. The almost exclusive grounding upon which it used to be 
justified – a consent-based principal-agent delegation from nation states – has failed 
to fully meet the coordination demands that chief global concerns call for.935 Yet, no 
matter how much sovereignty has been attenuated and how much the power of 
transnational decision-making sites has concomitantly been thickened, a sense of 
fragility and impotence lingers on. To a large extent, coordination is still hampered by 
sovereignty.936 
Innovative arrangements, at the same time, have also sparked a sense of 
legitimacy crisis.937 The greater the decision-making autonomy of transnational 
bodies have turned out to be, the more pressing the demands for a renovated 
legitimacy discourse have become. A hands-on response to this sense of crisis has 
recently been pushing for greater accountability of those transnational institutions that 
give rise to such anxiety. 
This is where the thesis departs from. Such point of departure, in itself, is not 
an original one. In the field of international law scholarship, the last twenty years or 
so have witnessed the publication of a plethora of studies, from the more theoretical to 
the rather empirically-driven, addressing similar concerns in a wide range of subject-
areas that pervade global governance. The concept of accountability, thus, is the 
cornerstone of a respectable portion of current discussion on the prospects of 
legitimate and effective global governance. It would be instrumental, in other words, 
for a more robust justification of transnational authority. 
                                                 
935 Boyle, 1993, 95. 
936 Henkin describes this situation: “We have had some cooperation, but it has been limited in the name 
of sovereignty. We pursue a quest for world order, but a limited world order. We created a United 
Nations, but it is a limited United Nations. We have a World Bank and an International Monetary Fund 
and other specialized agencies, and they are all limited, not only in achievement but even in aspiration, 
by a persistent addiction to this notion of sovereignty”. (1999, 3) 
937 This is a sense of crisis that applies, as contended by Weiler, not only to the “new layer” 
(regulation), but also to the previous ones (transactionalism and community). (2004, 561) 
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The meaning of accountability, however, cannot be taken for granted. 
Common usages denote quite distinct concepts and intend to apply to very diverse 
contexts. Quite often, moreover, the term becomes hostage to strategic rhetorical 
trends. For this very reason, this thesis has dedicated its first chapter to a preliminary 
conceptual work that attempted to delimit what political accountability means. Its 
second chapter, in turn, has offered a systematisation of what desirable political 
accountability minimally entails according to some of the most influential legitimacy 
discourses and normative manifestos. 
The concept of accountability here stipulated was a minimalist one, that is, 
comprehensive enough to grasp different sorts of power relations. I did not claim this 
was the one and only right definition of the term, but it nonetheless illuminates 
accountability facets of a broader spectrum of transnational institutions than a 
maximalist concept would otherwise do. As chapter 1 has demonstrated, that 
stipulated concept somewhat strays from the more commonsensical usages of the 
term, but it resonates with the approach adopted by a significant literature upon which 
I draw.938  
The more minimalist the definition, again, the larger its denotative range 
naturally becomes. At the transnational level, to avoid “overloading the definition of 
accountability”939 may be cognitively productive to perceive more nuanced 
interactions that shape accountability relationships, no matter how attractive they may 
be from the normative point of view.  
To be sure, one cannot overlook or underrate other fundamental distinctions, 
like the one between institutional and non-institutional forms of accountability, to 
produce a compelling analysis.940 The finer distinctions that an all-embracing 
definition occasionally fails to spot would then need to be developed through further 
qualifications. The descriptive coordinates of accountability, developed by chapter 1, 
have hopefully provided valid and powerful analytical angles to inform and flesh out 
those further qualifications. 
 
                                                 
938 Central in this literature are the arguments of Keohane, Mashaw and Philp. 
939 Philp maintains: “avoiding overloading the definition of accountability, should alert us to the 
multiple ways in which international organisations and their members are, in fact, accountable”. (2009, 
46) 
940 As Barros has insightfully argued: “it is important to draw out the difference between material and 
political constraints and institutional limits because references to the former may lead readers to 
erroneously think that limited authoritarianism is relatively unproblematic.” (2004, 27) 
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What is new? Conventional questions, transitional answers 
 
If one plans to go beyond description, as the political discourse and the 
literature in law and international relations have actually gone, how should one couch 
the demands for accountability? And what are the implications, if any, of the different 
ways through which the demands for accountability are couched? 
At the domestic level, the abstract answer to these questions is fairly 
consolidated and almost consensual. Constitutional democracy, however varied and 
controversial its practical translation might be from the normative and historical 
points of view, conveys an insuperable legitimating symbol for a state-based political 
community nowadays. 
At the global level, such a virtually unanimous normative response is hardly 
available. Chapter 2 has echoed an extensive literature in search for a new baseline of 
legitimacy in that sphere. This new baseline needs to grant feasibility considerations a 
relevant weight when devising proposals for institutional reforms. The prescription of 
an institutional design beyond the state involves different theoretical bets about what 
the plurality of transnational entities should look like (and about the likelihood, in the 
shorter or longer terms, of those cherished transformations to eventuate). 
The choice of the specific normative flag that will carry our most cherished 
normative ambitions is no gratuitous sloganeering. The labels are bound to traditions 
of legal thought and institutional experiences which constrain the plausibility and 
persuasiveness of uttering each signifier. 
The factual assumption about the “demise of the state-centric ‘Westphalian’ 
order”, as Krisch has phrased the phenomenon, triggers the normative question of 
how to “come to terms with the resulting new order.”941 The Global Administrative 
Law (GAL)  project offers one way to do that, however self-consciously limited such 
a way is. The GAL project tries to portray an accountability story from micro-
procedural features that moulds the “global administrative space” – the growing 
administrative dimension (quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial) of international 
regimes, as chapter 2 has explained in more detail. 
                                                 
941 Krisch, 2010, 245. Earlier, in a similar line, Rosenau had already claimed that there is a bifurcation 
between a “state-centric world” and a “multi-centric world”. (2001, 355) 
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If the overall goal of accountability is to promote “public responsible 
behavior”,942 the GAL project proposes to chase that goal through intra-institutional 
procedural devices writ small. This is crucial to understand, for some, the reputedly 
seductive feature of GAL project’s analytical framework: it provides transitional 
answers to more permanent questions. This inherent provisionality and non-
sufficiency signals a candidly stated incremental strategy for improving and 
legitimating the institutions of global governance.  
 
Between “pure instrumentality” and “normative modesty”: the limits of GAL 
 
The GAL programme consists in a step-by-step route for accountability-
building in institutions of global governance. As Krisch reminds, “proceeding in small 
steps, with limited ambition, may be the only sensible option”.943 The project itself, 
therefore, does not promise an overhaul legitimation of international institutions 
through that rather small set of procedural devices writ small. Its expectation has 
never been so ostentatious. 
A question remains, however, about the nature of GAL’s normative 
propositions. In other words, there is some disagreement about how neutral GAL’s 
normative propositions actually are or can consistenly be. MacDonald, for example, 
understands GAL as “purely instrumental”.944 Thanks to its fundamental ambivalence 
and versatility, GAL “can be flexed and adapted in thoroughly inappropriate – not to 
mention unethical – ways.”945 In the words of MacDonald and Shamir-Borer, GAL 
“can, for the most part, only be as ‘good’ as the ends it is intended to serve, be they 
constitutional, democratic, rights-based or, indeed, efficiency-enhancing.”946 In sum, 
GAL can be “harnessed to any end”.947 
GAL project would be basically oriented towards due process, something that 
Mashaw, when elaborating on the relationship between administrative law and 
institutional design, defined as a “straightforward, instrumentally rational, quasi-
                                                 
942 Mashaw, 2006, 123 
943 Krisch, 2010, 265. 
944 MacDonald claims: “Global administrative law, unlike global constitutionalism, functions as pure 
instrumentality.” (2008, 24) 
945 MacDonald and Shamir Borer, 2008, 55 
946 MacDonald and Shamir-Borer, 2008, 53. 
947 MacDonald, 2008, 25. 
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engineering process”,948 a tool that attempts to mould behaviour in the direction of 
our normative commitments whatever they may be. The goals, therefore, would 
remain external to the GAL project itself: rather than constitutive of the project, the 
goals would be contingent features to which procedural tools might be attached. 
For GAL advocates, democracy is perhaps too strong a word through which to 
judge the institutions that populate the international arena. Accountability would 
sound as a more achievable target in the current stage of international relations. It 
would be a second-best option for better governance while the first-best remains 
untenable and counter-productive in the foreseeable future. 
However, once we recognize that the claim for accountability, per se, is 
normatively empty, as chapter 1 has strived to contend, is there any political ideal 
sneaking behind GAL project’s proposals? Can it really be just about a thin and 
managerial idea of efficient and responsive administration? Can it retain any appeal if 
so radically conceived as pure instrumentality? 
MacDonald and Shamir-Borer have hinted at a tentative answer: “it would be 
naïve and misleading to suggest that global administrative law does not presuppose 
some values of its own: the desirability of accountability, participation, transparency, 
even the rule of law itself – these are all normative questions, the answer to which is 
simply assumed within the global administrative law project.”949 
They seem to suggest that GAL is either something more than sheer 
instrumentality, or there would be no good reason to embrace its cause, however 
pragmatically modest this cause might be.950 One would not be able to argue, 
therefore, for the superiority of one form of accountability over another regardless 
from a normative theory. And in order to take a stand on what GAL is being used for, 
we need some substantive value to come on board. Vindicating a value of such kind is 
a condition to keep the normative appeal of the whole project. 
If pressed to justify, then, GAL proponents can’t help but excavate deeper 
normative premises. Apodictic statements about the desirability of participation, 
transparency or reason-giving will not do, for they cannot be self-standing by 
justificatory fiat. GAL project, thus, would better disclose its normative alliances and 
speak out. It cannot ignore larger ideals, however controversial it is to define them 
                                                 
948 Mashaw, 2006, 152. 
949 MacDonald and Shamir-Borer, 2008, 53. See also Krisch (2006). 
950 For the idea of “pragmatic modesty”, see Krisch (2010). 
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and, at the same time, to identify what the next institutional step should be within a 
gradualist strategy of procedural reform. Otherwise, it remains a manipulable and 
hence unreliable cause to be endorsed. That does not entail losing the virtues of 
modesty and incrementality. In order to judge whether an institution deserves any 
political energy, that line between ultimate aims and recipe for immediate action 
should be drawn somewhere. 
Pursuing normative modesty, therefore, does not need to go as far as to make 
GAL ‘purely instrumental’. That would probably weaken rather than strengthen the 
whole project. A more convincing reading of the GAL project may see it as an 
attempt to carve common ground from the bottom-up and to agree on a normative 
level-playing field from where to assess and criticise currently existing decision-
making processes and structures. 
 
Tailoring fit-for-purpose accountability arrangements: the three works-in-progress 
of the Climate Change Regime 
 
This thesis has chosen three particular transnational bodies within the Climate 
Change Regime in order to describe and probe their accountability structures. My 
exercise was informed by the analytical framework assembled by chapters 1 and 2. 
The reason for choosing the three bodies was the very distinct yet indispensable roles 
they play within such a regime: structuring the science-policy dialogue without 
compromising the integrity of the former (IPCC); facilitating compliance of 
developed countries with emissions targets established by the Kyoto Protocol 
(CCKP); incentivising financial cooperation between developed and developing 
countries for the construction of climate-friendly projects (CDM). 
Holding each of these bodies to account, one might expect, would require 
tailor-made accountability structures according to the respective purpose of the 
institution. And, as a matter of fact, the analysis has unsurprisingly shown that each of 
the three bodies is accountable in a specific way. I did not intend, for sure, to recycle 
the relevant but unremarkable claim according to which international institutions are 
inevitably accountable one way or another.951 
                                                 
951 Krisch, 2010, 259-260. 
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Procedural peculiarities aside, however, the ethos of procedural reforms 
recommended to or actually undertaken by the three bodies over the last years have 
been oriented towards strikingly similar goals. As chapters 4, 5 and 6 depict, reforms 
have all been permeated by, among other things, convergent expectations of 
transparency, public justification, participation, representation and revisability. Such 
principles have become, moreover, official rhetoric of a large variety of transnational 
bodies. 
Approaching GAL as a mere reverberation of commonplace fashionable 
principles, however, would be unfairly reductionist. The GAL project should not be 
conceived as a free-floating list of accountability-enhancing devices that guide a 
mechanical box-ticking test. It checks, instead, the extent to which there is an 
intramural manifestation of those well-regarded and deep procedural values. It 
removes internal procedures from the comfortable zone of invisibility, where 
powerful interests may rule without much constraint or embarrassment. 
The three bodies very much remain as institutional works-in-progress that 
have been reacting to a common trend of external pressure. Its internal reforms were 
more or less distinctive instantiations of that same set of procedural principles. The 
three bodies do fairly meet, in sum, the normative recommendations of the GAL 
project. But what sort of achievement is that, if at all? 
The GAL project, indeed, does not go as far as to question the very point of 
each institution itself, or how it fits the fragmented power network of global 
governance and international relations. The GAL project rather invites, first and 
foremost, institutional introspection. Therefore, the contextualised question of 
whether these specific models of accountability are appropriate and sufficient, which 
this thesis has tentatively raised at last, cannot fully be answered by resorting to the 
GAL framework. 
Why, then, resort to the GAL framework for examining the accountability 
structures of the three institutions? There are two important considerations that help 
answering this question. First, despite its limited reach, the GAL framework is able to 
capture one crucial dimension of legitimate accountability of transnational institutions 
in general, and also essential for climate change bodies in particular: its procedural 
lenses, specially the demands for participation and representation, can already 
diagnose and criticise the occasional mismatch between, on the one hand, the 
decision-makers, and, on the other, the decision-takers or affected communities 
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generally conceived.952 The “problem of disregard”, as explained by Stewart, is part 
of the GAL’s agenda.953 
Second, the GAL framework was not the single analytical resource of this 
thesis. It was actually preceded by a complementary framework that attempted to cast 
light on the interconnected functions of accountability that undergird each procedural 
archetype and the tensions or inevitable trade-offs that pervade the task of 
institutional design. 
The thesis has scrutinised particular institutions that have not yet been 
thoroughly considered by the literature in international environmental law. It was an 
intra-sectoral investigation rather than an inter-sectoral comparison. But apart from 
that, it has also attempted to make a conceptual contribution to the ways of thinking 
about accountability. Distinguishing the descriptive from the normative question, and, 
additionally, identifying the several levels in which the normative question itself can 
be raised, is a decisive methodological premise for any research of this sort. 
A full test of appropriateness, or an exact detection of what the pending 
challenges to these three accountability experiences are, would certainly involve a far 
more ambitious inquiry than the one I was able to take up. However, checking the 
relationship between the general institutional purpose, the expected accountability 
functions and their translation through procedural devices is an enlightening starting 
point. This supplement, I believe, can aid the conclusions so far reached by the 
already numerous ‘case-studies branch’ of the GAL project’s literature (as opposed to 
the ‘foundational’ or ‘conceptual and taxonomical’ branch).954 Therefore, rather than 
a celebratory or apologetic account of the GAL project, the thesis has tried to identify 
what type of insights may spring from it. 
 
 
                                                 
952 Keohane and Grant (2005) have called it the “external” or participation dimension of accountability 
in transnational institutions, as opposed to the “internal” or delegation dimension. 
953 Stewart (2011). 
954 According to Kingsbury and Stewart, “more than 100 papers mapping and analyzing these 
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